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Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order
One of The New York Times’ “6 Books to Read for Context on Ukraine”
“A short and insightful primer” to the crisis in Ukraine and its implications for both the Crimean Peninsula and Russia’s relations with the West ( New York Review of Books )
The current conflict in Ukraine has spawned the most serious crisis between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War. It has undermined European security, raised questions about NATO's future, and put an end to one of the most ambitious projects of U.S. foreign policy—building a partnership with Russia. It also threatens to undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts on issues ranging from terrorism to nuclear proliferation. And in the absence of direct negotiations, each side is betting that political and economic pressure will force the other to blink first. Caught in this dangerous game of chicken, the West cannot afford to lose sight of the importance of stable relations with Russia.
This book puts the conflict in historical perspective by examining the evolution of the crisis and assessing its implications both for the Crimean Peninsula and for Russia’s relations with the West more generally. Experts in the international relations of post-Soviet states, political scientists Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer clearly show what is at stake in Ukraine, explaining the key economic, political, and security challenges and prospects for overcoming them. They also discuss historical precedents, sketch likely outcomes, and propose policies for safeguarding U.S.-Russia relations in the future. In doing so, they provide a comprehensive and accessible study of a conflict whose consequences will be felt for many years to come.
“A short and insightful primer” to the crisis in Ukraine and its implications for both the Crimean Peninsula and Russia’s relations with the West ( New York Review of Books )
The current conflict in Ukraine has spawned the most serious crisis between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War. It has undermined European security, raised questions about NATO's future, and put an end to one of the most ambitious projects of U.S. foreign policy—building a partnership with Russia. It also threatens to undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts on issues ranging from terrorism to nuclear proliferation. And in the absence of direct negotiations, each side is betting that political and economic pressure will force the other to blink first. Caught in this dangerous game of chicken, the West cannot afford to lose sight of the importance of stable relations with Russia.
This book puts the conflict in historical perspective by examining the evolution of the crisis and assessing its implications both for the Crimean Peninsula and for Russia’s relations with the West more generally. Experts in the international relations of post-Soviet states, political scientists Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer clearly show what is at stake in Ukraine, explaining the key economic, political, and security challenges and prospects for overcoming them. They also discuss historical precedents, sketch likely outcomes, and propose policies for safeguarding U.S.-Russia relations in the future. In doing so, they provide a comprehensive and accessible study of a conflict whose consequences will be felt for many years to come.
245 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 16, 2015
39 people are currently reading
365 people want to read
About the author
Rajan Menon
16 books5 followersRajan Menon holds the Anne and Bernard Spitzer Chair in Political Science at the City College of New York/City University of New York and is a Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University and a Global Ethics Fellow at the Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs.
Previously he was the Monroe J. Rathbone Professor and Chairman in the Department of International Relations at Lehigh University. He has been a Fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington, DC, an Academic Fellow and Senior Adviser at the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Director for Eurasia Policy Studies at the Seattle-based National Bureau for Asian Research (NBR). He has taught at Columbia University and Vanderbilt University and served as Special Assistant for Arms Control and National Security to Congressman Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY), while an International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, of which he is a member. His current work concerns American foreign and national security policy, international security, globalization, and the international relations of Asia and Russia and the other post-Soviet states.
Menon was awarded the Ellen Gregg Ingalls Award for Excellence in Classroom Teaching (at Vanderbilt University) and the Eleanor and Joseph F. Libsch Award for Distinguished Research and the Christian R. and Mary F. Lindback Award for Distinguished Teaching (at Lehigh University). He was selected as a Carnegie Scholar (2002-2003) and has also received fellowships and grants from the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Rockefeller Foundation, the John D and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the US Institute of Peace. Menon has written more than 50 opinion pieces and essays for the Los Angeles Times, Newsweek, Financial Times, International Herald Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, Newsday, Chicago Tribune, Boston Globe, and Washingtonpost.com. He has appeared as a commentator on National Public Radio, ABC, CNN, BBC, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, and World Focus (PBS).
(from https://www.ccny.cuny.edu/profiles/ra...)
Previously he was the Monroe J. Rathbone Professor and Chairman in the Department of International Relations at Lehigh University. He has been a Fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington, DC, an Academic Fellow and Senior Adviser at the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Director for Eurasia Policy Studies at the Seattle-based National Bureau for Asian Research (NBR). He has taught at Columbia University and Vanderbilt University and served as Special Assistant for Arms Control and National Security to Congressman Stephen J. Solarz (D-NY), while an International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, of which he is a member. His current work concerns American foreign and national security policy, international security, globalization, and the international relations of Asia and Russia and the other post-Soviet states.
