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Desert Armour: Tank Warfare in North Africa: Beda Fomm to Operation Crusader, 1940–41
Robert Forczyk covers the development of armored warfare in North Africa from the earliest Anglo-Italian engagements in 1940 to the British victory over the German Afrikakorps in Operation Crusader in 1941.
The war in the North African desert was pure mechanized warfare, and in many respects the most technologically advanced theatre of World War II. It was also the only theatre where for three years British and Commonwealth, and later United States, troops were in constant contact with Axis forces.
World War II bestselling author Robert Forczyk explores the first half of the history of the campaign, from the initial Italian offensive and the arrival of Rommel's Panzergruppe Afrika to the British Operation Crusader offensive that led to the relief of Tobruk. He examines the armored forces, equipment, doctrine, training, logistics and operations employed by both Allied and Axis forces throughout the period, focusing especially on the brigade and regimental level of operations.
Desert Armour goes back to the sources to provide a new study of armored warfare in the desert.
The war in the North African desert was pure mechanized warfare, and in many respects the most technologically advanced theatre of World War II. It was also the only theatre where for three years British and Commonwealth, and later United States, troops were in constant contact with Axis forces.
World War II bestselling author Robert Forczyk explores the first half of the history of the campaign, from the initial Italian offensive and the arrival of Rommel's Panzergruppe Afrika to the British Operation Crusader offensive that led to the relief of Tobruk. He examines the armored forces, equipment, doctrine, training, logistics and operations employed by both Allied and Axis forces throughout the period, focusing especially on the brigade and regimental level of operations.
Desert Armour goes back to the sources to provide a new study of armored warfare in the desert.
336 pages, Hardcover
Published February 28, 2023
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95 people want to read
About the author
Robert Forczyk
58 books73 followersRobert Forczyk has a PhD in International Relations and National Security from the University of Maryland and a strong background in European and Asian military history.
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
December 19, 2024
There's a lot to like about this book, but how you really feel about it will depend on how you feel about Forczyk's outlook as a writer, as it's best described as acerbic. He starts out early, by making no apologies for bringing more contemporary military theory than the typical "academic" or "general" reader might be comfortable with to his writing, which comes off as patronizing for me, but then ruthlessly applies those same standards to the period flag-rank commanders, and really takes no prisoners. At various points Forczyk refers to Erwin Rommel as being "egomaniacal" and a "con man," and certainly promoted beyond his abilities. On the other hand, less controversially, most of the British commanders get criticized for lack of energy and a failure to understand combined-arms warfare; even the men who beat the Italians in 1940. In fact, the Italians come off rather better in this book than one generally sees; at least Forczyk detects a determined effort to learn from mistakes and improve.
Apart from that, Forczyk keeps coming back to issues of logistics, training, and communication, emphasizing that unless you have these aspects of military art in order, you're unlikely to be successful in regards to mechanized warfare.
As for what I'd criticize, I do wonder if Forczyk is always in control of his material, as he is trying to cover a lot. I've seen reviews that have "dinged" Forczyk on some factual issues that are mostly small scale. At some points, Forczyk also might have wanted to step back from issues with doctrine, operations, and tactics and consider the general strategic picture. Yes, too many resources were being thrown at North Africa by the powers in question, but for the British this was the best war they had to convince the Americans that they were serious (and Churchill was never going to write off holding the British Empire together), and the German military high command still felt stung by the escape of the BEF from France in 1940, and North Africa in 1941 was the best way to collect prestige points. Still, this in advance over what the general reader has probably read about this campaign, Forczyk actually makes the most use yet I've seen of Italian sources, and I'm looking forward to seeing that the second half of this study is like.
Apart from that, Forczyk keeps coming back to issues of logistics, training, and communication, emphasizing that unless you have these aspects of military art in order, you're unlikely to be successful in regards to mechanized warfare.
As for what I'd criticize, I do wonder if Forczyk is always in control of his material, as he is trying to cover a lot. I've seen reviews that have "dinged" Forczyk on some factual issues that are mostly small scale. At some points, Forczyk also might have wanted to step back from issues with doctrine, operations, and tactics and consider the general strategic picture. Yes, too many resources were being thrown at North Africa by the powers in question, but for the British this was the best war they had to convince the Americans that they were serious (and Churchill was never going to write off holding the British Empire together), and the German military high command still felt stung by the escape of the BEF from France in 1940, and North Africa in 1941 was the best way to collect prestige points. Still, this in advance over what the general reader has probably read about this campaign, Forczyk actually makes the most use yet I've seen of Italian sources, and I'm looking forward to seeing that the second half of this study is like.
October 3, 2023
Excellent analysis of the early part of the war in desert in WW II. The author, a former armor officer, take a detailed and analytical look at the equipment, tactics, and leaders of the British, German, and Italian armor units. One thing is for sure, the author is no fan of Rommel. In his opinion Rommel hit his prime in WW I as an infantry battalion commander and displayed poor knowledge of leadership and logistics while commanding the Afrika Corps.
November 19, 2023
I’ll start with what I liked. The rigorous evaluation of the commanders’ tactics and battle decisions is mostly as good as it is in his other books. There is not a whiff of hero worship, which is unusual for a book on the North African campaign. I liked the commentary on training deficiencies in the various armies and the comparison of quantity and quality of radios. I also greatly appreciated his detailing of the damage that Basil Liddell Hart did to the UK’s defenses and to the historiography of armored warfare doctrine. Even as a young adult I could see that Emperor Liddell Hart had no clothes and was dismayed by the high regard that old people had for him. (Side note: a Google search shows that no one else has said that Liddell Hart had no clothes, but it does reveal that Liddell Hart had a corset fetish and forced his wives and stepdaughters to wear them.)
