Shrouded in government secrecy, clouded by myths and propaganda, the enigmatic tale of Nazi fugitives in the early Cold War has never been properly told—until now.
In the aftermath of WWII, the victorious Allies vowed to hunt Nazi war criminals “to the ends of the earth.” Yet many slipped away to the four corners of the world or were shielded by the Western Allies in exchange for cooperation.
Most prominently, Reinhard Gehlen, the founder of West Germany's foreign intelligence service, welcomed SS operatives into the fold. This shortsighted decision nearly brought his cherished service down, as the KGB found his Nazi operatives easy to turn, while judiciously exposing them to threaten the very legitimacy of the Bonn Government. However, Gehlen was hardly alone in the excessive importance he placed on the supposed capabilities of former Nazi agents; his American sponsors did much the same in the early years of the Cold War.
Beyond boring. A very interesting topic but presented in a way difficult to read (editing?)Author loves commas and looooong sentences. For some reason he uses the phrase "rubbish heap" as a description about 10 times in the first 50 pages, then never uses it again. Kind of odd.
When a regime collapses, it leaves a lot of political detritus, men unwilling or unable to knuckle down, accept defeat and build again under new conditions. The collapse of the Nazi regime allowed no opportunities to wait (as old Soviet warriors might have) for more propitious times for its ideology.
First, the victors over the regime were absolute in their victory, occupiers, quite capable of setting the terms for recovery. Second, the old regime had committed awesomely brutal crimes that should have brooked no forgiveness. Third, the regime was not decadent like Sovietism but fanatic in its last days.
Orbach's 'Fugitives' is about those war criminals, fanatics, psychopaths, cynics and opportunists who had to deal with collapse and build new lives in confused circumstances, what they did, why they did it and what happened to them in the end.
He is not interested in the escape routes ('rat lines'), those who ended up in South America or those who buried themselves and hoped for nonentity within the German Democratic Republic. He has very little to say about those who chose to join the Soviet cause (simply for lack of sources).
He has had exceptional access to the archives of the German and Israeli intelligence services. Although these will have their own biases, this is sufficient to tell some remarkable stories that shine a new light on post-war espionage and the 'politics of the dark side'.
If a Nazi of some notoreity or prominence did not decide to go quiet and try to become a businessman or minor bureaucrat in the new German democracy, he would have four broad choices. He could hold on to the Nazi faith in the belief that he could play the allies off against each other.
He could choose the Soviet path (if he got past the initial risk of the firing squad) on the basis that the Soviets were the enemy of Jewish capitalism. Or he could join the Western cause (if his crimes were not too obvious and he was not too high-ranking) because it was the enemy of Jewish Bolshevism.
The fourth option was not to give a damn about ideology or politics (and perhaps never to have given a damn in the first place) and look to old contacts to earn some money through political means - as military or police adviser, as arms dealer or perhaps in what might amount to organised crime.
Orbach looks at all these options and how they played out amongst a surprisingly small group of people, mostly chancers and sociopaths, over the few decades following the Second World War in a story that is highly complicated but is well presented here.
The author is a professional historian. He does not allow himself to get over-excited by his subject matter. He is diligent. He has excellent and (I believe) reliable sources. He writes well and clearly. It may not be the whole story but the story is interesting enough.
The first section concentrates on the oft-told story of Reinhard Gehlen and the compromises entered into in order to create the Gehlen Org, the precursor of the BND (the German State Intelligence Service). It is a revisionist tale, shattering Gehlen's own carefully cultivated legend.
The truth is that Gehlen was a lucky opportunist, that American weakness when it comes to interagency co-operation rather than anything more malicious allowed his rather bungling organisation to continue as long as it did and that it became riddled with Soviet infiltration.
The Soviets come out of this as rather clever, exploiting the Nazi old boy network with Nazis of their own to create a scandal that was highly disruptive of German politics as the German Establishment tried to avoid exposure of the rum ex-Nazi, Hans Globke, Adenauer's Chief of Staff, to world gaze.
To be charitable, German democracy could not have secured itself without accepting the services of some who served under the previous regime and who had 'mains sales'. The chaos of collapse appears to have allowed the new system to avoid the worst of the Nazis only by taking the most weaselly.
The first part of the book leads into the second with its strong Middle East focus by telling the story of the Gehlen Org's attempt to build a Middle Eastern intelligence network using old regime sympathisers while West Germany simultaneously tried to build a positive relationship with Israel.
The second part of the book then deals largely with those ex-Nazis who embedded themselves in the world of Arab nationalism and took a more political view of things - that the war against the Jews was a war against Israel and the West.
Ex-Nazis turned up in Nasser's Egypt and in Syria as it went through regime change after regime change, touting themselves as military, police and interrogation advisers and introducing the techniques of the Gestapo to Nasserite and proto-Baathist officers.
The two main stories here are those of the vicious and murderous war criminal Alois Brunner who embedded himself in the Syrian security state and the Nazi arms trading operations such as OTRACO which ran guns, not always competently, to the Algerian rebels against French rule.
