Major General Julian Thompson first wrote No Picnic when the momentous events of April – June 1982 were fresh in his mind. As Commander of 3 Commando Brigade, he was at the heart of the planning and conduct of the War. Under his direct command had been the Royal Marine Commandos and the two battalions of the Parachute Regiment who conducted the lion’s share of the fighting.
No-one therefore is better qualified to tell the extraordinary story of there-taking of the Falkland Islands from the Argentinians. The author, now a celebrated military historian, has revised his early book and added for this 25 Anniversary edition more of his own personal thoughts and impressions.
It is all too easy to overlook just how perilous and risky a venture this expedition to the depths of the Southern Hemisphere was. Victory and defeat hung in the balance. Even those who feel they know about this most remarkable of wars will learn more from reading this classic account.
Major General Julian Harold Atherdean Thompson, CB, OBE is a military historian and former Royal Marines officer who as a brigadier commanded 3 Commando Brigade during the Falklands war.
Thompson, who was British commander on the islands during the final phase of the conflict has written extensively on the Falklands conflict and British military history. He is also a visiting professor at the department of War Studies, King's College, University of London.
This is a really great book for the Military History reader of every stripe, for Julian Thompson is the quintessential professional soldier, and when he takes you along with him as he figures out the Logistical, Tactical, Strategic and even Political puzzle that was the re-conquest of the Falkland Islands, you feel like you are taking a staff college master class. You are with his forward tactical HQ when they learn their Helicopter transport has been almost totally destroyed by Argentinian Skyhawks in the Atlantic Conveyer disaster- and their original plans go up in smoke as well. Denied the ability to move his five battalions (Three Marine Commandos and two Para Regiments) in large batches - the battles will become long approach walks (Yomps or tabs in the squaddy slang) by night, laying up in hides during the day to avoid Argentinian Reconnaissance, moving artillery and Anti Aircraft Missiles and their ammo by his few Helos, and then making assaults on key strong points defending Port Stanley the Capital, by night as well. The assaults- usually on Argentinian hill top entrenchments or observation posts were also made more challenging, without the Helo's ability to insert troops on the flanks or rear of the enemy. Platoons, Companies, Troops and Squads had to walk to their kick-off lines- and then do any infiltration on foot as well. Further complication came from the Argentinians' possession of some American Made night vision gear- whilst the Commandos were expert in lightless warfare at night- relying on training and instincts to own the night rather than technology. The barriers all look very daunting at first, especially to a British Military without the resources to just send out 20 more Helos- like the American would do... I found the narrative gripping from start to finish.
This is a book about the skill , professionalism and focus of a group of Soldiers at the very ends of the earth- the South Atlantic Falklands are thousands of miles from the UK - using the tools and weapons they do have, Arctic Tracked Vehicles, ASW Helos, Milan AT Missiles, Artillery Batteries from both the Marines and RA and 4 light tanks of the Blues and Royals regiment - to confuse and engulf each Argentinian post in detail. With the arrival of the Army's 5th Brigade, the punches can be thrown at several target in a single night- pressure that cracks the enemies will. The reader, at Thompson's side for the whole progression, is privy to the fact that 3 Commando Brigade's Logistical Unit- was still feeding and supplying BOTH Brigades for the last offensive, an amazing feat- and proof of the coping ability of a NATO Military. All throughout the book there are bit and pieces of information I had not known, in particular that while the Argentinians did not use their Helos and Pucara attack Aircraft much- and many were destroyed by the Brits, both in the air and on the ground, they did fly a few very dangerous attacks on British Communication Helos and HQs or logistical supply dumps. and were a real worry. I really felt I was getting the real scoop from the guy who made it all go- a good feeling when you read a book.