Unfortunately, this book is marred by negligent research, mistakes, and some questionable judgments. Here is a list of the problems I have with this book.
Page 63: He says that the US 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions deployed to North Africa with an organization of 9 tank and 2 infantry battalions. These divisions actually deployed with 6 tank and 3 infantry battalions.
Page 85: He says a squadron in a British mixed armoured regiment contained 3 troops of 3 tanks each for a total of 16 tanks. The actual organization was 4 troops of 3 tanks each plus 4 headquarters tanks = 16.
Page 93: The 5th Panzer Regiment’s March 1941 wire diagram doesn’t add up for the Pz IV. A medium company should have 14 of them, not 10. I think he may have been trying to show actual strength at the company level, but to get to 20 in the regiment you’d need to count the 3 tanks that would not reach the division until 29 April. By then Rommel had driven the regiment into the ground and it had nowhere near 20 Pz IV runners.
Page 108 map: The Italian 64th Infantry Division should be east-southeast of Buq Buq, not deployed along the coast road. 2nd Libyan Division also had units in Ras el-Dai (The British called it Point 90.) to the east of the Tummar camps.
Page 141: This isn’t a criticism of the book, I just want to get in a dig at Churchill. Forczyk quotes Churchill’s message of 12 February 1941 instructing Wavell not to advance on Tripoli but send forces to Greece instead. In his history of the war (volume 3, p.342), Churchill shamelessly tried to stick Wavell with a share of the blame: “Books written since the war have shown how subordinate but influential portions of the Cairo Operations Staff had deplored the decision to send the army to Greece. They did not know how fully and willingly General Wavell had accepted this policy, still less how searchingly the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff had put the issue to him, almost inviting a negative.”
Page 148: Forczyk claims that 5th Light Division came to North Africa with truck capacity of 360 tons, citing page 15 of Battistelli’s Rommel's Afrika Korps. But that page does not provide a capacity. I can’t even find the number 360 anywhere in the book. Halder’s War Diary entry of 12 March 1941 says that four supply column battalions had been shipped to Libya, with a total capacity of 1440 tons.
Forczyk’s next point is that the truck capacity could not support long-range offensive operations, and he cites an OKH document that I looked up. I think it’s overly pessimistic, stating that the 1000 km round trip between Tripoli and Sirte would take 7 days. (Google Maps says the round trip is only 904 km.) 5th Light Division would need 2420 tons of capacity and 15th Panzer Division would need 3800 tons, for a total of 6220 tons. (The document has a math error so it concluded 6120 tons.) I wonder if this is an example of exaggerating difficulties to get more resources, or perhaps to try to kill the idea.
Kurowski’s Das Afrika Korps (p. 92) has what I believe to be a more realistic time of 6 days for the 1340 km round trip between Tripoli and the Arco dei Fileni to the west of El Agheila. But Forczyk claims (without providing a source) a dubious Tripoli to El Agheila round trip time of two days and a grossly short one-way distance of 600 km. Google Maps says it’s 732 km. Since Forczyk repeatedly condemns Rommel for disregarding logistics issues, you’d think he would have bothered to correctly determine distances, speeds, and truck capacities.
Page 152 map: 5th Light Division was armor, not infantry. II/5 Pz and 5 RTR were armor, not recon.
Page 161: 1st KRRC is omitted from Gott’s early April mobile force.
Page 163: Near the bottom he left out a name. I think he meant to write Ponath’s but it just says ‘s.
Page 166: He translates Kradschützen as motor infantry instead of motorcycle infantry.
Page 168: I disagree with his claim that the British should have left a delaying force in the Jebel Akhdar in April 1941. He thinks “the very survival of most of Rommel’s forces” depended on supplies from the coast road. To the contrary, supply trucks could and did take the desert tracks. Forczyk even admits this earlier in the book. Even if you assume that trucks could not leave the coast road, the delaying force would have surrendered once it had been cut off and Rommel’s advance would not have been substantially slowed. Forczyk’s plan would have just caused the pointless sacrifice of one or more battalions of Australians, which the British simply could not afford.
The actual moral of the story is not delay, but force preservation. The British did not have enough trucks to supply an adequate force at Mersa Brega from Tobruk (The Luftwaffe made Benghazi’s port too dangerous to use.) and they should have realized ahead of time that the Benghazi escarpment position was indefensible against a force with German tanks, so the 2nd Armoured Division and 9th Australian Division should not have deployed more than a covering force west of Gazala. They wouldn’t have lost their tanks to breakdowns and running out of fuel, while Rommel’s tanks would have been almost as decimated by the march as historically. Rommel might then have suffered a Leeroy Jenkins magnitude defeat at Gazala or Tobruk and become the laughingstock he deserved to be.
Page 169: He cites van Creveld’s Supplying War (p. 186) to claim that the Axis forces required roughly 3100 tons per day of supplies. What van Creveld actually says is they received 325,000 tons from February to May and that it was 45,000 tons over their consumption. 280,000/120 days = 2333 tons per day = 70,000 tons per month, which is the number van Creveld gives on page 185. Forczyk apparently thought February to May was three months. I consulted Germany and the Second World War for the monthly totals, and 325,000 tons corresponds to the four-month period.