Brunner is another well known story except that, here, because of his access to Mossad files, Orbach can give us a fuller picture of his adventures. One is gratified (spoiler alert) that he ends up a victim of the Baathists who clearly despised him, eventually languishing in a cell no better than a Gestapo one.
What is more interesting are the insights into Israeli policy towards Nazi holocaust perpetrators. It is not quite what one may think. Although it was vital for Israel to trigger global awareness of the Holocaust, this was also a State with limited resources and other priorities.
The capture and trial (1961) of Eichmann, which, of course, led to a classic text, Arendt's 'Eichmann in Jerusalem' which spoke of the banality of evil, satisfied that primary aim. Judgements then had to be made on use of resources once that core end had been achieved.
Mengele (never captured) was never not going to be on the 'forever' list of Israel (with full justification) but other existential concerns of the nation pushed punishing war criminals to the back of the queue once the Eichmann Trial had had its effect.
The Eichmann kidnapping unnerved old Nazis. The myth of Israeli 'justice' by any means was sufficient to drive some into hiding but, after an attempt to assassinate Brunner (rather than attempt his kidnap for trial), he was ignored for two decades.
The FLN arms trading operation naturally brought into play the thoroughly murderous and ruthless French security services who conducted a campaign of car bombs against Neo-Nazi arms dealers, on German soil if necessary which was not good for Franco-German relations.
The arms dealers were not particularly adept at either field craft or business. Some of the 'deals' appear almost comically inept in retrospect. The French scored a nice own goal by harassing the second rate Nazis out of existence only to create space for far more efficient Soviet suppliers.
The strategic incompetence of security services seems to be a theme of this book. Gehlen and French intelligence are soon matched in the third and final part by the story of Israeli intelligence's poor analysis and diversion of resources into yet another murderous campaign.
In this case, it was triggered by panic over Nasser's hiring at enormous expense of West German rocket scientists (not necessarily Nazis) who were presumed to be building a missile capable of dropping a nuclear bomb on Israel.
The fear is understandable. Concern about nuclear weaponry led Israel into its own nuclear weapons programme and it has guided its foreign policy ever since. However, on this occasion, the evidence was there that these rocket scientists were second rate and there was no threat.
The 'justice' agenda was dropped but the scientists were assumed to be Nazis seeking a second holocaust (they were not Nazis, just hired hands). Israeli intelligence went down the rabbit hole and undertook a violent programme of assassination that destabilised Israeli-German relations.
In the end, Nasser's missile programme got nowhere for reasons that had little to do with Israel's efforts but simply because his team was not up to the job. The project was too expensive to be maintained.
Again, to be fair, Cairo in the late 1940s and 1950s, was a hotbed of pro-Nazi and anti-Jewish sentiment but we are now well into the early 1960s. Nazis were getting old and tired in any case, past any serious usefulness to local Arab regimes if ever they were very useful in the first place.
In the end, the West Germans and Israelis settled the matter far more intelligently by simply buying off the rocket scientists in 1964. The irony of it all is that the deal was partly enabled with intelligence acquired by Israel with the help of one of the most prominent Nazis of all - Otto Skorzeny.
Skorzeny, as a foot note, in this context is interesting because, untainted by war crimes yet the hero of European Neo-Nazis, he comes across here as a pragmatic opportunist hinting at the first emergence of Far Right admiration of Israel as a plucky national socialist State in its own right.
This might be puzzling but if there were Nazis committed to 'extermination', other Nazis were more inclined to forced emigration (like the forcing out of the Moriscoes of Spain) so the existence of Israel might not present such a problem. This has been a division within the Far Far Right ever since.
There was another brief burst of 'justice' attempts at creating an assassination programme directed at elderly Nazis under Begin in the late 1970s but it did not get very far. Brunner lost some fingers because of a letter bomb attempt on his life in 1980.
This book is a fairly detailed account of the history of post-war Nazi mercenaries yet it is readable. The overwhelming effect is one of despair at our species, not because of its crimes but because of its blundering ineptitude whether Nazi, the sponsors of Nazis or their enemies.
We are watching a criminal circus of surprisingly few people either 'busking' their way through life or engaging in extreme measures that would have been less necessary with a little forethought and closer attention to intelligence analysis.
The Nazis come across as losers in a struggle for survival that simply results in them doubling down on their earlier criminal or sociopathic behaviour. Their enemies come across as tending to panicked paranoia which perhaps marks out active service units today then as now.
History never repeats itself precisely but we are left with a suspicion that the shenanigans of excitable security apparats from Moscow to London, from Warsaw to Kiev, are likely to exhibit much the same tendencies nowadays as French, German and Israeli intelligence in the two post-war decades.
On the other hand, and more positively, it is equally probable that amateur banditti arising from regime collapse may be disruptive but have no serious means of changing history while, on the few occasions that the big boys of politics intrude into the game, problems can be resolved rationally.
An excellent historical work on a neglected part of post-war espionage, Orbach's use of his limited but important resources is exemplary. We can only hope that, one day, the Russian, Syrian and Egyptian Governments will give him access to their archives to fill out the story.
