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Russian "Hybrid Warfare": Resurgence and Politicization
During the last decade, 'Hybrid Warfare' has become a novel yet controversial term in academic, political and professional military lexicons, intended to suggest some sort of mix between different military and non-military means and methods of confrontation. Enthusiastic discussion of the notion has been undermined by conceptual vagueness and political manipulation, particularly since the onset of the Ukrainian Crisis in early 2014, as ideas about Hybrid Warfare engulf Russia and the West, especially in the media.
Western defense and political specialists analyzing Russian responses to the crisis have been quick to confirm that Hybrid Warfare is the Kremlin's main strategy in the twenty-first century. But many respected Russian strategists and political observers contend that it is the West that has been waging Hybrid War, Gibridnaya Voyna, since the end of the Cold War.
In this highly topical book, Ofer Fridman offers a clear delineation of the conceptual debates about Hybrid Warfare. What leads Russian experts to say that the West is conducting a Gibridnaya Voyna against Russia, and what do they mean by it? Why do Western observers claim that the Kremlin engages in Hybrid Warfare? And, beyond terminology, is this something genuinely new?
Western defense and political specialists analyzing Russian responses to the crisis have been quick to confirm that Hybrid Warfare is the Kremlin's main strategy in the twenty-first century. But many respected Russian strategists and political observers contend that it is the West that has been waging Hybrid War, Gibridnaya Voyna, since the end of the Cold War.
In this highly topical book, Ofer Fridman offers a clear delineation of the conceptual debates about Hybrid Warfare. What leads Russian experts to say that the West is conducting a Gibridnaya Voyna against Russia, and what do they mean by it? Why do Western observers claim that the Kremlin engages in Hybrid Warfare? And, beyond terminology, is this something genuinely new?
261 pages, Paperback
Published August 1, 2022
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
February 2, 2024
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
А я все верю, что где-то
Божьей искрою света
Займётся костер.
Только нет интереса
И бездарную пьесу
Продолжает тянуть режиссер.
Только крашенный свет,
Только дым сигарет,
У дверей в туалет,
Меня нет.
Я за тысячу лет.
Я давно дал обет
Никогда не являться
В такой ситуации.
Это одна из самых пустых книг, что я читал за последнее время. Несмотря на многообещающее название, в книге нет ничего стоящего и интересного. Такое ощущение, что автору просто нечего сказать своим читателям. Я ожидал какие-то интересные истории или даже анализ пресловутого Hybrid Warfare, но ничего этого в книге нет. Автор ограничивается лишь теорией, но даже эта теория основывается на трёх основных источниках: Evgeny Messner, которых написал свои труды в начале XX века, Frank Hoffman и его работа «Hybrid Warfare», а также небезызвестный на Западе, но малоизвестный в самой РФ, товарищ Aleksandr Dugin, которого западные авторы используют в качестве пугала, которым пугают как западную аудиторию, так и западных политиков. Уже когда я увидел в книге фамилию Дугина, я понял, что эта книга не может быть серьёзной работой, т.е. серьёзным политическим анализов/исследованием данной темы, ибо Дугин это как Alex Jones, только с уклоном в псевдофилософию и псевдопатриотизм. Впрочем, я допускаю, что господин Дугин умнее Alex Jones. Но это не важно, ибо обе фигуры являются яркими, но не играющими важной роли в национальной политике своих государств. Но вернёмся к теме книги.
Итак, под фразой "Hybrid Warfare" понимается ведение военных действия на территории потенциального врага во всех сферах жизни общества, т.е. война ведётся не силами армии, а силами людей, которые к армии, а возможно даже к государству никакого отношения не имеют. Самым ярким примером может быть политика США в вопросах музыки и кино, которыми они, как предполагают многие шизофреники в СССР, а теперь и в РФ, подрывали изнутри государственность Советского Союза. Следовательно, пишут они, и Россия должна использовать те же самые методы, которые позволили США выиграть в Холодной войне, «развратив» советскую молодёжь. Разумеется, это полная чушь, ибо советская молодёжь слушала и смотрела западные фильмы и музыку не потому, что эта политика Hybrid Warfare со стороны США была успешной, а потому, что западная и музыка и фильмы были в разы качественней советского аналога.
