في السبيل الى الله الفتوحات العربية وتكوين الامبراطورية الاسلامية

Ancient Warfare and Civilization

by Robert G. Hoyland, فلاح حسن الأسدي (Translator)

للكتاب الحالي أهمية كبرى إذ يقدم رؤيةً مختلفةً عن تكوين الإمبراطوريَّة العربيَّة الإسلاميَّة للفترة من ظهور الإسلام حتَّى نهاية الحكم الأمويِّ (132 هـ/ 750م)، وتعتمد على استخدام المصادر غير الإسلاميَّة للفترة موضوع الدراسة، كالنقوش والبرديَّات والحوليَّات المسيحيَّة وغير المسيحيَّة، التي أكَّدت أنَّ العرب كانوا يخدمون في الجيوش البيزنطيَّة والفارسيَّة في الفترة قبل الإسلام بوقتٍ طويلٍ، وأحرزوا تدريبًا قيِّمًا على استخدام الأسلحة والخطط العسكريَّة في الجيوش الإمبراطورية. وأشارت هذه المصادر أيضًا إلى أنَّنا يجب رؤية الكثير من تحالف النبيِّ محمَّد مع القبائل العربيَّة في غرب الجزيرة العربيَّة، البدو منهم والمستقرِّين، ليس بوصفهم مجرَّد خارجيين يبحثون عن الغنائم وسلب الإمبراطوريَّات ونهبها، إنَّما عناصر داخليَّة تبحث عن مشاركةٍ في ثروات أسيادهم الإمبراطوريِّين، وكما هو الحال عند دخول القبائل الجرمانيَّة إلى الإمبراطوريَّة الرومانيَّة في القرون الميلاديَّة الأولى.
لقد أوضح الباحث نقطةً مركزيَّةً في بناء الإمبراطوريَّة العربيَّة الإسلاميَّة، وهي السرعة التي تمَّت بها بناء تلك الإمبراطوريَّة ليس بوصفها نتيجةً لقيادة العرب لتلك الفتوحات واعتمادهم على قواهم الذاتيَّة فحسب، بل استغلالهم للزمن الذي لم يكن إلى جانب الإمبراطوريَّتين الفارسيَّة والبيزنطيَّة، والبرهنة على استخدام "الاستيعاب المتبادل" الذي سمح للعرب والشعوب المفتوحة بالعيش معًا وخلق هُويَّة إسلاميَّة جديدة وحضارة إسلاميَّة فتيَّة…

Genres: History, Islam, Nonfiction, Religion, Middle East, Medieval History, World History

380 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2014

About the author

Robert G. Hoyland is a scholar and historian, specializing in the medieval history of the Middle East. He is a former student of historian Patricia Crone and was a Leverhulme Fellow at Pembroke College, Oxford.

Reviews

[فؤاد · Rating 4 out of 5]

فی سبیل‌الله: فتوحات عرب و تشکیل امپراتوری اسلامی

برخلاف تصور رایج، پس از درگذشت پیامبر، زمانی که فتوحات آغاز شد، هنوز تمام شبه‌جزیرهٔ عربستان مسلمان نشده بودند. روایات اسلامی می‌گویند که بازوی شرقی شبه‌جزیره (یمامه) که بیابان بزرگی آن را از بازوی غربی (حجاز) جدا می‌کند، پس از درگذشت پیامبر مرتد شدند و ابوبکر جنگ‌های متعددی کرد تا دوباره اسلام را در این خطه برقرار کند. و تنها پس از اتحاد تمام شبه جزیره زیر پرچم اسلام بود که فتوحات آغاز شد.
اما روایات معاصر با فتوحات می‌گویند که فتوحات پیش از این آغاز شده بود و لشکریان عرب پس از فتح سوریه و فلسطین دوباره به شبه‌جزیره بازگشتند و با بازوی شرقی وارد جنگی داخلی شدند.

به گفتهٔ مؤلف در طی جنگ‌های بیست سالهٔ ایران-بیزانس دو حکومت شبه جزیره را به حال خود رها کرده بودند و رهبران جدیدی که وجهه‌ای پیامبرانه داشتند ظهور کردند و جای خالی مقامات رسمی را پر کردند. پیامبر اسلام یکی از این پیامبران بود، اما منابع اسلامی از پیامبران دیگری که همزمان یا پس از پیامبر اسلام ظهور کردند نام می‌برد، به خصوص مسیلمة که در بازوی شرقی شبه‌جزیره ظهور کرده بود و قبایل آن نواحی از او پیروی می‌کردند. به روایت بلعمی مسیلمة به پیامبر نامه‌ای نوشت که نصف (شرقی) عربستان برای من و نصف (غربی) آن برای تو.

مؤلف همین را اساس نظریهٔ خود قرار می‌دهد و از آن جا که حملات ابتدایی به مرزهای ایران و بیزانس پیش از درگذشت پیامبر و توسط قبایل غیرمسلمان شروع شده بود، نتیجه می‌گیرد که فتوحات اعراب نه حرکتی منسجم تحت دینی واحد، بلکه غارت‌هایی پراکنده بود، مثل غارت‌های قبایل بیابان‌گرد دیگر، که به علت ضعف دو امپراتوری پس از جنگ‌های بیست ساله، با موفقیتی چشمگیر روبه‌رو شد و باعث شد قبایل بیشتر و بیشتری با این حرکت همراهی کنند و کم کم آنچه در آغاز صرفاً غارت پراکندهٔ نواحی روستایی بود، به لشکرکشی‌ای تمام عیار بدل شود.
در این میان، مسلمانان (عرب‌های غربی) تنها یکی از گروه‌هایی بودند که در این لشکرکشی شرکت داشتند، اما به علت سازماندهی بیشتر و اتحادشان تحت دین واحد، به سرعت توانستند بر گروه‌های دیگر تفوق پیدا کنند و جنبش قبایل عرب را به جنبشی اسلامی تبدیل کنند.

عنوان ثانوی کتاب هم به این دو مرحله اشاره می‌کند: «فتوحات عرب و تشکیل امپراتوری اسلامی». فتوحات خصلتی عربی داشتند، ولی امپراتوری‌ای که در نتیجهٔ آن تشکیل شد، خصلتی اسلامی.

کتاب
کتاب، همان طور که از اسمش هم برمی‌آید، بیشتر راجع به فتوحات اسلامی است و حتی به تاریخ زندگی پیامبر در حجاز هم خیلی گذرا اشاره می‌کند. موضوعی که برای مؤلف مهم است امپراتوری اسلامی است که چطور مناطق وسیعی را فتح کرد و چطور بر این مناطق حکومت کرد.

دوم این که مؤلف کار خاصی می‌کند: تا جای ممکن از تکیه کردن بر منابع اسلامی که دو سه قرن بعد از فتوحات نوشته شده‌اند اجتناب می‌کند و می‌کوشد از منابع معاصر با فتوحات، مثل سکه‌ها، کتیبه‌ها و گزارش‌هایی که همان زمان و عموماً توسط نویسنده‌های غیرمسلمان نوشته شده‌اند استفاده کند. در نتیجه حتی اگر با تاریخ اسلام آشنا باشید، کتاب نکات جدید زیادی برای گفتن دارد. مؤلف قبل از این یک کتاب دیگر هم نوشته و در آن فقط و فقط گزارش‌های غیرمسلمان‌ها از فتوحات اسلامی را جمع‌آوری کرده. تصور می‌کنم همان کتاب اطلاعات خام این کتاب را فراهم کرده.

کتاب ابتدا شرایط منطقه قبل از آغاز فتوحات را ترسیم می‌کند و سپس ماجرای فتوحات را تا سقوط سلسلهٔ اموی نقل می‌کند. هر فصل ابتدا ماجرای فتوحات یک برههٔ مشخص زمانی را بر اساس منابع معاصر بازگو می‌کند، و سپس بر اساس این اطلاعات وضعیت سیاسی و دینی و... را تحلیل می‌کند و نظریه‌های خودش را ارائه می‌دهد، که برای من این تحلیل‌ها و نظریه‌ها آموزنده‌ترین بخش‌های کتاب بودند. یکی از آن‌ها را در بالا آوردم.

[José Luís Fernandes · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very interesting and balanced account of the Arab conquests and the formation of the Islamic civlization as well as its early empires (of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties).

I loved Hoyland's contextualization of the Arab expansion within the developments of Late Antiquity, his reassessment of the importance of the rise of Islam to it and his approach to the formation of several features of Islamic civilization like the "sharia", the evolution of the concept of "jihad", its social structure and the development of Islam as a religion, which are very important both for the historiography of this period and modern debates on Islam (the latter is horribly skewed by far-right propaganda entering into History, especially in America and Europe after 9/11).

There might be a few imperfections (there was no Georgia in the 7th and 8th centuries, for instance, although I suspect the author used that name for familiarity), while the use of "and" gets sometimes annoying for me, but the scholarship in this book is invaluable and very well thought out.

[Maitrey · Rating 4 out of 5]

In God's Path by Robert Hoyland was an intriguing history of the Arab conquests after the death of Muhammad. Hoyland is currently the Professor of Islamic History at Oxford University. He has previously written on the histories of Islam, the Arabs and the Near East.

Hoyland sets out from the beginning to challenge the narrative that Islam was carried at a breakneck speed across the world on the backs of Arabian horses. This is evidently a one-sided version, and if not wrong, it certainly is heavily biased towards the victors i.e the Muslims. I thought he successfully achieved this by critically re-looking at sources from people living in the 7th Century, both Muslim and non-Muslim, (especially the latter since the bulk of sources from this time are chroniclers from Byzantium). Then he gives precedence to later writers and sources from the 8th-9th centuries onwards, but is still pretty picky about whom to trust and whom not to.

The book's main thrust is that it wasn't inevitable for Islam to be successful, or that it wasn't just zeal and God which propelled the conquerors. Like all good history, it's far more complex than that. Take for instance that just before the Prophet's birth in the early 7th Century, the then superpowers of Byzantium and Persia were locked in a struggle for the Middle East and were exhausted by the time the first Muslim soldiers tested these empires. There was also a devastating plague which swept across these regions which might have not struck core-Arab areas such as Mecca and Medina too hard.

Also consider that many Arab tribes had learnt quite a bit through association with both empires, whether it was administrative skill, siege technology or simply the power of propaganda and organization.

The book is mainly divided chronologically with periods such as pre-Islam, immediately post-Muhammad, and the wars between the Arabs and Byzantium (in Syria, Egypt and North Africa), and those between the Arabs and the Persians. Throughout, Hoyland stresses on credible sources and what might have actually happened in battles. Since much of our history, both Islamic history from the Middle Ages and modern history has stressed the victors' tale, Hoyland I think doesn't do too much of disservice by stressing on sources who might have been eye-witnesses or writing immediately after these battles. Therefore we get a picture not of one-sided victories but a jumble of victories, defeats and even stalemates between the Arabs and their various opponents. I read for the first time of how the Arabs lost to various hardy tribes such as the Khazars of the Caucasus, or the North African Berbers. Hoyland states repeatedly, that this wasn't just religion-fueled conquering but a complex relationship between conquerors, the conquered, local elites, tax-payers and governors.

Some of the most interesting sections were Arab interaction with the Persians and Central Asia. The Persian Sassanian Empire collapsed totally when fighting the Arabs, and the polities in Central Asia didn't fair much better. The melding here of Islam with the local culture (not to mention of the Arabs and locals), and it's distance from central Arabia played a pivotal part in how the Ummayad dynasty of caliphs was overthrown by the Abbasids, and how much of Islam came to Persianized.

