Who Lost Russia?: From the Collapse of the USSR to Putin's War on Ukraine

by Peter Conradi

How did we get from the end of the Cold War to Trump and Putin?

‘A must read for anyone interested in the future of Europe and the world as a whole.’ Serhii Plokhy, author of The Last Empire

An essential insight into Russia’s relations with Ukraine, the US and beyond

Why did Vladimir Putin launch his devastating attack on Ukraine in February 2022? And is Western policy towards Russia to blame for the bloodiest war on European soil since 1945? Peter Conradi, Europe Editor of the Sunday Times, analyses the series of mistakes and misunderstandings on both sides since the end of the Soviet Union in this updated version of his critically acclaimed book. This edition contains five new chapters that bring the story right up to the present day, examining the events leading to the invasion and setting out what the conflict will mean for the future of Europe

Genres: History, Russia, Nonfiction, Politics, Russian History, Historical, War

496 pages, Paperback

Published November 1, 2022

About the author

See also philosopher Peter J. Conradi

Foreign Editor of The Sunday Times & author of The King's Speech and of Who Lost Russia? How the World Entered a New Cold War, updated and out now in paperback

Reviews

[Bindesh Dahal · Rating 3 out of 5]

The West lost Russia with arrogance and adversarial attitude. Conradi laying the blame at Putin's feet in the epilogue doesn't sound right. But the book describes in detail what went wrong in the relationship, that too in a convincing manner.

[Clem · Rating 5 out of 5]

If you were to ask a random individual on the street to describe the relationship between Russia and the U.S. in the past 80 years, they would probably state something such as:

“Russia became an enemy with the U.S. after World War II because of communism. When communism self-destructed in 1991, Russia then became one of the “good” guys. Lately, though, the relationship between Russia and the U.S. has seemed to have gotten worse. Although I’m not entirely sure why.”

That person would be mostly correct. What this book does so well, is explain why the euphoria of the early 1990s deteriorated around the relationship between the superpowers, and why things have regressed since then. In other words, this book is an excellent resource for those who don’t read about world news that often, and tend to read the Sports page first when they open their newspaper.

This book was very well written and very easy to follow. It’s not a book that you “give up on” because it’s too detailed, too scholarly, or too long. The author does an outstanding job balancing how to present enough crucial material for one to digest without putting them to sleep or overwhelming them with details ad nauseum. This is one of the books that I finished in only a few days because it was so well written, interesting, and informative.

A key point when discussing foreign relations is that other countries and other cultures think and behave differently. Most of us are unaware of this. We can’t understand why, for example, when we topple a brutal dictator such as Saddam Hussein, there’s dancing and singing in the streets of Baghdad for a few days, but then things seem to go back to exactly how they were before. So when the Cold War ended and the Communist regime was toppled in 1991, there were many in the West that thought all they needed was a few more shopping malls and trendy restaurants, and Russia would magically transform to a peaceful place that looked and acted just like the state of Vermont.

The author reminds us though, that even though Russia “lost” the Cold War, they have always been a proud country. For the United States to start dictating how they run their country, and more importantly, the relationship with subjugated neighbors such as Ukraine and Georgia, there are going to be problems. There is a lot of focus on the relationships between the leaders of the two countries. First, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin. Then, Bush and Putin, followed by Obama and Medvedev (later, back to Putin). None of the leaders of the West seem to perfectly play their cards, and whatever methods are tried, it seems as though relationships between the two simply become worse. How does one maintain a healthy relationship with a country when it has such a cruel demeanor with places such as Crimea and Syria?

Old habits die hard, and Putin and his cronies are no choirboys. We read about a lot of rigged elections, under-the-table deals, and poisoned enemies that allow the country to climb back to the top and retain its former glory. They may not be “Communist” anymore, but the author successfully argues that the cruelty that has been there since the Revolution in 1917 hasn’t abated. It may have taken a brief sojourn, but the nothing has really changed that much since the days of well-documented infamy.

The author does reveal who he thinks actually “lost” Russia in the last few pages. I’m not sure I completely agree with him. For something to be “lost” it must first be “owned” or “possessed” and I’m not sure the U.S., or anyone else, ever had a firm grasp on the country to begin with. We may have thought we did 25 years ago, but smarter heads (i.e. Henry Kissinger) have always told us otherwise. We just never wanted to listen. Why listen to people tell you things aren’t that great when they feel so good?

The book does talk a bit about the Clinton-Trump presidential race. The author makes no accusations, but it’s clear that Russia would much prefer a Trump president than a Clinton one. In fact, there are several references to Clinton, as Obama’s Secretary of State, wanting her Commander and Chief to do things differently and have a firmer hand. It’s easy to speculate that if Hillary Clinton had won the election, things would finally move in the correct path, but one would have to be mightily optimistic to hold such a position. In fact, after reading this, my sad conclusion is that anytime we want something to be better, it sometimes must, first, get worse. Sometimes much worse. We can only hope and pray that things don’t deteriorate much more in the coming years. We should all pay attention to world news more often.

[Jay Cresva · Rating 3 out of 5]

No criticism of NATO and USA's military imperialism?
The author tries to stay impartial until the last few sections - where he blames Russia for losing itself by isolating itself from the world. His advice is to "get on with the times".

[Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book offers an analysis of the complex relations between the West and Russia since the end of the USSR's collapse. The narrative is precise and comprehensive, with significant events presented accurately. However, the perspective chosen by the author is the analysis of relations and tensions. Fortunately, other authors complement this perspective, particularly Catherine Belton's book "Putin's People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took On the West," which provides insight into the internal economic and social motivations of the Putin regime.

All these explanations (including those by other authors) lead me to a conclusion: no action taken by the West since the end of the USSR in 1990 could have led to a different outcome. The nature of the social, political, and economic culture of this country would not change because countries have incited or constrained Russia; only Russia can change and evolve itself, everything else is conjecture. Russia under the Tsars, Lenin, Stalin, and Putin is essentially identical in certain aspects: an authoritarian and autocratic regime, a totalitarian state, a regime where citizens' rights are minimal in a repressive regime. The regime controls propaganda, information, communications, monitors its citizens, imprisons them without any reason, and uses its citizens as cannon fodder in conflicts.

