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Gallipoli: The End of the Myth
The Gallipoli campaign of 1915–16 was an ill-fated Allied attempt to shorten the war by eliminating Turkey, creating a Balkan alliance against the Central Powers, and securing a sea route to Russia. A failure in all respects, the operation ended in disaster, and the Allied forces suffered some 390,000 casualties. This conclusive book assesses the many myths that have emerged about Gallipoli and provides definitive answers to questions that have lingered about the operation. Robin Prior, a renowned military historian, proceeds step by step through the campaign, dealing with naval, military, and political matters and surveying the operations of all the armies British, Anzac, French, Indian, and Turkish. Relying substantially on original documents, including neglected war diaries and technical military sources, Prior evaluates the strategy, the commanders, and the performance of soldiers on the ground. His conclusions are powerful and the naval campaign was not “almost” won, and the land action was not bedeviled by “minor misfortunes.” Instead, the badly conceived Gallipoli campaign was doomed from the start. And even had it been successful, the operation would not have shortened the war by a single day. Despite their bravery, the Allied troops who fell at Gallipoli died in vain.
288 pages, Hardcover
First published June 2, 2009
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223 people want to read
About the author
Robin Prior
20 books8 followersRobin Prior was born in rural South Australia and has been a farmer, shopkeeper, librarian and an academic. He was educated at Kapunda High School and at the University of Adelaide where he obtained a degree in 1972, an honours degree in 1974 and a PhD in 1979 (all in Arts/History).
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
November 5, 2020
A readable Prior? Miracles do happen. Short on facts, economical with statistics but rich in historical analysis, he has written 250 pages that will make any Gallipoli buff who can tell Helles from Krithia think. The volume of prewar buffonery at Whitehall alone goes far beyond Churchill.
February 4, 2015
With the 100th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings coming up in April 2015, I wanted to refresh my memory and update my knowledge of this significant World War 1 campaign. This Australian-authored history covers the whole of the Gallipoli war, including the actions of the British, Indian and French forces, something that Australians tend to forget. Gallipoli was not the exclusive preserve of the ANZACs.
Although Gallipoli: The End of the Myth is a serious historical text book, its writing style is reasonably plain and straightforward, making it accessible to the lay reader. Having said that, I found that I had to skim over several sections where the writing became too convoluted for my brain to absorb.
The first five chapters deal with the background to the decision made by the British War Council to mount an assault on the Gallipoli Peninsula. This was the section of the book that I found to be least accessible, as the author tried to untangle the complicated web of opinions and decisions made by the British military high command and the politicians in London. Yet in the end it was for me the most important, and I re-read certain sections to get things straight in my head.
‘I seek to understand whether [the sailors and troops who fought at Gallipoli] were well led by officers both junior and senior, whether the high command gave them a decent chance of success and whether they fought to any purpose. These are difficult questions but they are vital to an understanding of the campaign.’
From Chapter 6 onwards, the author moves on to examine what happened with the landings, and to explore issues of what went wrong. His very strong contention is that the exceedingly hostile terrain and the lack of adequate support, both in terms of materiel and personnel, combined with the woeful command problems to create an unwinnable situation. 46,000 Allied troops died as a result, while another 86,000 were wounded. The Turks incurred similar or more casualties on their side. Adding in non-combat deaths, from dystentery, flu, exposure etc, the author estimates that over 300,000 people died in a futile campaign that was destined to failure before it even began. I felt truly devastated, thinking about all those casualties, even though it was 100 years ago. Sobering reading, made me very reflective.
The credibility of a history book lies as much in the quality of its research as in the expansion of its major themes. The extensive end notes and bibliography demonstrate the meticulous research done by Robin Prior in order to produce a fresh view on what happened at Gallipoli, rather than relying on rehashing the work of earlier historians. Of course, how the author uses the information to propound a particular thesis about those historic events is entirely subjective. There is no absolute truth, and we must always exercise a degree of caution in accepting the author’s interpretation of what happened.
