What a curious book! Paola Cavalieri composes a Socratic dialogue to argue for a non-speciesist view of animal rights, and four respondents critique (not to say criticize) the dialogue. Cary Wolfe and Matthew Calarco approach from (broadly) the perspective of critical theory and continental philosophy; Harlan Miller is mainly sympathetic to Cavalieri's project; and John (J. M.) Coetzee assails the bloodlessness and lack of realism in any philosophical approach by saying that most people (and animals) crave the physical pleasure that eating meat and killing other animals involve, and we need to get real and stop being so high-minded.
Cavalieri's somewhat peevish response to Wolfe and Calarco is to complain that continental philosophy essentially has its head up its arse and doesn't deal with reality that laws and rights matter. Calarco and Wolfe in turn tell her that she misunderstands such continental philosophers as Derrida and Levinas and that they (and Calarco and Wolfe) are interested in going beyond the anthropocentric and perfectionist boundaries that define the languages of rights and laws. Coetzee claims he was misunderstood and that, sure, thinking is as important as having sex and fun, but, he states, we need to employ more than just the brain in persuading people to change their habits. Calarco, Wolfe, and Miller come back in the end to wonder in their various ways and with differing degrees of intensity whether the spat between continental and analytical philosophy isn't all beside the point, given the vast horrors of industrialized animal abuse, but I'm not sure that the harmony is that convincing. Wolfe wonders whether they're all just talking past each other—which, by the end, I also felt.
I find myself in sympathy with Wolfe and Calarco, and to a degree with Coetzee—although the last could have been a little less chilly in his championing of the quest for la dolce vita. On the other hand, I find myself wondering, perhaps along with Cavalieri, just what, therefore, we're expected to "do" when confronted with animal abuse. I'm also frankly irked (like Cavalieri) by Derrida's non-vegetarianism and Levinas's failure to acknowledge the animal's "face"—and no amount of fancy talk can convince me otherwise than it's some kind of failure of nerve. Nonetheless, whether you're analytic or continental, this is an intriguing book, not least as a curiosity. How Cavalieri must feel to write something and then have, within the pages of the same book, her effort taken to task so strongly, I can't imagine!