If countries have joined NATO, it is because they feel threatened by an aggressive regime. Russia has committed several genocides throughout its history, in the 1930s against Ukraine, and in 1940 with Germany against Poland, according to the secret agreement concluded between the two dictators, Hitler and Stalin. The USSR then militarily occupied Eastern Europe for 45 years until the regime succumbed to its economic dysfunctions. Putin's attitude is reminiscent of Hitler's, who urged his citizens to deny the defeat of 1918 and seek revenge against enemies convenient to his racial prejudices. Russia, like Germany in 1939, denies responsibility for its own misfortunes, and the West is the adversary. Putin is a war criminal who acts according to the twisted historical vision of a KGB agent, for whom controlling citizens is the norm, resignation to a dictatorial power the normal eventuality of his population destined for an imperialistic role destroying its immediate neighbors, especially when they have transformed into a democracy that undermines the atmosphere of a dictatorship.

[Chris · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fascinating insight into the deterioration of East-West relations, following the fall of communism, right up until the Ukraine war (latest edition). highly recommended.

[Jarno Mehtiö · Rating 5 out of 5]

Loistava kirja Yhdysyvaltojen (/lännen) ja Venäjän suhteista Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen. Kirjassa käydään läpi ajanjakson tapahtumia ja niiden vaikutusta suhteisiin. Paino on sen pohtimisessa, mikä aiheutti tapahtuman ja reaktiot siihen, sekä miten nämä reaktiot ja tapahtumat vaikuttivat myöhempiin. Samalla mietitään, oliko kulloisenkin reaktion takana jomman kumman toimijan aito halu toimia tehdyllä tavalla vai olisiko halu ollut toisenlaiseen reaktioon, jollaiseen kyky vain ei riittänyt.

Hyvän kirjasta tekee, että siinä kerrotaan myös Venäjän näkemyksiä ja motiiveja heidän toimiin sekä reaktioihin. Suhteet ovat huonot ja Venäjä toimii länttä ärsyttävällä ja kauhistuttavalla tavalla. Venäjän toimilla on kuitenkin osin selkeät syyt, ja perustelutkin. Perustelut eivät ole moraalisesti kestävällä pohjalla, mutta kirjan ansio on sen selittämisessä, että lännenkin toimet ovat usein moraalittomia, kaksinaismoraalisia ja/tai lyhytnäköistä, oman näkökannan jyräämistä. Eikä kirjan ansio ole whataboutismin hyödyntämisessä puolusteluun, vaan Venäjän näkökulmat perustellaan. Tuskin kukaan voi huutaa vapauden ja demokratian puolustamisen pommittamalla, kauppasaarrolla ja tiukoilla puheilla kohdistuvan tasaisesti kaikkiin. Ja kun näistä toimista moni kohdistuu juurikin Venäjän omaksi intresseikseen mieltämillä alueilla, mutta ei lännelle suotuisissa paikoissa, ei se ole omiaan lisämään yhteistyöhalua.

Päätösluvussa summataan kirja loistavasti. Jokainen USAn presidentti on aloittanut kautensa halulla parantaa suhteita Venäjään, mutta päättänyt kautensa suhteet vielä huonommalla tolalla kuin aloittaessaan. Suhteet lähtivät jo alussa kieroon suuntaan, kun tasapainosta oli epäselvyyttä: onko venäjä hävinnyt osapuoli vai tasaveroinen kumppani. Jenkkien ilakointi kylmän sodan voitolla (George H.W. Bush) ja Venäjän talouskriisi ei parantanut tilannetta. Kumpikin osapuoli jäi myös osaksi kylmän sodan käyttäytymismalleihin. Lännen halu säilyttää Nato ja laajeentaa sitä, tulkiten Venäjän suostuvan tähän, oli myös vika tulkinta. Venäjä suostui heikkouden tilassaan, pakosta. Ketä vastaan Nato laajeni 90-luvun lopussa, vaikka toisin oli sanottu ja suhteet olivat parhaassa kunnossa? Toisaalta lännen heikko reaktio Georgian jyräämiseen vahvisti Putinin näkemystä Venäjän erityisoikeuksista "near abroadissa". Samalla kun Irakin sodan oikeutusta ei liiemmälti usko enää kukaan, Serbian pommitusten voimakkuutta voidaan kyseenalaistaa. Lännen toimista huolimatta suurin syy on silti Putinin johtamassa Venäjässä, joka näkee salaliittoja ympärillään ja vaatii suurvallan kunnioitusta. Myös Venäjän määritelmä itsestään entistä nationalistisemmin lisää jännitettä, koska maan rajojen ulkopuolella asuu miljoonia "venäläisiä". Historiansa takia ei myöskään ole näkyvissä, että Venäjä suostuisi näkemään itsensä tai tulemaan kohdelluksi muuna kuin suurvaltana. Se ei halua olla pikkutekijä isompien koalitiossa. Ehkäpä 1990-luvun näkemys yhteistyöstä olikin poikkeus, ja nyt olemme takaisin normaalissa. Kennania siteerataan päätöslauseessa "To be genuine, to be enduring and to be worth the hopeful welcome of other peoples such a change would have to flow from the initiatives and efforts of the Russian themselves."

[Ronald Gruner · Rating 4 out of 5]

How did the relations between Russia and the West, particularly the United States, deteriorate from the warm feelings after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s to today's war in Ukraine? “Who Lost Russia” explains what happened.

After World War II, America's enlightened policies towards defeated Germany and Japan turned these former enemies into two of America's greatest allies. It could have been different. Late in the war, the Morgenthau Plan proposed destroying Germany's industrial base and turning the country into "a giant potato patch." But President Truman chose another course, rebuilding Germany and allowing Japan to keep its Emperor.

Similar enlightened policies weren't followed after the end of the Cold War. During the late 1990s, NATO expanded eastward into Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, former Warsaw pact countries. Shortly after assuming the Russian presidency, Putin asked that Russia be allowed to join NATO on an expedited basis. But NATO bureaucrats refused to give Russia priority. Putin, rightly or wrongly, was humiliated. Then, over the next two decades, NATO expanded into Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, and Northern Macedonia. Russia considered NATO’s eastward expansion a threat to Russia's borders -- a country which has a deep fear of foreign invasion after being invaded by Napoleon and Hitler costing tens of millions of Russian lives. Russia, though, also contributed to the deterioration of East/West relations through Putin's aggression in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine.

Then Putin invaded Ukraine in the largest European land war since World War II, with the omnipresent threat of nuclear weapons.