Вообще, все эти размышления автора насчёт Hybrid Warfare крайне примитивны и могут серьёзно рассматриваться только такими же шизофрениками, которые были и есть в СССР/РФ. Причины, почему это так, я уже объяснил. Если Запад производит что-то лучше и что пользуется спросом, это не значит, что Запад это произвёл с целью подрыва государственности некого государства, а это означает, что продукт получился более качественный и/или существует спрос на такую продукцию. В СССР была наискучнейшая разрешённая государством музыка и такие же скучные фильмы, а запад предлагал более качественную альтернативу, которая, к тому же, была свободна от политических штампов. Поэтому советские люди потребляли её. Если бы такая продукция была бы противна их природе, они бы не стали её потреблять какие бы попытки не делались со стороны Западных стран. Так и сегодня, если люди не хотят смотреть фильмы, связанные с вопросами гомусексуализма, их никакими способами не убедить такие фильмы смотреть. Поэтому вся концепция Hybrid Warfare выглядит крайне слабой, ибо подразумевает, что люди будут бездумно потреблять такую продукцию. Конечно, автор не ограничивается практикой Hybrid Warfare ориентированной только на культурную сферу, а приводит целый список общественных отраслей, где политика Hybrid Warfare может использоваться. Список, кстати, он берёт у товарища Дугина.
As the fall of the Soviet Union was an outcome of the Soviet defeat in the net-centric war waged by the West (mainly the United States), the Western network’s penetration of Russian society reached a peak in the 1990s. During that period, the West actively incorporated different Russian social, economic, academic and other groups of influence into its network. Dugin lists these as follows:
Financial system;
Economy (through oligarchs);
Political elite (through ideas of liberalism and pro-Westernism);
Mass Media (through copying Western shows);
Educational standards (through the imitation of Western education systems
and adaptation of tutorials written in the West or according to Western
values);
Scientific Institutions (through a system of brain exportation or provision of
Western grants);
Youth environments (through fashion, images and the Internet).
Упоминать олигархов в этом списке особенно смешно, учитывая, что все они являются гражданами России, многие из которых были инкорпорированы в коммунистические структуры в бытность существования СССР. Вообще список Дугина можно назвать списком Alex Jones, в том смысле, что он никакого отношения к реальности не имеет.
Короче, смысла обсуждать эту книгу нет, так как автор проделал очень плохую работу, как в плане выбора источников для исследования, так и в плане анализа эффективности Hybrid Warfare. Кстати, насчёт эффективности. В книге нет данных, которые показывали бы, что такая политика Hybrid Warfare является эффективной, ибо автор ограничивается лишь утверждениями не предлагая никаких фактов, за исключением кейса Дональда Трампа, но в этом случаи я считаю, он повторяет политизированный демократами тезис о том, что это не американский народ выбрал Трампа, а Россия смогла вмешаться в выборы США и только поэтому Трамп стал президентом. Это, конечно же, явное преувеличение. Трампа избрал американский народ, и влияние Кремля было минимальным.
This is one of the emptiest books I've read in a while. Despite the promising title, the book contains nothing worthwhile or interesting. It feels like the author has nothing to say to his readers. I was expecting some interesting stories or even an analysis of the notorious Hybrid Warfare, but there is nothing in the book. The author limits himself to theory, but even this theory is based on three main sources: Evgeny Messner, who wrote his works in the early XX century, Frank Hoffman and his work "Hybrid Warfare", as well as not unknown in the West, but little known in the Russian Federation, comrade Aleksandr Dugin, who is used by Western authors as a scarecrow to scare both Western audiences and Western politicians. When I saw Dugin's name in the book, I realized that this book cannot be a serious work, i.e., a serious political analysis/research of this topic, because Dugin is like Alex Jones, only with a bias towards pseudo-philosophy and pseudo-patriotism. However, I admit that Mr. Dugin is smarter than Alex Jones. But this does not matter, as both figures are flamboyant but not important in the national politics of their states. But let us return to the subject of the book.