Menon was awarded the Ellen Gregg Ingalls Award for Excellence in Classroom Teaching (at Vanderbilt University) and the Eleanor and Joseph F. Libsch Award for Distinguished Research and the Christian R. and Mary F. Lindback Award for Distinguished Teaching (at Lehigh University). He was selected as a Carnegie Scholar (2002-2003) and has also received fellowships and grants from the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Rockefeller Foundation, the John D and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the US Institute of Peace. Menon has written more than 50 opinion pieces and essays for the Los Angeles Times, Newsweek, Financial Times, International Herald Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, Newsday, Chicago Tribune, Boston Globe, and Washingtonpost.com. He has appeared as a commentator on National Public Radio, ABC, CNN, BBC, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, and World Focus (PBS).
(from https://www.ccny.cuny.edu/profiles/ra...)
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Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews
November 25, 2022
This is a book about the events leading up to and including the Russian invasion of Crimea and the Donbas area in 2014 and doesn't cover the 2022 invasion of the rest of Ukraine.
The authors mention Zbigniew Brzezinski and his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard in which he stressed the importance of Ukraine as they key to Russia's future. With Ukraine, Brzezinski argued, Russia is destined to remain an empire; without it, it is not.
Contrary to an oft-repeated claim, Mikhail Gorbachev was not given a formal commitment that NATO wouldn't expand eastwards to countries bordering Russia. It's hard to imagine any Russian leader being phlegmatic about any former Warsaw Pact country or former Soviet Republic joining NATO.
Interestingly, when considering the aftermath of the 2014 invasions, the authors of this book considered the most likely outcome was a frozen conflict where Russia holds on to Crimea and the Donbas area and there's no resolution in sight. This was the case for almost eight years of course, but the authors didn't think at the time of writing the book that Russia would invade the rest of Ukraine because Russia would be reluctant to bear the economic and political costs an invasion would entail. Obviously that wasn't the case.
The problem has been that the entire post-Cold War European political and security architecture was built on the EU and NATO, neither of which included Russia. Europe and the USA hoped that Russia would eventually embrace a vision of Europe that was whole, free, and at peace with all its neighbours. There was no strategy about what to do if Russia didn't embrace this vision. This is the challenge that has been exacerbated by the 2022 war - how to create a strategy for dealing with Russia that is based on a deep and realistic understanding of Russia rather than relying on a hope that Russia will fall into line and behave in the way the West expects.
The authors mention Zbigniew Brzezinski and his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard in which he stressed the importance of Ukraine as they key to Russia's future. With Ukraine, Brzezinski argued, Russia is destined to remain an empire; without it, it is not.
Contrary to an oft-repeated claim, Mikhail Gorbachev was not given a formal commitment that NATO wouldn't expand eastwards to countries bordering Russia. It's hard to imagine any Russian leader being phlegmatic about any former Warsaw Pact country or former Soviet Republic joining NATO.
Interestingly, when considering the aftermath of the 2014 invasions, the authors of this book considered the most likely outcome was a frozen conflict where Russia holds on to Crimea and the Donbas area and there's no resolution in sight. This was the case for almost eight years of course, but the authors didn't think at the time of writing the book that Russia would invade the rest of Ukraine because Russia would be reluctant to bear the economic and political costs an invasion would entail. Obviously that wasn't the case.
The problem has been that the entire post-Cold War European political and security architecture was built on the EU and NATO, neither of which included Russia. Europe and the USA hoped that Russia would eventually embrace a vision of Europe that was whole, free, and at peace with all its neighbours. There was no strategy about what to do if Russia didn't embrace this vision. This is the challenge that has been exacerbated by the 2022 war - how to create a strategy for dealing with Russia that is based on a deep and realistic understanding of Russia rather than relying on a hope that Russia will fall into line and behave in the way the West expects.
March 12, 2019
Authors succinctly narrate the unfolding of events preceding the Russian-Ukrainian war. It is an unbiased book, which reads more like a chronology, dry at times, with comments explaining the impact and significance of the events.
Like prior reviewers have noted- it lacks the most important component for me- the impact of the war on Ukrainians themselves, as well as their stance throughout the conflict. It revolves too much on what the war means for the EU and the USA, forgetting Ukraine itself.
As a Ukrainian, I didn't learn anything new from this book. It will be a good summary for those completely unfamiliar with the Ukrainian-Russian war and Ukrainian history.
Like prior reviewers have noted- it lacks the most important component for me- the impact of the war on Ukrainians themselves, as well as their stance throughout the conflict. It revolves too much on what the war means for the EU and the USA, forgetting Ukraine itself.
As a Ukrainian, I didn't learn anything new from this book. It will be a good summary for those completely unfamiliar with the Ukrainian-Russian war and Ukrainian history.
October 22, 2018
Decent snapshot of what the landscape was like a few years ago, slightly dated, but still with surprising relevance in 2018. It's prediction about the situation in Eastern Ukraine becoming a "frozen conflict" appears to have held, and does a sober job of explaining how intertwined Russia and the EU are economically. As well, good discussion of some missed post-Cold War opportunities to bring Russia a little closer to "the West." Dry at times, but a quick overview of the many facets of this unfortunate situation. It read almost like the political brief a diplomat might read on their way to meet with someone. Quick and interesting.