If you are interested in getting beyond the bluster of today’s politics and cable news, read "Who Lost Russia?" for a historical perspective on why the West and Russia have become dangerous enemies. It’s a tragic lost opportunity.

[Stan Prager · Rating 5 out of 5]

There perhaps could not be a more timely and relevant book to see publication than Who Lost Russia: How the World Entered a New Cold War, by Peter Conradi. As this review is written, friction between the United States and Russia is currently at levels not witnessed since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The sound of saber-rattling echoes from potential flashpoints across the globe. Russia has annexed Crimea–which resulted in loud condemnation from the West as well as crippling economic sanctions–and actively sponsors civil war in Ukraine through its support of two breakaway self-proclaimed republics, much as it has done in Georgia, another former Soviet state, but with greater vigor and less restraint.
President Vladimir Putin has remade his role as an elected official in an emerging democracy into that of an iron-fisted old-style autocrat, and seeks to refashion Russia into a key actor in the global arena once more. Relying on a toolkit that includes political and economic intimidation, misinformation campaigns and election meddling, a newly resurgent Russia is actively reasserting itself with states once part of the Soviet Union, with former allies, and in efforts directed at destabilizing the Western alliance. Russia has intervened in Syria, a traditional Soviet ally, ostensibly to fight ISIL but in fact to prop up the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad, putting it at direct odds with US interests in a highly unstable region. A new American President won the White House under a cloud of suspicion as it has become increasingly clear not only that Russia intervened in the election, but that it did so to promote Donald Trump. Twin committees in both houses of Congress are currently investigating whether there was active collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia. Trump himself seems struck with a kind of boyhood admiration of Putin and his brand of authoritarianism, which may or may not have been put to the test when he ordered a missile strike on a Syrian airbase. Russia seems unfazed, brandishing its military might, leaving spy ships lingering off the American coast, and buzzing American fighter jets. It’s almost like a flashback to the 1960s.
But, as Peter Conradi reminds us with this insightful and well-written study, it did not start off that way, and perhaps it did not have to come to this. Conradi, foreign editor of the UK’s The Sunday Times, and thus absent the bias that seems to inform the outlook of Americans from all ends of the political spectrum, revisits the collapse of the Soviet Union–which he witnessed first-hand as a foreign correspondent in Moscow–and the heady optimism that came along with it in Europe and the United States. The world marveled at unfolding events then, cheering on first Gorbachev and then Yeltsin, as the fear of nuclear annihilation gave way to the welcoming of Russia to a community of nations predicated upon democracy and a market economy. Few in the West paid much attention as a similar, initial buoyancy within Russia itself rapidly deteriorated into a growing sense of humiliation as shell-shocked citizens came to grips with their new status. No longer a superpower, stripped of vast territories–including Ukraine and the Central Asian republics–that were historically part of Greater Russia, the dawn of democracy and capitalism brought to a much-diminished state political uncertainty and economic chaos, along with crime and corruption. It was this Russia that with a mixture of hope and shame held out its hands to a West that championed its rebirth and rewarded it with … a loan package insufficient to truly stabilize the economy, thunderous encouragement, and very little else.
In a fast-moving, highly articulate narrative that neatly blends the arts of historian and journalist, Conradi recounts events and assigns historical context that is frequently overlooked, with an eye for analysis that is largely unblemished by typical Western bias. The author underscores that it was the USSR–in its manic attempt to create fictional Soviet republics with faux autonomy within the historic Greater Russia–that encouraged secession when the Soviet Union dissolved. Ukraine had been a part of Russia for hundreds of years. So too was Crimea, which was only ceremoniously gifted to Ukraine in 1954, when it had almost no practical significance. Today Russian nationalists look upon these former territories and others as the “near abroad,” and demand to have a say in their respective destinies. These points are not made to justify recent Russian aggression, but to place them in the appropriate context, something often conspicuous in its absence in media coverage.
I noted before the advantage of Conradi as a non-American observer. I am reminded of the distorted perspective in the United States every time a partisan or pundit acclaims Reagan for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, which in fact he had little to do with. (Historian Richard Reeves credits Reagan only for insisting, against the advice of his inner circle, that Gorbachev’s reforms were genuine and that he deserved to be reckoned with. While that certainly merits significance, it hardly translates into winning the Cold War.) Conradi’s thesis, which he argues convincingly, is that it was this kind of loud triumphalism in the West, coupled with an aggressive expansion of NATO to the edges of the Russian border, that drove the relationship in the last two and a half decades to its current state of confrontation. He does not speak as an apologist of Putin and his increasing belligerence. Far from it. He recognizes Putin as the amoral autocrat that he is, murdering or jailing rivals and opponents alike, presiding over the dismantling of democratic institutions and–as the emerging agent of realpolitik projecting power over a reasserted Russian sphere of influence–a true threat to the Western community of nations. But he also suggests that it was the various missteps by the West–and the mishandling of the fledgling new Russia that emerged from the ashes of the USSR–that set the stage for someone like Putin to seize power and sustain overwhelming support from the populace.
I am old enough to recall the terror that gripped our home during the Cuban Missile Crisis, “duck-and-cover” drills in elementary school, and the flawed domino theory that led to the tragedy of Vietnam. We all expected that Iron Curtain to define the next century, but then one day it turned out that the Soviet Union was simply one massive Potemkin Village, a fact that had somehow eluded us all along despite billions of dollars spent on intelligence gathering, and only made manifest as it imploded before our wondering eyes. One day, unexpectedly, the USSR simply went out of business.
I watched that happen too, and what followed, through the pages of the New York Times. I recall bemoaning that such momentous historical events–the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, the rise of new states from the ashes of the old Soviet Union and its dramatic aftermath–unfolded with Oval Office occupants, first George H.W. Bush and then Bill Clinton, who seemed to lack the vision to shape the future that lay ahead. Who Lost Russia appears to underscore my anecdotal observations as the author points to a series of lost opportunities under a succession of American Presidents. He also notes that along with tone-deaf triumphalism there was a consistent, pronounced arrogance that failed to accord proper respect to Russia and its security concerns. This was, of course, evident in the expansion of NATO to include not only former Warsaw Pact allies but also former Soviet Republics in the Baltic states, the unilateral abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, and the very real possibility that what were once integral parts of Russia–Georgia, Ukraine, and especially the critically strategic Crimean Peninsula–were lining up as NATO candidates that could serve as hosts to missiles pointed at Moscow. It was within this context that Putin acted on the Crimea.
Conradi also reminds us that initially Putin’s Russia objected but largely accepted NATO expansion. That Putin himself offered strategic airspace as support to George W. Bush in the aftermath of 911, and did not balk when the US invaded Afghanistan, a site of the last foreign adventure of the USSR where much blood and treasure was expended. It was only the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the United States that finally cut a deep fault line in Russian-American relations, as Putin branded this a calculated act of foreign aggression. Few outside of the United States would disagree with this characterization.
Conradi goes on to objectively chronicle the failed “reset” efforts by President Obama and his Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, noting that Obama, like those before him, seemed plainly unaware of what really went to the heart of Russia’s concerns. The author appears to disapprove of Obama’s absence of decisive action in Syria, which no doubt signaled weakness to Putin, yet he neglects to advance an available option that would have avoided exacerbating the multiplicity of competing conflicts on the ground there. Perhaps, I would suggest, doing nothing is better than decisively doing the wrong thing.
It is disconcerting that an unschooled and unpredictable man now sits in the White House as the prospect of nuclear war again looms before us. Conradi’s account of the wrong turns taken by his better qualified predecessors leaves us little room for optimism. Who Lost Russia is a brilliant book that should be required reading for those who have the current President’s ear. Our only opportunity to offset disaster is to carefully review what has once again set us on the brink.


