The definitive history of the Spanish Armada, lavishly illustrated and fully revised
In July 1588 the Spanish Armada sailed from Corunna to conquer England. Three weeks later an English fireship attack in the Channel—and then a fierce naval battle—foiled the planned invasion. Many myths still surround these events. The genius of Sir Francis Drake is exalted, while Spain’s efforts are belittled. But what really happened during that fateful encounter?
Drawing on archives from around the world, Colin Martin and Geoffrey Parker also deploy vital new evidence from Armada shipwrecks off the coasts of Ireland and Scotland. Their gripping, beautifully illustrated account provides a fresh understanding of how the rival fleets came into being; how they looked, sounded, and smelled; and what happened when they finally clashed.
Looking beyond the events of 1588 to the complex politics which made war between England and Spain inevitable, and at the political and dynastic aftermath, Armada deconstructs the many legends to reveal why, ultimately, the bold Spanish mission failed.
I enjoyed this book immensely. The historiography was excellent—solid documentation going back to original sources including a thorough survey of archives and archaeological data (mostly underwater Spanish ships).
The book argues that the traditional interpretation of what happened (unsurprisingly) is far too simple. While the Spanish fleet certainly faced the confluence of factors outside of their control, there were other, very specific reasons why the enterprise failed. I appreciated the in-depth analysis and the recognition that simple narratives never suffice for good historical analysis.
-Phillip II of Spain's hubris, micromanaging every detail of the invasion and pinning his hopes on the confidence that God would help. That led, for instance, to his critical assumption that the fleet would be able to quickly and successfully rendezvous with the land forces in Flanders to cross the channel and invade. When the messengers took longer to reach the Duke of Parma in Flanders and the rendezvous was delayed, the entire plan quickly fell apart. -The Spanish military hierarchy was fragmented and contentious. Because of internal conflicts between the Spanish officers, decisions were nearly impossible. (This is acknowledging, still, that the English command was hardly efficient. Francis Drake often acted independently and rather self-servingly. But the English were still able to learn and adapt far better than the Spanish hierarchy.) -On a related note, the Spanish military culture was significantly inferior at this time. While they had an abundance of money and resources, the size and calibre of their guns, for instance, was not at all standardized, making supplying them extremely complicated. The English were likewise appalled by the conditions their Spanish peers lived in on board the ship with vermin and a putrid stench. Spanish officers didn't inspect or get involved with the details of their inferior's work. -The English were innovating new strategies of naval combat. Specifically, they viewed ships as artillery platforms, boarding them primarily with sailers. The Spanish, however, relied on the older, traditional methods, using fewer sailers and mostly soldiers. Their goal was to grapple and board ships, overcoming the enemy with superior forces in hand-to-hand combat. As a result, the English ships were lighter and more maneuverable, while many of the Spanish ships were converted merchant vessels—huge hulks. This was mirrored by the skill of the English sailors. (Of course, a major factor is the fact that the Armada carried with them the additional machinery needed for land invasion and provisions for a long journey. The English ships needed only to last for a week or two of battle.) -This also led to differences in artillery engineering. The Spanish ships had longer, more bulky guns (designed for land use) that made multiple reloading nearly impossible. These guns also had to be loaded by pulling them back (nearly impossible because of their size) or loaded outside the ship, which was essentially suicidal. Their larger ordnance was loaded and fired once, and thereafter soldiers returned to the main deck to await boarding. Archaeological evidence demonstrates that the large Spanish guns were fired only a few times. The English guns were shorter, on spoked wheels, and could be pulled inside the ship for reloading. This meant that the English ships fired their larger ordnance many times during the battle with devastating results. -As these differences worked themselves out in battle, English captains gradually learned how to maximize their strategic advantages. The critical battle (Gravelines) occurred while the Spanish fleet waited for their rendezvous with the land invasion forces (which never happened). The English ships used fire ships (another developing innovation) and extensive success from their artillery while not providing the Spanish ships an opportunity to board or much opportunity to fire back with their artillery. (Martin takes issue and successfully argues against the more traditional idea that the English had longer range artillery and simply stayed outside of the shorter range of the Spanish guns. Rather, both sides demonstrably had large and long range guns. Because of the difference in the gun designs and the fact that the Spanish didn't have trained gun crews, they hardly used their larger artillery while the English fired constantly.) -After Gravelines, the English gave chase (even though they were very nearly out of ammunition) and the Spanish fleet was forced into the North Sea. Because of the regular wind and out of fear of the British, this forced them to return home by crossing above Scotland. While the storm that struck as they returned was disastrous, this was hardly exceptional for where the ships were at. Furthermore, many of the ships had suffered debilitating damage to their hulls during the bombardment, and during the long journey home many of the ships failed structurally.