September 22, 2016
This book had very little substance about the crisis and instead focused on the potential outcomes of the crisis for Ukraine's relations with various states. I was a bit disappointed in its lack of content.
June 23, 2022
This book covers the invasion of Russia of Crimea (as well as Eastern Ukraine) in 2014, the events that led up to and the implications for the role of the EU and NATO in Ukraine.
I found this interesting in light of Russia's current invasion of Ukraine, and how the international community responded to it. It would be interesting to read an updated edition of this book.
Lots and lots notes.
For me, this is just the start of delving more deeply into the history of Ukraine.
I found this interesting in light of Russia's current invasion of Ukraine, and how the international community responded to it. It would be interesting to read an updated edition of this book.
Lots and lots notes.
For me, this is just the start of delving more deeply into the history of Ukraine.
April 11, 2024
I wish all my students who wrote about Ukraine for their final essay had read (properly, and understood) this book…
The early chapters are great for anyone who wants to understand the relationship between Ukraine and Russia (in their various permutations).
The early chapters are great for anyone who wants to understand the relationship between Ukraine and Russia (in their various permutations).
February 8, 2024
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
И не склеить осколки,
И не вытравить мрак,
Видишь, как плодятся волки
Из бездомных собак.
Вставь башку в телевизор,
Протри кушетку до дыр,
Ты уже посмертно вписан в этот
Брошенный, брошенный, брошенный Богом мир.
Книга является коротким обзором политических событий, которые привели к кризису, а потом и к открытому военному противостоянию между Россией и Украиной, а также коротким обзором ситуации на международной арене в контексте российско-украинского конфликта и роли ЕС и США в нём. Можно сказать, что эта книга является очередным пересказом политических событий случившихся за несколько лет до событий 2014 на востоке Украины. С моей точки зрения, авторского взгляда в книге крайне мало, его анализ довольно поверхностен и в большей степени касается российско-европейских отношений. Каждая глава или тема выглядит так: полторы-две страницы на каждую тему. Это очень мало ибо даже посты в Facebook и то бывают зачастую длинней. Что касается Украины, то она, конечно, присутствует в книге, но не на первых ролях. В итоге можно сказать, что такие книги как Ukraine and the Art of Strategy, Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War, Putin's War on Ukraine: Russia's Campaign for Global Counter-Revolution и Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia являются альтернативами этой книге. Различия, конечно, есть, но они минимальные и касаются в основном российско-европейских отношений. Так же следует добавить, что, книга политически нейтральная (не предвзятая) и это явный плюс. Минусом же является сам текст – он скучен. Читатель должен быть очень сильно заинтересован в данной теме, чтобы осилить всю книгу. Хотя книга была издана в 2015 году, я всё же считаю, что некоторые моменты всё ещё актуальны для сегодняшнего дня. К примеру, разве можно сказать, что следующее заключение автора полностью потеряло актуальность в 2023?
In short, the EU had good reason, based on the Kremlin's words and deeds, to expect that Moscow would resist EaP initiatives that threatened to draw Ukraine away from Russia. But when the resistance became reality in 2014, Europe was largely helpless, just as it was in Georgia in 2008.
Можно ли заявить, что именно эта беспомощность Европы стала главным аргументом для начала полномасштабного военного конфликта в 2022 году? Думаю, да и как показывает книга, в Европе все осведомлены по поводу такой невнятной и откровенно слабой позиции ЕС. Возможно, именно этим и объяснялись многочисленные попытки европейских лидеров убедить Украину подписать Минские договорённости. Увы, но они не учли одного – изменившуюся с 2004 политику украинских элит в русско-украинском вопросе. Как я понимаю, в глазах украинских граждан, любой, кто бы подписал мирные договорённости, рассматривался в таком случаи как политический лидер, пошедший на попятную Москве, рассматривался бы как предатель украинских интересов, а возможно даже как коллаборационист. Поэтому Минские договорённости не могли быть имплементированы по идеологическим или даже мировоззренческим причинам. Почему ЕС в таком случаи не скоординировал политику в сторону полного отказа Украине во вступление НАТО или, в ином случаи, не начал готовится к противостоянию с Россией, если бы был выбран путь «войны», мне совершенно не понятен. То, что я вижу, это попытка сидеть на двух стульях при условии, что вся эта эпопея с оружие для Украины не является обманным манёвром.