Hoyland also de-stresses the importance payed to so-called pivotal battles like the Battle of Poitier/Tours (between the Arabs and the Franks) or the Battle of Talas (between Arabs and the Chinese Tang dynasty). These were on-off and really didn't much determine future events. Other factors such as Central Asia, Spain and North Africa becoming more or less independent from centralized Muslim rule were far more pivotal. The last few chapters wonderfully dealt with the Islamic civilization that was created by the melding of various cultures, yet how the Arabs remained important still (consider: Mecca is still the holy site for Muslims, or that Muslim children are still given Arabic names). Insights such as why there might have been a ban of images in Islamic art, or the widespread practice of alms-giving among Muslims were particularly delightful to read about.

Some things I can criticize about the book was that it was too short, and more details wouldn't have hurt at all. A short biography of Muhammad say, or the Arab civil wars that are only mentioned in passing. Hoyland also assumes the reader to be somewhat well versed in Arab history, quite a drawback in a book aimed at an interested yet layman reader. The time periods also jump around quite a bit such as we might move on to the 9th Century in Persia but then return to the 7th in Egypt. Otherwise, the book is written simply and in an engaging manner.

Overall the book is an eye-opening read of how one can approach early Islamic history. It is also a great example in how to evaluate historical sources. Highly recommended.

Full Disclosure: I was given a advanced reading copy of the book in exchange for a review by the publisher.

[BenAbe · Rating 3 out of 5]

In In God’s Path, Robert Hoyland examines the Arab conquests of the Byzantine and Sassanid empires in the 7th century, tracing their expansion up to the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate in 750. His approach relies on non-Muslim sources rather than the Islamic tradition that dominates most historical accounts. The author's preference for these earlier, non-Islamic sources stems from a critical view of the Standard Islamic Narrative (SIN), which only takes shape in the 9th century and reflects the sectarian, political, and ideological conditions of its time. These later Muslim accounts, written generations after the events they describe, are seen by Hoyland as idealized and shaped more by retrospective religious identity than by immediate historical experience.



The book spans a wide geographic range: from the Sassanid Empire in the East, through the Byzantine territories in the North, to North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula in the West. However, the focus of the main action is on the eastern theater of operations (Iranian heartlands, Transoxiana, and the Caucasus), where geography, social, and cultural circumstances set in motion complex, unforeseen, and far-reaching effects on the empire-building that came afterward.

When it comes to the identity of the conquerors, there are indications that the Arab conquests were not initiated by Muhammad alone, but had already begun before him and were conducted by other leaders in other locations. So, Muhammad's coalition was only one among many Arabian groups trying to take advantage of the lax security situation created by the preoccupation of the Byzantines and Persians with waging war against each other. Raiding had already become endemic by the 620s.
The conquest began as an Arab insurrection. These were not invaders coming from outside the empires, but insiders (former auxiliaries or tribal allies employed in the service of both the Byzantines and the Sassanids) who wanted a share of the power and wealth of these states. Among them was Muhammad's coalition, which at its core was made up of semi-nomadic and settled, civilized tribes living on the fringes of the Byzantine border, while the bulk of the manpower came from the nomadic Arabs of the interior—that is to say, the West Arabian tribes.
This is because the percentage of men available for military service in nomadic societies tends to be much higher than in settled or semi-settled ones. Unlike agricultural communities, nomadic tribes do not rely on labor-intensive farming, so a larger portion of the male population can be mobilized for raiding or warfare.


When it comes to the causes behind the sweeping and successful Arab incursion, they can be summed up as follows:

*The devastation suffered by both powers in the aftermath of the Byzantine–Persian wars, which ultimately culminated in a civil war within the Sassanid Empire.

*The recruitment of troops was hampered by recurrent outbreaks of plague that afflicted the entire region. Areas with high population densities were hit hardest, in contrast to the sparsely populated nomadic and semi-nomadic settlements.

*The Arabs possessed a high degree of internal cohesion through the unifying force of Islam, which facilitated efficient mobilization. Various tribes and tribal confederations were brought together under a simple but compelling cause: to migrate to garrison towns and to fight in God’s path against His enemies. This religious mission was further reinforced by zeal and a sense of dual reward—either the acquisition of spoils in victory or the eternal pleasures of paradise in martyrdom.

*Another factor behind their success was more diplomatic than martial. A long-standing tradition in the Middle East, shared by both the Romans and Persians, encouraged the peaceful surrender of communities in exchange for security, property rights, and favorable terms outlined in a formal pact, usually sealed with a binding oath. The Arabs made extensive use of such agreements, often offering monetary rewards or tax exemptions to those who submitted or collaborated.



Now, when it comes to my criticism, it's twofold: one has to do with how the author got his ideas across, and the other with how he dealt with the subject itself.


On the first point:
The author covered a vast period of time, stretching over many years—decades even—and ranging from the Iberian Peninsula to the Iranian heartland and beyond. In a book of such length, we inevitably get a rapid sequence of figures, battles, and skirmishes, all crammed into just a few pages. Frankly, it’s dizzying. I’m afraid that a reader won’t retain much detailed information about the different theaters of operation beyond the general picture. And at times, it was hard to follow, simply because there was just too much information, which honestly called for a bit of a break every now and then.


On the second point:
That is, how the author deals with the Islamic narrative. At first, he seems skeptical of it and says as much in the introduction and conclusion—rightly noting that many of these sources came from a time of sectarianism, and that bias likely shaped the narratives according to the interests of the scholars who wrote them. But then, throughout the book, he often accepts parts of this same narrative at face value.

For instance, he accepts the idea that in the Western Arabian interior, there was a powerful tribe—the Quraysh—based in Mecca, just as the Islamic narrative claims. But there’s at least enough solid work out there from historians who raise valid doubts about this. There’s no real historical or archaeological proof that Mecca existed at the time, either in the pre-Islamic period or during the early conquests. Same with the Quraysh—nothing in the historical record confirms their existence in that period. But the author doesn’t question any of this.

Another example: he assumes Muʿāwiyah was a Muslim. But he also admits there’s no direct evidence for it—not in coins, not in inscriptions. In fact, everything from that time avoids clear Islamic markers as we know them today. Yet, the author goes ahead with the assumption, based mainly on two things.

First, a letter Muʿāwiyah sent to the Roman emperor, which had an anti-Trinitarian tone—but nothing clearly Islamic in it. And second, he argues that the absence of Islamic content in coins and inscriptions is because of a doctrinal point in Islam: the idea that only Islam is the true religion, and everything else is a corruption. So, from that logic, early Muslims wouldn't have bothered to define themselves in ways that demarcate and separates them from other religions.
This is problematic for two reasons. One, anti-Trinitarian language wasn’t exclusive to Islam. There were several monotheistic sects around at the time—many of them heretical by mainstream Christian standards—that rejected the Trinity too. So that alone doesn’t point to Islam.
And two, the author’s reasoning assumes that a Qur’an already existed back then, that it already had this doctrinal stance, and that it had enough authority to shape how people wrote and thought at the time (something the standard Islamic narrative claims). But the existence and authority of the Qur’an during the early conquests is exactly what's in question.

As scholars like Stephen Shoemaker argue, the earliest Islamic narratives concerning the Quran (and indeed the compilation of the Quran) seems to have taken shape later—possibly during the reign of ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān. Even within the Islamic tradition, accounts of the Qur’an’s compilation contradict each other. Non-Islamic sources from the time don’t mention Muhammad’s community having a revelation or scripture. And the development of the Arabic language itself points toward a later formalization of Islamic identity.

Another issue: the author implies that one reason for the short lifespan of a unified Arab empire—the fact that unity only really lasted during the Umayyad period—is that Islam, by its very nature, is anti-imperial. I find that hard to accept. I come from an Islamic background, and let me tell you, that’s not how Islam sees itself. From the beginning, Islam had a state—unlike Christianity, where Jesus and the Apostles didn’t wield political power. Muhammad had political authority. If we take Islam as defined by the later scholars (since he's rasing a point concerning doctrine and ideology in a later period after the conquest), then yes, it started with a state. It had rules for war, rules for governance, even for things like slaves and rules of engagement in war. It wasn’t anti-empire—it had empire baked into it. So I can’t agree with the author’s point that Islam was inherently opposed to empire, and that’s what led to internal fragmentation.
Also, he points to how Islamic scholars often criticized rulers, as if that proves Islam didn’t support empire. But that’s only part of the story. Sure, some scholars did criticize rulers—but others didn’t. In Arabic, they’re known as ‘ulama’ as-sultān or shuyūkh as-sultān—the sultan’s scholars. These were scholars who served the rulers’ interests, provided religious cover for political decisions, and gave legitimacy to the state. So again, this isn’t proof that Islam was naturally anti-imperial. Quite the opposite: Islam could and did serve empire when needed.



The author's inconsistency was problematic. At times, he dismisses the standard Islamic narrative, yet elsewhere he relies on it without explanation or justification. He never clarifies his methodology as to why he accepted those elements, leaving the reader uncertain about when and why he accepts or rejects certain sources. This inconsistency undermines the integrity and balance of the work. Frankly, it feels like he’s trying to have it both ways.

It also didn’t help that he inserted, in the postscript, a claim that jihad is not solely military but also an internal struggle of the self. First, it is not the historian’s role to make doctrinal or theological assertions, which this clearly is. Second, speaking as someone from an Islamic background: yes, there is a concept of jihad as a personal, internal struggle—but that is a secondary understanding. The primary meaning of jihad, historically and scripturally, is military. In the Qur’an and other sources, jihad most often refers to physical warfare—whether through fighting, supporting the fight, or financing it. To pretend it's primarily an inner struggle is misleading. Most knowledgeable Muslims would affirm that the dominant context of jihad is martial.

This reflects a broader issue with many Western historians of Islam: they tend to treat Islam through a Christian lens. They assume that Islam functions like Christianity, that its message and nature are parallel. But ideas are not created equal, and religions are not all the same. Islam is not Christianity (I'm saying this as a non Christian btw). It had, from its inception, an explosive combination: both political authority and final revelation. This foundational mix eternalized the sociopolitical circumstances of 7th-century Arabia. Hence, many Muslims today live according to rules and norms rooted in that era. This isn’t an accident, but a structural feature of Islamic theology and history.

The author also attributes Islam’s divergence from Roman norms to its absorption of Persian lands in addition to Byzantine provinces. He suggests that had Islam only conquered Byzantine territory, it might have been assimilated into Roman culture. Persian influence, he argues, threw off that trajectory. While Persian culture certainly had an impact, it wasn’t the primary reason for Islam’s distinct development. The core issue lies in Islam’s structure: a religion with a state from the start, led by a prophet who was also a military leader. Unlike Jesus, Muhammad led raids and oversaw battles (even massacres as reported by Islamic sources themselves -Banu qurayza comes to mind). Whether these events happened exactly as described is irrelevant (since we're not talking of Islam's historicity anymore instead it's islam the religion-as a collection of ideas) ; what matters is that Muslims believe they did. In matters of ideology, perception shapes reality.

This essential difference—Islam beginning as a state power under a military-religious leader—sets it apart from Christianity, and to overlook this in favor of materialist explanations alone is reductive. The divergence wasn't just due to Persian influence—it was embedded in the ideological and theological framework of Islam itself.