The eye-opener for me was Prior’s diligence in digging out the archival material relating to the torturous decision-making in late 1914 to open a second theatre of war in the eastern Mediterranean. The main proponent of this idea, First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, intended to distract and weaken Germany in its aggression on the Western Front, and at the same time to boost the involvement of the British Navy in what was essentially a land-based conflict thus far. Seizing the strategically important Dardanelles would enable the Brits to attack and capture Constantinople, capital of Germany’s principal ally, the Ottoman Turks.
… [Now, the] unwelcome conclusion about Gallipoli and the Dardanelles. Despite the bravery of the Allied troops who fought there, the campaign was fought in vain. It did not shorten the war by a single day, nor in reality did it ever offer that prospect.
Although Gallipoli: The End of the Myth is a serious historical text book, its writing style is reasonably plain and straightforward, making it accessible to the lay reader. Having said that, I found that I had to skim over several sections where the writing became too convoluted for my brain to absorb.
The first five chapters deal with the background to the decision made by the British War Council to mount an assault on the Gallipoli Peninsula. This was the section of the book that I found to be least accessible, as the author tried to untangle the complicated web of opinions and decisions made by the British military high command and the politicians in London. Yet in the end it was for me the most important, and I re-read certain sections to get things straight in my head.
‘I seek to understand whether [the sailors and troops who fought at Gallipoli] were well led by officers both junior and senior, whether the high command gave them a decent chance of success and whether they fought to any purpose. These are difficult questions but they are vital to an understanding of the campaign.’
From Chapter 6 onwards, the author moves on to examine what happened with the landings, and to explore issues of what went wrong. His very strong contention is that the exceedingly hostile terrain and the lack of adequate support, both in terms of materiel and personnel, combined with the woeful command problems to create an unwinnable situation. 46,000 Allied troops died as a result, while another 86,000 were wounded. The Turks incurred similar or more casualties on their side. Adding in non-combat deaths, from dystentery, flu, exposure etc, the author estimates that over 300,000 people died in a futile campaign that was destined to failure before it even began. I felt truly devastated, thinking about all those casualties, even though it was 100 years ago. Sobering reading, made me very reflective.
The credibility of a history book lies as much in the quality of its research as in the expansion of its major themes. The extensive end notes and bibliography demonstrate the meticulous research done by Robin Prior in order to produce a fresh view on what happened at Gallipoli, rather than relying on rehashing the work of earlier historians. Of course, how the author uses the information to propound a particular thesis about those historic events is entirely subjective. There is no absolute truth, and we must always exercise a degree of caution in accepting the author’s interpretation of what happened.
The eye-opener for me was Prior’s diligence in digging out the archival material relating to the torturous decision-making in late 1914 to open a second theatre of war in the eastern Mediterranean. The main proponent of this idea, First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, intended to distract and weaken Germany in its aggression on the Western Front, and at the same time to boost the involvement of the British Navy in what was essentially a land-based conflict thus far. Seizing the strategically important Dardanelles would enable the Brits to attack and capture Constantinople, capital of Germany’s principal ally, the Ottoman Turks.
… [Now, the] unwelcome conclusion about Gallipoli and the Dardanelles. Despite the bravery of the Allied troops who fought there, the campaign was fought in vain. It did not shorten the war by a single day, nor in reality did it ever offer that prospect.
June 21, 2015
Robin Prior has a long and distinguished background as a military historian in Australia. He has some strongly held views not entirely in line with revisionist historians such as Gary Sheffield (I recommend his appearance on the Radio National, see the episode Lions and Donkeys http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/p...). This important book contains up to date scholarship but also a well written account of the whole campaign dating from its origins.