So, the phrase "Hybrid Warfare" means the conduct of military operations on the territory of a potential enemy in all spheres of society, i.e., the war is conducted not by the forces of the army but by the forces of people who have nothing to do with the army and perhaps even with the state. The most striking example is the U.S. policy on music and movies, which, as many schizophrenics in the USSR and now in the Russian Federation suggest, undermined the statehood of the Soviet Union from within. Therefore, they write, Russia should use the same methods that allowed the U.S. to win the Cold War by "corrupting" Soviet youth. Of course, this is complete nonsense because the Soviet youth listened to and watched Western movies and music, not because this policy of Hybrid Warfare on the part of the USA was successful, but because Western music and movies were many times better quality than their Soviet counterparts.
In general, all these thoughts of the author about Hybrid Warfare are primitive and can be seriously considered only by the same schizophrenics who were and are in the USSR/RF. I have already explained the reasons why this is so. If the West produces something better that is in demand, it doesn't mean that the West produced it to undermine the statehood of some state; it means that the product is of higher quality and/or there is a demand for such products. The USSR had the most boring state-sanctioned music and equally boring movies, while the West offered a better alternative that was free of political clichés. So, the Soviet people consumed it. If such products were against their nature, they would not consume them, no matter how much the Western countries tried to do so. So, today, if people do not want to watch movies related to homosexuality, they cannot be persuaded to watch them in any way. Therefore, the whole concept of Hybrid Warfare looks extremely weak because it implies that people will mindlessly consume such products. Of course, the author does not limit himself to the practice of Hybrid Warfare focused only on the cultural sphere but gives a whole list of social sectors where Hybrid Warfare policy can be used. The list, by the way, is taken from Comrade Dugin.
As the fall of the Soviet Union was an outcome of the Soviet defeat in the net-centric war waged by the West (mainly the United States), the Western network’s penetration of Russian society reached a peak in the 1990s. During that period, the West actively incorporated different Russian social, economic, academic and other groups of influence into its network. Dugin lists these as follows:
Financial system;
Economy (through oligarchs);
Political elite (through ideas of liberalism and pro-Westernism);
Mass Media (through copying Western shows);
Educational standards (through the imitation of Western education systems
and adaptation of tutorials written in the West or according to Western
values);
Scientific Institutions (through a system of brain exportation or provision of
Western grants);
Youth environments (through fashion, images and the Internet).
Mentioning oligarchs in this list is particularly ridiculous, given that they are all Russian citizens, many of whom were incorporated into communist structures when the USSR existed. In general, Dugin's list can be called the Alex Jones list, in the sense that it has nothing to do with reality.
In short, there is no point in discussing this book, as the author has done a very poor job, both in terms of selecting sources for research and analyzing the effectiveness of Hybrid Warfare. Speaking of effectiveness. There is no data in the book that would show that this Hybrid Warfare policy is effective, because the author limits himself to assertions without offering any facts, except for the case of Donald Trump, but in this case, I believe he repeats the thesis politicized by Democrats that it was not the American people who elected Trump, but Russia was able to interfere in the U.S. elections and that is the only reason why Trump became president. This is, of course, a clear exaggeration. Trump was elected by the American people, and the Kremlin's influence was minimal.
А я все верю, что где-то
Божьей искрою света
Займётся костер.
Только нет интереса
И бездарную пьесу
Продолжает тянуть режиссер.
Только крашенный свет,
Только дым сигарет,
У дверей в туалет,
Меня нет.
Я за тысячу лет.
Я давно дал обет
Никогда не являться
В такой ситуации.
Это одна из самых пустых книг, что я читал за последнее время. Несмотря на многообещающее название, в книге нет ничего стоящего и интересного. Такое ощущение, что автору просто нечего сказать своим читателям. Я ожидал какие-то интересные истории или даже анализ пресловутого Hybrid Warfare, но ничего этого в книге нет. Автор ограничивается лишь теорией, но даже эта теория основывается на трёх основных источниках: Evgeny Messner, которых написал свои труды в начале XX века, Frank Hoffman и его работа «Hybrid Warfare», а также небезызвестный на Западе, но малоизвестный в самой РФ, товарищ Aleksandr Dugin, которого западные авторы используют в качестве пугала, которым пугают как западную аудиторию, так и западных политиков. Уже когда я увидел в книге фамилию Дугина, я понял, что эта книга не может быть серьёзной работой, т.е. серьёзным политическим анализов/исследованием данной темы, ибо Дугин это как Alex Jones, только с уклоном в псевдофилософию и псевдопатриотизм. Впрочем, я допускаю, что господин Дугин умнее Alex Jones. Но это не важно, ибо обе фигуры являются яркими, но не играющими важной роли в национальной политике своих государств. Но вернёмся к теме книги.