This book has some adult themes, some politics and a little bit of frank injury and combat description that make it best for the Junior Reader over about 12/13 years. For the Gamer/Modeler/Military Enthusiast, this is pure gold. I think. The Gamer gets maps and diagrams of Company and Battalion size engagements for British infantry, a popular force to game in Team Yankee/Bolt Action Modern/BattleGroup Modern/Red Storm Rising, often showing where and how to place Mortars, HMGs, and Milan Missile teams to support your assaults. The Modeler gets a lot of interesting ideas for builds and dioramas, some from the good b/w photo section. The Military Enthusiast is the biggest winner, as one does not always get one of the key commanders in a War- writing a war memoir so close to the events themselves, only three years after. Team Yankee players in particular will appreciate a book written in 1985, the exact year their fictional conflagration kicks off. I think all sorts of readers will appreciate a book written seemingly in the midst of one of the most compelling events of the 1980s. For Falklands War readers, this is part of the canon for sure.
Published in 1985, 'No Picnic' is a personal account by the Commander of 3 Commando Brigade during the Falklands War of 1982. As such, this account gives an excellent operational perspective on the land warfare element of the campaign and, whilst a little dry in places, makes an interesting read.
I read Major General Julian Thompson's 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands: No Picnic after reading Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle of San Carlos Water by Commodore Michael Clapp. The two books are excellent complements to each other. Just as Clapp telld the story of the Falklands campaign from the amphibious commander's perspective, Thompson tells the story from the perspective of the land forces commander then as a brigade commander under General Jeremy Moore. No Picnic, however, is a much easier read and feels less like a rebuttal and more like a history of the campaign.
I would not suggest this book as a first read on the Falklands War; this book does seem to assume some prior knowledge. You would be better served by reading a general history of the war first so you have some general knowledge of the war. This is not a self absorbed account of the war meant to bring glory and attention to the commander; Thompson spreads accolades and credit among his subordinates and the units under his command. Likewise, he doesn't blame other component commanders, supporting decisions that both Admiral Woodward and Commodore Clapp had to make. He goes into the doctrine and tactics behind decisions made, getting the reader inside the mind of the commander. He dwells on logistical, geographic, and climate issues that played into decision making. In this updated edition, Thompson also has the opportunity to look back with some hindsight and offers more thoughts and insights on the battles and decision making.
While No Picnic covers some of the same ground as Amphibious Assault Falklands, it is a much easier read because it engages readers and isn't nearly as dry. After reading a general history of the Falklands War and getting a good idea of how the war came to be and an idea of what happened I would strongly recommend reading No Picnic to get inside the commander's head and better understand how and why things happened the way they did.
An interesting book, especially about the early planning, preparation and ramping up of forces.
The battle itself, especially the last push toward Port Stanley, is really suffering from a lack of proper terrain representation, so the proper way to read it is with an accurate Order of Battle nearby (which the book does provide in annex), and a good map of the East Falklands. A good read of this little known but highly relevant conflict from a Cold War military study standing point.
This is a good book. Like many of its sort it is not a great book but a quite good book, well worth reading by anybody interested in the Falkland War, or 3 Commando Brigade’s role. It is undoubtedly true, factual and comprehensive. The author is the Brigade Commander of 3 Commando. He reported directly to Commander Land Forces throughout the Falkland War in 1982. His skill, discipline and determination ensured the allies re-took the Falklands as rapidly as possible with minimal casualties. By 1983 he had been promoted to Major-General.
Of course, the book is wholly concerned with actions of 3 Commando. The author does a good job of identifying the intelligence the Brigade staff had available when planning the various battles. He also mentions where intelligence erred, after each battle was complete. The naval and air situation and battles were mentioned only when their results would directly impact his unit’s planning or actions. To be fair to the reader, he could have spent a couple of paragraphs to clarify the naval and air situation. The general plan was to allow British ships (including freighters) and aircraft within Argentina’s Falklands Exclusion Zone only from first light to dark unless there is s specific need for a specific ship or aircraft.
While the military at hand were allowed considerable freedom of action. Control at the strategic level was provided by a London based committee of senior military and civilian members by daily updates and discussions. The author frets a couple of times about British media identifying detailed locations or proposed plans. The author used these as opportunities to lambaste the senior committee to manage its security better. What he did not discuss was why there were so many unexpected Argentines in certain locations or why the British air effort seemed so thin to the ground forces, or even why the navy seemed thin where his unit was fighting. All these issues have a rationale: good or bad. It would be very interesting to the reader to know, at least at a high level, what the rationale was.