Other interesting things: -It was extremely fascinating to think about what a huge difference technology has made on navigation and naval warfare. One of the biggest issues for the Armada was communication. Any information might take weeks to reach its destination or might never make it. Even after the battle was over, Elizabeth knew the outcome a long time before Philip II did. Similarly, the issue of keeping provisions was huge, since even sea biscuits would rot after a few months. -Spanish ships that crashed on the Irish coast received little mercy. Most sailers were executed immediately. -Afterwards, English sailors involved in the battles unfortunately received little compensation. Most lived and died forgotten, while English propaganda enjoyed huge success interpreting the victory patriotically and as a demonstration of God's favor. -Phillip II had spent impossibly large sums to fund the fleet. Of course, it was also a huge embarrassment and loss of prestige. Many historians would view this event as the crisis for the Spanish empire that began their long descent and weakness. -Had the Spanish successfully invaded, English land preparations were ridiculously weak and the military was extremely disorganized. It's fully feasible that the army could have marched to London in a week. -On the other hand, Spain's best success probably would have been occupying for awhile and then extracting some type of negotiated settlement. Spain was probably too disorganized and so overextended already that they couldn't have held on to control indefinitely. Furthermore, English political resolve was fairly strong. Martin argues that Phillip II would have been so committed and controlling that he would have tried to do too much and ended up losing control eventually anyway. (Counterfactuals like this are impossible to really demonstrate, and this section occupies only 5-10 pages with the least documentary support for obvious reasons.)
Even for the Armada aficionado this book is a must read. My copy of 'The Spanish Armada' by Colin Martin and Geoffrey Parker was published in 1988. The book was revised in 1999. Few authors on this subject, and there are many, have such authoritative qualifications as Martin and Parker. Colin Martin has been investigating the Armada wrecks around Britain and Ireland since the 1960's, which resulted in his publication of 'Full Fathom Five: the Wrecks of the Spanish Armada' in 1975. Geoffrey Parker is a Fellow of both the British Academy and the Real Academia de la Historia in Madrid. He has also published works related to this time period. Together, the authors have expertly analysed the years leading up to 1588. Utilising archived documents from Spain and the Netherlands and clear explanations of the political situations in Europe that gave rise to Phillip II's 'Great Enterprise against England'. The book is augmented with archaeological research from the many wrecks investigated by Colin Martin with many pages of illustrations of finds recovered from the hulks. What I particularly appreciated was the overall treatment of this subject, with both the Spanish, English and Dutch involvements and the expert analysis and chronology of all the events between July and October 1588, the full lists of the Spanish and English fleets, the treatise of the ordinance aboard the Armada ships and the Notes accompanying the text. I just have a little guilt at taking this book from a charity shop for only £1.
The most complete work you will find on the famed Armada. Easy to follow and read, and impeccably sourced.
If you are looking for a stirring battle scenes and detailed exchanges of cannon fire, then think again. The evidence is simply not there to support this level of detail, and thus 99% of this book comprises of historical context, administration, logistics, and legacy.
Alt for tung og tjukk. Veie sikkert 3 kg. Kjedelig historie om krig på sjøen. Alt du treng å vit om den her krigen står på wikipedia. Får en stjerne for fin forside og en stjerne for innsats.