Итак, под фразой "Hybrid Warfare" понимается ведение военных действия на территории потенциального врага во всех сферах жизни общества, т.е. война ведётся не силами армии, а силами людей, которые к армии, а возможно даже к государству никакого отношения не имеют. Самым ярким примером может быть политика США в вопросах музыки и кино, которыми они, как предполагают многие шизофреники в СССР, а теперь и в РФ, подрывали изнутри государственность Советского Союза. Следовательно, пишут они, и Россия должна использовать те же самые методы, которые позволили США выиграть в Холодной войне, «развратив» советскую молодёжь. Разумеется, это полная чушь, ибо советская молодёжь слушала и смотрела западные фильмы и музыку не потому, что эта политика Hybrid Warfare со стороны США была успешной, а потому, что западная и музыка и фильмы были в разы качественней советского аналога.
Вообще, все эти размышления автора насчёт Hybrid Warfare крайне примитивны и могут серьёзно рассматриваться только такими же шизофрениками, которые были и есть в СССР/РФ. Причины, почему это так, я уже объяснил. Если Запад производит что-то лучше и что пользуется спросом, это не значит, что Запад это произвёл с целью подрыва государственности некого государства, а это означает, что продукт получился более качественный и/или существует спрос на такую продукцию. В СССР была наискучнейшая разрешённая государством музыка и такие же скучные фильмы, а запад предлагал более качественную альтернативу, которая, к тому же, была свободна от политических штампов. Поэтому советские люди потребляли её. Если бы такая продукция была бы противна их природе, они бы не стали её потреблять какие бы попытки не делались со стороны Западных стран. Так и сегодня, если люди не хотят смотреть фильмы, связанные с вопросами гомусексуализма, их никакими способами не убедить такие фильмы смотреть. Поэтому вся концепция Hybrid Warfare выглядит крайне слабой, ибо подразумевает, что люди будут бездумно потреблять такую продукцию. Конечно, автор не ограничивается практикой Hybrid Warfare ориентированной только на культурную сферу, а приводит целый список общественных отраслей, где политика Hybrid Warfare может использоваться. Список, кстати, он берёт у товарища Дугина.
As the fall of the Soviet Union was an outcome of the Soviet defeat in the net-centric war waged by the West (mainly the United States), the Western network’s penetration of Russian society reached a peak in the 1990s. During that period, the West actively incorporated different Russian social, economic, academic and other groups of influence into its network. Dugin lists these as follows:
Financial system;
Economy (through oligarchs);
Political elite (through ideas of liberalism and pro-Westernism);
Mass Media (through copying Western shows);
Educational standards (through the imitation of Western education systems
and adaptation of tutorials written in the West or according to Western
values);
Scientific Institutions (through a system of brain exportation or provision of
Western grants);
Youth environments (through fashion, images and the Internet).
Упоминать олигархов в этом списке особенно смешно, учитывая, что все они являются гражданами России, многие из которых были инкорпорированы в коммунистические структуры в бытность существования СССР. Вообще список Дугина можно назвать списком Alex Jones, в том смысле, что он никакого отношения к реальности не имеет.
Короче, смысла обсуждать эту книгу нет, так как автор проделал очень плохую работу, как в плане выбора источников для исследования, так и в плане анализа эффективности Hybrid Warfare. Кстати, насчёт эффективности. В книге нет данных, которые показывали бы, что такая политика Hybrid Warfare является эффективной, ибо автор ограничивается лишь утверждениями не предлагая никаких фактов, за исключением кейса Дональда Трампа, но в этом случаи я считаю, он повторяет политизированный демократами тезис о том, что это не американский народ выбрал Трампа, а Россия смогла вмешаться в выборы США и только поэтому Трамп стал президентом. Это, конечно же, явное преувеличение. Трампа избрал американский народ, и влияние Кремля было минимальным.