[Note: I read an ARC (Advance Reader’s Copy) of this book as part of an early reviewer’s program, but the book is hot off the press as of April 11, 2017. Buy it and read it!]


My latest review, Who Lost Russia?: How the World Entered a New Cold War, by Peter Conradi, is live on my book blog: https://regarp.com/2017/04/30/who-los...

[Rayrumtum · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book was an update of early Cold War volumes asking Who Lost China. In this case, most of the book makes a good case that it was American politicians of both parties, but then at the end he concludes it was Putin. The author IMO correctly draws the conclusion that NATO enlargement into former countries of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR itself would be received with hostility. Despite early American promises that the US would not take advantage at the end of the Cold War, we persisted one step after another. We changed the goal posts. Earlier we only wanted the East European countries to be Finlandized--neutral, neither East nor West. Now after 1989 that was not good enough. How did we feel when the USSR put bases in Cuba? We were sufficiently concerned to threaten nuclear Armageddon.
Moreover, if Putin had not been selected eventually it would have been someone like him. Communism was not really the ideology that was driving Soviet foreign policy it was Russian nationalism as it was under the tsar and has been since 1989.
We in the West have made a big deal of not changing international borders by military means, but that is exactly what we did in Serbia and Kosovo. The Russians spot those inconsistencies and claim Ukraine is a similar case. It seems to me some resolution is needed for the Ukraine problem. The Crimea is never going to revert to Ukraine. Maybe the Ukrainian should "sell" Crimea to Russia for energy and pulling support from the East Ukrainian separatists. That way the West could ease sanctions.
Given the mess that Presidents of both parties have made with respect to Russia, I am not sure what can happen. We can't very well undo Nato enlargement as of now, but we perhaps should encourage Finlandization of the remaining countries that remain between East and West.

[Kristjan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ülevaade sellest, kuidas Lääs Ameerika presidentide juhtimisel on järjepidevalt püüdnud resettida suhet Venemaaga, kuid sügavale silma vaatamisest hoolimata ei ole suutnud teistsugust kultuurikonteksti lugeda ja omadega sügavale sohu sattunud.

Vahest kõige kõnekam oli juba Bill Clintoni ja Boriss Jeltsin suhe, kes suhtlesid teineteisega kui sõbrad. Iga kohtumine algas Jeltsini pika tiraadiga majandusabi, ameeriklaste välispoliitika või NATO laienemise teemal. Clinton aga kasutas vastamisel Ameerika väärtusi, demokraatiat ja teisi ülevaid sõnu. Võite ise arvata, kui palju diile sedasi teha suudeti. Aga sõprus püsis.

Sealt edasi vaatleb autor Bushi kauboipoliitikat ja Obama seni kuulda olevat kummi tühjaksvilisemist Süüria teemal. Mehed Kremlis nende vastas olid samad kogu nende valitsemisperioodi. Raamat lõppeb põgusa aruteluga Trumpi presidendiks saamisest ja Venemaaga suhtlemise võimalustest. Mis sest saanud on, teame ju kõik - Putini ausõna on Trumpi jaoks olulisem Ameerika luureandmetest.

Mõned naljakad tõlkeapsud olid ka - keset välispoliitika analüüsi hakati kõnelema kellesti Kirill Lavrovist. Venemaa presidenti Vladimir Putinit tutvustati aga kui The New York Timesi juhtkirja autorit. Op-Edi on Putini nime all küll kirjutatud, aga see on (eesti keeles samuti) hoopis midagi muud kui (toimetuse) juhtkiri.

[Khairul Hezry · Rating 2 out of 5]

A primer on the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of Russia under Putin. It's good but no earth-shaking revelation contained within if you have been following the news with regards to Russia for the past 30 years. Like I wrote in the beginning; it's more of a primer on Russian politics and their relationship with the West.

[Dmitry · Rating 1 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

Я не удивлен, что эта книга была написана журналистом. Я хотел написать, что книга выглядит как большая журналистская статья в каком-нибудь журнале о международных отношениях, пока не узнал, кем же является автор. Ну да, это очень чувствуется. Но если одних журналистов ещё более-менее интересно читать, то других, особенно если им сказать чего-то нового нечего, читать очень скучно. Я лет 10 как не читаю журналы и газеты предпочитая ограничиваться либо книгами либо видеороликами c сайта YouTube именно по причине того что читать журналистов скучно и особенно скучно читать международников. Эта книга не сильно отличается от ряда подобных книг, хоть автор и пытается выглядеть «объективным» и поэтому книга не походит на попытку оправдать Путина как это видно в книгах типа Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the "New Cold War" или The Lost Peace: How the West Failed to Prevent a Second Cold War. Но всё равно это скучная книга, которая не прибавляет ничего нового по данной теме и поэтому она встаёт в один ряд с такими похожими книгами как, к примеру, Getting Russia Right или The New Cold War: The United States, Russia, and China from Kosovo to Ukraine. Другими словами, ядром всей книги является тема НАТО и России.