Интересное наблюдение делает автор по поводу причин, почему для Путина было так важно, чтобы Янукович подписал торговое соглашение с Россией, а не ЕС. А ведь в Кремле видели, что это решение является крайне опасным и может вызвать волну недовольства (что и произошло), но почему-то был выбран вариант «рискнуть» и поэтому решили надавить на Януковича, чтобы тот подписал соглашение с Москвой. Очевидно, что дело заключалось не в экономике, а исключительно в политике, ну и надежде что Янукович сможет устоять и как-то подавить народные выступления. Так что можно сказать, что Кремль должен обвинять себя сам в том, что их главный и единственный союзник в Украине не устоял в 2014. Однако меня заинтересовало именно политическое объяснения важности подписания торгового соглашения с Россией. Почему-то раньше я на такое объяснение не обращал внимание, но именно в этой книге мне показалось оно очень интересным.
In Moscow's eyes, the AA would have accelerated this trend, making Ukraine less dependent on Russia for goods, technology, and capital, and increasing the role of Europe, which simply had more to offer as a market and a source of investment and technology than the Russian economy, whose mainstay is energy. The inevitable result would have been reduced Russian influence, and not just economic, in a critical neighboring country.
<…>
But ultimately his apprehensions were not limited to trade competition; they reflected Russia's concerns about a general loss of influence in its most strategically significant neighbor.
Добавим к этому, что строительство Северного потока – 2 было затеяно явно, чтобы шантажировать Украину отключением её как от транзита газа, так и от поставок газа в Украину как таковых. Данное соглашение могло бы использоваться как дополнительный рычаг. Тем не менее, что-то в этой версии кажется мне не убедительным. Ну, т.е. неужели без этого соглашения между Россией и Украиной не было бы никакой торговли? Думаю всё же, дело в символизме, т.е. в открытом переходе на сторону РФ. Торговля – вопрос второй, в данном контексте.
Последний абзац книги особенно актуален. Вот только из книги я так и не понял, что предлагает автор.
The Ukraine crisis is undoubtedly a pivotal event for Europe. But Ukraine is not the cause of the crisis. It is rather a symptom of an even larger problem for Europe. Europe's problem is with Russia, and its principal political, security, and economic challenges for the coming years will be to develop a new strategy for dealing with its giant neighbor. This strategy will have to be built on a realistic understanding of Russia rather than on what the West would like it to be and hopes it will one day become. It will remain a monumental task for the transatlantic community for years to come. Unless it is tackled with the ruthless realism and serious resources it deserves, stability and security in Europe will prove elusive.
The book is a short overview of the political events that led to the crisis and then to the open military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, as well as a short overview of the situation on the international scene in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the role of the EU and the US in it. One can say that this book is another retelling of the political events that took place a few years before the events of 2014 in eastern Ukraine. From my point of view, there is very little of the author's view in the book, and his analysis is rather superficial and mostly concerns Russian-European relations. Each chapter or topic looks like this: one and a half to two pages per topic. This is very little since even Facebook posts are often longer. As for Ukraine, it is certainly present in the book but not at the forefront. In sum, books such as "Ukraine and the Art of Strategy," "Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War," "Putin's War on Ukraine: Russia's Campaign for Global Counter-Revolution" and "Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia" are alternatives to this book. There are differences, of course, but they are minimal and mainly concern Russian-European relations. I should also add that the book is politically neutral (not biased), and that is a plus. The downside is the text itself - it is boring. The reader must be very interested in the subject in order to get through the whole book. Even though the book was published in 2015, I think some of the points are still relevant today. For example, can we say that the author's next conclusion is completely irrelevant in 2023?
In short, the EU had good reason, based on the Kremlin's words and deeds, to expect that Moscow would resist EaP initiatives that threatened to draw Ukraine away from Russia. But when the resistance became reality in 2014, Europe was largely helpless, just as it was in Georgia in 2008.
Can it be said that this very helplessness of Europe was the main argument for launching a full-scale military conflict in 2022? I think so, and as the book shows, everyone in Europe is aware of this inarticulate and frankly weak position of the EU. Perhaps this explains the numerous attempts of European leaders to persuade Ukraine to sign the Minsk agreements. Alas, they did not take into account one thing - the policy of Ukrainian elites in the Russian-Ukrainian issue that has changed since 2004. As I understand it, in the eyes of Ukrainian citizens, anyone who would sign the peace agreements would be seen as a political leader who backed down to Moscow, would be seen as a traitor to Ukrainian interests, and perhaps even as a collaborator. Therefore, the Minsk agreements could not be implemented for ideological or even for worldview reasons. Why the EU, in such a case, did not coordinate its policy in the direction of a complete refusal of Ukraine to join NATO or, otherwise, did not start preparing for a confrontation with Russia, if the path of "war" was chosen, is not clear to me at all. What I see is an attempt to sit on two chairs, provided that this whole epic with weapons for Ukraine is not a deceptive maneuver.