He claims that Tripoli’s port capacity was 1500-2000 tons per day. Sadkovich’s The Italian Navy in World War II says the capacity was 3500 tons per day (p. 145). As a reality check, I looked at March 1941 before the Axis captured Benghazi. The Axis unloaded 92,753 tons = 2992 tons per day, which all had to go through Tripoli. I therefore trust Sadkovich’s number more.
Page 171: 15th Panzer Division had the 15th Kradschützen, not the 33rd.
Page 187 map: The RTRs are depicted as battalion-sized, so the 11th Hussars should be too.
Page 206: He says the reorganization involved the 15th Panzer Division giving the 21st Panzer Division one infantry battalion, which is an oversimplification. 15th Panzer actually gave a two-battalion regiment in exchange for a single battalion. He also says the Afrika Division’s units began deploying to North Africa in late September 1941, but most of them actually arrived in June, July, and August.
Page 208: He says the Pz III H model was relatively rare in North Africa. Jentz’s Tank Combat in North Africa (p. 38) says that 72% of 15th Panzer Division’s Pz III’s were the H model, so “uncommon” would be a better word choice than “rare”.
He wrote about the Italian VII medium tank battalion earlier in the book, so he should have written that Ariete was reinforced *to* three medium tank battalions, not “with”. 146 was the total number of Italian medium tanks present for Operation Crusader in Ariete and RECAM, not the number of reinforcements.
Page 215: He says Cunningham’s command in East Africa comprised four Indian brigades. This is only half of the actual size and completely incorrect regarding the composition. It actually comprised 1st, 2nd, and 5th South African Brigades, 21st, 22nd, and 25th East African Brigades, 23rd Nigerian Brigade, and 24th Gold Coast Brigade. Platt had the six Indian brigades in Eritrea to the north.
Page 220: He repeats the dubious claim that Rommel was not expecting to be attacked in November 1941 and ignored warnings out of wishful thinking. Von Mellenthin debunked this in Panzer Battles back in 1956 (pp. 69-71). Rommel knew an attack was coming but took a calculated risk that he could capture Tobruk before dealing with 8th Army. This would have allowed him to use his entire force against 8th Army rather than having to leave a large force besieging Tobruk. If 8th Army attacked first, his forces along the frontier and 21st Panzer Division might be able to hold them off until Tobruk had fallen. To hedge his bet, 15th Panzer Division was instructed that it had to be able to cancel its assault plans and move to support 21st Panzer with 24 hours’ notice. He only told the Italians that the British would not attack because he was afraid that they would lose their nerve and insist on canceling the assault on Tobruk.
Page 221: I don’t buy Forczyk’s claim that Axis supply shortages made it impossible to assault Tobruk while fending off 8th Army. In the actual event, the Axis was able to fight for 3 weeks before retreating and had to leave their artillery ammunition dumps behind. When Rommel returned to assault Tobruk in June 1942, he found the dumps undisturbed and used the ammunition to crack the defenses in a single day.
Page 223: The Operation Crusader map is weak. The most important terrain features were the escarpments, but the map doesn’t show them. The black and white maps in the early histories are much better. There are also multiple unit symbol mistakes: 90th Light Division was not motorized yet, 1st Army Tank Brigade is shown as a division, and 13th Corps is shown as armored.
Page 224: RECAM started the battle at Giovanni Berta near Derna, and was not ordered to move until 22 November, so it could not have been at Bir el Gubi on 19 November. Montanari (volume 2, p. 443) says that the 11th Hussars actually encountered German armored cars and two Ariete tank platoons.
Page 237 map: Cramer is misspelled. I would have liked a map for the Totensonntag battle too, but that’s Osprey’s fault for strictly rationing how many maps authors can include.
Page 258: I think he meant to say that the 7th Armoured Brigade was sent back to Egypt, not the entire division.
44 RTR was omitted from his accounting.
Page 261: Rommel’s half-track was named Greif (Griffin), not Grief.
Page 279: Convoy M.41 also lost 45 German tanks to Upright’s torpedoes. Page 267 says Carr was wounded on 27 November and command of 22nd Armoured Brigade passed to Jago, which I believe is accurate. But page 279 says this also happened on 27 December, which I do not believe.
Appendix 1: Major Tank Deliveries to North Africa, 1940-41
5th Light Division had 29 Pz I (not 30), 45 Pz II (not 43), and 17 Pz IV (not 18).
The 10 Pz III and 3 Pz IV replacements for the tanks lost in the Leverkusen fire are missing.
15th Panzer Division had 78 Pz III (not 77) and 20 Pz IV (not 18).
German summer 1941 replacements were 29 Pz III, not 15 Pz III plus 5 Pz IV.
IX Btg Carri M arrived 25 August 1941, not in October.
RECAM’s 9 M13/40 and 4 L6/40 are missing. Sadkovich’s book has 7 M13/40 arriving in July and the other 6 tanks in September.
The 45 German tanks and 52 Italian tanks sunk by Upright are missing.
Empire Song sank with 45 Matildas, not 50.
Convoy W.S. 8b had 14 Matildas and 12 cruisers, not vice versa.
Convoy W.S. 11 had 24 Crusaders, 2 Mk II, and 4 Mk IV (not 20 Crusaders).