Многие читатели этой книги пишут, что в самом её конце автор критикует Путина. Ну, возможно это и так, ибо я бросил книгу на середине. Большую часть книги автор выдерживает якобы «нейтральный» тон, просто рассказывая о международных отношениях между Россией и США, т.е. между Клинтоном и Ельциным, а потом между Бушем и Путиным, включая знаменитый телефонный звонок Путина Бушу, когда произошли теракты 11 сентября в США (с последующем «я заглянул ему в глаза и увидел там душу»). Однако я увидел в этой книге совсем другой подтекст, нежели простое описание международной политики и какие шаги кем были предприняты в то время. Я не зря привёл в пример множество разных книг о взаимоотношениях между США и НАТО с одной стороны и России и Путиным, с другой. В большинстве подобных книг, авторы критикуют недальновидность стран Запада в их желании расширения НАТО на восток. Автор и этой книги очень много посвящает этой теме, т.е. расширению НАТО, военному конфликту в бывшей Югославии и как с этого момента начали портиться международные отношения между странами Запада (во главе с США) и Россией. Автор также вспомнит знаменитую Мюнхенскую речь Путина. С одной стороны это можно рассматривать как констатацию фактов, т.е. что автор просто описывает произошедшие события. Но вот с другой в этом можно усмотреть критику стран Запада и США, т.е. что они не послушались к ещё советским политологам, которые предупреждали о негативных последствиях при расширении НАТО на восток или более комплексно – игнорировании интересов России. Из этого можно сделать вывод, что виноваты в нынешнем украино-российском конфликте не только Россия и Украина, но и страны Запада во главе США. Мол, предупреждал же Кеннон в своей телеграмме, что ж вы не послушались? Разумеется, прямо автор об этом не пишет, но именно это я увидел в книге, читая между строк. Просто в ином случаи не понятно, зачем писалась книга? Да, автор может в самом конце критиковал Путина, но для меня, очевидно, что вся книга была написана не с целью критики Путина, которого он не трогает на протяжении большей части. Кого он критикует, пусть и мягко и ненавязчиво, это Западных правителей. И, разумеется, политику НАТО.

Так почему же я даю книге отрицательную оценку? Во-первых, книга очень скучная. Она читается как очередной пересказ международной политики в типичной газете, когда автор ориентируется на то, что его будут читать только те, кто очень сильно интересуется международными отношениями (правда такие люди и так всё знают и им не нужно читать то, что было совсем недавно). Во-вторых, автор ничего нового не предлагает. Я не увидел авторского анализа ситуации. И в третьих, пусть не прямо, а косвенно, но автор старается переложить ответственность с России на страны Запада, при этом я не увидел никакой критики в ответ на ту политику, которую проводил сначала Ельцин, а потом и Путин. Я говорю об агрессивной имперской политике, которую начал Ельцин в Приднестровье, Абхазии и Чечне, и которую продолжил Путин, но уже в Грузии, Сирии и Украине. Автор как-то не заметил этого. Можно тогда задастся вопросом: но может именно отсутствие реакции со стороны лидеров Западного мира на агрессивные действия Москвы и критикует автор? Я этого не увидел. Конечно, на агрессивные действия ельцинско-путинской России нужны были адекватные действия со стороны Запада, которые бы торпедировали бы дальнейшую эскалацию со стороны РФ, но этого явно не подразумевается автором.

I'm not surprised that this book was written by a journalist. I was going to write that the book looked like a big journalistic article in some international relations magazine until I found out who the author was. Well, yes, it does feel very much that way. But while some journalists are still more or less interesting to read, others, especially if they have nothing new to say, are very boring to read. I haven't read magazines and newspapers for 10 years, preferring to limit myself to either books or YouTube videos for the very reason, that it is boring to read journalists, especially international journalists. This book is not very different from several similar books, although the author tries to appear "objective" and, therefore, the book does not seem to be an attempt to justify Putin as it is seen in books like Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the "New Cold War" or The Lost Peace: How the West Failed to Prevent a Second Cold War. But it is still a boring book that does not add anything new to the topic and, therefore it is on par with similar books like Getting Russia Right or The New Cold War: The United States, Russia, and China from Kosovo to Ukraine. In other words, the core of the book is NATO and Russia.

Many readers of this book write that at the very end of the book, the author criticizes Putin. Well, this may be true because I abandoned the book in the middle. For most of the book, the author maintains a supposedly "neutral" tone, simply talking about international relations between Russia and the US, i.e., between Clinton and Yeltsin, and then between Bush and Putin, including Putin's famous phone call to Bush when the 9/11 attacks on the US occurred (followed by "I looked into his eyes and saw his soul"). However, I saw in this book a very different subtext than a simple description of international politics and what steps were taken by whom at the time. I have cited many different books about the relationship between the US and NATO on the one hand and Russia and Putin on the other. In most of these books, the authors criticize the shortsightedness of Western countries in their desire to expand NATO eastward. The author of this book also devotes a lot to this topic, i.e., the expansion of NATO, the military conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and how international relations between Western countries (led by the USA) and Russia started to deteriorate from that moment. The author will also recall Putin's famous Munich speech. On the one hand, this can be seen as a statement of facts, i.e., that the author is simply describing the events that took place. But, on the other hand, it can be seen as a criticism of Western countries and the United States, i.e., that they did not listen to Soviet political scientists who warned about the negative consequences of NATO's expansion to the East or, more comprehensively, ignoring Russia's interests. From this, we can conclude that not only Russia and Ukraine are to blame for the current Ukrainian-Russian conflict, but also the countries of the West led by the United States. Kennan warned us in his telegram, why didn't you listen? Of course, the author does not write about it directly, but that is what I saw in the book, reading between the lines. Otherwise, it's just not clear why the book was written. Yes, the author may criticize Putin at the very end, but for me, it is obvious that the whole book was not written to criticize Putin, whom he does not touch throughout most of it. Who he does criticize, albeit gently and unobtrusively, is the Western rulers. And, of course, NATO policy.

So why am I giving the book a negative review? First of all, the book is very boring. It reads like another retelling of international politics in a typical newspaper when the author is focused on the fact that it will be read only by those who are very much interested in international relations (although such people already know everything and do not need to read what has happened recently). Secondly, the author offers nothing new. I did not see the author's analysis of the situation. And thirdly, even if not directly but indirectly, the author tries to shift the responsibility from Russia to the Western countries. But, I did not see any criticism in response to the policy pursued first by Yeltsin and then by Putin. I am talking about the aggressive imperial policy that Yeltsin started in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and Chechnya and that Putin continued in Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine. The author has somehow failed to notice this. One might then wonder: but maybe it is the lack of reaction on the part of the leaders of the Western world to Moscow's aggressive actions that the author is criticizing. I did not see it. Of course, the aggressive actions of Yeltsin-Putin's Russia needed adequate actions from the West, which would have torpedoed further escalation on the part of the Russian Federation, but this is clearly not implied by the author.

[Michael · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent book, well written history of the period from the fall of the Soviet Union to the present day.

[Nick Turner · Rating 4 out of 5]

Russia is a country with very little democratic tradition, in 1991 it was a country without one at all. It was in there 1990's therefore that such a tradition had to be born. Conradi lays the blame for the for the failure to create one, and the paths that Russia subsequently chose, on the failure to complete the revolution which brought down the Soviet Union. Sure there was Yeltsen on a tank, the lowering of the hammer and sickle on 25th December 1991 but there was no break, no moment where a new Russia truly began. Denied a 'Soviet Nuremburg' or a truth and reconciliation commission, which would mark the changing of the guard, all ordinary Russians received was deprivation, kleptocracy and humiliation, all still watched over by a statue of Lenin in every town square. Trauma without the catharsis.

After the chaos of the 1990s the strong will of Vladimir Putin (A man who believed the collapse of the Soviet Union to be a catastrophe) must have seemed like a breath of fresh air. With the political stability, and a high oil price, came economic riches. Yet Putin yearned for ever more. Russia should once more be the other pole in world affairs.

The Putin government seems schizophrenic, it is both angry at that the US will not treat it as an equal, yet believes that every American foreign policy decision is calculated to keep Russia down. Incapable of accepting that the world regards Russia as a second order power, Putin began to act more and more like Soviet leaders of Old.

Putin is depicted as a man who cannot accept that the near-abroad (and the world in general) does not always move forward according to his grand vision. The story of his presidency is his ever increasing willingness to intervene to guide global events. During Ukraine's Orange Revolution he complains to at a meeting with the Finnish President, but does nothing, by 2008 he is willing to openly intervene in Georgia, by 2014 in Ukraine, in 2016 his spies are working to rig the election of a US president.

Conradi writes well, this history has exactly the right amount of detail to engage the reader without his becoming bogged down. He is clearly put his significant knowledge of the subject, gained as the Sunday Times man in Moscow in the 1990s, to good effect and the final chapters on Trump's election and presidency take matters right up to date.

But who lost Russia? For Conradi, ultimately, since the early 1990s Russia has been faced with a choice, either to be subsumed into the international community as middle ranking nation or to go it alone and become and assertive, if isolated, international power once more. Russia was lost when Vladimir Putin chose the latter.

[Colin · Rating 5 out of 5]

This took me a long time to read partly due to getting distracted early on by other things, but once I got into it, it was a very easy read. Of course it's a bit depressing being old enough to read history books of events that take place entirely during your adulthood, but here we are, and it was interesting to get some of the deeper, behind-the-scenes details added to what I already knew. Starting in the closing years of the soviet empire, he tracks though the various stages of collapse, support, attempted rebuilding and finally a reversion to normal, gradually becoming more confident and more intense. Its sad, really, to track through all these connected events that I remember as clear as day and realise what an opportunity was wasted. For a brief moment, Russia was prepared to start behaving differently, more like an ordinary power, but western triumphalism, combined with an exodus of its allies into the NATO camp meant Russia began to experience buyer's remorse over democracy almost straight away. We missed that chance. It has gone back to being basically as belligerent and almost as repressive as it ever was, perhaps with a more tsarist flavour than communist but all the same, not what was hoped for in the optimistic days of the early nineties.
Worse still, it's starting to have sympathisers at the highest level in America where its "strong" leadership and assertive conservatism (ie, kleptocracy and gay-bashing) give so many trumpist republicans a political hard-on. The book was written in the first year of the 45th US presidency and some of the more depressing, eye-rolling moments of that orange idiot are trotted out as evidence of that reverse McCarthyism. Ugh.
All this was obvious of course, but I think my pessimism was quite late to arrive, and I hadn't realised quite how early the trend had asserted itself. This book really highlights the arc of history, bending away from justice, with the Liberal dream really ending almost before it had begun.
And of course since the book was written, we've seen ongoing belligerence in the middle East, another murdered former KGB man in the UK, the arrest of Navalny, and three more years of shitty presidency in the US (not that his successor is much good either of course). It's clear we need to find a new way of working with Russia but its not clear how.

[Stephen Heiner · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's hard to find truly objective writing on the subject of Russia/US relations from 1991 to present, but Conradi's book is probably the best I've read. This isn't to say that he doesn't have biases. He consistently refers to the "annexation of Crimea" despite the fact that there was a major democratic referendum there with huge turnout. There have been country separations frequently since 1991, it's just that we "don't care" about South Sudan or Timor Leste. The US supports the independence of Kosovo against the protests of Serbia and other neighboring countries. So too Russia, by the principle established in Kosovo by the US, supports the independence of Crimea. The utter ignorance by most (not Conradi) when talking about Crimea as if Ukraine has had a long history or has even had a long connection with Crimea (my mother has been alive longer than Crimea has been linked with Ukraine, and there's no precedent in Russian history for the "gift" that Krushchev gave to Ukraine while he was Chairman in order to appease them. It wasn't his to give, anyway.

But apart from the bias he could not escape regarding Crimea, which is now and always will be a part of Russia, despite American bullying and stamping of feet, Conradi's book does a great service in presenting both sides, explaining how actions were misinterpreted, deliberately or unintentionally, and how Putin himself changed from 2000-2007 and then from 2007 on, against the backdrop of 3 different US presidents. For US flag wavers who are honestly looking to understand what is going on with our Russian relationship, this book is very helpful.

[John · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the best books I've read in a while. Its a reasonable 364 pages and has very fluid prose and so its easy to read.

It describes the fall of the USSR in 1991, the rise of Yeltsin and then the political and economic reforms of the 1990s when Russia looked to be shaped in a Western image but then goes on to note the shift under Putin from the turn of the century when he took charge.

It was incredibly interesting, discussing along the way topics like the leaders of the West/Russia's personal relationships, the sell-off of Russian state assets in the 1990s, the Chechnian Wars, Georgia, Iraq, Crimea, Afghanisation, the Trump election and the expansion of NATO.