Prior acknowledges the fascination of Gallipoli - not only its privileged position as a source of nationalist mythology but its 'could have been' quality. For many, the campaign offered the opportunity for massive strategic advantages worth some risk - a risk that continued to escalate with growing entanglement as a solely naval attack transformed into a full scale military invasion. Its status as a theatre that could have changed the course of the war is part of the fascination, but so is the variety of phases of the battle where commentators have suggested victory was 'just around the corner'. Prior spends little time on the question of whether the course of the war would have been transformed, and instead describes the course of the battles and examines whether they really were that close to victory. Could the naval bombardment have succeeded had de Robeck pressed the attack on? Would the invasion have succeeded without the warning of the naval attack? Would things have been different if the Anzacs hadn't landed on the 'wrong beach'? Would more competent Generals have changed everything?
Prior decimates all of the might have beens. About the only successful strategy (abandoned quickly and pretty expensive in any case) was the 'bite and hold' strategy that Hunter-Weston eventually arrived at in his repeated attempts at Krithia. As he does this he describes the narrative in clear prose, minimising the tendency for confusion with the variety of battalions and units. The maps are clear and very helpful in understanding the course of events.
Although a bit more discussion of how useful or otherwise a victory would have been in the overall course of the war would have been useful, overall this book provides a well written and up to date account of the causes, course and mistakes of the Gallipoli campaign.
Prior acknowledges the fascination of Gallipoli - not only its privileged position as a source of nationalist mythology but its 'could have been' quality. For many, the campaign offered the opportunity for massive strategic advantages worth some risk - a risk that continued to escalate with growing entanglement as a solely naval attack transformed into a full scale military invasion. Its status as a theatre that could have changed the course of the war is part of the fascination, but so is the variety of phases of the battle where commentators have suggested victory was 'just around the corner'. Prior spends little time on the question of whether the course of the war would have been transformed, and instead describes the course of the battles and examines whether they really were that close to victory. Could the naval bombardment have succeeded had de Robeck pressed the attack on? Would the invasion have succeeded without the warning of the naval attack? Would things have been different if the Anzacs hadn't landed on the 'wrong beach'? Would more competent Generals have changed everything?
Prior decimates all of the might have beens. About the only successful strategy (abandoned quickly and pretty expensive in any case) was the 'bite and hold' strategy that Hunter-Weston eventually arrived at in his repeated attempts at Krithia. As he does this he describes the narrative in clear prose, minimising the tendency for confusion with the variety of battalions and units. The maps are clear and very helpful in understanding the course of events.
Although a bit more discussion of how useful or otherwise a victory would have been in the overall course of the war would have been useful, overall this book provides a well written and up to date account of the causes, course and mistakes of the Gallipoli campaign.
July 14, 2013
This is a phenomenal overview of the Gallipoli campaign in World War I. The author has a clear axe to grind, but frankly I agree with him entirely. His point is that not only was the campaign poorly run and planned, but was a complete mistake from the very beginning, way back when it was a plan to force the Dardenelles with the navy alone. It was a stupid, wasteful idea that would never have worked, and they should never have reenforced failure.
There is one thing, and one thing only, keeping this from being a five-star. In the introduction, the author stated that he was going to discuss the Indian and French troops, since they are often given short shrift from historians. Only there was almost NOTHING about them in the entire book! Not just a lack of sources, or only side notes, but almost no actual writing about either group. Occasionally he will mention that the French assisted on this flank of the attack, or whatever. But he never has perspective from any of the French or Indian troops or commanders, that I can recall. Frustrating. I wouldn't mind, but he SPECIFICALLY said he was going to discuss them.
There is one thing, and one thing only, keeping this from being a five-star. In the introduction, the author stated that he was going to discuss the Indian and French troops, since they are often given short shrift from historians. Only there was almost NOTHING about them in the entire book! Not just a lack of sources, or only side notes, but almost no actual writing about either group. Occasionally he will mention that the French assisted on this flank of the attack, or whatever. But he never has perspective from any of the French or Indian troops or commanders, that I can recall. Frustrating. I wouldn't mind, but he SPECIFICALLY said he was going to discuss them.