The author makes an interesting observation about the reasons why it was so important for Putin to have Yanukovych sign a trade agreement with Russia rather than the EU. The Kremlin saw that this decision was dangerous and could cause a wave of discontent (which is what happened), but, for some reason, it chose the "risk" option and, therefore, decided to pressure Yanukovych to sign the agreement with Moscow. Obviously, it was not about economics but purely about politics and the hope that Yanukovych would be able to resist and somehow suppress the popular uprisings. So, we can say that the Kremlin should blame itself for the fact that its main and only ally in Ukraine failed to hold out in 2014. However, I was interested in the political explanation of the importance of signing a trade agreement with Russia. For some reason, I had not paid attention to this explanation before, but I found it very interesting in this book.
In Moscow's eyes, the AA would have accelerated this trend, making Ukraine less dependent on Russia for goods, technology, and capital, and increasing the role of Europe, which simply had more to offer as a market and a source of investment and technology than the Russian economy, whose mainstay is energy. The inevitable result would have been reduced Russian influence, and not just economic, in a critical neighboring country.
<…>
But ultimately his apprehensions were not limited to trade competition; they reflected Russia's concerns about a general loss of influence in its most strategically significant neighbor.
To add to this, the construction of Nord Stream 2 was clearly intended to blackmail Ukraine by cutting it off from both gas transit and gas supplies. This agreement could be used as an additional lever. Nevertheless, something in this version does not seem convincing to me. Well, I mean, would there really be no trade between Russia and Ukraine without this agreement? I think it's all about symbolism, i.e., openly siding with the Russian Federation. Trade is the second issue in this context.
The last paragraph of the book is especially relevant. But I didn't understand from the book what the author was proposing.
The Ukraine crisis is undoubtedly a pivotal event for Europe. But Ukraine is not the cause of the crisis. It is rather a symptom of an even larger problem for Europe. Europe's problem is with Russia, and its principal political, security, and economic challenges for the coming years will be to develop a new strategy for dealing with its giant neighbor. This strategy will have to be built on a realistic understanding of Russia rather than on what the West would like it to be and hopes it will one day become. It will remain a monumental task for the transatlantic community for years to come. Unless it is tackled with the ruthless realism and serious resources it deserves, stability and security in Europe will prove elusive.
И не склеить осколки,
И не вытравить мрак,
Видишь, как плодятся волки
Из бездомных собак.
Вставь башку в телевизор,
Протри кушетку до дыр,
Ты уже посмертно вписан в этот
Брошенный, брошенный, брошенный Богом мир.
Книга является коротким обзором политических событий, которые привели к кризису, а потом и к открытому военному противостоянию между Россией и Украиной, а также коротким обзором ситуации на международной арене в контексте российско-украинского конфликта и роли ЕС и США в нём. Можно сказать, что эта книга является очередным пересказом политических событий случившихся за несколько лет до событий 2014 на востоке Украины. С моей точки зрения, авторского взгляда в книге крайне мало, его анализ довольно поверхностен и в большей степени касается российско-европейских отношений. Каждая глава или тема выглядит так: полторы-две страницы на каждую тему. Это очень мало ибо даже посты в Facebook и то бывают зачастую длинней. Что касается Украины, то она, конечно, присутствует в книге, но не на первых ролях. В итоге можно сказать, что такие книги как Ukraine and the Art of Strategy, Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War, Putin's War on Ukraine: Russia's Campaign for Global Counter-Revolution и Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia являются альтернативами этой книге. Различия, конечно, есть, но они минимальные и касаются в основном российско-европейских отношений. Так же следует добавить, что, книга политически нейтральная (не предвзятая) и это явный плюс. Минусом же является сам текст – он скучен. Читатель должен быть очень сильно заинтересован в данной теме, чтобы осилить всю книгу. Хотя книга была издана в 2015 году, я всё же считаю, что некоторые моменты всё ещё актуальны для сегодняшнего дня. К примеру, разве можно сказать, что следующее заключение автора полностью потеряло актуальность в 2023?
In short, the EU had good reason, based on the Kremlin's words and deeds, to expect that Moscow would resist EaP initiatives that threatened to draw Ukraine away from Russia. But when the resistance became reality in 2014, Europe was largely helpless, just as it was in Georgia in 2008.
Можно ли заявить, что именно эта беспомощность Европы стала главным аргументом для начала полномасштабного военного конфликта в 2022 году? Думаю, да и как показывает книга, в Европе все осведомлены по поводу такой невнятной и откровенно слабой позиции ЕС. Возможно, именно этим и объяснялись многочисленные попытки европейских лидеров убедить Украину подписать Минские договорённости. Увы, но они не учли одного – изменившуюся с 2004 политику украинских элит в русско-украинском вопросе. Как я понимаю, в глазах украинских граждан, любой, кто бы подписал мирные договорённости, рассматривался в таком случаи как политический лидер, пошедший на попятную Москве, рассматривался бы как предатель украинских интересов, а возможно даже как коллаборационист. Поэтому Минские договорённости не могли быть имплементированы по идеологическим или даже мировоззренческим причинам. Почему ЕС в таком случаи не скоординировал политику в сторону полного отказа Украине во вступление НАТО или, в ином случаи, не начал готовится к противостоянию с Россией, если бы был выбран путь «войны», мне совершенно не понятен. То, что я вижу, это попытка сидеть на двух стульях при условии, что вся эта эпопея с оружие для Украины не является обманным манёвром.
Интересное наблюдение делает автор по поводу причин, почему для Путина было так важно, чтобы Янукович подписал торговое соглашение с Россией, а не ЕС. А ведь в Кремле видели, что это решение является крайне опасным и может вызвать волну недовольства (что и произошло), но почему-то был выбран вариант «рискнуть» и поэтому решили надавить на Януковича, чтобы тот подписал соглашение с Москвой. Очевидно, что дело заключалось не в экономике, а исключительно в политике, ну и надежде что Янукович сможет устоять и как-то подавить народные выступления. Так что можно сказать, что Кремль должен обвинять себя сам в том, что их главный и единственный союзник в Украине не устоял в 2014. Однако меня заинтересовало именно политическое объяснения важности подписания торгового соглашения с Россией. Почему-то раньше я на такое объяснение не обращал внимание, но именно в этой книге мне показалось оно очень интересным.
In Moscow's eyes, the AA would have accelerated this trend, making Ukraine less dependent on Russia for goods, technology, and capital, and increasing the role of Europe, which simply had more to offer as a market and a source of investment and technology than the Russian economy, whose mainstay is energy. The inevitable result would have been reduced Russian influence, and not just economic, in a critical neighboring country.
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But ultimately his apprehensions were not limited to trade competition; they reflected Russia's concerns about a general loss of influence in its most strategically significant neighbor.
Добавим к этому, что строительство Северного потока – 2 было затеяно явно, чтобы шантажировать Украину отключением её как от транзита газа, так и от поставок газа в Украину как таковых. Данное соглашение могло бы использоваться как дополнительный рычаг. Тем не менее, что-то в этой версии кажется мне не убедительным. Ну, т.е. неужели без этого соглашения между Россией и Украиной не было бы никакой торговли? Думаю всё же, дело в символизме, т.е. в открытом переходе на сторону РФ. Торговля – вопрос второй, в данном контексте.
Последний абзац книги особенно актуален. Вот только из книги я так и не понял, что предлагает автор.
The Ukraine crisis is undoubtedly a pivotal event for Europe. But Ukraine is not the cause of the crisis. It is rather a symptom of an even larger problem for Europe. Europe's problem is with Russia, and its principal political, security, and economic challenges for the coming years will be to develop a new strategy for dealing with its giant neighbor. This strategy will have to be built on a realistic understanding of Russia rather than on what the West would like it to be and hopes it will one day become. It will remain a monumental task for the transatlantic community for years to come. Unless it is tackled with the ruthless realism and serious resources it deserves, stability and security in Europe will prove elusive.
The book is a short overview of the political events that led to the crisis and then to the open military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, as well as a short overview of the situation on the international scene in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the role of the EU and the US in it. One can say that this book is another retelling of the political events that took place a few years before the events of 2014 in eastern Ukraine. From my point of view, there is very little of the author's view in the book, and his analysis is rather superficial and mostly concerns Russian-European relations. Each chapter or topic looks like this: one and a half to two pages per topic. This is very little since even Facebook posts are often longer. As for Ukraine, it is certainly present in the book but not at the forefront. In sum, books such as "Ukraine and the Art of Strategy," "Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War," "Putin's War on Ukraine: Russia's Campaign for Global Counter-Revolution" and "Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia" are alternatives to this book. There are differences, of course, but they are minimal and mainly concern Russian-European relations. I should also add that the book is politically neutral (not biased), and that is a plus. The downside is the text itself - it is boring. The reader must be very interested in the subject in order to get through the whole book. Even though the book was published in 2015, I think some of the points are still relevant today. For example, can we say that the author's next conclusion is completely irrelevant in 2023?
In short, the EU had good reason, based on the Kremlin's words and deeds, to expect that Moscow would resist EaP initiatives that threatened to draw Ukraine away from Russia. But when the resistance became reality in 2014, Europe was largely helpless, just as it was in Georgia in 2008.
