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The Material Theory of Induction
The fundamental burden of a theory of inductive inference is to determine which are the good inductive inferences or relations of inductive support and why it is that they are so. The traditional approach is modeled on that taken in accounts of deductive inference. It seeks universally applicable schemas or rules or a single formal device, such as the probability calculus. After millennia of halting efforts, none of these approaches has been unequivocally successful and debates between approaches persist.
The Material Theory of Induction identifies the source of these enduring problems in the assumption taken at the outset: that inductive inference can be accommodated by a single formal account with universal applicability. Instead, it argues that that there is no single, universally applicable formal account. Rather, each domain has an inductive logic native to it. The content of that logic and where it can be applied are determined by the facts prevailing in that domain.
Paying close attention to how inductive inference is conducted in science and copiously illustrated with real-world examples, The Material Theory of Induction will initiate a new tradition in the analysis of inductive inference.
The Material Theory of Induction identifies the source of these enduring problems in the assumption taken at the outset: that inductive inference can be accommodated by a single formal account with universal applicability. Instead, it argues that that there is no single, universally applicable formal account. Rather, each domain has an inductive logic native to it. The content of that logic and where it can be applied are determined by the facts prevailing in that domain.
Paying close attention to how inductive inference is conducted in science and copiously illustrated with real-world examples, The Material Theory of Induction will initiate a new tradition in the analysis of inductive inference.
- GenresPhilosophy
680 pages, Paperback
First published December 15, 2021
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June 12, 2025
Prolog Notes:
"The principal idea of the material theory of induction is that background facts obtaining in some domain tell us which are the good and bad inductive inferences in that domain."
"While different formal approaches may work in different domains, a formal approach is the wrong one for understanding inductive inference overall."
"I lean towards grasping the science by exploring its history, for an emphasis on the history provides protection from the inevitable, modern textbook simplifications of relations of inductive support."
(later he elaborates)
"Worse, as this Bayesian approach ascends to the dominance it presently enjoys in the philosophy of science, its analyses became more and more separated from the real applications to inductive inference in the sciences. These analyses have drifted towards self-contained exercises in recreational probability theory. This separation is disguised by tendentious labeling of terms. A calculation best adapted to the accumulated results of many coin tosses is represented as giving some sort of understanding of how the accumulation of intricate and diverse evidence in science can support a univocal result."
"We are told a fable of a punter at a racetrack making monetary bets with bookies who are determined to take every advantage possible. This epistemic situation is supposed to be sufficiently close to that of scientists weighing evidence for the Big Bang cosmology or a neural basis of cognition."
- I resonate with this critique of Bayesian epistemology from what I encountered in my independent study.
"the essential relation is inductive support. It obtains between the general propositions of science and those particular ones that express the evidence on which science rests."
Why an account of inductive support is important: "without it, the idea of science are no better than the fanciful creation stories of primitive mythologies."
"The clue in all this is that the application of the various approaches works when we add factual conditions that limit the domain in which they are to be applied"
"that is, what warrants the successful application of a particular inference is found entirely in the background factual conditions that delimit the domain of application."
-Note he says facts warrants specific applications (so specific inductive logics/ principles) (not necessarily specific deductions within those rules. Although those might also be materially warranted)
- Note he makes the strong claim "entirely"
Q. What are we to make of inferences in psychology using non-material variables like personality type? Or more generally inductive inferences using discovered features in machine learning? Are those inferences unwarranted until a material substrate accounting for their success is found? This leaves open the question of what counts as 'material'? Sensory substitution makes it seem that material and informative for prediction/ achieving goals is a hard distinction to draw.
"The principal idea of the material theory of induction is that background facts obtaining in some domain tell us which are the good and bad inductive inferences in that domain."
"While different formal approaches may work in different domains, a formal approach is the wrong one for understanding inductive inference overall."
"I lean towards grasping the science by exploring its history, for an emphasis on the history provides protection from the inevitable, modern textbook simplifications of relations of inductive support."
(later he elaborates)
"Worse, as this Bayesian approach ascends to the dominance it presently enjoys in the philosophy of science, its analyses became more and more separated from the real applications to inductive inference in the sciences. These analyses have drifted towards self-contained exercises in recreational probability theory. This separation is disguised by tendentious labeling of terms. A calculation best adapted to the accumulated results of many coin tosses is represented as giving some sort of understanding of how the accumulation of intricate and diverse evidence in science can support a univocal result."
"We are told a fable of a punter at a racetrack making monetary bets with bookies who are determined to take every advantage possible. This epistemic situation is supposed to be sufficiently close to that of scientists weighing evidence for the Big Bang cosmology or a neural basis of cognition."
- I resonate with this critique of Bayesian epistemology from what I encountered in my independent study.
"the essential relation is inductive support. It obtains between the general propositions of science and those particular ones that express the evidence on which science rests."
Why an account of inductive support is important: "without it, the idea of science are no better than the fanciful creation stories of primitive mythologies."
"The clue in all this is that the application of the various approaches works when we add factual conditions that limit the domain in which they are to be applied"
"that is, what warrants the successful application of a particular inference is found entirely in the background factual conditions that delimit the domain of application."
-Note he says facts warrants specific applications (so specific inductive logics/ principles) (not necessarily specific deductions within those rules. Although those might also be materially warranted)
- Note he makes the strong claim "entirely"
Q. What are we to make of inferences in psychology using non-material variables like personality type? Or more generally inductive inferences using discovered features in machine learning? Are those inferences unwarranted until a material substrate accounting for their success is found? This leaves open the question of what counts as 'material'? Sensory substitution makes it seem that material and informative for prediction/ achieving goals is a hard distinction to draw.
Displaying 1 of 1 review