June 1, 2018
I greatly enjoyed this book. The author has a brisk, clear writing style and does what seems to be a very good job of analyzing various aspects of the Gallipoli campaign to figure out why it failed so badly. This is not a blow-by-blow account of Gallipoli so anyone who wants that should look elsewhere. (Alan Moorehead in his classic account in 1956 and Peter Hart much more recently provide that.) However, if you have some general familiarity with the campaign and want a more analytical approach, then this is an excellent book to read.
April 16, 2020
Gallipoli was one of the greatest mistakes of many British mistakes in the First World War. I have to admit, reading the title and know it was written by a Britisher I had thought this would be apologia. Instead, this book truly was "the end of the myth" and pulled no punches in painting the British misadventure in Gallipoli as a disaster and mistake in every regard.
The ill-fated British army and navy involvement on the Gallipoli penninsula at a time when the Western Front in Europe had stale-mated was the error of Winston Churchill, who almost saw his career ended by the military disaster. Throw in too many British generals more worried about and more experienced in social standing than warfare and Admiral Jackie Fisher who seemed to be incompetent at best, and a mental case at worst, and you have the makings of a catastrophe.
The victim in the ill-fated Gallipoli invasion was the average British soldier and NCO. Basically, they were sent to be massacred time and time again, in ill-considered and utterly hopeless attacks on a Turkish adversary that frankly was nowhere near as good an army as the British, but much more sensible. Here Attaturk makes his first substantial appearance although as the book points out his deeds while considerable, were less than legend.
What also comes through is the British practice of having a "War Committee" of politicians trying to direct the war from afar was at best a sad joke. Combine that committe with the generals and admirals more worried about social standing than winning and the whole concept of winning over Gallipoli leading to the fall of Turkey being such a sadly flawed idea and you can have an understanding of the mess that Gallipoli became.
This book is very well written, and full of helpful maps that help illustrate the account. Despite not being a long book, you get a very real understanding of how Gallipoli came to be, politically and militarily and even a person not used to reading about battles will not get lost as the battles and manuevers progress. The book is so well written you get a solid understanding of what front line soldiers faced, what NCOs faced, what officers faced, and what politicians faced and that is rare for a book on World War One. Most books focus on one aspect.
When you read about how after the battle was lost and the army faced massacre, about how good a job the British did retreating, you cannot help but recall the line from the 1970 movie Patton, where the general says the British are "more concerned with not losing a battle than winning it!"
It is also remarkable that Churchill ever came back from such a debacle. Every part of this book is engagingly readable and informative. Even the book itself is top quality-- a strong hardback cover, quality binding and high quality paper with extremely readable type. Just as a book, this book is one of the highest quality publications I have recently beheld.
If you want a solid frank understanding of what happened at Gallipoli without a dense long tome this is your book. Even today after reading this, and books on other British debacles such as Passchendale and the Somme, you wonder if truly Britain did not deserve to lose the war and how it came to be that a group of politicians and so-callled gentry military leaders sacrified an entire generation of young British men in totally inept military campaigns.
The ill-fated British army and navy involvement on the Gallipoli penninsula at a time when the Western Front in Europe had stale-mated was the error of Winston Churchill, who almost saw his career ended by the military disaster. Throw in too many British generals more worried about and more experienced in social standing than warfare and Admiral Jackie Fisher who seemed to be incompetent at best, and a mental case at worst, and you have the makings of a catastrophe.
The victim in the ill-fated Gallipoli invasion was the average British soldier and NCO. Basically, they were sent to be massacred time and time again, in ill-considered and utterly hopeless attacks on a Turkish adversary that frankly was nowhere near as good an army as the British, but much more sensible. Here Attaturk makes his first substantial appearance although as the book points out his deeds while considerable, were less than legend.
What also comes through is the British practice of having a "War Committee" of politicians trying to direct the war from afar was at best a sad joke. Combine that committe with the generals and admirals more worried about social standing than winning and the whole concept of winning over Gallipoli leading to the fall of Turkey being such a sadly flawed idea and you can have an understanding of the mess that Gallipoli became.