A forensic investigation of the Spanish Armada of 1588, its strengths and weaknesses, and its fate. Geoffrey Parker would become the foremost analyst of the strategy of the Spanish Habsburgs, digging through their voluminous archives to write impressive histories of the reigns of Charles V and Philip II. Colin Martin, a diver and naval archaeologist, contributed to the physical evidence for the Armada’s ships and equipment. They made a powerful duo.
To call it the “Spanish” armada is at best a useful shorthand. As Parker and Martin document, the empire of Philip II was multinational. (There would not be a unified Spanish state, army and navy until the early 18th century.) Of the first line of dedicated fighting ships, about half belonged to the crown of Castile, but the most powerful of the galleons were Portuguese, the four galleases came from Naples, and one galleon was impounded from Florence. Some of the largest transport vessels came from ports as far flung as Rostock on the Baltic Sea, or Venice and Ragusa on the Adriatic. The operation of the fleet was handicapped by an unwieldy command structure and differences in ship design and performance. In a time before units of measurements were standardised, supplying ammunition for guns in endlessly varying calibres must have been an enduring headache.
The authors carefully analyse the artillery of the armada. They conclude that the English fleet not only had a 30% superiority in weight of fire, but thanks to dedicated naval gun carriages, was able to fire its large guns repeatedly in battle. Apparently this was not the case for many large guns of the Armada: Limits of crew, procedure and technology limited them to one shot, and they could not be reloaded until the battle was over. Many Armada ships would run out of ammunition for small calibre guns, but barely touch their stocks of larger cannon balls. Perhaps it was just as well for them, as at least some of the guns that had been hurriedly cast in Lisbon were flawed and very dangerous to use.
The fundamental flaw in the plan created by Philip II and his advisors was that the time window during which the warfleet of Medina Sidonia and the invasion barges of Parma had to link up was shorter, due to the lack of a safe port or anchoring ground, than the cycle time of communication between them, and indeed than the uncertainty in communication between them. This was an enormously dangerous gamble, which the deeply religious Philip II seems to have justified by counting on the assistance of God — he was too intelligent not to understand the problem. This hubristic assumption resulted in the death of thousands.
The authors make a solid effort to track the fate of the sailors and soldiers of the Armada. To the honor of Spanish crown it must be said that it made a credible effort to bring the men home, feed them and pay them what was due. The English monarchy proved far more callous towards it own men. The English also summarily murdered many of the Armada survivors that fell into its hands.
Armada: The Spanish Enterprise and England’s Deliverance in 1588 by Colin Martin,
Geoffrey Parker
Easily one of the best histories I have read recently – the authors take you back to 16th Century England and Spain, the origins of the conflict culminating in Spain’s attempted 1588 invasion of England (the Enterprise of England, as it was then known in Spain). Phillip II of Spain was a micro-manager of unequalled prowess, and a self-seen messianic emissary of God, who determined that he should restore England to Catholicism. He disliked face-to-face meetings, preferring to communicate by letter and written reports. He did not visit his troops, tour his ships or make his presence known, preferring to isolate h8imself at his palatial abode outside of Madrid, the Escorial, similar to Versailles in grandeur. Elizabeth was queen of a relatively weak and uncertain England. Her hold on power was somewhat tenuous, with assorted active conspiracies against her. Unlike Phillip, she delegated authority, and encouraged her commanders on the scene to act on their own discretion as circumstances dictated. She made her presence known among her troops and ships, and she sought personal interactions with her trusted advisors. The two could not have been more different in their leadership styles, and the authors fully explore their differences and the effects those differences had on events and battles and the progress of Spain's campaign. You become familiar with them both, and their advisors, their antagonists and protagonists (think Mary Queen of Scots, for one example) through the course of the book.
The authors employ a wealth of archival records, accounts, diaries, minutes of meetings, memoirs and technical documents in conjunction with archeological discoveries from assorted Armada wrecks to animate their narrative. They personalize the people involved, Spanish and English, within the geopolitical realities of the time – the ongoing Dutch rebellion, the logistical nightmares Spain faced with regards to its forces in the Netherlands as well as at sea, the operational and tactical differences unique to each side that affected outcomes. They explore the innovations in ship design and construction, armament mounts, and fleet tactics that gave the English such advantage over the Spanish fleet. The rigors of life at sea in 1588 are driven home, and are daunting.
Through it all, the reader is struck by the humanity, and the human frailties, of both Spanish and English actors, from the monarchs to the unnamed soldiers and sailors dying by the thousands on Irish shores. Some of it is endearing, some of it is appalling, some is heart-breaking - all of it drives home the realization that these people of almost 500 years ago in a medieval world we cannot fully understand are in actuality facing problems and coping with personalities and human factors no different from those we confront today. It was a remarkable event – the deliberate invasion of England by the largest, most dominant global power of the day – Spain, the first empire in human history on which the sun literally never set. It was an existential threat for Tudor England, and it was a near thing. In addition to clearly analyzing and explaining the failure of Spain’s campaign, the authors also make clear that Phillip’s plan could have worked – it would have worked with a few simple corrective adjustments – and history would have changed.
This is a fascinating, and important, history with parallels and lessons still relevant today. In their Epilogue, the authors quote a Spanish authority from 1884, Captain Cesáreo Fernández Duro: “Weapons change, and so do the qualities of the men who wield them; but the basic principles of the art of war on both land and sea remain the same, and knowing what factors led to a disaster will always make profitable reading for a warrior.” There is much to learn from, and about, the series of events that is the Spanish Armada – and this book is an ideal source.
"Armada: The Spanish Enterprise and England’s Deliverance in 1588" by Colin Martin and Geoffrey Parker is now my 'go-to' book on the Spanish Armada, the definitive text on the subject for a non-specialist. At 718 pages, of which 545 pages is narrative text, the rest being Glossary, Chronology, Abbreviations, Notes and Bibliography (Appendixes are on-line) this is a massive book.
However, as large as it is, it’s a joy to hold and to read. The book is beautifully presented by Yale University Press, nicely and securely bound, good quality paper and around 155 illustrations, pictures and diagrams, the majority in colour. Also provided is six informative charts covering various subjects mentioned in the narrative by the authors.
The book is divided into four parts made up of twenty-one chapters and an Epilogue. The four sections are; "The Fleets Assemble", "God's Obvious Design", "It came, it saw, it departed" and "The Aftermath". The authors provide a coherent and non-biased account of the events and people involved in this great enterprise which was both easy to read and very informative.
The book covers in detail the Armada's movements along with the Spanish army of Flanders, the English countermoves, the manoeuvres and fighting in the English Channel, the subsequent destruction of many of the Armada's ships during the long voyage back home past the rugged shores of Scotland and Ireland and the fate of the Spanish sailors and soldiers.
The final few chapters cover the fall-out from the failure of the Armada, the search for scapegoats and the events of the Counter-Armada. The authors then delve into the Spanish Armada in myth and legend - both in England and Spain, followed by the various wrecks that have been located and identified as ships from the Armada and what has happened to these wrecks since.
Before reading this book, my two favourite titles cover the Armada had been "Defeat Of The Spanish Armada" by Garrett Mattingly and "The Confident Hope of a Miracle: The True History of the Spanish Armada" by Neil Hanson. I can be reasonably confident in saying that this new book by Colin Martin and Geoffrey Parker has edged past those two as 'the' book on the subject.
I have no hesitation in recommending this book to anyone who enjoys reading great history, it is how a history book should be written and presented.
A great book, providing a detailed history of the attempted Spanish invasion of England in 1588. The authors, historians Geoffrey Parker and Colin Martin, have done a complete rewrite of their 1989 work. The authors draw on research advances in the last 30+ years, both in underwater archaeology and contemporary manuscript research, to offer up plenty of new analysis for this pivotal maritime campaign. Parker and Martin do a good job of peeling away the myths of the Armada to get at the true story. As such, most of the narrative follows the Spanish side of events, given their predominant role in the enterprise. Much time is spent on the resource challenges that were at the heart of the campaign. The inherent problems with the Spanish command method are also deeply analyzed. I especially liked how the authors apply modern military processes (intelligence reports, operations orders, logistics directives, after action reports, etc.) to describe the actions of the participants. Via these present-day references, the book forces an assessment of the Armada with a modern perspective. A great book for understanding the critical components of a complex maritime campaign. Highly recommended for an analysis of trans-oceanic operations.