Appendix 3: Orders of Battle for Armoured Units
For Operation Compass, Italian XXIII Corps is missing the 1st and 2nd CCNN Divisions and is wrongly given the entire 4th CCNN. (It had only some elements of it.) The Libyan Group is missing the 1st Libyan and 4th CCNN Divisions.
Some of the British tank strengths for Operation Compass are off. I’ve listed the 6 December 1940 tank state according to WO 169/27. I put Forczyk's numbers in parentheses. He claims 139 cruisers + 161 light (300 total) vs the actual 91 cruisers + 161 light (252 total) for the six regiments. Even if you add in the tanks in the HQs, RAC Base Depot, and the workshops, that only adds up to 137 cruisers. On page 117 he gives a different set of wrong numbers: 193 light, 128 cruisers, 321 total. And on page 121 he gives a third incorrect total: 350 tanks, which he says does not include the 7th RTR’s Matildas.
HQ, 7 Armd. Div. 4 lt, 1 cr
HQ, 4 Armd. Bde. 3 lt
HQ, 7 Armd. Bde. 5 lt, 2 cr
1 RTR 22 lt, 16 cr (26/23)
2 RTR 16 lt, 36 cr (16/38)
3 Hussars 36 lt, 16 cr (36/16)
6 RTR (- B Sqn) 9 lt, 9 cr (16/32 for entire unit)
7 Hussars 34 lt, 4 cr (32/16)
8 Hussars 36 lt, 4 cr (35/14)
B Sqn, 6 RTR 8 lt, 6 cr
RAC Base Depot 13 lt, 2 cr
Workshops 82 lt, 41 cr
For the Mersa Brega battle, he claims an impossibly high 71 Pz III and 20 Pz IV.
For Operation Brevity, of 2 RTR’s 36 tanks, only 28 were runners on 11 May 1941.
In Operation Crusader, the Italians had 146 M13/40s, not 159.
9th Bersaglieri Regiment should not be detached from the Trieste Division. It didn’t become a corps asset until 1942. There’s also some double-counting going on, with Trieste claimed to have 6 motorized battalions without the Bersaglieri regiment. It should actually have 4 motorized battalions and 9th Bersaglieri another 4 battalions (2 motorized, 1 motorcycle, and 1 support weapons).
RECAM’s infantry battalions were the Giovani Fascisti. I can’t think of a legitimate reason for omitting the name, because there was plenty of room for it.
42 RTR supported the Indians, not the New Zealanders. 4th South African Armoured Cars should be with 7th Armoured Brigade, not the 4th. 1st King’s Dragoon Guards should be with 4th Armoured Brigade, not the 7th. Page 236 correctly places the South African Armoured Cars at Sidi Rezegh with 7th Armoured Brigade. The British official history says 7th Armoured Brigade had 26 early cruisers, 62 A13s, and 53 Crusaders, not 21/68/69.
Unfortunately, this book is marred by negligent research, mistakes, and some questionable judgments. Here is a list of the problems I have with this book.
Page 63: He says that the US 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions deployed to North Africa with an organization of 9 tank and 2 infantry battalions. These divisions actually deployed with 6 tank and 3 infantry battalions.
Page 85: He says a squadron in a British mixed armoured regiment contained 3 troops of 3 tanks each for a total of 16 tanks. The actual organization was 4 troops of 3 tanks each plus 4 headquarters tanks = 16.
Page 93: The 5th Panzer Regiment’s March 1941 wire diagram doesn’t add up for the Pz IV. A medium company should have 14 of them, not 10. I think he may have been trying to show actual strength at the company level, but to get to 20 in the regiment you’d need to count the 3 tanks that would not reach the division until 29 April. By then Rommel had driven the regiment into the ground and it had nowhere near 20 Pz IV runners.
Page 108 map: The Italian 64th Infantry Division should be east-southeast of Buq Buq, not deployed along the coast road. 2nd Libyan Division also had units in Ras el-Dai (The British called it Point 90.) to the east of the Tummar camps.
Page 141: This isn’t a criticism of the book, I just want to get in a dig at Churchill. Forczyk quotes Churchill’s message of 12 February 1941 instructing Wavell not to advance on Tripoli but send forces to Greece instead. In his history of the war (volume 3, p.342), Churchill shamelessly tried to stick Wavell with a share of the blame: “Books written since the war have shown how subordinate but influential portions of the Cairo Operations Staff had deplored the decision to send the army to Greece. They did not know how fully and willingly General Wavell had accepted this policy, still less how searchingly the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff had put the issue to him, almost inviting a negative.”
Page 148: Forczyk claims that 5th Light Division came to North Africa with truck capacity of 360 tons, citing page 15 of Battistelli’s Rommel's Afrika Korps. But that page does not provide a capacity. I can’t even find the number 360 anywhere in the book. Halder’s War Diary entry of 12 March 1941 says that four supply column battalions had been shipped to Libya, with a total capacity of 1440 tons.
Forczyk’s next point is that the truck capacity could not support long-range offensive operations, and he cites an OKH document that I looked up. I think it’s overly pessimistic, stating that the 1000 km round trip between Tripoli and Sirte would take 7 days. (Google Maps says the round trip is only 904 km.) 5th Light Division would need 2420 tons of capacity and 15th Panzer Division would need 3800 tons, for a total of 6220 tons. (The document has a math error so it concluded 6120 tons.) I wonder if this is an example of exaggerating difficulties to get more resources, or perhaps to try to kill the idea.