This book is very well written, and full of helpful maps that help illustrate the account. Despite not being a long book, you get a very real understanding of how Gallipoli came to be, politically and militarily and even a person not used to reading about battles will not get lost as the battles and manuevers progress. The book is so well written you get a solid understanding of what front line soldiers faced, what NCOs faced, what officers faced, and what politicians faced and that is rare for a book on World War One. Most books focus on one aspect.
When you read about how after the battle was lost and the army faced massacre, about how good a job the British did retreating, you cannot help but recall the line from the 1970 movie Patton, where the general says the British are "more concerned with not losing a battle than winning it!"
It is also remarkable that Churchill ever came back from such a debacle. Every part of this book is engagingly readable and informative. Even the book itself is top quality-- a strong hardback cover, quality binding and high quality paper with extremely readable type. Just as a book, this book is one of the highest quality publications I have recently beheld.
If you want a solid frank understanding of what happened at Gallipoli without a dense long tome this is your book. Even today after reading this, and books on other British debacles such as Passchendale and the Somme, you wonder if truly Britain did not deserve to lose the war and how it came to be that a group of politicians and so-callled gentry military leaders sacrified an entire generation of young British men in totally inept military campaigns.
January 25, 2023
Excellent. This is the third book by this author that I have read and I would read anything written by him.
It's not a long history of the Gallipoli campaign but had more than enough detail to gain an understanding of what went wrong. The gist of it is that the whole idea was crazy and that the war s always going to be determined by what happened on the Western Front.
Many myths are dispelled. The author is very logical and objective. For example, the author is Australian but goes out of his way to counter the long standing Australian myths that the Australian soldiers did the bulk of the fighting and would have won but for the incompetence of the British officers. He also covers the Indian and French contributions to the fighting which are usually downplayed if not downright ignored by most Gallipoli histories.
It's not a long history of the Gallipoli campaign but had more than enough detail to gain an understanding of what went wrong. The gist of it is that the whole idea was crazy and that the war s always going to be determined by what happened on the Western Front.
Many myths are dispelled. The author is very logical and objective. For example, the author is Australian but goes out of his way to counter the long standing Australian myths that the Australian soldiers did the bulk of the fighting and would have won but for the incompetence of the British officers. He also covers the Indian and French contributions to the fighting which are usually downplayed if not downright ignored by most Gallipoli histories.
June 8, 2023
Perfectly decent account of the campaign but the maps are damnably bad; I found myself wondering why Prior didn't seem aware that point of maps is to support text not as something to break up the text! Locations named in-text often not marked on the maps and many of the maps additionally are graphically confusing. By final third I'd given up hope of them being useful.
November 17, 2024
Erudite and balanced. IMVHO required reading for those interested in the Gallipoli Campaign.
August 27, 2025
Really depressing look at how hubris and ambition can destroy so many lives. The older I get and the more history I read the more war becomes a waste.
September 18, 2010
This book not only covers the Gallipoli campaign in World War I, but it goes after the "myths" of the battle with gusto. Prior's main argument is that the battle could never have really been won. Certain battles probably would have gone better with better leadership, better tactics, better supplies, and better condition of the troops (disease became an issue) but the goal of the campaign (opening the Dardenelles) was never close at hand.
Prior's writing is decent though his verbiage at times seemed strange. He is Australian and I don't know that I have read anything by an Australian writer before so that may explain it.
Maps were numerous and pretty good, but still could have been more detailed. Some terrain features were repeatedly referenced in the book but never labeled on the maps.
Prior's writing is decent though his verbiage at times seemed strange. He is Australian and I don't know that I have read anything by an Australian writer before so that may explain it.
Maps were numerous and pretty good, but still could have been more detailed. Some terrain features were repeatedly referenced in the book but never labeled on the maps.
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June 8, 2015Great book. The Dardanelles campaign was a fiasco from start to finish.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews