This is a solid and broadly well argued revisionist account of the Battle of Culloden (1745) and its cultural significance. As much if not more attention is given to the meaning of the event as to what actually happened and why.
It has two faults. In trying to keep to the pagination of the series, Pittock often fails to explain himself on the facts, leaving the general reader sometimes puzzled, in order to concentrate on what appears to be his hobby horse - the use and misuse of the battle by ideologues of all stripes.
The second fault is that the maps are very poor indeed to the point of being useless, An account of any battle requires good visual aids that mark out clearly who was involved and what they did - if the text is not to be nigh on incomprehensible. This fault may be put down to editorial laziness.
The battle itself took only an hour. Pittock explains what happened well enough. In essence, two much more matched armies than legend has it met on ground and terms less attractive to the Jacobites and these were ouflanked by British cavalry.
It is a case where it was possible that the Jacobites might have won but, all in all, unlikely. Their ability to carry on a war was already strategically lost in any case because of errors made by a team of somewhat divided leaders who did not back their chancer Prince at the moment of truth.
Pittock uses battlefield archaeological evidence and much improved historical research in recent years to make mincemeat of the fantasies of British apologists and Scottish nationalists alike of savage but noble tribespeople crushed by overwhelmingly superior modernity.
There are times when you get a sense of Pittock being quite angry at the failure to understand what was actually going on here, to the point where occasionally he can hover on the edge of being tiresome about it. Historiographical contestation is generally less interesting than the facts.
The book should be read only half as the story of the battle with half as a disquisition on memory (a very few pages of academic obscurity here) and on cultural belief and ideological manipulation. It was quite pleasing to see the estimable Foucault quoted at least once.
The take-away from the book is valuable. Rewriting history - any history - to serve contemporary purposes is magical stuff, interesting in its own right but not the story of what actually happened and why. Culloden can be presented as a type case in magical historiography.
Two eighteenth century armies operating within the context of clashing larger scale proto-imperial dynastic states struggled to control through force majeure the destiny of an otherwise potentially viable smaller nation, Scotland. This greater struggle is what matters here in terms of outcome.
The tragedy of Scotland was that it simply did not have the resources, organisational or financial, to sustain itself against a rival nation which was involved in its own existential struggle for survival and at a global level. Ireland was in a far worse state to do so.
The 1745 rebellion might best - my view not Pittock's - be seen as the last act in a complex struggle between nations and religions that started somewhere back in the distant past, not 1640 but with the Protestant Reformation and some might say with Edward I.
What it was not was a struggle between barbarian Highlanders and Whig modernisers. Even if Scots were divided amongst themselves, with many prepared to back the Hanoverians (so long as they were winning at least), Pittock is persuasive that the Jacobite army was a Scottish army.
What we are seeing are just different visions of what Scotland should be. There would be country English Tories who would have had the Stewart vision just as there were Edinburgh and Lothian interests already tied to the financial system centred on London.
This Scottish army, with scarcely any English Jacobite support of consequence in the event, contained Irish elements and was backed by the French (which rather justified English engagement). It faced something recognisably British rather than English, a true imperial force.
Once defeated, the British engaged in undoubted atrocities (though one suspects Pittock might err a little in favour of the victims here when there is some gap in the data) and were an occupation force for some considerable time.
One senses modern liberal Scottish outrage at British actions - an outrage shared by many Englishman at the time as news came through - but he cannot have his cake and eat it. This was early modern warfare in the boondocks and some ethnic cleansing was going to be likely.
Being English, the English came to take Butcher Cumberland to task for this, ruined his reputation eventually through silence and contempt as much as protest and then did what the English always do well when they are discomfitted by the sight of the sausages being made - moved on.
Pittock does an excellent job of taking us through the false construction of meanings around Culloden, especially the attempt to class the Jacobites not as simply the weaker professional army of the period but as some sort of analogue of the Pathan or Algonquian.
The twists and turns of false meaning are fascinating but I, for one, will never take Peter Watkins' film 'Culloden' (1964) seriously again and I will be constructively cautious as the National Trust of Scotland attempts with difficulty to keep ahead of fast-moving scholarship.
Where does this lead us? Pillock is persuasive that a simple tale of barbarism versus modernity and of inevitability is absurd. It was quite possible if unlikely that the chancer Charles Edward might have created a very different sort of United Kingdom. Some might still regret this.
However, he did not. Counter-factuals are absurd. Despite a tendency to argue this away somewhat, the British won for a reason. They would eventually have won (assuming Charles Edward did not seize and hold London) even if they had been defeated at Culloden.
The British were simply (ultimately) financially, materially, in morale terms, organisationally and culturally ahead of the game by the 1740s. They were probably always ahead of the game. Invasion from Europe was the real threat and the Celtic zones offered a war on two fronts.
If Cumberland was brutal - unjustifiable from a humanitarian point of view - this had its logic in the need to crush military resistance in Scotland to ensure the transfer of troops back to Europe in order to maintain the alliance against France, the real invasion threat.
The crushing of the '45 at Culloden and the occupation by the British (not the English but a militarised ruling caste linked to trade finance) might be said to have enabled the end of the early modern period and the construction of empire.
Nothing happens clearly on set dates. Empire certainly was a process emerging out of dynasticism that centred itself on trade and piracy only in the Elizabethan era and Ireland was never quite tamed but Culloden can be argued to be the cusp of the change.
Pittock certainly argues for the centrality of the battle as a pivotal point in world history and I think he is persuasive. Mid-eighteenth century Americans, for example, seized on the victory as a very good thing indeed for them and for their aspirations to be protected from the French.
What is left in the air is how the facts affect the current national question. The British are probably at the end of their tether now as an imperial power but clearly sentiment in England and outside the cities is still for a unified Kingdom outside European entanglements.
We have to remember that the British elite were not unhappy to be ruled by a Dutchman or a German so long as such dynasts could guarantee their rights and privileges. The Scottish elite in the Lowlands too struggled to swing the 1707 Act of Union in their own class interest.
It is the rights and privileges of the elite that matter. Brexit was a shock because our elite had recast itself into Europeanism because Europeanism protected its rights and privileges. In many ways Brexit was a revolt of the English. Culloden simply does not matter today in this English context.
However, in Scotland it clearly does matter not only in its absurd mythic quality but perhaps also in this revisionist version of Pittock's. Pittock is offering a model in which Scotland tried and failed to overturn the 1707 decision by armed force. It was the Scottish equivalent of Brexit and failed.
The primary nationalist narrative is that Scotland can be free within the EU - which is really just substituting the British with the Europeans. The British nationalist story is a vague mystical idea centred on the Crown and the military little different from the eightenth century model.
It could be argued that Scotland can be 'free' and sustain itself without the EU or it could be argued conversely that the English, Scots and Irish could be jointly and severally free of the old imperial elites and become associates in a new form of 'Britishness' outside the alien European Union.
The story of Culloden in the future is thus ambiguous because it can be a story of the restoration of Scotland as a nation yet might also raise questions about the imperial project's usefulness now and the potential for rethinking the 'United Kingdom' altogether.
Whatever the answer, despite this sterling work of Pittock, we can be sure of one thing - the myth-making and false claims around Culloden and its meaning will continue because ideologues will steal anything to hand in order to present their case.