The Wandering Army: The Campaigns that Transformed the British Way of War

by Huw J. Davies

At the outbreak of the War of Austrian Succession in 1742, the British Army’s military tactics were tired and outdated, stultified after three decades of peace. The army’s leadership was conservative, resistant to change, and unable to match new military techniques developing on the continent. Losses were cataclysmic and the force was in dire need of modernization—both in terms of strategy and in leadership and technology.
 
In this wide-ranging and highly original account, Huw Davies traces the British Army’s accumulation of military knowledge across the following century. An essentially global force, British armies and soldiers continually gleaned and synthesized strategy from warzones the world over: from Europe to the Americas, Africa, and Asia. Davies records how the army and its officers put this globally acquired knowledge to use, exchanging information and developing into a remarkable vehicle of innovation—leading to the pinnacle of its military prowess in the nineteenth century.

Genres: Military History, History, 18th Century, Nonfiction, Military Fiction

384 pages, Hardcover

Published December 13, 2022

Reviews

[Michael · Rating 5 out of 5]

Davies uses an encyclopedic analysis of the British army over roughly 1740-1840. His main thesis is the army's 18th Century's experiences fighting in the 7 Years war and Peninsular campaign in Europe, the French and Indian War and American Revolutionary conflict and Western Caribbean in the western hemisphere and on the Indian subcontinent provided lessons learned and encouraged innovation away from the old continent mass attack heavy infantry strategy around for decades.

Generals Howe, Clinton, Amherst, and Murray also saw how defeating the French and Americans would need new strategies like securing supply lines, using local intelligence and native allies, building a light infantry and could move in the forests hidden and agile. The old brown Bess muskets were also aging against enemies in the Anglo Mysore war in the 1780s. less visible and comfortable uniforms, more accurate and useful rifles, not torturing the locals by using a speculative enlightenment, all would become knowledge to be transferred in conversations, papers, books, a new military school to officers and soldiers alike.

The British army outperformed Napoleons grand army in Egypt, Spain, the Caribbean and finally in Belgium at Waterloo in 1815 to conquer London's greatest enemy. however the military leadership then began to ignore much of what learned and pushed a revisionist old school approach again, de-modernizing tactics and strategies resulting in losses against the US in the battle of New Orleans, against indigenous Maori and aborigines in the SOUTH Pacific, even against Afghan rebels in 1841 and Xhosa warriors in South Africa.

Officers like Abercrombie, Cornwallis, Burgoyne and Cumberland used civilized behavior against European foes but not against natives or indigenes or American who were deemed traitors. American leaders like Washington and Lincoln used guerilla tactics and American hatred against the redcoats to make the American colonies unwinnable. the military is a slow stubborn learning institution.

The army did hold the empire together despite mistakes and erratic knowledge use. of course the Royal navy's presence didn't hurt and Davies does mention sea support at appropriate times. Strongly recommend even if military history is not your forte.

[Rhiannon · Rating 5 out of 5]

Davies has a thesis and explains it very clearly. You won't get a campaign history from this book but you will get an overview of the transmission of ideas about warfare between different regiments and battlefields in the eighteenth century: the way that defeat prompted reform and victory led to complacency and conservatism. It's a truism that armies prepare to fight their last war. Davies digs into the philosophical impulses and practical networks that underpin that impulse. In that sense, The Wandering Army could be read in counterpoint to the examination of national and cultural responses to lost wars in Schivelbusch's The Culture of Defeat.

Davies focuses on military practice; but the part I found most interesting was the way that these developments took place alongside enlightenment philosophy. The same philosophical and cultural impulse towards 'humane warfare' were used in other contexts to justify atrocity and the user of terror tactics against non-Europeans and civilian populations. This aligns with things I've read about the development of the international red cross organisation such as DePies phd thesis Humanitarian Empire: The Red Cross in Japan 1877-1945.

The book is little repetitive, as books making an argument generally are; and I felt Davies skimmed a bit over the changes in the nineteenth century that disrupted the knowledge networks he described in the eighteenth.

4.5 stars, rounding up.

[Robert · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is a slog. It’s very detailed about British military history so it is not for the casual reader.

[Tim · Rating 2 out of 5]

This was a thoroughly researched and written history book that does an excellent job going over the intended topic. But for myself personally, it was a bit too dry and uninteresting.