Kurowski’s Das Afrika Korps (p. 92) has what I believe to be a more realistic time of 6 days for the 1340 km round trip between Tripoli and the Arco dei Fileni to the west of El Agheila. But Forczyk claims (without providing a source) a dubious Tripoli to El Agheila round trip time of two days and a grossly short one-way distance of 600 km. Google Maps says it’s 732 km. Since Forczyk repeatedly condemns Rommel for disregarding logistics issues, you’d think he would have bothered to correctly determine distances, speeds, and truck capacities.
Page 152 map: 5th Light Division was armor, not infantry. II/5 Pz and 5 RTR were armor, not recon.
Page 161: 1st KRRC is omitted from Gott’s early April mobile force.
Page 163: Near the bottom he left out a name. I think he meant to write Ponath’s but it just says ‘s.
Page 166: He translates Kradschützen as motor infantry instead of motorcycle infantry.
Page 168: I disagree with his claim that the British should have left a delaying force in the Jebel Akhdar in April 1941. He thinks “the very survival of most of Rommel’s forces” depended on supplies from the coast road. To the contrary, supply trucks could and did take the desert tracks. Forczyk even admits this earlier in the book. Even if you assume that trucks could not leave the coast road, the delaying force would have surrendered once it had been cut off and Rommel’s advance would not have been substantially slowed. Forczyk’s plan would have just caused the pointless sacrifice of one or more battalions of Australians, which the British simply could not afford.
The actual moral of the story is not delay, but force preservation. The British did not have enough trucks to supply an adequate force at Mersa Brega from Tobruk (The Luftwaffe made Benghazi’s port too dangerous to use.) and they should have realized ahead of time that the Benghazi escarpment position was indefensible against a force with German tanks, so the 2nd Armoured Division and 9th Australian Division should not have deployed more than a covering force west of Gazala. They wouldn’t have lost their tanks to breakdowns and running out of fuel, while Rommel’s tanks would have been almost as decimated by the march as historically. Rommel might then have suffered a Leeroy Jenkins magnitude defeat at Gazala or Tobruk and become the laughingstock he deserved to be.
Page 169: He cites van Creveld’s Supplying War (p. 186) to claim that the Axis forces required roughly 3100 tons per day of supplies. What van Creveld actually says is they received 325,000 tons from February to May and that it was 45,000 tons over their consumption. 280,000/120 days = 2333 tons per day = 70,000 tons per month, which is the number van Creveld gives on page 185. Forczyk apparently thought February to May was three months. I consulted Germany and the Second World War for the monthly totals, and 325,000 tons corresponds to the four-month period.
He claims that Tripoli’s port capacity was 1500-2000 tons per day. Sadkovich’s The Italian Navy in World War II says the capacity was 3500 tons per day (p. 145). As a reality check, I looked at March 1941 before the Axis captured Benghazi. The Axis unloaded 92,753 tons = 2992 tons per day, which all had to go through Tripoli. I therefore trust Sadkovich’s number more.
Page 171: 15th Panzer Division had the 15th Kradschützen, not the 33rd.
Page 187 map: The RTRs are depicted as battalion-sized, so the 11th Hussars should be too.
Page 206: He says the reorganization involved the 15th Panzer Division giving the 21st Panzer Division one infantry battalion, which is an oversimplification. 15th Panzer actually gave a two-battalion regiment in exchange for a single battalion. He also says the Afrika Division’s units began deploying to North Africa in late September 1941, but most of them actually arrived in June, July, and August.
Page 208: He says the Pz III H model was relatively rare in North Africa. Jentz’s Tank Combat in North Africa (p. 38) says that 72% of 15th Panzer Division’s Pz III’s were the H model, so “uncommon” would be a better word choice than “rare”.
He wrote about the Italian VII medium tank battalion earlier in the book, so he should have written that Ariete was reinforced *to* three medium tank battalions, not “with”. 146 was the total number of Italian medium tanks present for Operation Crusader in Ariete and RECAM, not the number of reinforcements.
Page 215: He says Cunningham’s command in East Africa comprised four Indian brigades. This is only half of the actual size and completely incorrect regarding the composition. It actually comprised 1st, 2nd, and 5th South African Brigades, 21st, 22nd, and 25th East African Brigades, 23rd Nigerian Brigade, and 24th Gold Coast Brigade. Platt had the six Indian brigades in Eritrea to the north.
Page 220: He repeats the dubious claim that Rommel was not expecting to be attacked in November 1941 and ignored warnings out of wishful thinking. Von Mellenthin debunked this in Panzer Battles back in 1956 (pp. 69-71). Rommel knew an attack was coming but took a calculated risk that he could capture Tobruk before dealing with 8th Army. This would have allowed him to use his entire force against 8th Army rather than having to leave a large force besieging Tobruk. If 8th Army attacked first, his forces along the frontier and 21st Panzer Division might be able to hold them off until Tobruk had fallen. To hedge his bet, 15th Panzer Division was instructed that it had to be able to cancel its assault plans and move to support 21st Panzer with 24 hours’ notice. He only told the Italians that the British would not attack because he was afraid that they would lose their nerve and insist on canceling the assault on Tobruk.