Decisions impacting the equipment or capability of the Brigade, were explained at length: mobility, attire including boots, weapons, communications etc. Footwear was an issue that was discussed two or three times. Given the temperatures and what the army knew about the terrain, the army decided to dress the Brigade in winter boots. The problem was that the troops had to debark into water and then walk to almost every location they were sent. Most of the surface of the islands is peat. That peat was always wet, often deeper than the boots and sometimes shallow lakes under the surface level of peat grass. The troops often went a week before they could warm or dry their feet thoroughly. This caused casualties, some serious enough to be medevac’d. An editor could have helped as the author could not resist the use of acronyms. They were all defined at the beginning however some were used infrequently or totally missing. I find this merely painful. Acronyms can simplify when used frequently in speech, but they are not helpful when used only occasionally and in writing. if the book is planned for sale to a wider audience, the text should be easily read throughout.
This is a good book. It provides an honest story of these soldiers in this war. It provides a realistic and detailed description of small unit battle in this terrain and demonstrates several examples of excellent leadership by NCOs, junior officers and middle officers up to Battalion and Brigade level. Four stars.
An excellent book that talk about the first person experience, problems between the different forces on the ground and high historical value to understand the war. Personally I can not ignore that the battle of Mount Tumbledown its totally aboided if you remember that the troops who participated during this battle stayed under his command and was one of the most furius battles in the conflict.
This was an excellent book which provided me with a whole new perspective on events which I had read about in several broader histories of the Falklands War. Necessarily focused on the Commando Brigade, this nevertheless covers many of the key engagements and doesn’t dwell at all on the political events surrounding the conflict. I would have liked the book to be longer!
Este libro cuenta la versión de la fuerza de desembarco británicas durante el conflicto de Falkland,desde la perspectiva de quien fuese la mayor parte del tiempo y en los momentos más complejos su Comandante Brigadier Julian Thompson (RMC).El libro cuenta la vertiginosa puesta en marcha de la TF en demanda de su objetivo a más de 12.000 kilómetros, donde el desconocimiento del área era generalizado.La fuerza no tuvo tiempo de ensayo, no habían medios navales suficientes para apoyarla (se recurrió a mercantes) y la logística hacia muy frágil el sostenimiento de la operación. Todo lo anterior , incluyendo la resistencia Argentina, mitigado por fuerzas altamente entrenadas , que si bien no preveían un conflicto en el Atlántico sur , su constante entrenamiento , incluyendo campañas de ejercicio en Noruega, les permitieron sobreponerse a la resistencia argentina. La pérdida de gran parte de los HH,tendió a una campaña mayoritariamente pedestre.
Problemas en la relación de mando dentro la TF, sin un Deputy que coordinará las fuerzas, y su CO en UK, generaron instancias de fricción.
Se destaca como gran opositor la aviación Argentina, si la prioridad de ataque hubiese sido sobre la LF durante el desembarco y consolidación de la HB, probablemente sería otra historia.
A personal history of the Falkland Islands conflict from the commander of the English forces there. I enjoyed this book well enough, but the author assumes familiarity with the conflict; I strongly recommend reading something like The Battle for the Falklands first or you'll be totally lost. This book is much shorter than that one, and I might recommend reading this one right after it as a nice little chaser.
The Falklands conflict from the overview of a Brigade leader. No first hand battle accounts, this man had to manage the expectations of a government and nation 8000 miles from the front. The fear of losing before his troops were ashore and what to expect from an enemy who had weeks to dig in and prepare. He credits the officers and men after each battle, also for their endurance and sightedness over the terrain and weather.
An excellent military book written from inside the scene. Brig Gen Thompson develop a detailed, amazing and interesting description of the Falklands campaign from a Brigade commanders sight. The last edition shows the links between the operational level assets and orders, and tactical actions even until small units engagements. Highly recommendable to whose like reading modern military history.
An interesting read about a peculiar war, however, it starts and stops rather suddenly, leaving no room for an after-action report of personal observations. That is rather surprising and dissapointing.
I enjoyed this book because it gave a good illustration of how command structure functions during combat conditions. The Argentinians had superior air support plus plenty of artillery at their command but poor recconaisance and inferior fire discipline resulted in a resounding defeat.