Can it be said that this very helplessness of Europe was the main argument for launching a full-scale military conflict in 2022? I think so, and as the book shows, everyone in Europe is aware of this inarticulate and frankly weak position of the EU. Perhaps this explains the numerous attempts of European leaders to persuade Ukraine to sign the Minsk agreements. Alas, they did not take into account one thing - the policy of Ukrainian elites in the Russian-Ukrainian issue that has changed since 2004. As I understand it, in the eyes of Ukrainian citizens, anyone who would sign the peace agreements would be seen as a political leader who backed down to Moscow, would be seen as a traitor to Ukrainian interests, and perhaps even as a collaborator. Therefore, the Minsk agreements could not be implemented for ideological or even for worldview reasons. Why the EU, in such a case, did not coordinate its policy in the direction of a complete refusal of Ukraine to join NATO or, otherwise, did not start preparing for a confrontation with Russia, if the path of "war" was chosen, is not clear to me at all. What I see is an attempt to sit on two chairs, provided that this whole epic with weapons for Ukraine is not a deceptive maneuver.
The author makes an interesting observation about the reasons why it was so important for Putin to have Yanukovych sign a trade agreement with Russia rather than the EU. The Kremlin saw that this decision was dangerous and could cause a wave of discontent (which is what happened), but, for some reason, it chose the "risk" option and, therefore, decided to pressure Yanukovych to sign the agreement with Moscow. Obviously, it was not about economics but purely about politics and the hope that Yanukovych would be able to resist and somehow suppress the popular uprisings. So, we can say that the Kremlin should blame itself for the fact that its main and only ally in Ukraine failed to hold out in 2014. However, I was interested in the political explanation of the importance of signing a trade agreement with Russia. For some reason, I had not paid attention to this explanation before, but I found it very interesting in this book.
In Moscow's eyes, the AA would have accelerated this trend, making Ukraine less dependent on Russia for goods, technology, and capital, and increasing the role of Europe, which simply had more to offer as a market and a source of investment and technology than the Russian economy, whose mainstay is energy. The inevitable result would have been reduced Russian influence, and not just economic, in a critical neighboring country.
<…>
But ultimately his apprehensions were not limited to trade competition; they reflected Russia's concerns about a general loss of influence in its most strategically significant neighbor.
To add to this, the construction of Nord Stream 2 was clearly intended to blackmail Ukraine by cutting it off from both gas transit and gas supplies. This agreement could be used as an additional lever. Nevertheless, something in this version does not seem convincing to me. Well, I mean, would there really be no trade between Russia and Ukraine without this agreement? I think it's all about symbolism, i.e., openly siding with the Russian Federation. Trade is the second issue in this context.
The last paragraph of the book is especially relevant. But I didn't understand from the book what the author was proposing.
The Ukraine crisis is undoubtedly a pivotal event for Europe. But Ukraine is not the cause of the crisis. It is rather a symptom of an even larger problem for Europe. Europe's problem is with Russia, and its principal political, security, and economic challenges for the coming years will be to develop a new strategy for dealing with its giant neighbor. This strategy will have to be built on a realistic understanding of Russia rather than on what the West would like it to be and hopes it will one day become. It will remain a monumental task for the transatlantic community for years to come. Unless it is tackled with the ruthless realism and serious resources it deserves, stability and security in Europe will prove elusive.
March 14, 2015
Excellent overview of the problems in Ukraine involving the United States, the European Union, and NATO. The authors explain the roots of the crisis and elaborate the strong case Russia has in being defiant against the West's reconstitution of Europe after the Cold War.
"The Ukraine crisis is undoubtedly a pivotal event for Europe. But Ukraine is not the cause of the crisis. It is rather a symptom of an even larger problem for Europe. Europe's problem is with Russia, and its principal political, security, and economic challenges for the coming years will be to develop a new strategy for dealing with its giant neighbor. This strategy will have to be built on a realistic understanding of Russia rather than what the West would like it to be and hopes it will one day become. It will remain a monumental task for the transatlantic community for years to come. Unless it is tackled with the ruthless realism and serious resources it deserves, stability and security in Europe will prove elusive."
"The Ukraine crisis is undoubtedly a pivotal event for Europe. But Ukraine is not the cause of the crisis. It is rather a symptom of an even larger problem for Europe. Europe's problem is with Russia, and its principal political, security, and economic challenges for the coming years will be to develop a new strategy for dealing with its giant neighbor. This strategy will have to be built on a realistic understanding of Russia rather than what the West would like it to be and hopes it will one day become. It will remain a monumental task for the transatlantic community for years to come. Unless it is tackled with the ruthless realism and serious resources it deserves, stability and security in Europe will prove elusive."
October 22, 2015
Conflict in Ukraine provides a succinct and valuable look at the Russian takeover of Crimea and the effect it has had on world politics. The book provides a primer on the history of Ukraine focusing on its relationship with Russia and identity with Poland. The regional division is clearly outlined and well done. The book then skips to the current conflict and looks at its effects domestically in Ukraine with its political parties and how it has interacted with Russia. Both Russia and the EU are looked at with regards to how Ukraine has effected policies there. NATO is also looked at with regards to its relevance as a counterbalance to Russian power. The book is even handed and balanced and a great primer for this subject for those looking to learn more about a complex topic.