Page 221: I don’t buy Forczyk’s claim that Axis supply shortages made it impossible to assault Tobruk while fending off 8th Army. In the actual event, the Axis was able to fight for 3 weeks before retreating and had to leave their artillery ammunition dumps behind. When Rommel returned to assault Tobruk in June 1942, he found the dumps undisturbed and used the ammunition to crack the defenses in a single day.
Page 223: The Operation Crusader map is weak. The most important terrain features were the escarpments, but the map doesn’t show them. The black and white maps in the early histories are much better. There are also multiple unit symbol mistakes: 90th Light Division was not motorized yet, 1st Army Tank Brigade is shown as a division, and 13th Corps is shown as armored.
Page 224: RECAM started the battle at Giovanni Berta near Derna, and was not ordered to move until 22 November, so it could not have been at Bir el Gubi on 19 November. Montanari (volume 2, p. 443) says that the 11th Hussars actually encountered German armored cars and two Ariete tank platoons.
Page 237 map: Cramer is misspelled. I would have liked a map for the Totensonntag battle too, but that’s Osprey’s fault for strictly rationing how many maps authors can include.
Page 258: I think he meant to say that the 7th Armoured Brigade was sent back to Egypt, not the entire division.
44 RTR was omitted from his accounting.
Page 261: Rommel’s half-track was named Greif (Griffin), not Grief.
Page 279: Convoy M.41 also lost 45 German tanks to Upright’s torpedoes. Page 267 says Carr was wounded on 27 November and command of 22nd Armoured Brigade passed to Jago, which I believe is accurate. But page 279 says this also happened on 27 December, which I do not believe.
Appendix 1: Major Tank Deliveries to North Africa, 1940-41
5th Light Division had 29 Pz I (not 30), 45 Pz II (not 43), and 17 Pz IV (not 18).
The 10 Pz III and 3 Pz IV replacements for the tanks lost in the Leverkusen fire are missing.
15th Panzer Division had 78 Pz III (not 77) and 20 Pz IV (not 18).
German summer 1941 replacements were 29 Pz III, not 15 Pz III plus 5 Pz IV.
IX Btg Carri M arrived 25 August 1941, not in October.
RECAM’s 9 M13/40 and 4 L6/40 are missing. Sadkovich’s book has 7 M13/40 arriving in July and the other 6 tanks in September.
The 45 German tanks and 52 Italian tanks sunk by Upright are missing.
Empire Song sank with 45 Matildas, not 50.
Convoy W.S. 8b had 14 Matildas and 12 cruisers, not vice versa.
Convoy W.S. 11 had 24 Crusaders, 2 Mk II, and 4 Mk IV (not 20 Crusaders).
Appendix 3: Orders of Battle for Armoured Units
For Operation Compass, Italian XXIII Corps is missing the 1st and 2nd CCNN Divisions and is wrongly given the entire 4th CCNN. (It had only some elements of it.) The Libyan Group is missing the 1st Libyan and 4th CCNN Divisions.
Some of the British tank strengths for Operation Compass are off. I’ve listed the 6 December 1940 tank state according to WO 169/27. I put Forczyk's numbers in parentheses. He claims 139 cruisers + 161 light (300 total) vs the actual 91 cruisers + 161 light (252 total) for the six regiments. Even if you add in the tanks in the HQs, RAC Base Depot, and the workshops, that only adds up to 137 cruisers. On page 117 he gives a different set of wrong numbers: 193 light, 128 cruisers, 321 total. And on page 121 he gives a third incorrect total: 350 tanks, which he says does not include the 7th RTR’s Matildas.
HQ, 7 Armd. Div. 4 lt, 1 cr
HQ, 4 Armd. Bde. 3 lt
HQ, 7 Armd. Bde. 5 lt, 2 cr
1 RTR 22 lt, 16 cr (26/23)
2 RTR 16 lt, 36 cr (16/38)
3 Hussars 36 lt, 16 cr (36/16)
6 RTR (- B Sqn) 9 lt, 9 cr (16/32 for entire unit)
7 Hussars 34 lt, 4 cr (32/16)
8 Hussars 36 lt, 4 cr (35/14)
B Sqn, 6 RTR 8 lt, 6 cr
RAC Base Depot 13 lt, 2 cr
Workshops 82 lt, 41 cr
For the Mersa Brega battle, he claims an impossibly high 71 Pz III and 20 Pz IV.
For Operation Brevity, of 2 RTR’s 36 tanks, only 28 were runners on 11 May 1941.
In Operation Crusader, the Italians had 146 M13/40s, not 159.
9th Bersaglieri Regiment should not be detached from the Trieste Division. It didn’t become a corps asset until 1942. There’s also some double-counting going on, with Trieste claimed to have 6 motorized battalions without the Bersaglieri regiment. It should actually have 4 motorized battalions and 9th Bersaglieri another 4 battalions (2 motorized, 1 motorcycle, and 1 support weapons).
RECAM’s infantry battalions were the Giovani Fascisti. I can’t think of a legitimate reason for omitting the name, because there was plenty of room for it.
42 RTR supported the Indians, not the New Zealanders. 4th South African Armoured Cars should be with 7th Armoured Brigade, not the 4th. 1st King’s Dragoon Guards should be with 4th Armoured Brigade, not the 7th. Page 236 correctly places the South African Armoured Cars at Sidi Rezegh with 7th Armoured Brigade. The British official history says 7th Armoured Brigade had 26 early cruisers, 62 A13s, and 53 Crusaders, not 21/68/69.