As for the book, while it had moments of balance and objectivity, these were undercut by the inconsistencies. I also felt the coverage of pre-Islamic Arab identity was too brief. The military narratives felt rushed and underdeveloped. That said, the book does offer valuable insights into why some cultures retained their language and identity under Islamic rule, and why some dynasties remained independent while others didn't.


Still, I recommend familiarizing yourself with the standard Islamic narrative beforehand. Also, read Stephen J. Shoemaker’s The Death of a Prophet and Creating the Qur’an. Shoemaker is far more consistent. He justifies his use of sources clearly and leans heavily on non-Islamic texts, making his conclusions more methodologically satisfying—though his scope is narrower. Death of a Prophet focuses on Muhammad’s death and early conquests, while Creating the Qur’an explores the Quran’s compilation and the conflicting traditions surrounding it.

In short: hoyland's book has value, but comes with significant caveats: Don’t go into it blind.


Rate : 3.5/5

[فهد الفهد · Rating 4 out of 5]

In God's Path

القراءة عن التاريخ الإسلامي بقلم أجنبي وبلغة أجنبية تجربة مختلفة، يمكنك رؤية الأحداث والشخصيات من زاوية مغايرة، تتفق أو تختلف مع ما يقدمه المؤلف – وخاصة عندما يزيف أو يفسر الأحداث بطريقة لا يسهل ابتلاعها – إلا أن التجربة مهمة وتستحق المزيد من القراءات، من أهم اللحظات التاريخية الإسلامية هي فترة الفتوحات، كيف استطاعت الحضارة الإسلامية العربية إنتاج كل هؤلاء الخلفاء والقادة العسكريين والفقهاء، فترة غنية امتدت على مدى ما يزيد على المئة سنة، وواجهت فيها الجيوش العربية الروم والفرس وقبائل البربر والقوط الغربيين والإفرنج، كما واجهت الترك والفرغانيين وكل شعوب ما وراء النهر، يرصد المؤلف في هذا الكتاب المهم التقدم الإسلامي السريع، الانتصارات العسكرية وبعض النكسات التي عانت منها الجيوش وخاصة في بعض المجاهل البعيدة والأراضي الموحشة، الموضوع يحتاج المزيد من القراءات، وقد أكون قرأت عنه عدة كتب خلال السنوات الماضية وحتى الآن لم أفرغ ولم أشبع.

[Mohammad Al Refaei · Rating 2 out of 5]

كيف استطاعت الفتوحات العربية تشكيل الحضارة الإسلامية؟
على هذا السؤال يحاول الكاتب الإجابة معتمداً بشكلٍ رئيس على مصادر الشعوب المغلوبة.

حسناً، فلنبدأ بالعنوان: الكتاب يتكلم عن فتوحات "عربية" شكلت الحضارة "الإسلامية" وهنا أولى مآخذي على الكاتب، فرغم أنه صرف وقتاً طويلاً باحثاً عن تحديد ماهية العربي والمسلم ودور كلٍّ منها في الفتوحات إلا أنه لم يوفق، حتى أنه استعمل مصطلح "العرب من غرب شبه الجزيرة العربية" وهو مصطلح قد يكون مقبولاً لو تحدثنا عن بداية التاريخ الإسلامي كون مكة والمدينة المنورة تقع غرب شبه الجزيرة لكنه استعلم المصطلح لفترات زمنية تتعلق بفتوحات متأخرة مثل فلسطين.

والآن إلى مقدمة الكتاب، حيث يقول الكاتب أنه سيعتمد على مصادر المغلوبين لأن مصادر الغالبين مكتوبة في فترة متأخرة وكُتِبت وفق وجهة نظر المنتصر، لكنه في الواقع باستعماله هذا المنهج وقع في نفس المشكلة التي أراد الهروب منها، فمصادر المغلوبين كُتِبت عن طريق السلطة الخاسرة التي أرادت أن تشوه صورة الفاتحين وأن تبرر خسارتها، فضلاً أنه عندما استعمل بعض مصادر المنتصرين حدثت هناك أخطاءٌ في الترجمة مثل ترجمة كلمة "غلام" التي تعني "عبد" إلى
children
التي تعني "ولد".
هذا فضلاً عن أن المصادر التي استعملها ذكرت بعض الأرقام الكبيرة غير المقبولة أو بعض الأحداث التي يُستبعد أن تحدث مثل نهب مدن الأناضول وحرقها عدة مرات خلال فترات زمنية متقاربة (فكيف يمكن أن تُحرق مدينة ��تنهب بالكامل ويُقتل مقاتلوها ويُستعبد سكانها ومن ثم يحصل نفس الأمر لهذه المدينة بعد عدة سنوات ويكسب منها الفاتحون ذهباً كثيراً)
هناك أيضاً ذكر لبعض المعارك التي لم تذكرها المصادر الإسلامية في مصادر المغلوبين وكان الكاتب ميالاً لها رغم عدم وجود سبب مقنع لعدم ذكر المصادر الإسلامية لها كوجود جيش آخر مرافق لجيش عمر بن العاص أثناء فتح مصر أو إغفال معركة حدثت بعد معركة ذات السلاسل خسرها المسلمون (هذه المعركة لا تذكرها مصادر المسلمين رغم أنها -أي مصادر المسلمين- تذكر معارك خسروها فلماذا نغفل مصادرهم ونأخذ مصدر مؤرخ يشير إلى هذه المعركة لم يكن هو الآخر موجوداً قرب ساحتها -وهي بالمناسبة ليست معركة بل تتحدث عن عاصفة دمرت أسطول المسملين بعد دعاء قسطنطين عليه)
الكاتب يتكلم عن الفاتحين وكأنهم وحوش بلا رحمة، ينهبون ويسرقون ويقتلون، وهي رؤية غير موضوعية، فعندما تتحدث عن ��ينكيز خان على أنه مجرم لا يحق لك أن تنفي أنه عبقري بكل المقاييس وأن رجاله كانوا شجعاناً وعلى قدر عالٍ من الكفاءة، وكذلك الأمر هنا، فحتى لو أراد أن يصف الفاتحين بالوحوش فعليه أن يشير إلى كفاءتهم العالية وقوتهم، وعلى الطرف الآخر كان يمدح بالشجاعة والقوة الخاسرين حتى في المعارك التي خسروها، هذا فضلاً عن ذكر بعض المصطلحات غير الأكاديمية، ففي تعليقه على معركة اليرموك التي فتحت الطريق للمسلمين إلى بلاد الشام يعزو انتصارهم إلى كونهم "محظوظين" وقد تكرر ذلك في أكثر من موضع.
طبعاً أنا أتفق مع الكاتب على أهمية مصادر الفاتحين والخاسرين وعلى أن الحضارة الإسلامية هي حضارة إنسانية لكنه ما لم أجده في الكتاب.

قراءة الكاتب للحدث التاريخي:
حتى الآن كان تعقيبي على السرد التاريخي، أم فيما يخص استنتاج الكاتب للقوانين والظروف التي مهدت لهذا الفتح فاعتراضي على الكتاب أكبر:

الكاتب يعزو سرعة الفتح وتوقفه فيما بعد إلى عوامل جغرافية مثل السهول المساعدة والجبال المعاوقة (للفتح) ورغم أهمية العامل الجغرافي إلا أن نجاح هذه الفتوحات من الصين إلى شبه الجزيرة الإيبيرية (إسبانيا والبرتغال أو الأندلس) لا يمكن أن يُعزى إلى عامل جغرافي أو حتى عوامل بيئية مثل الطاعون الذي ذكره (فلم أجد في المصادر التاريخية -ولم يذكر هو مصدراً- يشير إلى أعداد وفيات عالية نتيجة الطاعون أو موت المحاصيل)

حاول الكاتب تفسير التحول إلى الإسلام الذي حصل بمجموعة عوامل منها: الانتصار، فالناس يرون أن الله مع المنتصر، وإلى رغبة الناس في استلام المناصب وإعتقاق من يسلم من العبودية، ورغم دور هذه العوامل إلا أنها ليست الأساس، فلا أعداد العبيد ولا المناصب يمكن أن تفسر هذا التحول الكبير، وإلا فكيف يفسر انتشار الإسلام في جنوب شرق آسيا ووسط آسيا وإفريقيا (عدا الساحل الشمالي للقارة) وحتى الهند، ففي معظم هذه المناطق، دخل الإسلام قبل مراحل من دخول المقاتلين بل حتى ربما لم يدخلوها فلا توجد فتوحات وصلت إلى قلب أفريقيا حيث وصل الإسلام.

باختصار، أتفق مع الكاتب في بعض ما سرده من الأحداث التاريخية وكذلك في قراءته لها، لكنه في المجمل لم يسردها بالشكل الصحيح ولم يقرأها بالشكل الأمثل، ولذا أنصح القارئ بكتب أخرى عن التاريخ الإسلامي مثل:
The Great Arab Conquests, How the Spread of Islam Changed the World we Live in
لم أنهِ هذا الكتاب لكنني أنصح أيضاً بقائمة من الكتاب الأجنبية التي أراها أفضل بكثير:
http://lostislamichistory.com/books/

[Bfisher · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author contends that the classic history of the Arab conquests has been an Islamicized story written primarily by 9th century Muslim historians - the victors sometimes get to write the history :) Therefore, the accepted history of the Arab conquests was written two centuries afterwards to fit the Islamic worldview of the time. The author cites a number of contemporaneous non-Arab sources to provide a more nuanced view of the sweep of Arab dominance over the Middle East and North African area in the century after the Hijra.


There is a more nuanced explanation of why the Arab armies were able to partition the Byzantine empire, one of the prior superpowers of the region, and overwhelm the Persian empire, the other superpower, and inaugurate an enduring cultural, if not a lasting political change. This is explained in terms of both military and nonmilitary factors, and the role of Islam itself in the conquered areas.


It is a condensed view of a long running process over a vast sweep of territory. Fortunately, there are maps to connect the place names for the reader.

[xhxhx · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good short history, full of suggestive thoughts on early Muslim civilization.

Holyand takes a skeptical approach to the Arab sources on the first four Caliphs (632–61 CE). Prefers contemporaries (Christian) to later (Arab Muslim) sources throughout. As a result, provides an episodic and spotty narrative. Hoyland fills in the gaps in his sources by inference and conjecture. But he's all the more convincing for that.

Some questions asked and answered:

Did the conquerors offer the defeated a choice between conversion and death? No. They offered conquest, and took the spoils. They offered their new subjects peace in exchange for tribute. Were the conquerors all Muslims? (I hadn't even thought to ask this question before reading Hoyland.) No; the first conquerors were Arabs leading Arab armies, but many were not Muslim.

The first conquerors did not think of Islam as a universal religion. It was an Arab religion. Muslims were exempt from all taxes. If the conquered people converted to Islam, there would be nothing left to take. When their new subjects asked to convert, the conquerors stalled them. They asked for an Arab Muslim sponsor. They asked for circumcision too. But the conquered still converted. There was nothing in the Qur'an to forbid it.

Two things accelerated the process: First, the Arabs had non-Muslim wives. Those wives gave them Muslim children. Second, the Arabs had non-Muslim servants in their armies and households. They needed the non-Muslims to fight for them, and to administer their estates. When they had rendered those services, the conquerors offered them manumission, and they accepted their requests to convert.

That meant that Islamic civilization assimilated Roman and Persian influences. Especially Persian influences. (Rome had survived, so honouring Rome was always more politically dubious than honouring Persia.) The great learned Muslims of the first centuries were not ethnic Arabs. They were not born Muslims. They were not the conquerors. They were Persians, Egyptians, and Syrians. They were converts. They were the conquered.

How did the conquerors take so much, so quickly? They were a nomad army on advantageous terrain, facing states weakened by decades of war. And as Roman and Persian allies in the centuries before Mohammed, Arabs in the borderlands had learned from the empires. Did the heterodox Christians of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and North Africa betray the orthodox empire? We have no contemporary evidence for it. Our sources suggest the opposite: the heterodox were as unhappy as the orthodox about the fall of the Near East to non-Christians.

The conquerors were not invincible. They took the Near East because it was flat, rich, and right next door. They had a lot of trouble in the highlands. They didn't make much headway in the Anatolian highlands and the Caucasus. They had trouble in the Sind and the Hindu-Kush. They tried and failed to take Afghanistan several times. Their sovereignty in northern Iran and the highlands of North Africa was more nominal than real. And they couldn't take Constantinople, even with Slavic help.

The empires were not defeated in the cities or in the countryside. They were defeated on the battlefield. They were not defeated by a new religion. They were defeated by a nomad army. But the conquerors were just and equitable, offering honourable terms to the defeated. (The Arab conquerors followed Near Eastern best practices in that regard.) The conquered kept their old freedoms. They kept their churches. They just had to pay a few new taxes.

[Heinz Reinhardt · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Arab Conquests, which in the span of less than a century spread from southern France in the West, to the borders of India and China in the East, have attained a bit of modern relevance due to recent geopolitical challenges. Anyone studying the Conquests, however, tend to repeat passed down historical tropes that aren't necessarily true when one digs deeper.
This book is written both as an introductory overview of the Arab Conquests, but also to do a bit of mythbusting and to shed some light on some overlooked aspects.
Possibly the most oft repeated myth is that of the uncivilized Arab nomads, bursting unexpectedly form the deserts of Arabia, and conquering all before them. As the author shows, this is not at all accurate.
In truth, most Arabs at the time immediately before the arrival of Mohammed were Christian, and were already dwelling in established, if minor, Arab Christian Kingdoms.
As such they were in intimate contact with both the Byzantine and Sassanian Persian Empires. Therefore they were not uncivilized savages, they were already sophisticated people who had contacts via trade with all of the powers of the region as well as the Chinese, Koreans, and Indians due to overseas trade.
The wars between the Eastern Romans and the Persians saw the Arabs often used as auxiliaries between the two sides against each other, and the Arabs were very well versed in the military nuances of both. The Abyssinian conquest of Yemen in the generation immediately before the rise of Islam (a response to a cruel Jewish ruling dynasty that acted quite barbarically to Christians, the Abyssinians being Orthodox Christian themselves) also put the Arabs in contact, and conflict, with the African empire emanating from Ethiopia.
That, in part, helps explain the rapidity of the Arab Conquests, as they already knew much of the ground they conquered, familiar with the ways and means of their foes, and had established relations with the locals they could use to their advantages.
Speaking of which, the author points out how the Arabs were willing to use diplomacy, as well as bribery to achieve expansion besides just the sword, and were largely successful, for a time, in balancing the needs abd desires of a multi-ethnic, multi-faith territory without revolts.
The Conquests themselves are briefly covered, but not skimmed over and barely mentioned as would be the case with most academic works. This is a relatively short work, 230 main pages, so there was a space constraint. Even so, the author does a wonderful job of showcasing the Conquests from a strategic perspective, doing his best to show how they won, or lost, rather than just mention that they did so.
The Arab Empire didn't last long. Defeats at the hands of the Franks, Byzantines, Afghans, Khazars, Indians, and Chinese brought to a halt their expansions in the 700's, while their Empire split apart in ethnic revolts and the Arabs themselves fought three civil wars before their first century of dominance was over.
And even though Spain, North Africa (save Egypt), and central Asia either broke away from their rule, or their gains were erased, these areas remained Islamic, and Arab culture and Arabization permanently changed those regions.
Overall, this was an excellent introductory source to the Arab Conquests. A book I highly recommend.

[Anthony Nelson · Rating 3 out of 5]

Perhaps I'm in the minority, but this is the type of book I would much rather be twice as long. Lots of good information, but little time to get acquainted with the people portrayed.

[dathomira]

read this as someone who was raised fairly fundie with an exacting knowledge of the 16 years between the prophets revelation and his conquest of mecca but NO outside or contextualizing information of the geopolitics of the time preceding the first or following the second so this was both illuminating and engaging. i did know a lot about the umayyads and their rise, but less about the specific battles and in-fighting, so if military history is of interest to you this will hit.

[Jimmy · Rating 5 out of 5]

I am glad that Oxford University Press published this book since works by Middle East historians on early Islamic conquest (seventh to ninth century AD) are rare as the author stated in the introduction and the end of the book. I thought this is a relevant book in light of the contemporary discussion about Islam, Islamic violence and the Middle East which lead some to ask the question of what the Islamic Arabic world was like shortly after Muhammad died. It is indirectly relevant to those discussions because this book touches on the early Islamic movement and warfare. The author has no intention of writing a book bashing Islam nor is he presenting an apologetics for Muslim. The book’ main thesis is to challenge the common assumption made by many people today including historians that the Islamic Arabic empire expanded rapidly at an unprecedented rate and that these military expansion are driven to convert people to Islam. Here the author points out that the Islamic expansion was at the same rate as those of other nomadic people such as the Mongols; the author also noted how few people converted to Islam during the military conquests during the early Caliphs as evidence that in the beginning the expansion was not about bringing about conversion of others to Islam per se. In fact, there were strong incentive in the beginning not to convert people into the Arabic community of faith, as that would mean the distinction between conqueror and conquered would be erased and the profit of invasion for the conqueror would disappear (in later period the issue of conversion was controversial because of what it would mean for the original Arabic party). I think the author’s citation of early Muslim political sources are solid in establishing this point. I really enjoyed how the book describe the context of the Arabic/Islamic expansion as during a time in which much of the known world was going through a population decrease due to diseases and also the weakening of empires that allowed the Islamic empires to rise and fill in the vacuum. Specifically those empires were the Byzantine, Persians and the Chinese. What made this book unique to other works on the Islamic military expansion (some of which are mentioned in the bibliography) is that this particular work didn’t just study the issue from 9th and 10th Century Arabic Sources (some centuries removed from the actual events) but instead it focused on the earlier sources and it also looked into non-Islamic sources. It is incredible to see the citation and footnotes of a wide array of cosmopolitan sources, from the Byzantines, Armenians, Christian monks, Persians, Chinese, Buddhist monks and travelers who wrote account, the author’s ability to cover such large and diverse sources make this a valuable work for decades to come. The appendix must not be missed in which the author summarizes some of the primary sources he employ, so that readers will get a better understanding of what it was that the author was citing. Excellent work and I recommend it for the history buffs, those interested in understanding the role of warfare and violence in Islam and those interested in the history of the Middle East.
NOTE: This book was provided to me free by Oxford University Press and Net Galley without any obligation for a positive review. All opinions offered above are mine unless otherwise stated or implied.

[Stephen · Rating 4 out of 5]

A Roman author referred to the Roman and Persian empires as the two eyes of the world -- but they didn't see the Arabs coming. In the span of a hundred years, a people from the desert wastes between Egypt and Mesopotamia had traveled from Spain to the Indus, bringing together a diversity of nations under one banner and laying waste to empires. History texts usually present a map of expansion as the sudden creation and explosive growth of Islam, but Hoyland argues that's premature. Instead, he examines the Arab conquests as...the Arab conquests, in which Islam is first the means of an alliance between Arab tribes that allows them to sack two ailing realms, and then is the means of forging their own empire that transcended tribal bounds. Instead of merely attributing the Arab spring into empire as one motivated by religious zeal, Hoyland examines the Arabs as actors on the historic stage, and dwells on their political skill.

The result is a history that overturns elementary assumptions. For instance, conquest and conversion were two completely different processes: even a province absolutely integral to the nascent Islamic civilization, Persia, was not majority-Muslim until the 14th century. (Islamic provincial governors were by no means eager to force conversion: non-Muslims were taxed by the government.) By preserving the structure of the societies they were conquering -- relying on Christian and Persian scribes, civil officers, etc to retain their roles -- and offering completely secular benefits for joining the Arabs on their globetrotting campaigns, what began as a local city-state quickened into a global phenomenon. Eventually, the religion of the Arabs, who had become the ruling class, would become the religion of a multitude, evolving along the way. Towards the end Hoyland dips into religious history, reflecting on how the century of war, mixed defeats and triumphs, and the assimilation of various cultures shaped it. For instance, he views the bar against images as a way for the Arabs to distinguish themselves against the decadent empires they had supplanted, but especially against the Romans, whose Constantinople twice defeats sieges here. While there were some brief spots in the strictly historical narrative that rivaled Numbers for being a list of names and places without story to them, Hoyland's insightful commentary more than makes for it, This is a history that illustrates not only the beginning of the Islamic world, but shows some of the shared machinery of empires in general. For a book on conquests, there's comparatively little about the actual execution of battles; for that, a source like Crawford's War of the Three Gods might prove a complement.



Related:
War of the Three Gods: Romans, Persians, and the Rise of Islam, Peter Crawford
Destiny, Disrupted: A History of the World Through Islamic Eyes, Tamim Ansary

[Justin Tapp · Rating 4 out of 5]

In an effort to greater understand the history of Islam and the Middle East, I worked through several books and concluded with some of the most recent books on Islamic reform and the rise of ISIS (many reviews forthcoming). In God's Path most closely resembles Tom Holland's In the Shadow of the Sword as well as the first half of Tamim Ansary's Destiny Disrupted. I've also read Reza Aslan's The Origins and Future of Islam, but Aslan crafts his story far too selectively from history in the years this book covers. Other books that assissted my understanding of this book are Albert Rouhani's History of the Arab Peoples, the surprisingly helpful Islam: A Very Short Introduction by Ruthven, The Koran: A Very Short Introduction by Cook, The Cambridge History of Turkey Vol. 1, and Justinian's Flea for the immediately preceding context up to 565 AD. I also used to live in Azerbaijan which was at an important geographic crossroads of much of the history in this book.

In God's Path is a lightning read, as it is a amazing how quickly nomadic tribes from the Middle East were able to subdue so many lands and peoples in just a couple centuries' time. Hoyland embraces the challenge of examining the scant literary evidence from the time period of 600-800 AD that Islam fanned out across the globe. He gives credence to 7th and 8th century sources as opposed to earlier texts, irregardless of their religious source. Christian texts of the period writing fearfully of Islamic invaders (ie: biased) still have value in dating events into a timeline. Hoyland does not focus much on religious development, except toward the end when Muslims began to write down and codify Islam. Instead he focuses on the battles and the characteristics of the tribal organizations that allowed for the most rapid expansion of an empire since Alexander the Great.

Beginning in the 630s, Hoyland examines the context in which Muhammed the Prophet arose. The Persian Empire had dreams of success over the collapsing Byzantine empire after the time and treaties of Justinian in the 550s. Plague and division had greatly weakened the Byzantine Empire. From 602-628 the Sassanids had pushed back in the Levant and Anatolia, forcing a seige of Constantinople in 626 before Turks in the area actually helped defend the area from the Persian-Avar attack in 627. A Byzantine resurgence and Sassanid civil strife eventually pushed the Sassanids out of their territories in Persia and Jerusalem. The Sassanids were in a weakened state to face a new threat of united tribes of Arab warriors.

The first period is the time before 600 to 640. The author points out that contrary to sterotype, Arabs are/were not all monolithically nomads, some controlled and inhabited cities alongside other peoples, like Jews. There were already a lot of battles around 610 AD between Arab tribes and Persians, Muhammed's own tribe was only one of many attacking Sassanids in both Persia and the west around 625-630, though the details are "lost to history." Muhammed's rise is dealt with rather quickly. He is opposed at Mecca in 622, the beginning of the Islamic calendar, forms an army in Medina, takes Mecca through both battle and marriage, uniting tribes into an impressive force capable of subduing other tribes of Arabic speakers and leading them to conquest. After Muhammed's death, the conquest of Palestine continued under the Rashidun Caliphate, for which Abu Bakr had laid down rules of war from Muhammed's teaching. Actual historical details of battles are not many, but in the 634 Battle of Ajnadayn, Muslim warriors from many united-but-rivalrous tribes outfought Byzantines. A monk in Jerusalem in 634 is recorded as calling for repentance in his city because the "Saracens," the Greco-Roman term for Arabs, were ravaging the area. In 636, the Rashidun Caliph's army defeated the Sassanids at Basra. There were definitely raids, if not battles, throughout Arabia. In 636, perhaps weakened by plague and doubtless out-generaled, the Byzantine force lost the Battle of Yarmouk, and with it Palestine and the Levant, a major blow. Syria, Damascus, and Antioch were written off by the retreating Byzantines. Gaza and Palestine eventually became fully occupied in 637. Historic accounts of the 636-637 seige of Jerusalem by Caliph Umar's forces are "murky." The Byzantines apparently surrendered without a fight. Jews had been both slaughtered and marginalized by the Byzantines, so some welcomed the Arab forces as liberators, as did some Christians-- who increasingly joined the Muslim conquerers for various reasons. Muslims granted freedom to Jews and Christians to practice, although there were varieties to policies in various territories depending on who was in charge fo the area. Conversian was often optional, and large populations of ethnic Christians were left alone provided they did not pose a threat. Later 9th century Muslim scholars adopted a view of spreading Islam by uniting all Arabs under Islam, but in the 7th century there was quite a bit of variety and not everyone in the marauding armies was Muslim.

The next major period is 640-652 AD. In 643, the Christian John of Nikiu chronicled conquest of Egypt by Amr ibn al-Aas, which took only two years. John apparently wrote that the Muslims were harsh on the populace, particular with taxation, but left churches and church property untouched. (His is a chronicle I'd like to read. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_of...) Like other Christian writers of the time, John saw the Muslim conquests as God's judgement on apostate Christians (his church itself was considered un-orthodox after the Council of Chalcedon).

Hoyland then quickly moves to the conquest of Libya and then Iran. Iran had claims on the Caucauses lands since 428 AD, but the Arab tribes moved quickly. (Today, the peoples of the North Caucases are largely Sunni whereas Azerbaijan itself is Shi'ia from later Persian occupation of the land south of the mountains.) In 640, the Arabs had invaded Armenia and were able to set up a buffer zone with Byzantium in Anatolia. History records that the choices facing non-Muslims were not "just submit or be killed in battle" but that a wide range of remedies were applied, the Arab conquerers were often outnumbered by Christians and others, after all. Some were given deals exempting them from taxes upon conversion, which led to quite a few converts-- and quite a few angry converts when those privileges were later taken away once the conquest had roughly ended and the focus switched to governing. Christians still made up the majority in Damascus, its walls were left intact. Many simply thought the Arabic occupation was a thing that would quickly pass at any rate.

While Hoyland does not go into nearly as much detail and speculation as does Holland, he does note that "the Arabic 'Bismillah' is an exact translation of the Greek en onomati tou theou ("in the name of God", p. 101). He notes a papyrus written in Greek and Arabic from 643 AD, the first document we have written in Arabic, which adopts many Greek terms and cutural forms of the area (some of which also come from Syriac). This suggests that there was already a similar Arabic "administrative tradition" as was found in Byzantine areas and that there was already a familiarity among both the conquered and the conquerers in culture, administration, and religion, such as that it may not have been a radically big deal for these groups to be under Arab control. Hoyland writes that we should refer to the conquerers as "muhajirun," whose message was "to conquer and settle" which was part of the appealing message for their recruits (p. 102).

Chapter 4 covers 652 to 685, beginning with the movement toward Constaninople. An Arab fleet sent to blockade the Bosphorous was "miraculously" (to the inhabitants) wiped out by a storm in 654. The Arabs were later able to blockade Constantinople from 668-669. Meanwhile, Arab differences resulted in civil war, allowing Christians a chance to regroup; Armenia restored its ties with Byzantium in 656. From 656-661, there was the first "Arab civil war" (chronicled well by Holland) which resulted in the Umayyads supplanting the Rashidun caliphs. There was increasing debate about who had the right of succession. Arab conquests had reached into what is now Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_F... Hasan ibn Ali submitted to the Ummayads to keep the peace.

Chapter 5, "The Great Leap Forward," covers the Berber-Arab conquest of Spain and an increasing shift toward actual governance circa 685-715. Caliph Abd Al-Malik is credited with the minting the shahada onto coins. Arabs were outnumbered 100 to one in non-Arab territories, so Islam and Arab cultured tended to be absorbed over time, with syncretism common in territories like the Caucasus. The line between ethnic and cultural Arabs became quite blurred. Hoyland writes that conversion became more common in Al-Malik's reign, and the Arab practice of enslavement encouraged conversion to gain more favorable treatment and potential freedom. At the frontiers of the Islamic state, deals were increasingly worked out which encouraged syncretism in order to get local subjugation.

In 703, Armenians revolted against the Arabs in what is now Naxchivan, and between 715-730 there was further "retrenchment and revolt." There is very little about Arab battle tactics or technology during this period and in 732 Arabs gained full control over what is now Azerbaijan. Armenia and Georgia were largely left alone and maintained their Christian heritage, whereas (Caucasian) Albania was not and did not. As the Arabs increased codification of Islam, the practice of Islam as the state religion became codified and minority religions were held protected but subservient. Alms-giving became mandatory around 730 AD. Arab Muslims, interestingly, paid lower taxes than non-Arabs but all were taxed. Initially, exemption from poll taxes encouraged local converts, but when fiscal needs led to repeal of this exemption the local populations across the territory would revolt.

We may often forget that there was no organized clergy or system of religion yet in the 8th century, most people who were writing down sayings of Muhammad or chronicling events were amateurs with other jobs. But Arabic becoming the new lingua-franca uniting the region from North Africa to the Central Asian steppe led to the intellectual boom in the 9th century as trade increased and Greek works were quickly translated into Arabic and disseminated. There were distinct differences between "Gentile Islam" and Arab Islam. While some aspects of codified Islamic law were already present early on, in many cases some local laws were incorporated. Some laws which were rejected were later claimed to have been explicitly rejected by Muhammed. The early civil wars were covered over by later Islamic history, and later scholars overrode the earlier. Only the Caliph ruling from 632-660 had the ability to truly legislate, after that the canon was closed.

The author concludes with thoughts on the success of the spread of the Islam empire, crediting it ultimately with the recruitment of nomads under one central ruler that made it effective. (My own thoughts): In that sense, it is no different than the Mongol invasions from the East-- a centralized command structure over a highly mobile force encountering other tribes and people who were weakened by divisions and plague, and in some cases eager to cast off the yoke of their current rulers. Perhaps unlike the Mongols, Arabs allowed for some tolerance and self-governance, and actually focused on building in place rather than simply extracting resources. It was only later when exclusive and extractive institutions were built, leading to the inevitable decline of the empire. Other books in the list at the top of this post deal more with the decline and psychological effects, Hoylands work deals purely with the rapid expansion. A solid four-star work.

[Derek · Rating 5 out of 5]

A concise, scholarly overview of the main thrusts of the Arab Conquests. I highly recommend this book to those whom are unfamiliar with these epochal events.

[Mohamad Ballan · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent book that sheds important light on the multiple factors that contributed to the process known to historians as the "Arab Conquests." Hoyland provides readers with crucial insight into the social, political, religious, and economic forces that contributed, in one way or another, to the establishment of Islam as a world civilization between 600 and 800 A.D. The author clearly has a strong grasp of the sources--textual, epigraphic, and numismatic--and his critical approach to the evidence is one of the strong points of the book. Rather than privileging later narrative histories of the conquests and the foundation of the Islamic Empire (many of which can be considered founding myths composed by later generations motivated by their own concerns), Hoyland roots his discussion in the seventh-century source material. This ultimately means that he is able to produce a narrative that is colored as much by the conquered as it is by the conquerors. The inclusion of these non-Muslim voices and narratives does a great service to the modern reader who can appreciate the complexity of the Arab conquests and the various ways in which it was understood by contemporaries. The excellent research is presented in a highly accessible, jargon-free manner which can allow this important work to be appreciated by students and scholars, specialists and non-specialists.

Highly recommended to all students of medieval history.

[Brett · Rating 3 out of 5]

A very historically solid book that discusses an important theme in Middle Eastern history. I felt that the book did a good job of discussing the Arab conquests in a modern and insightful way that exposes the common misconceptions regarding them. In particular, the thematic sections at the end of each chapter, the introduction, and the end of the book did a good job of this. The majority of the book's content was a little on the dense side, but very informative and detailed for people who are into the nitty-gritty details of wars and names.

The book only gets three stars from me for three reasons. First, I found that other books, such as Tom Holland's In the Shadow of the Sword, explained the book's major themes and arguments in a more cohesive, intelligent, well-written way. Second, this book's use of largely Christian or "Western" sources reminded me slightly of an orientalist approach; Hoyland justifies this in a mostly acceptable way, but I nonetheless thought that at certain moments, Arab accounts of events were "disproven" or painted in a patronizing light. Finally, the book was simply on the dull side at times. I don't blame Hoyland for this, as history books often can be very dry, but it did contribute to this book's rating of only three stars, rather than four.

Overall, In God's Path was a solid, though sometimes boring, exploration of the truly multicultural, patient character of the Arab Conquests.

[Melinda · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well balanced account of this period. I enjoyed the narrative and learnt a great deal.