This is one of the emptiest books I've read in a while. Despite the promising title, the book contains nothing worthwhile or interesting. It feels like the author has nothing to say to his readers. I was expecting some interesting stories or even an analysis of the notorious Hybrid Warfare, but there is nothing in the book. The author limits himself to theory, but even this theory is based on three main sources: Evgeny Messner, who wrote his works in the early XX century, Frank Hoffman and his work "Hybrid Warfare", as well as not unknown in the West, but little known in the Russian Federation, comrade Aleksandr Dugin, who is used by Western authors as a scarecrow to scare both Western audiences and Western politicians. When I saw Dugin's name in the book, I realized that this book cannot be a serious work, i.e., a serious political analysis/research of this topic, because Dugin is like Alex Jones, only with a bias towards pseudo-philosophy and pseudo-patriotism. However, I admit that Mr. Dugin is smarter than Alex Jones. But this does not matter, as both figures are flamboyant but not important in the national politics of their states. But let us return to the subject of the book.
So, the phrase "Hybrid Warfare" means the conduct of military operations on the territory of a potential enemy in all spheres of society, i.e., the war is conducted not by the forces of the army but by the forces of people who have nothing to do with the army and perhaps even with the state. The most striking example is the U.S. policy on music and movies, which, as many schizophrenics in the USSR and now in the Russian Federation suggest, undermined the statehood of the Soviet Union from within. Therefore, they write, Russia should use the same methods that allowed the U.S. to win the Cold War by "corrupting" Soviet youth. Of course, this is complete nonsense because the Soviet youth listened to and watched Western movies and music, not because this policy of Hybrid Warfare on the part of the USA was successful, but because Western music and movies were many times better quality than their Soviet counterparts.
In general, all these thoughts of the author about Hybrid Warfare are primitive and can be seriously considered only by the same schizophrenics who were and are in the USSR/RF. I have already explained the reasons why this is so. If the West produces something better that is in demand, it doesn't mean that the West produced it to undermine the statehood of some state; it means that the product is of higher quality and/or there is a demand for such products. The USSR had the most boring state-sanctioned music and equally boring movies, while the West offered a better alternative that was free of political clichés. So, the Soviet people consumed it. If such products were against their nature, they would not consume them, no matter how much the Western countries tried to do so. So, today, if people do not want to watch movies related to homosexuality, they cannot be persuaded to watch them in any way. Therefore, the whole concept of Hybrid Warfare looks extremely weak because it implies that people will mindlessly consume such products. Of course, the author does not limit himself to the practice of Hybrid Warfare focused only on the cultural sphere but gives a whole list of social sectors where Hybrid Warfare policy can be used. The list, by the way, is taken from Comrade Dugin.
As the fall of the Soviet Union was an outcome of the Soviet defeat in the net-centric war waged by the West (mainly the United States), the Western network’s penetration of Russian society reached a peak in the 1990s. During that period, the West actively incorporated different Russian social, economic, academic and other groups of influence into its network. Dugin lists these as follows:
Financial system;
Economy (through oligarchs);
Political elite (through ideas of liberalism and pro-Westernism);
Mass Media (through copying Western shows);
Educational standards (through the imitation of Western education systems
and adaptation of tutorials written in the West or according to Western
values);
Scientific Institutions (through a system of brain exportation or provision of
Western grants);
Youth environments (through fashion, images and the Internet).
Mentioning oligarchs in this list is particularly ridiculous, given that they are all Russian citizens, many of whom were incorporated into communist structures when the USSR existed. In general, Dugin's list can be called the Alex Jones list, in the sense that it has nothing to do with reality.
In short, there is no point in discussing this book, as the author has done a very poor job, both in terms of selecting sources for research and analyzing the effectiveness of Hybrid Warfare. Speaking of effectiveness. There is no data in the book that would show that this Hybrid Warfare policy is effective, because the author limits himself to assertions without offering any facts, except for the case of Donald Trump, but in this case, I believe he repeats the thesis politicized by Democrats that it was not the American people who elected Trump, but Russia was able to interfere in the U.S. elections and that is the only reason why Trump became president. This is, of course, a clear exaggeration. Trump was elected by the American people, and the Kremlin's influence was minimal.