January 21, 2024
Robert Forczyk, former US Army Armor officer, Intelligence officer, and military analyst, has also made quite a name as a phenomenal military historian. Volume 1 of his 'Desert Armour' duology only reinforces his status as a top tier historian.
The North African Campaign has always been a very popular niche in military historiography, what with such mythological luminaries as Rommel, Patton, Montgomery, and slightly less well known, but equally tall tale figures as O'Connor, Bernard Freyberg, Strafer Gott, and Hans Joachim Marseilles to draw the attention, and fascination of many thousands around the world. Part of the merit of historians like Forczyk, however, is their measured ability to critique, and analyze, accepted narratives without reverting to Critical Theorist deconstructivism merely for the sake of reputation annihilation
If for nothing else, this superb work tears down the myth of North Africa in the annals of WW2, and replaces it with a sober, clear eyed, narrative analysis of the what, how, and why. While some may find it slightly annoying, or long winded, Forczyk spends the first third of the book detailing the development of armor, and it's operating doctrine during the interwar period for Great Britain and the Commonwealth, Italy, and Germany.
This long distance travel down the road of doctrine, technology, and theory is necessary to highlight why the North African Campaign went down the way that it did. Both the British, and the Italians, being colonial powers, put a premium on lighter, cost effective vehicles designed to police natives, and rapidly put down insurgencies, while the Germans, a Continental power, placed more of an emphasis on armor designed to engage other armor, and to shape, and exploit the battlefield against a peer opponent. However, one of the truly intriguing facets of the evolution of armor in this period is how the harsh realities of budgets, industrial deficiencies, and bureaucratic interference altered the trajectory of design, development, and deployment.
Leaving aside discussions on how the various powers were brought together to clash in North Africa, as this book is focused on the armored operations of the theater (as such, it leaves unsaid, or only mentioned in passing, events that did not have a heavy armor emphasis), the various campaigns and operations in the Cyrenaican, and Egyptian deserts were ones primarily of maneuver. Therefore, be prepared for a rapidly moving narrative, much like a squadron of Crusaders rumbling across the undulating sands.
Fast paced though the narrative is, this is not a light read.
Forczyk spent years in the US Army, served overseas in Armor units as an officer, and was in Army Intelligence, and is a current military analyst. His work is highly technical, and focused on a writing style that is informative to both professional military types, as well as civies, such as myself, up to speed with military terminology.
Moving from detailing the initial Italian invasion of Egypt, O'Connor's dramatic counteroffensive in Operation Compass, the arrival of the Deutches Afrika Korps, Rommel's initial offensive, the Siege of Tobruk, Unternehmen Sonnenblummen, Operation Battleaxe, and finally, Operation Crusader Forczyk narrates, and deeply analyzes, all of the major moves, countermoves, desperate actions, bloody slugfests, ambuscades, triumphs, defeats, and blunders of this fast paced theater of operations.
If, heretofore, you had been enamored with the legend of Rommel, Forczyk makes no bones about not being exactly keen on the Desert Fox. You might find this somewhat troubling, however, he backs up his criticisms with sound evidence, and very astute analysis. He is also not afraid to showcase where the Italians did well. In fact, this book contains some of the best descriptions of the Italian Army’s struggle in the desert against the British, and their strained relationship with hard to work with allies in the DAK.
To those who love throwing out the far too used cliche, amateurs study tactics, but professionals, logistics, will find much to love here. Forczyk spends considerable time detailing the considerable maintenance requirements of armored warfare. How merely moving across open terrain rapidly wears out tracks, road wheels, suspensions, guide pins, etc..., and of course, the veritable lodestone of fuel.
However, even food, and water, for the crews and supporting arms are discussed as well.
Even so, what warmed my heart, is Forczyk reminds those a bit too wedded to that cliche that all the logistics in the world mean nothing at all if you can't fight well with what you have. And no where else is this made more apparent than in the long discussion on the absolute bloody mess that was Operation Crusader.
If I were to put it succinctly, I would have to use a very un professional, rather profane, phrase, so I'll just say that neither side really looks well the closer you study the battles of Crusader. None of the major commanders involved, not even Rommel, really shine here, and both sides tended to spend just as much time blundering and chasing their own tails as they did aiming properly at the enemy.
Fog of War was the clear winner of Crusader, with incompetence being a close second.
And of course, the men at the sharp end paid for it all in
spades.
The British win primarily on points, and Crusader was a very close game, indeed.
By the end of the book, the half time of the North African Campaign, the battle lines are right back where they were just before Rommel's opening gambit. Both sides are getting heavily resupplied, and reinforced, and both sides are
confident of ultimate victory in the next round.
As usual, Forczyk hits a home run, and volume 2 is on my too read pile.
Very highly recommended.
The North African Campaign has always been a very popular niche in military historiography, what with such mythological luminaries as Rommel, Patton, Montgomery, and slightly less well known, but equally tall tale figures as O'Connor, Bernard Freyberg, Strafer Gott, and Hans Joachim Marseilles to draw the attention, and fascination of many thousands around the world. Part of the merit of historians like Forczyk, however, is their measured ability to critique, and analyze, accepted narratives without reverting to Critical Theorist deconstructivism merely for the sake of reputation annihilation
If for nothing else, this superb work tears down the myth of North Africa in the annals of WW2, and replaces it with a sober, clear eyed, narrative analysis of the what, how, and why. While some may find it slightly annoying, or long winded, Forczyk spends the first third of the book detailing the development of armor, and it's operating doctrine during the interwar period for Great Britain and the Commonwealth, Italy, and Germany.
This long distance travel down the road of doctrine, technology, and theory is necessary to highlight why the North African Campaign went down the way that it did. Both the British, and the Italians, being colonial powers, put a premium on lighter, cost effective vehicles designed to police natives, and rapidly put down insurgencies, while the Germans, a Continental power, placed more of an emphasis on armor designed to engage other armor, and to shape, and exploit the battlefield against a peer opponent. However, one of the truly intriguing facets of the evolution of armor in this period is how the harsh realities of budgets, industrial deficiencies, and bureaucratic interference altered the trajectory of design, development, and deployment.
Leaving aside discussions on how the various powers were brought together to clash in North Africa, as this book is focused on the armored operations of the theater (as such, it leaves unsaid, or only mentioned in passing, events that did not have a heavy armor emphasis), the various campaigns and operations in the Cyrenaican, and Egyptian deserts were ones primarily of maneuver. Therefore, be prepared for a rapidly moving narrative, much like a squadron of Crusaders rumbling across the undulating sands.
Fast paced though the narrative is, this is not a light read.
Forczyk spent years in the US Army, served overseas in Armor units as an officer, and was in Army Intelligence, and is a current military analyst. His work is highly technical, and focused on a writing style that is informative to both professional military types, as well as civies, such as myself, up to speed with military terminology.
Moving from detailing the initial Italian invasion of Egypt, O'Connor's dramatic counteroffensive in Operation Compass, the arrival of the Deutches Afrika Korps, Rommel's initial offensive, the Siege of Tobruk, Unternehmen Sonnenblummen, Operation Battleaxe, and finally, Operation Crusader Forczyk narrates, and deeply analyzes, all of the major moves, countermoves, desperate actions, bloody slugfests, ambuscades, triumphs, defeats, and blunders of this fast paced theater of operations.
If, heretofore, you had been enamored with the legend of Rommel, Forczyk makes no bones about not being exactly keen on the Desert Fox. You might find this somewhat troubling, however, he backs up his criticisms with sound evidence, and very astute analysis. He is also not afraid to showcase where the Italians did well. In fact, this book contains some of the best descriptions of the Italian Army’s struggle in the desert against the British, and their strained relationship with hard to work with allies in the DAK.
To those who love throwing out the far too used cliche, amateurs study tactics, but professionals, logistics, will find much to love here. Forczyk spends considerable time detailing the considerable maintenance requirements of armored warfare. How merely moving across open terrain rapidly wears out tracks, road wheels, suspensions, guide pins, etc..., and of course, the veritable lodestone of fuel.
However, even food, and water, for the crews and supporting arms are discussed as well.
Even so, what warmed my heart, is Forczyk reminds those a bit too wedded to that cliche that all the logistics in the world mean nothing at all if you can't fight well with what you have. And no where else is this made more apparent than in the long discussion on the absolute bloody mess that was Operation Crusader.
If I were to put it succinctly, I would have to use a very un professional, rather profane, phrase, so I'll just say that neither side really looks well the closer you study the battles of Crusader. None of the major commanders involved, not even Rommel, really shine here, and both sides tended to spend just as much time blundering and chasing their own tails as they did aiming properly at the enemy.
Fog of War was the clear winner of Crusader, with incompetence being a close second.
And of course, the men at the sharp end paid for it all in
spades.
The British win primarily on points, and Crusader was a very close game, indeed.
By the end of the book, the half time of the North African Campaign, the battle lines are right back where they were just before Rommel's opening gambit. Both sides are getting heavily resupplied, and reinforced, and both sides are
confident of ultimate victory in the next round.
As usual, Forczyk hits a home run, and volume 2 is on my too read pile.
Very highly recommended.
December 19, 2024
A bit dry. Dense. But incredibly informative. I care more about the larger operations and tank doctrine than the smaller details about specific tanks themselves.
A tank being a class medium or light is good enough for me. I mostly cared about North Africa at large.
For those who love tanks and tank warfare this will most certainly be a treat. For a more casual academic or reader this will be a tough but overall enjoyable chew
A tank being a class medium or light is good enough for me. I mostly cared about North Africa at large.
For those who love tanks and tank warfare this will most certainly be a treat. For a more casual academic or reader this will be a tough but overall enjoyable chew
October 14, 2024
Strategic-to-tactical overview of main operations in the desert with emphasis on armored warfare. Lots of interesting insights. The only thing I didn't really like is the author's tone in a couple of his assessments, but don't let it stop you."
March 21, 2025
Great read
A well written overview of the early armoured operations in North Africa. The authors experience shows through, and while his opinions also show through, they are well reasoned. I'm looking forward to his follow-up volume.
A well written overview of the early armoured operations in North Africa. The authors experience shows through, and while his opinions also show through, they are well reasoned. I'm looking forward to his follow-up volume.
February 2, 2024
Excellent book from an excellent author. One of my favourite military history authors. Enormous detail but still very readable.
January 25, 2025
Exhaustivament documentat, detallat, molt interessant.
May 2, 2024
A good book that I would give four stars to but it gets a bonus star because the author skewers Rommel and the Rommel myth.
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