[Carlos Wang · Rating 4 out of 5]

華文圈在這幾年，向讀者貢獻了不少伊斯蘭相關的作品，以台灣的廣場來說，《中斷的天命》就是一本相當出色的入門通史，作者文筆幽默，深入淺出。現在，他們又向我們推出了本書：《真主大道上》，一本講述阿拉伯帝國如何在短短的時間內迅速崛起並擴張的故事。

本書作者羅伯特.霍伊蘭(Robert G. Hoyland)是古代晚期跟伊斯蘭文明的研究者，但他更專注於研究基督教、伊斯蘭與猶太人之間的連結與身分認同的問題，還有一些文化知識的保留與傳播上。而他在序言自述在本書中的想要表達的目標更是吸引我想閱讀的動力。


首先，霍伊蘭在對於傳統研究者在史料的選擇上提出了質疑，他對那些“因為是伊斯蘭的歷史，應該優先注重他們自己的記述”這個理論不以為然。作者主張，穆斯林自身的許多史料，都是在八、九世紀之後的創作，距離阿拉伯帝國的征服與創立這個事件本身也有一定的年代之隔，霍伊蘭相信這些史家回顧過往的時候，不見得就有多中立客觀。相反的，他更樂意去從“接近當代的不同立場的史料”中去挖掘，進行比對跟考察。作者並不認為“基督教的記述就一定帶著敵意跟失實”。他在書中一直會存在這樣的觀點，讀者可以自己看看霍伊蘭到底怎麼檢證自己的見解，而且他在書後附錄了有運用過的相關史料，想深入研究的也可以去找找。(不見得有中譯就是)

其次，霍伊蘭深入地解釋了“阿拉伯征服”(他不稱“伊斯蘭征服”的原因是，作者並不認為參予這次行動的全部都是伊斯蘭信徒) 的快速成功的原因。他指出，阿拉伯人的征服並不是像匈人對中東或東歐，還是西班牙人對美洲那樣“突如其來”。他們做為黎凡特地區的“鄰居”已經很久，並扮演了很多重要的角色，例如傭兵，或者是成為波斯、東羅馬(拜占庭) 兩強競逐中的拉攏合作的戰略夥伴。

而且，與其說他們的征服造成了兩大帝國的衰亡，不如說是，拜占庭與波斯之間的劇烈鬥爭導致兩敗俱傷，露出了極大的破綻，才誘使這場入侵的開展；做為鄰居，阿拉伯人非常清楚兩大帝國的底細，當伊斯蘭社群成立後，他們便充分的利用了這個弱點。不過，作者有特別解釋，為何拜占庭能夠倖存，而波斯不能。主要原因是，波斯戰後陷入內亂，幾乎跟“插標賣首”沒有兩樣；而且他們國家的地形破碎，地方貴族本來就依靠中央的統合聚在一起，當波斯國王失位，首都淪陷，就各自為政，難再統合反抗。至於東羅馬，擁有一個得天獨厚的首都，而小亞細亞地形只能蠶食不能鯨吞提供了廣大的戰略縱深，雖然丟失了大半領土，可至少保住了部分核心。我們看到，伊拉克略雖然對波斯反敗為勝看起來有中興之氣，但其實是強弩之末，面臨阿拉伯的征服一開始集結了聲勢浩大的軍隊反擊，但吃了一場大敗仗後就無力重振，大部分的領地都只能自求多福。況且，伊斯蘭對投降者相當寬大，投降者的利益幾乎獲得了保證，對於當地宗教跟傳統也都允以尊重，只要你乖乖繳稅即可。這種手段幾乎是世界史上成功的征服者必備的技巧，阿拉伯人也運用的爐火純青，讓他們在各地甚少面臨重大的反抗。(除了阿富汗，那裡做為“帝國的墳場”真是“自古以來”。阿拉伯人在那邊吃鱉了三次，只好乖乖認栽。)

其三，霍伊蘭問了一個問題：這些征服者究竟是什麼人？

穆罕默德在早期其實提出了一個非常有政治智慧的政策，他向所有一神教的人們提出了協議書，大家共同遵守信仰，並且忠誠跟互信，向多神教徒開戰。這讓他聚攏了許多方面的人們，形成一個“穆民”社群，並維持了很長的一段時間。隨著戰爭的勝利，越來越多被征服者，或者機會主義者倒戈過來，伊斯蘭社群逐漸擴大，成分也更加多元，統治者在必要時也擴大了“阿拉伯人”的解釋以符合政治需求。雖然後面八、九世紀的伊斯蘭史學家很不喜歡提及這段歷史。然而，這非常符合當時地中海世界的身分認同觀。同樣的情況我們可以在西歐的日耳曼諸國看到，當地在消融的羅馬認同背後支解了“整體”，重新建立了“法蘭克人”、“哥特人”、“倫巴地人”，在定義上也都非常複雜，異於我們現在基於十九世紀民族主義的見解。

接著作者又問：為真主還是為利益而戰？

兩大帝國的衰弱招致周邊部族的蠢蠢欲動，這在歷史上並不奇怪。而阿拉伯半島在四、五世紀面臨經濟困境，例如古老的葉門王國的滅亡導致貿易衰退，都迫使當地人必須另尋出路。搭配伊斯蘭信仰中的驅使討伐不信者的教條，這成為共同驅動這場大征服的重要原因。至於到底為何而戰，可以說兩者都是吧。

最後，霍伊蘭探討了一個有趣的命題：雖然阿拉伯的征服快速又成功，但他們維持一個統一的帝國卻也十分短暫，何故？

他的解釋有兩個。第一，曾經困擾過波斯的地形導致的區域破碎化，同樣困擾著阿拉伯統治者，疆域太大了，包容的傳統跟民族太多，有些利益是無法兼顧，交通線的困難同樣妨礙著治理。第二，伊斯蘭的宗教意識型態並不鼓勵帝國統治。真主阿拉把權柄交給哈里發，但這個職位並不該是世襲化，儘管也有部分學者支持，但這種對立造成了不合；此外，阿拉伯人最初是遊牧民族，他們的傳統是利益均霑，但後來的寡頭統治階級開始獨占利益，就引起了不滿。從內部開始，帝國出現了裂痕。

討論完這些問題後，霍伊蘭繼續向讀者分析伊斯蘭文明。他說，這個新興宗教最初征服了廣大的土地與民眾，吸收了許多傳統與文化，融合了許多特色與概念，形成了獨樹一格的文明。雖然它沒有像基督教或佛教那些跟最初創立的族群分割，但也不至於像猶太教、印度教等宗教那樣帶著排外的色彩。不過，作者曾提過一個有趣的問題，做為同樣是亞伯拉罕系的一神教，伊斯蘭因為吸收了波斯文化的特色而發展出不同道路，假若非如此，它跟基督教是否還會如今日般的差別呢？


總而言之，霍伊蘭在本書中帶給讀者一場相當有趣的思辨之旅。他在每一章敘述完史實背後，都會展開探討與分析，而作者的文筆出色，見解言之有物，個人相當的喜歡這場閱讀體驗。廣場這次的翻譯也基本上沒太大的問題，除了幾個地方的人名沒有依照慣常的翻譯外(例如大名鼎鼎的Charles Martel 變成了戰槌查爾斯)。編輯方面除了提供的地圖中後兩張年代標錯(分別是685跟750)，沒太大的問題。

是可以放心推薦的作品。



第100頁

阿拉伯人直到第五位哈里發穆阿維耶在位時，才開始認真建構一個中央政府。在這之前，他們對於征服地的政策是一般慣用的伎倆：先維持xx年不變，然後再慢慢插手滲透。據說在很長一段時間，那些前拜占庭領土上的菁英，都還抱著“皇帝隨時會回來接管”的心態。阿拉伯統治者只有兩件影響深遠的政策，第一個就是發放薪水給士兵，讓他們集中在城市，避免“在地化”(像當時西歐發生的)；第二件就是課徵人頭稅。

作者引用了一張埃及保存下來的莎草紙，是七世紀的當地人繳稅給阿拉伯官員的收據，裡面透漏了三點重要的訊息：

1.西元紀年跟伊斯蘭紀年並行。

2.希臘文跟阿拉伯文並用，合約、擔保等都是“以主之名”(上帝或阿拉看你信誰了)。

3.文件稱這些征服者為阿拉伯人(magaritai 或 moagaritai)，這個詞可以指向阿拉伯文裡的一個用語：穆哈吉爾(muhajir：遷士)，這是穆罕默德在麥加奠基合約時的名詞，意思是指那些陪他從麥加出走到麥地那，又跟他一���打擊不信伊斯蘭的人。在古蘭經裡，這個詞跟吉哈德(聖戰)一起，都是邁向真主之路的意思。也是七世紀之後，人們稱呼那些征服者的詞。所以，作者主張，在七世紀的語境下，應該稱之為“穆哈吉勒征服”(muhajirun)，而不是八世紀後的阿拉伯、穆斯林征服。這也是當時大征服的動機。


第139頁

穆阿維葉是第一個讓哈里發如同專制君王般統治的人，他在歷史的名聲很差，除了他將這個頭銜世襲化外，還有內戰的影響。此外，一批七世紀的宗教學者，提出了只有先知跟他的血脈才能夠統治跟制定律法，不過他們並沒有譴責其他幾位哈里發，甚至最後表示他們也是接受了真神的引導，建立了黃金時代直到伍麥亞家族上台，但這個學說也不受普遍認可。直到九世紀以後一位影響力強的大學者發揚了這個見解，於是成為主流意見。但仍有許多死硬派堅持擁護阿里，他們分裂出去自成一派，被稱之為“什葉派”，而原本多數的就是“遜尼派”。

穆阿維葉的能力不下於前幾位哈里發，跟世界上許多強大帝國的開國君主一樣都有很多開明的政策，但他將伊斯蘭世界世襲化，注定了得不到好名聲。(大概像夏啟那樣吧)

[Wolgraugorimilir · Rating 5 out of 5]

I finished this faster than any other history book because it’s dense with answers to the questions which brought me here in the first place. Fabulously researched from relentlessly diverse sources, and simply spoken. This kind of stuff is what brings me back to history.

[Ciaran Greer · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent and Informative history on the Arab rise to power and their subsequent power struggles with identity and expansion. One of the best military history books I have read, while also providing a great cultural background. Highly recommend.

[Kumail Akbar · Rating 4 out of 5]

My only issue with this book is how short it was. The early eras of the rise of Arab-Islamic polities are fascinating and Hoyland could have elaborated more in this work.

[Andres Felipe Contreras Buitrago · Rating 5 out of 5]

En la introducción el autor nos menciona de la gran expansión que tuvo el islam, las fuentes contemporáneas a este acontecimiento en su mayoría son cristianas, en el texto, se van a poner en discusión 3 aspectos: el primero, es poner en duda qué tan rápida fue la expansión árabe, puesto que, otros pueblos nómadas también lograron una expansión así de sorprendente; el segundo, es recuperar la voz de los vencidos y el tercero, entender la cultura de medio oriente antes de la llegada de Mahoma, para ello es importante abarcar otros pueblos árabes, una cosa que deja en Claro él, es que las conquistas fueron más árabes que islámicas porque participaron muchos pueblos que no profesaban esa religión.

En el primer capítulo, el autor nos sitúa en el contexto en la época de la expansión árabe, para ello hay que remontarnos a los siglos 2 y 3 después de Cristo, en los que el imperio romano se expandía hacia el este, una vez la dinastía sasánida toma el poder, se vuelven más expansionistas, por lo que empieza en los ataques persas contra los romanos, pero se llegó a una aceptación mutua, no obstante de un periodo de Guerra Fría, se pasó a una escalada muy grande, fue tal la expansión persa que inclusive llegó a las puertas de Constantinopla, sin embargo, los bizantinos contraatacaron y humillaron a los persas, con ello el cristianismo se relacionó con esta victoria, esto conllevó también a una gran expansión y difusión de esta religión, inclusive en la península árabe había cristianos.

La guerra entre estos 2 imperios, condujo a que se necesitará más personal, Dado que, tanto Persia como Roma estaban agotados por tantos ataques, es aquí que entran pueblos periféricos como los turcos los cuales ayudaron a los bizantinos a derrotar a los persas, por otra parte, los ávaros también lograron una gran expansión al igual que los jázaros, dichos pueblos periféricos usaron sus interacciones con los grandes imperios para fortalecerse, sus objetivos era enriquecerse y no hacerse con el poder de estos. En el mundo árabe, existían ciudadanos romanos y otros que eran nómadas, estos últimos serán los más importantes ya que servían en el ejército de los 2 imperios en guerra, inclusive los líderes árabes, tenían cada vez más poder. Existió otro factor importante para el ascenso de los pueblos periféricos y es que había un declive en los imperios como se demuestra en la poca actividad comercial de la época, que también afectó a los árabes, otras variables a tener en cuenta fue la peste bubónica y las catástrofes ambientales, que resultaron en malas cosechas.