July 28, 2020
A strong comparison between Western (U.S.) definition and perception of hybrid warfare and the same from Russia. I categorize this as a well-written and well-organized literature review that compares opposing powers in the international system. A must-read for those studying or working in Great Power competition as it stands today.
April 17, 2022
Very interesting book. Author shows that buzzword mentioned in every media as THE danger - hybrid war - is neither new nor revolutionary nor defined by any military (West or East) in the way media uses it. While militaries of both blocs make very fine distinction what is war and what isn't war (and their views match which makes sense because they are oriented towards actual combat and application of force) it is what civilian government (non-military means) push that is true "hybrid war" - from political isolation, economic sanctions (to ludicrous levels), information warfare, propaganda and demonization and inflammatory hate speech against the "other side" (and here I think that West media is outdoing itself in a very negative way). Unfortunately these non-military means can be prelude to extremely serious and deadly military means and it takes true statesmen (that are in very short supply in these times) to steer away from catastrophe and not just aim for short term political goals. Danger lies in the fact that these non-military means (ironically called non-lethal) do not end up with immediate dead bodies so everyone involved just keeps up on creating more and more pressure and are able to easily escalate to the point of no return.
Historically both military and non-military means are present since the dawn of the time (I had a laugh when author cited one of the Russian strategists that if we look at everything as means of war then entire existence of human species is war) only thing that changes are technical and technological means to increase the impact of the means used.
As author points out very mention of hybrid war (as media repeats it) is used by NATO to find its purpose again (always that there-be-dragons East which they need to look out for) and Russians to show how West is not friendly (if it ever was).
What surprised me the most is the level of West's misunderstanding of Russian goals and policy (that seems to continue to this day).
That being said author mentioned incredible thing that explains this lack of information - West dropped any studies in Russian culture/politics after Cold War ended. Instead of that they decided to rely on Eastern European NATO member countries for information on Russia. Which seems like repeating the same mistake as trusting various warlords in Afghanistan to show NATO forces targets that in good percentage of cases ended up as said warlord's opposition. If you want objective information on some country never ask the immediate neighbor - they will definitely have history and keep grudge from some times in the past that they will use for immediate political gain against "them over the border". The way NATO characterized the Russian military capabilities just before the events in 2014 is so amateurish I cannot believe it. Bias against the Russians is unbelievable, even author in few places says Soviet instead of Russian (subject are events in 2000's with Soviet Union gone for at least a decade).
Author's analysis and conclusions are sound for both parties. While at times it might seem too academic I have to admit that author's style is very good and book is very readable for its subject.
That being said there are two things I do not agree with.
First, author's opinion that Russia is exaggerating about information warfare/propaganda from the West aimed against it. Current developments show that Russia might not be exaggerating. I think that current level of propaganda, media and outright antagonism from the West is reaching ridiculous levels and it already entered racial and are-they-human-at-all discussions which is very very disturbing.
Second, condemning the control Russia imposed on internal elements funded and supported by foreign entities. Considering the level of pressure through media and politicization of anything at hand (foreign NGOs for example) putting some sort of control sounds rather rational considering that alternative is internal conflict. This is same thing West did to any protest against the official line during the pandemic, declaring all opposition as enemies (to use not so inflammatory terms) and in case of some countries (like Canada) outright pariahs without any rights, frozen assets and no income. It is just the way security services work to ensure internal security.
Excellent book, highly recommended.
Historically both military and non-military means are present since the dawn of the time (I had a laugh when author cited one of the Russian strategists that if we look at everything as means of war then entire existence of human species is war) only thing that changes are technical and technological means to increase the impact of the means used.
As author points out very mention of hybrid war (as media repeats it) is used by NATO to find its purpose again (always that there-be-dragons East which they need to look out for) and Russians to show how West is not friendly (if it ever was).
What surprised me the most is the level of West's misunderstanding of Russian goals and policy (that seems to continue to this day).