I'd highly recommend it to anyone

[Margarita · Rating 5 out of 5]

A timely read. It's a thoroughly researched, clearly and concisely written analysis of Russia-US relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Conradi's perspective is not only well-informed and insightful, it is balanced. He skillfully maneuvers his way through the historically complex Russia-US relationship. Through a gradual and detailed layering of arguments, he ultimately concludes that Russia's motives and intents have often been grossly misunderstood and that as a consequence, a powerful and dangerous enemy has emerged.

[Barry · Rating 3 out of 5]

Short version of the answer to the book's title: ultimately, it may have been inevitable, but it would have helped if Putin wasn't such a power hungry Russian nationalist autocrat, if the West had responded more generously to the real social and economic trauma of post-Soviet-Bloc economic collapse, if the West (especially USA) had had more competent foreign policy more sensitive to Russia's legitimate security interests.

[KarYan Lam · Rating 1 out of 5]

I bought on this book in sale and thought I can get a glimpse of Russia history and Putin from this book. However, this book is boring, all it talked about was how each US president pretended to be concerned about Russia's policy and democracy.

[Dei Mur · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wedi ei ysgrifennu'n glir ac haws i'w gofio.

[Bert Bruins · Rating 5 out of 5]

A thorough look back of what happened in Russia and between Russia and the West over the last 30 years. because it is such recent history the avid follower of the news will find much that is familiar, but to have it all summed up, with added detail is no mean feat. The title of the book is a conscious reference to the question asked after the 1949 Communist take-over "Who lost China?" in said country. Here Conradi tries to unravel how the temporary good relations between Yeltsin and Bill Clinton of the early 1990 turned slowly but surely into a new hostile stand-off and an information war. Conradi gives no clear and decisive answer to the question, but here are some of the factors that played a part:
1) George W Bush describing the collapse of communism and afterwards the falling apart of the Soviet Union (admittedly aimed at a domestic audience) in terms of "We won the Cold War". This was hurtful and insulting even to Russians who supported liberalisation and the fall of communism.
2) The mishandled economic reform program of the 1990s
3) The misreading by the West of Russian openness to Western approaches as permanent change, rather than as a symptom of temporary Russian weakness
4) The West, and the US as the only remaining super-power in particular, behaved with hubris and arrogance in the new 1990s world order.
4) High oil prices allowed Russia to abandon an overly meek approach.
5) Old attitudes to the West and fear of encirclement by enemy states had not gone away in Russia, neither had the Russian belief that they are the lead nation among lesser Slavic brother nations.
6) Long established KGB practices of mis-information, fake-democracy, propaganda and a lack of respect for human rights got revived once Russia became disenchanted with its poor treatment by the West. And with an ex-KGB officer as president, with plenty of secrets to hide, genuine free political debate and an independent judiciary became too risky for the current ruling class.

These were some of the pointers I picked up from Conradi's book. It doesn't answer the question "Who lost Russia?" conclusively, and neither does it provide an answer as to how to solve the current unpleasant situation....

[Mads Hansen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Peter Conrad is clearly a well-written and well-researched journalist that paints a thorough yet readable picture of how we ended in the current political crisis we are in today with Russia becoming more and more isolated from the international community.

The first part of the book is extremely strong with great historical and political analysis of the situation in Russian-American relationship in the 1990s. It's clear that Conradi was actively working as a journalist in Moscow at that point and the way he draws on autobiographies from Clinton, Yeltsin etc. is phenomenal.

Some of Conradi's key points are:

- The breakdown of the Soviet Union resulted in a chaotic period in Russia and the Russian economy and political system which later led to the rise of a more nationalist Russia. Another reader calls it the "denied Nuremberg" which is a notion that really strong. There was no clean break with totalitarianism.
- Western politicians bear some responsibility for the new situation as they (according to Russia) violated the agreement about not enlarging NATO (which started with Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999) beyond a reunited Germany.
-The US saw the collapse of the Soviet Union partly as an American victory which, if you know how proud Russians are, is not the best way to approach a future peaceful relationship.
- When Putin realised that the West was not going to work for Russia (and instead work against Russia in any foreign policy decision being it the enlargement of NATO or the Ukrainian election) he started working like his predecessors and using brute force to protect Russian interests.

The book is really readable and interesting in the first 2/3 and in the very end. At some point (the last 1/3) the book turns into a summary of superficial news stories, especially when discussing the potential collusion in the American election. Peter Conradi should have left this part out and I would have given it 5 stars.

[Aaron Makepeace · Rating 3 out of 5]

It is a strange book that describes the U.S direct involvement with the 2014 coup in Ukraine, the Georgia attacks killing over 1,000 civilians & Russians in south ossetia that started the 2008 war, as well as charting the missile defence issue with surprising balance, yet blames Putin for Russia's alleged isolation in the epilogue.

It even lists American foreign policy of "containment" of Russia, an official endeavour to keep Russia in the dirt so the U.S could & did act without constraint, bullying the world, until recently.

Very strange indeed.

The title of the book is interesting in and of itself, implying that Russia was owned or in the pocket of outside actors & was lost, during the cold bath of Rampant corruption & "free markets" in the 90's, as the book details, it certainly was. American companies took great advantage of the state's weakness. The book documents the US trying extremely hard indeed to help in his elections, fearing a Communist party victory. It is no wonder many Russians take the view of Yeltsin as an american stooge & sellout.

I was grateful to see the author describe in some detail the process of privatisation that happened in the 90's, the voucher auctions were something i had not learnt about before and is a very upsetting thing to read about.

I was also surprised to see the author document the US desire to see the Soviet Union survive, fearing the possible violence & risks that would follow its collapse, the author notes this to highlight the hollow words US politicians have spouted since in claiming "we won the cold war".

It was an interesting book to read but the epilogue, as well as the glowing references to Yeltsin, despite all his wrongs that the author has included in this book left me somewhat bewildered.

A more congruent conclusion might be, that US hegemony is at an end & they do not like having equals with differing opinion on the world stage, their fall from olympus is not proceeding gracefully.

[Monty Milne · Rating 4 out of 5]

Some other reviewers have suggested this book doesn’t tell you anything you wouldn’t already know if you had been following the news closely for the last thirty years. I think this is a little unfair. It’s well written journalism and it made me think of familiar events in new ways. When did the current conflict in the Ukraine become inevitable? Certainly, it has unfolded as inexorably as a slow motion train crash, but things could have been so different, if only thirty years ago so many opportunities hadn’t been squandered.