En el segundo capítulo, estamos ante un imperio persa muy inestable a causa de sus guerras fallidas, estaban siendo amenazados por los turcos, al grado de que estos estuvieron muy cerca de conquistar este imperio, pero una lucha interna les impidió hacer esto, allanando así el camino para los árabes. En la península arábica un reino de Yemen ya había conquistado gran parte de este territorio, posteriormente el reino de topia también llegó a conquistar partes al sur de este lugar, por lo que se puede decir que se desarrolló toda una civilización árabe al sur, pasamos así a todo un contexto de Mahoma y su mensaje de ellos. Los árabes tenían una ventaja y es que no tenían fronteras al norte de su península por lo cual el camino estaba libre para iniciar sus conquistas, estas incursiones no empezaron con Mahoma, ya que antes de él había precursores de estas acciones, llegamos así a la primera crónica de una guerra en Palestina en la que ganan los ejércitos de Mahoma, posteriormente estas tropas llegan al sur de Siria y logran capturar pueblos, pero en la batalla es yarmuk, es que sea la gran derrota de los bizantinos, en las que empieza a haber miedo dentro del pueblo romano.

Los árabes también lograron grandes victorias contra los persas, estos últimos se encontraban muy débiles ante la ausencia de un rey, al igual que con el imperio bizantino mucho antes de Mahoma había saqueos en las tierras fronterizas de Irak, este último lugar era importante debido Asus tierras fértiles, la batalla de Qadisiyya, fue la gran victoria de los árabes contra los persas, en el que lograron la toma del bajo Irak. Sobre la pregunta de quién eran estos conquistadores, es importante resaltar que muchas personas no árabes aprovecharon el periodo de inestabilidad para conquistar, conquistas anteriores se habían llevado a cabo antes de Mahoma y dirigidas por otros líderes, inclusive judíos y cristianos participan en la empresa expansionista árabe, por lo que en pocas palabras los conquistadores eran un pueblo muy diverso, muchos se unieron a las filas árabes, para no estar en el lado de los perdedores, tal como pasó con la caballería persa.

El porqué tuvieron éxito esta expansión es que muchas pequeñas incursiones aleatorias tuvieron un éxito con lo que provocó un efecto dominó en el que más personas participaron, los habitantes de la península arábica también estaban en una crisis económica por lo que necesitaban más recursos de los imperios próximos, el Corán también es una fuente importante de inspiración para luchar porque recompensa a quienes batalla en el nombre de Dios, no había muchas conversiones forzadas.

En el capítulo 3 la expansión árabe empezaba a generar pánico entre el pueblo bizantino, el terror era justificado, puesto que el imperio persa dejó de existir, muchos de los locales empezaron a pactar con los árabes, es aquí donde surge una de las grandes campañas árabes, la conquista Egipto, la cual era importante tomarla para debilitar al imperio bizantino a causa de sus impuestos y grandes cosechas, Egipto estaba mal preparado, no tenían un ejército adecuado, pese a todo, los árabes se impusieron y conquistaron todo Egipto, donde encontraré lo que se cree no fueron muy bien recibidos, inclusive llegaron a masacrar personas, pues a los intentos bizantinos de reconquistar a esta Tierra nunca pudieron.

Expandir el imperio árabe macias al sur de Egipto, era una tarea difícil a causa de los nubios, que resistían cualquier escaramuza árabe, además no se conquistó Etiopía a causa de sus pocas riquezas que había. Los árabes se seguían expandiendo en Irán, donde lograron tomar la residencia favorita, esto gracias a las conspiraciones locales. Conquistar el Cáucaso era una tarea complicada a causa de su terreno montañoso, los árabes lograron conquistar a Armenia, siendo los armenios los que juraron lealtad hacia este pueblo a causa de la debilidad bizantina, durante aquella época los árabes se dieron cuenta de que necesitaban una armada para conquistar la isla de Chipre, logrando este objetivo, nuevamente el éxito de las conquistas árabes se debió a como ya se ha mencionado a la debilidad de ambos imperios que la gran experiencia que tenían los árabes por prestar servicio militar a los imperios, además que fue fácil hacer una coalición con los pueblos árabes cercanos, con ello había una estructura de mando unificado y coherente, no solo se usó la guerra para expandir el imperio, ya que también se usó la diplomacia como el respetar a los locales. Sobre los primeros años del gobierno árabe hay muy poca información respecto a los primeros califas, estos llegaron a usar el sistema que ya existía en los pueblos conquistados, inclusive se usaban las monedas de ambos imperios, empero, introdujeron grandes innovaciones como el pago a los soldados y el impuesto capitacional.

El cuarto capítulo es una pausa de la expansión árabe a causa de 2 guerras civiles y al deseo de establecer un control administrativo, los árabes querían conquistar Constantinopla, aunque ese objetivo no se logró a causa de una tormenta que destruyó toda la flota árabe lo que dio inicio a guerras civiles dentro del mundo árabe, aunque las embarcaciones árabes eran superiores a las bizantinas a causa de su ligereza, una tormenta salvó a Constantinopla de la avalancha árabe, aunque estos intentaron poner un cerco, fracasó a causa de 3 razones: la primera, es que los árabes ya no soportaban más; la segunda, los bizantinos contaron con refuerzos y tercero, el fuego griego ayudó a quemar las embarcaciones árabes. En el Cáucaso, los armenios expulsaron a los árabes por el fracaso de estos en la conquista de Constantinopla, por ello es que los árabes arrasaron Armenia como forma de venganza, aunque Armenia gozó de cierta libertad a causa de las guerras civiles en el mundo árabe una vez son acabadas, los armenios vuelven a aliarse con los árabes.

Los terrenos del norte de Irán y Asia central estaban dotados de cadenas montañosas lo cual impedía su conquista más fácil, otro lugar es como en Afganistán la resistencia era fuerte y los turcos llegaron a establecerse allí, en el norte de África la expansión también era difícil, por ejemplo, existía una frontera natural la cual era la cordillera del atlas, aun así los árabes lograron conquistar Túnez.

Aunque existiera un levantamiento persas con el objetivo de resistir a la dominación árabe, estas revueltas no fueron sostenidas y principalmente eran locales por lo que no se podrían expandir más, por otra parte, a los bizantinos tampoco le era fácil reconquistar Tierra del cercano oriente, ya que no contaban con los recursos para un desembarco numeroso, pese a las guerras civiles dentro del mundo árabe, hubo poca fragmentación, los conquistadores no le eran ajeno los asuntos de gobierno gracias a la influencia del sur de Yemen, como imperio ya estaban viendo que no era necesario una capital tan aislada como era medina, se necesitaba de una nueva capital como damasco, fue importante en esta época la ayuda de aliados no musulmanes, la forma en que se enriquecieron los árabes fue por medio de la apropiación de tierras abandonadas, sumado al consumo ostentoso que estimulaba la economía.

El capítulo 5 el gran salto hacia adelante, vemos como un nuevo grupo musulmán se hace con el poder, por lo que para crear unión se dictó una moneda única y el árabe como idioma oficial, iniciando ha sido un nuevo impulso para las conquistas, los bizantinos trataron de impedirlo, pero fracasaron, los bizantinos sí tuvieron cierto éxito en reconquistar a África, el lugar más disputado fue Cartago a causa de sus grandes cosechas, pese a que cambió de manos muchas veces los árabes lograron conquistar, en África los árabes se hicieron aliados de un poderoso pueblo los bereberes. En la península ibérica, existía una gran división entre los reyes visigodos, por lo que el cruce de árabes y bereberes supuso una gran victoria, aunque la caída de este lugar se debió a los acuerdos de los locales con los árabes, la escasez de fuente de esta conquista es resultado del poco interés que tenían los árabes por este lugar tan remoto. Los árabes también lograron expandirse por Afganistán y transoxania, esto se logró gracias a que nunca hubo un frente unido que pudiera resistir a los árabes, en otra religión es el budismo era tan fuerte que dificultó la conquista árabe.

Los pueblos del Cáucaso también se resistían a la conquista, cuando los armenios se revelaban los árabes no dudaban en ningún momento en quemar a los nobles de este lugar. Los árabes se llegaron a mezclar con muchas personas no árabes, la cultura árabe, nunca se llegó a imponer, solo se absorbía y se reformaba según los valores locales, las conversiones de los no árabes al islam se debía a que las personas deseaban escalar en la jerarquía de poder, en pocas palabras se convirtió el individuo al islam para tener mejores condiciones, pueblos como el cristiano que tenían una historia de resistencia fueron los que difícilmente se convirtió en al islam, esta mezcla entre ambas culturas llegó a ser difícil de distinguir entre árabes y no árabes, por lo que el imperio se volvió uno muy cosmopolita, los no árabes en el ejército funcionan como tropas auxiliares, pero las guerras civiles en el imperio árabe hizo que se necesitará de más guerreros no pertenecientes al mundo árabe, si existieron revueltas de estos últimos, pero fueron muy pocas.

El sexto capítulo es sobre el nuevo fracaso para conquistar Constantinopla, los árabes se encontraron el límite de su expansión a causa de pueblos más organizados como los francos, jázaros, turcos e indios, Bizancio logró sobrevivir gracias a sus recursos, pese a que se había preparado un gran ejército para conquistar el imperio bizantino a los árabes se les privó de sus suministros por los que vieron abandonar el asedio, los francos también pusieron resistencia en la expansión de los árabes en Europa, pero contrario a lo que se cree, no se siguieron haciendo intentos para conquistar la Tierra los francos a causa de los problemas con los bereberes, además que no había muchos recursos, puesto que España era muy alejado de damasco, sobre los bereberes estos iniciaron una revuelta en los que establecieron diferentes reinos poderosos, el fracaso en Constantinopla también frenó la expansión de los árabes en Asia central, aunque he logrado poner fin a la influencia China en esta región, en el Cáucaso los jázaros dominaban como resultado también de la derrota de los árabes en Constantinopla, por lo que estos pueblos también debieron coexistir, ya que una derrota absoluta del otro era difícil.

Durante aquella época del islam se impuso como religión del estado, aunque los no musulmanes eran clasificados y debían pagar un impuesto si no eran obligados a ser convertidos o ser asesinados, aunque la regulación de este grupo de personas se dio mucho tiempo después, no obstante, los árabes siempre tuvieron miedo de los no árabes temía a que obtuvieran más beneficios que los locales. Los omeyas a causa de sus derrotas y reforma sufrieron un gran rechazo por parte de los árabes, por lo que empezaron a gestarse movimientos como los chiitas en Irán.

En el capítulo 7 se nos vuelve a reiterar que los árabes vieron frenada su expansión a causa de las fronteras naturales ya los estados muy bien organizados con los que se encontraban, por lo que ahora la religión musulmana se expandía por medio de comerciantes y misioneros, el objetivo ahora era forjar una civilización tal como lo hicieron los abasíes, muchas partes del imperio se separaron como es el caso de España a mano de los omeyas, varios pueblos túrquicos conquistaron varios lugares del imperio árabe, pese a toda la fragmentación, el islam era la religión que unía todos estos pueblos, el porqué de la fragmentación del imperio árabe, es que su imperio era muy vasto recorrido por desiertos y montañas por lo que cualquier revuelta local hacía difícil acallarla, pero también era vulnerable a otras incursiones no más como es el caso de las tribus túrquicas o mongolas, además hay que sumarle que el islam era muy hostil al sistema imperial de gobierno, no había un clero que justificara el sistema imperial, y mucho del botín capturado no era dado para el estado, sino que se lo quedaban los conquistadores, los árabes también lograron imponer su lengua a causa de que no debía de lidiar con tantas lenguas, solo con el griego y el persa, en los terrenos ya muy alejados la lengua local era la que sobrevivía, en esta época es que también surge la gran cultura árabe en donde hay grandes aportes a la cultura y ciencia, inclusive se crea un conjunto de leyes islámicas con influencia de leyes anteriores a Mahoma.

A manera de conclusión, el autor nos menciona que la ventaja de los árabes fue por ser guerreros nómadas lo cual los hacía más móviles, estos pueblos también contaban con gran experiencia militar a causa de servir a 2 grandes imperios, el islam fungía como entidad que integraba estos pueblos, también mucho de la cultura persa influyó en el mundo árabe, ya en el epílogo el autor nos muestra fuentes y comentarios respecto a fuentes primarias contemporáneas de las conquistas árabes.

[J · Rating 4 out of 5]

Certainly a very fun book with many fine anecdotes

[H. P. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Hoyland (or his publisher) chose a funny name for Hoyland’s book on the Arab conquests. So much of Hoyland’s thought-provoking and groundbreaking book downplays the role of religion and Islam. Any historian of the birth of Islam and the Arab conquest faces a basic problem—essentially all of the Arabic sources were written two centuries later. Hoyland adopts a sensible response that is otherwise avoided, I assume, due to academic siloing and language barriers. That is, he consults contemporary, non-Arabic sources.

These are frequently Christian sources, but another major theme of Hoyland’s work is that religious differences were not as important then as centuries later. Early Muslims tended to divide the world between adherents of Abrahamic religions and pagans. The Middle East of the time was pluralistic. Certain unorthodox Christian sects had been persecuted by the orthodox and welcomed a more forgiving Arab rule. Later Islamic sources see only Muslims and infidels, Persians and Turks; Christian and other contemporary sources show a rich tapestry of religions and ethnic groups. Islam only broke “away from the more narrow Judeao-Christian focus” after “east Iran/Transoxania provided a majority of the troops who would overthrow the Umayyad dynasty in AD 750.”

Hoyland pushes back against the idea that the Arab armies sprang forth from a desert nowhere. “Arab tribesmen had been serving in the armies of Byzantium and Persia in large numbers in the fifth and sixth centuries.” It is true that nomadic Arabs played an important role in the conquering armies (nomadic people can produce roughly twice the soldiers per capita) but there were a number of Arabs living in cities in the Levant and much of the early Arab armies were drawn from Yemen, which had been civilized for centuries. The Arabs were exposed not only to the Byzantine and Persians but also Ethiopians and Indians.

Hoyland also pushes back against the idea that the Arabs deserve all the credit for toppling the Persian Empire and crippling the Byzantine one. The Byzantine and Persian empires had conspired for their own demise through over a century of costly war. Those empires also suffered heavily from a plague that didn’t hit the more dispersed Arabs as hard. The Arabs co-opted a long tradition of cutting agreements with conquered peoples to respect life, property, and customs in return for submission and tribute.

Hoyland redefines the role of Islam. Islam was not the all-important factor as it is sometimes treated, but it played a key role. It helped the Arabs develop the strong organization necessary to conquer and govern their large empire. Islam’s initial tolerance “distinguished it from Christendom” and “enabled Christians and Jews to make a substantial contribution to the intellectual life of the Islamic world.” Conversion only took place slowly (in part because more Muslims meant more diluted spoils), and non-Muslims “formed the majority of the population of the Middle East for at least the first three centuries after the death of Muhammad.” It goes beyond the scope of the book, but of course it was religion that took Islam past the “natural barriers and well-organised states” that stopped Arab armies. On the opposite side of the coin, the lack of an organized clerical hierarchy robbed the Arab Empire of a potential source of imperial support.

Hoyland also redefines what it meant to be “Arab” at the time. It was already applicable to a number of non-ethnically Arab people in the Levant in Muhammad’s time who spoke Arabic, and became in the Arab Empire “a term like ‘American,’ applied to people with very different roots, but who have shared cultural values and a common language.” The Arabicization led to a cultural boom as texts from other nation-states “were translated into Arabic, studied, and made a part of the intellectual worldview of Islamic civilization.”

In discussing the decline of the Arab Empire, Hoyland covers geographic scope and exposure to nomads like the Turks and Mongols, but also touches on the vulnerability to climate fluctuations of the marginal, arid lands of much of the empire. That’s not a point unknown the literature, I think, but one less prevalent in popular histories.

The bulk of the book, which concerns the conquests themselves, suffers from sparse source material. Without accounts of tactics and weaponry employed, it inevitably turns into a tiresome string of dates and names. The section on the Islamicization and Arabicization of the Middle East doesn’t suffer the same weakness and is much stronger. This is a book from an academic publisher, but it doesn’t read like it. Hoyland addresses scholarly dispute without robbing the story of its narrative force.

Disclosure: I received a free, advance copy through NetGalley.

[Christopher · Rating 4 out of 5]

Short overview of the period of the Arab conquests in the first two centuries after Mohammed's death. The author's main perspective is to use contemporary sources by non-Arabs. The main Arabic sources are later and tend to reinterpret the earlier period from a teleological perspective by which the conquests are a purely Arab enterprise carried out by pious adherents of the one true god with his help. Hoyland emphases the local circumstances in the aftermath of the brutal wars between the Persians and the Eastern Roman Empire that resulted in the exhaustion of those two states. Basically, the Arabic tribes of the Arabian peninsula had been a part of the military conflict between those states, and the galvanizing force of the new religion combined with the military exhaustion of the two major powers of the Middle East resulted in the permanent loss of Byzantine territory south of the Tarsus Mts. and the complete collapse of the Persian state, whose populace then largely converted. The author also treats the social circumstances that allowed small Arab/Moslem groups to dominate much larger populations of conquered adherents of other religions, and the policies and circumstances that led to the gradual Arabicization/Moslemification of the area, which resulted in the formation of the modern Arab/Moslem world, which is much broader than the area in the Arabian peninsula that gave rise to it.

The story told makes overall sense. There is a huge amount of historical information and processes to deal with in a rather short compass (less than 250 pp. of real text). The necessarily thin narrative is a little trite at times, but the main point is the overall interpretation of the historical process rather than the details, so I guess the weak narrative is excusable (even if the threadbare narrative is at times a bit unengaging).

[Mohammed Adnan]

في السبيل الى الله
الفتوحات العربية وتكوين الإمبراطورية الإسلامية
للمستشرق: روبرت جي هويلاند
ترجمة: الدكتور فلاح حسن الأسدي
عدد الصفحات: 380
الكتاب صادر عن جامعة اكسفورد في عام 2016
نبذة عن الكتاب ؛
للكتاب الحالي أهمية كبرى إذ يقدم رؤيةً مختلفةً عن تكوين الإمبراطوريَّة العربيَّة الإسلاميَّة للفترة من ظهور الإسلام حتَّى نهاية الحكم الأمويِّ (132 هـ/ 750م)، وتعتمد على استخدام المصادر غير الإسلاميَّة للفترة موضوع الدراسة، كالنقوش والبرديَّات والحوليَّات المسيحيَّة وغير المسيحيَّة، التي أكَّدت أنَّ العرب كانوا يخدمون في الجيوش البيزنطيَّة والفارسيَّة في الفترة قبل الإسلام بوقتٍ طويلٍ، وأحرزوا تدريبًا قيِّمًا على استخدام الأسلحة والخطط العسكريَّة في الجيوش الإمبراطورية. وأشارت هذه المصادر أيضًا إلى أنَّنا يجب رؤية الكثير من تحالف النبيِّ محمَّد مع القبائل العربيَّة في غرب الجزيرة العربيَّة، البدو منهم والمستقرِّين، ليس بوصفهم مجرَّد خارجيين يبحثون عن الغنائم وسلب الإمبراطوريَّات ونهبها، إنَّما عناصر داخليَّة تبحث عن مشاركةٍ في ثروات أسيادهم الإمبراطوريِّين، وكما هو الحال عند دخول القبائل الجرمانيَّة إلى الإمبراطوريَّة الرومانيَّة في القرون الميلاديَّة الأولى.
لقد أوضح الباحث نقطةً مركزيَّةً في بناء الإمبراطوريَّة العربيَّة الإسلاميَّة، وهي السرعة التي تمَّت بها بناء تلك الإمبراطوريَّة ليس بوصفها نتيجةً لقيادة العرب لتلك الفتوحات واعتمادهم على قواهم الذاتيَّة فحسب، بل استغلالهم للزمن الذي لم يكن إلى جانب الإمبراطوريَّتين الفارسيَّة والبيزنطيَّة، والبرهنة على استخدام "الاستيعاب المتبادل" الذي سمح للعرب والشعوب المفتوحة بالعيش معًا وخلق هُويَّة إسلاميَّة جديدة وحضارة إسلاميَّة فتيَّة…

[Zaid · Rating 2 out of 5]

Interesting, but there are better books on this subject

I had high hopes for this book and looked forward to a unique perspective of the Arab conquests during the early years of the Islamic empire. However, I was disappointed by the authors opinion that manifested through the book, which discounted the testimony of Arab sources and showed a lack of comprehension towards the Islamic faith.

In addition, the book was very difficult to follow. It is ordered chronologically and by region. Yet, there is no context to the individuals in the book. Names and leaders just show up, and the jumping between events make this a challenge to follow.

I understand that Robert Holland wanted to provide a unique understanding of the history of the Arab invasions but the lack of Arab sources and understanding of Islam made this book miss out on a full comprehensive offering. For example, he cites that Abd al Malik established the creed “There is no God but God and Muhammad is his messenger” to garner larger Muslim support (Location 2301 in book). These statement are numerous in the Quran and was long established before the Al Malik “established” it. Statements such as this were many and it unfortunately took away from the book.

[Ali · Rating 3 out of 5]

I have a huge interest in the topic covered by the book and I was really excited to read it to better understand the actual impact of "politics" on the early days of the Islamic empire founding, and obviously a different perspective from the traditional, mainstream view of the Islamic civilization founding and growth.

Even though the book did satiate some of my interest, I still found it a bit too fragmented at various points and just getting too bogged down in really intricate details and dates. I would have liked it to have more analysis and critical thinking of the impact of the incidents and activities going on, rather than dry just specifying dates, battles and names.

It is still a good book, and well worth a read, but my wait for a book that covers this topic to the depth it requires still goes on.

[Sarah Nichols · Rating 3 out of 5]

This well-researched history provides a wealth of information about the territorial expansion of the Arab world during the 7th and 8th centuries. As the title implies, it focuses on the military conquests of the Arabs and challenges the commonly held notion of an Arab "Blitzkrieg". While I enjoyed reading the book and certainly gained new insights into this period, I wish that the author had gone into more detail about the political organization of the new empire and the cultural interaction between the conquerors and the native populations. This is not missing from the book, but seems to be relegated to a small section at the end of each chapter.