That being said author mentioned incredible thing that explains this lack of information - West dropped any studies in Russian culture/politics after Cold War ended. Instead of that they decided to rely on Eastern European NATO member countries for information on Russia. Which seems like repeating the same mistake as trusting various warlords in Afghanistan to show NATO forces targets that in good percentage of cases ended up as said warlord's opposition. If you want objective information on some country never ask the immediate neighbor - they will definitely have history and keep grudge from some times in the past that they will use for immediate political gain against "them over the border". The way NATO characterized the Russian military capabilities just before the events in 2014 is so amateurish I cannot believe it. Bias against the Russians is unbelievable, even author in few places says Soviet instead of Russian (subject are events in 2000's with Soviet Union gone for at least a decade).
Author's analysis and conclusions are sound for both parties. While at times it might seem too academic I have to admit that author's style is very good and book is very readable for its subject.
That being said there are two things I do not agree with.
First, author's opinion that Russia is exaggerating about information warfare/propaganda from the West aimed against it. Current developments show that Russia might not be exaggerating. I think that current level of propaganda, media and outright antagonism from the West is reaching ridiculous levels and it already entered racial and are-they-human-at-all discussions which is very very disturbing.
Second, condemning the control Russia imposed on internal elements funded and supported by foreign entities. Considering the level of pressure through media and politicization of anything at hand (foreign NGOs for example) putting some sort of control sounds rather rational considering that alternative is internal conflict. This is same thing West did to any protest against the official line during the pandemic, declaring all opposition as enemies (to use not so inflammatory terms) and in case of some countries (like Canada) outright pariahs without any rights, frozen assets and no income. It is just the way security services work to ensure internal security.
Excellent book, highly recommended.
February 27, 2020
"Hybrid Warfare" is a confused, misused, and abused term. The value of this book lies primarily in its attempt to sift through the intellectual and rhetorical debris to uncover its roots and, in the process, a better understanding of today's complex strategic environment.
Through the examination and comparison of the intellectual approaches used by the West and Russia, the author sheds light on just how differently the two "sides" think about warfare. The US, in particular, has an intensely practical perspective that seeks tangible, executable ideas and concepts. This carries with it a tendency to focus at the tactical and operational levels of war. In contrast, the Russians seem to value the development of larger theoretical frameworks that would seem to trend toward a more strategic mindset since "bigger" concepts have the potential to unify actions across a broad spectrum of activity.
Overall, Fridman's book is fascinating for anyone interested in the intellectual evolution of concepts related to modern warfare. Anyone in the US military struggling to come to grips with the new (and confusingly named) concept of "Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)," would be well-served in reading this cover to cover.
Through the examination and comparison of the intellectual approaches used by the West and Russia, the author sheds light on just how differently the two "sides" think about warfare. The US, in particular, has an intensely practical perspective that seeks tangible, executable ideas and concepts. This carries with it a tendency to focus at the tactical and operational levels of war. In contrast, the Russians seem to value the development of larger theoretical frameworks that would seem to trend toward a more strategic mindset since "bigger" concepts have the potential to unify actions across a broad spectrum of activity.
Overall, Fridman's book is fascinating for anyone interested in the intellectual evolution of concepts related to modern warfare. Anyone in the US military struggling to come to grips with the new (and confusingly named) concept of "Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)," would be well-served in reading this cover to cover.
July 4, 2024
I can't say that I really got into this book. In about halfway the author got to the point of the book, which was Russia's use (and America's concept of it) of hybrid warfare. I did have an inkling of what hybrid warfare was, but didn't know the particulars in all honesty. About I would say a few pages described what it was and so on and frankly left the book with a better understanding of hybrid warfare. I just wish that the book wouldn't meander on the subject, unlike some other books I've read. I'll probably in the future look for another book on the subject, and hopefully it'll hold my interest better than this one.
November 9, 2023
Such an interesting analysis of the various innovations, interpretations, and developments around the term of “hybrid warfare”. I have enjoyed a non fiction genuinely after so long.
Someone please find me a way to have a chat with dr. Ofer Fridman!
Someone please find me a way to have a chat with dr. Ofer Fridman!
December 25, 2018
A profound and tempting trip into the world of terminology in contemporary security studies.
December 8, 2020
Ihan kelpo teos, mutta näin aiheeseen tarkemmin perehtyneenä tiettyjä puutteita oli löydettävissä. Neljä miinus olisi ollut oikea arvio, mutta kolme liian vähän.
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