There are so many “if only” moments. If only Boris Yeltsin had been able to avoid drinking himself into a stupor at such regular intervals, and if only Bill Clinton had been able to keep his trousers on. The former’s erratic alcoholism and the latter’s distraction by Monica Lewinsky both had disastrous long term effects.

This is a sad story, full of missed opportunities and self harming idiocy on all sides. Almost all of the players seem to be either fundamentally decent human beings who make terrible mistakes, or terrible human beings who make terrible mistakes. And yet it could all have been so different. A dismantled NATO, an open and democratic Russia welcomed into the West, and a strategic partnership to contain both China and Islamic terrorism: it could easily have happened, with better leadership on all sides.

Although I’m giving this four stars, I didn’t really enjoy it: the subject is too gloomy. I now have an overwhelming urge to stop watching the news and to cultivate my garden instead.

[Peter Stuart · Rating 4 out of 5]

Presented from a western viewpoint as to why a new "Cold War" has come to be currently in effect between principally the United States and the EU with Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, this may be a valued addition to any readers current knowledge of current Geo, Eurasian and European politics and the paths these may take in the time to come.

The work is fascinating in components, expertly presented to a level of detail needed to form an historical understanding in others and interspersed with first hand interviews by the author with Russians that add credibility and alternative views, which contributed well to the overall work. So too are the presented facts on the opinions of, and methods of propagation by several Russian government funded media outlets, principally RT, and how they consistently fail fact checking (too many to summarize here) or how their opinion can swing 180 degrees in a matter of hours given global electoral results (U.K. Brexit, us federal, Austrian federal).

After circa 400 pages then of balanced, and at times detailed, historical record and analysis, the author presents his opinion of who it was who lost Russia. However this is quickly potentially countered as the author then looks from his 2016 view to a possible view 25years hence.

Time will tell if either opinion holds true, or if indeed there are others who contributed in material ways, or perhaps indeed created, the conflict that rages.

[Jake Justen · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is overall a very good, if already dated, summary of the rift in relations between the US/West and Russia following the dissolution of the USSR in the early 1990s. A time which could have fostered friendlier relations instead led to more of the same from the Cold War era. While Conradi spends much of the book outlining the impatience of the West in establishing a western liberal capitalist democracy in the 1990s, expansion of the militaristic NATO alliance eastward toward Russia in the 2000s, failure to cooperate in the terror wars, America exiting nuclear proliferation and missile treaties, and poor diplomacy in Eurasia and the Baltics, he is quick in the epilogue to lay blame with Putin's authoritarianism and antagonism, saying that if anyone is to blame it's Putin - maybe it's not the way Conradi intended the remark, but it came off to me as a "Germany is entirely at fault for WWI" type of statement. That's not to say Putin is not at fault, just not entirely; the book also takes care to address Russia's, and particularly Putin's, involvement and exertion of hard influence on its neighbors and former satellites. The chapter "You Do It Too" was almost laughable in its attempt to discuss mis/disinformation from Russian media and intelligence services, while portraying western media and intelligence services positively. That would have been a tough case to make in 2017, let alone in 2024 when they don't even attempt to hide their carefully constructed narratives.

[Michael · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mr. Conradi provides a highly educational overview of American policy toward Russia (and the Soviet Union) from George H.W. Bush to the first months of the Trump administration. I found the book balanced in terms of chronicling U.S. missteps, but also not letting Mr. Putin off the hook for his own provocations and zero-sum approach to diplomacy. Two regrets, one of which the author could not help:

- I wonder how his view of the Trump administration would have changed with the revelations over the last couple of years of the Democrat party's role in conjuring the dossier on Trump, as well as the outcome of the Mueller investigation (i.e., no collusion). These revelations certainly do not excuse Mr. Trump's diplomatic missteps and poor judgment in dealing with Putin, but his actions were not crimes given the facts now revealed. However, crimes were likely committed by Democrats in their actions, surveillance and otherwise. Obviously, the author would not know this at the time of the writing.

- I would have liked a little more on Europe's role on "Who Lost Russia". Mr. Conradi chronicles the German and French, as well as British positions, but he provides more of a thumbnail sketch, rather than the deep dive given to the American role in dealing with Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Medvedev and Putin. The mistakes made by the Europeans have also led to a new Cold War.

[Bryan · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a fascinating book. As someone not well versed in Russian/Ukrainian/ Eastern European history, I found it easy to understand and quite helpful. The book mainly covers the period from the fall of the Berlin wall (in 1989) to the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war of 2022. I found it remarkably fair given how many sensitive topics it covers. Strictly speaking there are no pure "good guys" or "bad guys" just a lot of different people from two vastly different societies trying, and unfortunately failing, to find a mutually beneficial path to a healthy diplontic relationship. I came away feeling sorry for the Russians, especially in the wake of the end of the Cold War when many the West were spiking the football talking about "defeating Russia"; many Russians did not see the end of the Soviet system like that, it ultimately helped poison the well for future relations.

I saw the book was "remarkably fair" that is until the last chapter, added on in the wake of the war. Not to say I think he is 100 percent wrong in all of his judgements, but it feels rushed and the losing the evenhandedness is a major consequence. The added parts just feel like a different book and why I can't give it 5 stars.

Overall, worth a read if you are interested in a fair look of this conflict.

[Dave · Rating 5 out of 5]

I've read a number of books focusing on Russia and it's tumultuous history since the collapse of the Soviet Union. I believe journalist Peter Conradi provides one of the most succinct and effectively written books on this topic. Beginning with the last days of Gorbachev's rule Conradi demonstrates how missed opportunities (on behalf of Russia and the West) along with diplomatic misunderstandings and internal political gaffes gradually combined to extinguish the dramatic potential that existed when the USSR ceased to exist. Numerous presidents from the first Bush administration to Obama attempted to rework the relationship with Russia. Despite some successes, once Vladimir Putin established complete control over all levels of government, the potential for mutual progress became all but impossible.

While I do believe the West holds some responsibility for the radicalization of Russia on the international scene, I believe the fault lies largely with Putin and his pursuit of power at home and abroad. It is difficult to see where the Putin regime will move to next with the ongoing pandemic and collapse of oil prices. To better understand how things got to where they are today between Russia and the West, I strongly recommend reading this book.