This is an encyclopedic study of Phillip II's "enterprise of England", covering everything from the causes of the conflict between England and Spain, the personalities of the leading figures on each side, developments in ship design and, of course, a blow by blow account of the Armada campaign. It is such an all encompassing undertaking that it also takes in counterfactual analysis, the Armada in legend and folklore as well as the ongoing archaeological efforts to recover the Spanish shipwrecks dotted along the west coasts of Scotland and Ireland. Because of this comprehensiveness, and the fact that I am merely an enthusiast, not an obsessive, I chose to bypass some of the more niche chapters. However, as a work of research and erudite storytelling, this is astounding stuff and well worth dipping into.
Brilliant historical scholarship written to be accessible to a general audience. A fabulous read if you want to better understand the Spanish Armada. I particularly appreciated the sections on underwater archaeology, the aftermath, the counter-factual "If the Armada had Landed", the Armada in popular culture and a discussion of the "Dutch Armada" of 1688.
While there are sections of little intrinsic interest, such as the chapter devoted to speculation regarding a Spanish victory, this monumental study exhibits the profound use of archival material, playfulness, and great common sense that have made Parker so redoutable a force in early modern studies of Spain. Well written, exceptionally clear, with a useful chronology and loads of bonus material on a website. I look forward to watching the BBC documentary to which the authors contributed.
This engrossing history of the naval crusade of Phillip II of Spain against Elizabeth and the Tudor Protestants of England reviews the geopolitics of 16th century North Atlantic Europe in comprehensive detail, explaining the precursors, the conduct of Spain’s impossible strategy, and the centuries of archeological and documentary reconstruction of the historic sea battle and its consequences.
outstanding book with new information on the Armada
This is the book, on the Spanish armada, if you want to know just about every aspect of the campaign. This book is right up-to-date with the latest information on the Armada and the celebrations of it over the years.
A hefty book, weighing in at 4.2 pounds with 717 pages. Definitely the definitive book on the Spanish Armada. The chapter on the Spanish shipwrecks was especially interesting.
Chance and uncertainty, an important factor of war. So Clausewitz should have said, but the point remains. Looking back on history, it's amazing how often important events that change the world, so often hinge on trivial matters. If Franz Ferdinand had turned left instead of right, if the French cavalry at Waterloo had nails to silence the British guns, if Julius Caesar had worn armour under his toga and so on. In this regard, the Spanish Armada was no different. If The Armada had been able to communicate better with the Army of Flanders, then it's likely I'd be writing this review in Spanish! Far from being the lumbering behemoth as it's commonly portrayed, the Armada was a master class of planning and organization. Only a great empire at its height, could have gathered together such an instrument of power. On the English side, we see tensions and weaknesses that almost proved fatal to their cause, stark contrast to the harmony between Drake, Howard and Raleigh that is accepted as common knowledge. Which begs the question: if the Armada was so good, how did it lose? Parker and Martin attribute this to many things: poor communications (understandable in 16th century Europe) superior English gunnery, and as mentioned above, sheer bad luck. If the wind had blown favourably for the Spanish… That's my conclusion from Parker and Martin's brilliant work on the Armada. Despite being written more than 25 years ago, this is a weighty tome with a gravity of authority. Lavished with maps, diagrams and photos, this book debunks many a myth, reassessing the common wisdom of wily English sailors running rings around their cumbersome Spanish opponents . In Wellington's words, it was a close run thing. If only every history textbook was this good.
The campaign was a completely desater for Philip ii and for Spain....bravo
Thanks to the wisdom and right strategy of the queen.
just a handful of ships returned home...
And Philip was crying and flamming to God.
Thanks to this victory Spain was lowering in power and wealth....bu in Peru and other colonies they were like tennias abstracting all the commodities and commiting genocide.
This is a brilliant book, and I own it! The authors do a lot to help the average reader know everything about the Spanish Armada. I think even a 4th grader would understand it. This is a great book, read it!