Currently reading
March 29, 2022This book, along with 22 other books relating to Ukraine, its context and its current situation, has been made available to read online (though not downloaded) by Exacted Editions until April 16th 2022. https://publisher.exacteditions.com/u...
June 25, 2015
An excellent quick summary of Ukrainian history and the current crisis. The authors are objective and balanced in their assessments and very knowledgeable about the subject.
May 21, 2022
This book discusses the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, the history leading up to it, and predictions for the future. The contextual information was valuable to me but I found a lot of the rest of the book focused more on the European relationship with Russia than anything to do with Ukraine. I noticed a couple of errors with inconsistently romanized names and there were a few places where the authors' policy opinions were annoyingly visible (particularly regarding the role of social programs). I wish the nationalism and militia aspects had been discussed further but in fairness the authors didn't know how relevant that would become.
April 10, 2022
The views expressed herein are mine alone and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U.S. Coast Guard.
An excellent primer on the longer trajectory of Ukraine history, importantly explaining why Russia and Belorus without Ukraine are unlikely to be a major regional power in the long term. At 162 pages, even the drier or more academic parts are easily digested into a great summary of the situation as of 2014… and readers will enjoy projecting 2022 and beyond from there!
An excellent primer on the longer trajectory of Ukraine history, importantly explaining why Russia and Belorus without Ukraine are unlikely to be a major regional power in the long term. At 162 pages, even the drier or more academic parts are easily digested into a great summary of the situation as of 2014… and readers will enjoy projecting 2022 and beyond from there!
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April 19, 2022I was looking for a simple book that would help me understand the current Russian/Ukraine war (2022). This book is well researched but it reads like a doctorate paper so it's not what I was looking for.
June 28, 2022
A very succinct and clear summary of recent Ukrainian history. This book is bound to be useful for anyone wanting a quick insight into the past to help frame current events. This book was relatively quick and easy read, and accessible for a diverse range of audiences. Definitley recommend.
May 10, 2025
very interesting background info, and an interesting perspective given that it was written after the annexation of Crimea but before the war in Ukraine. they lay out the history and attempt to foreshadow what's next. a little more than I could handle but I learned some good stuff
January 4, 2018
Good in depth review of crisis. Some clunky phrasing but overall good
March 6, 2022
Gives a good overview regarding the background to the Ukraine-Russia conflict (which has now become a war).
March 27, 2022
Helped me understand the current situation excellently. Although its not about the latest round of conflict it gives a great historical background and the geopolitics surrounding it.
April 21, 2022
Ageing rapidly, but is an excellent primer on how we got where we are. It covers off the US, EU, Europe and Russian perspectives well, whilst giving a detailed chronological approach to events.
November 8, 2022
A good basic book on ukraine ( til 2015)
It is a good tick tock of Ukraine and its state with Russia, Nato, the US and the west- it gives you a good intro on that side of the world.
It is a good tick tock of Ukraine and its state with Russia, Nato, the US and the west- it gives you a good intro on that side of the world.
June 1, 2015
"The system of vast corruption explains in part why Yanukovych eventually shelved the Association Agreement (AA) and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) accord after a long dalliance. ... [R]adical reforms were incompatible with the survival of the system that amounted to a cash cow for Yanukovych and the lobbies backing him." (51)
"The annexation of Crimea marked the Kremlin's abandonment no only of the post-Cold War security order among the former Soviet states, whose leaders had agreed to recognize and respect their intra-USSR administrative boundaries as interstate borders, but also of the post-World War II European norms codified in the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which asserted the commitment of all European nations to recognize each other's borders and not change them by force." (98)
"The war has given rise to private armies, raised and financed by -- and answerable to -- the oligarchs." (149)
"The annexation of Crimea marked the Kremlin's abandonment no only of the post-Cold War security order among the former Soviet states, whose leaders had agreed to recognize and respect their intra-USSR administrative boundaries as interstate borders, but also of the post-World War II European norms codified in the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which asserted the commitment of all European nations to recognize each other's borders and not change them by force." (98)
"The war has given rise to private armies, raised and financed by -- and answerable to -- the oligarchs." (149)
August 21, 2015
A good overview of the conflict in Ukraine between Russia, Ukraine, EU and United States. The book covers Ukraine's history and the political events which have occurred since the early 2000's leading up to Crimea occupation by Russia.
December 26, 2015
An excellent overview of the crisis. Comprehensive and succinct.
March 28, 2017
A concise, comprehensive and historical analysis of the situation in Ukraine, starting from the revival of Ukrainian statehood in 17th and 18th centuries in the form of the various Cossack polities and ending in the gory incidents of 2014 spring. Really appreciated the references.
April 21, 2017
Good if you want a general primer on the background to the current crisis. If you've been following Russia for a while and kept track of the crisis as it unfolded, you're unlikely to learn much new, but that's the nature of the book.
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