Very interesting book about some of the members of the Nazi party up to 1980s when majority of "old guard" died out. Focus is on Europe and Middle East and author does not go around the world, especially South America.
Finding themselves at the mercy of the Allies at the end of WW2 in Europe, lots of members of Nazi party that held prominent positions [but did not manage to escape] decided that they have to make themselves useful to new [de facto] rulers, US and Russia.
And so story begins. In the shadow of Red Scare and overestimation (better said over-blowing) of the quality of information and skills of remaining Nazi/SD/GESTAPO/ABWEHR members, they tried to find their niche in order .... well, basically just to survive. And thrived they did - as arms smugglers (having FLN as customers was .... interesting gotta admit, until Action service came in), as weapon designers (missiles for Egypt to be used against Israel) and spies for hire (providing services to anyone who can pay - US, Russians, UK, French, Israelis .... as long as they have money all's good). Highest achievement was of course in Western Germany where lots of these former Nazis found place in state level ministries and especially in Gehlen's organization that with time became Western Germany security service BND. Did this open the soft belly of the W. Germany to Soviet blackmail and infiltration - definitely. Was it unexpected? You gotta be kidding me. if people in profession that is based on blackmail and extortion were surprised by this ...... come on! it was just a lever everyone wanted in place so they can use it for their convenience.
While entire feeling about the book is that this is talk about past, I beg to differ. Riding on the wave of romanticizing German army of WW2 (and all other German services of the same time period) starting from 1950's, propagandists enabled all the hard-core beliefs from the surviving Nazis to transfer to new generations. And this gave birth to not just holocaust denier groups (which is terrible on its own) but to groups of paramilitary organizations throughout the world created with the single purpose - hunting down the Red Scare, no matter the casualties and no matter who is marked as Red Scare. If in doubt just check South America and various dictators and juntas that grew and flourished there starting from 1960's onward, especially among military elite.
It is interesting author never discusses South America and effect Nazis had in those areas. In my opinion this would make the work much more serious because what happened in 20th century, during the Cold War, in S. America was terrible application of Nazi general politics, approaches to forcing people to bend to their will and in general experiences from battlefields of WW2 (especially those connected to counter intelligence and spy/partisan hunting).
Unfortunately Hydra of Nazism is still alive and interestingly enough groups that grow with this highly dangerous ideology are still used as a weapon in deniable operations. With time people got desensitized on the notion of Nazism and Fascism (especially with the total devaluation of the terms themselves because progressives know only to call their opponents Nazis), and this is something that needs to be handled somehow with highest priority and these groups stopped. And I don't mean just fringe groups but paramilitaries and corporate/governmental organizations used as dogs of war and [as history repeats itself] again romanticized as knights on a mission when fighting in [deniable] wars for their [progressive, well they call themselves that] masters who always see themselves as only light on the planet.
For European and Mediterranean area this book is pretty good. For greater picture on these dangerous people on world level it is seriously lacking.
The writer has written a fascinating account of nazi (ss, sd, gestapo) criminals , with varying degress of culpability in the holocaust, after ww2. Some adopted anti-communism ast their creed (R Gehlen became head of german intelligence); some adopted anti-western ideals as their creed (Felfe became a Soviet spy); while others became intelligence mercenaries for hire (Brunner, Besiner) who settled in middle east and ran gun running operations (while being fiercely anti-Israels and anti-Jewish) among other things. At various points in time, the Americans, West Germans, even Israelis kept employing them. All these intelligenc eservies overestimated their importance. France targeted these gun runners during the Algerian war of independence through assassinations. When their main org, OTRACO, faded, the russians adn the chinese took that place. After 1962, with Egypt working on building ballistic missiles with the help of german scientist and security experts, Israel targeted these Germans using 1) assassination and after its scandalous failure 2) employment opportunities. Some nazis started working for Mossad to get their name off Nazi hunting files and avoid an Eichmann like trial. Mossad used them, despite knowing their holocaust past, to counter Arabs who were the present danger. Eventually by the late 60s, most of their employers stopped hiring them and most faded into oblivion.
Historia popleczników Hitlera po wojnie jest niezwykle ciekawym zagadnieniem. W mainstreamowej wyobraźni narodów tkwi przekonanie, że procesy norymberskie skazały i ukarały winnych, a ład i porządek w Europie został przywrócony. Oczywiście, ujmując ten temat w skrócie, bo nie było to wszystko tak przejrzyste, a wręcz zagłębiając się w historię okazuje się, że sprawiedliwość była tylko powierzchowna, a polityka, biznes i interesy światowe wzięły górę.
Danny Orbach, w swoje książce, oddał się bardzo szczegółowej analizie sytuacji wielu wysoko postawionych nazistów, po zakończeniu wojny. Skupił się on na tych postaciach, które zostały wykorzystane przez Amerykanów i ZSRR do swoich celów podczas Zimnej Wojny. Okazało się, że ich wiedza i umiejętności są bardzo przydatne i mogą zostać spożytkowane do działania na rzecz destabilizacji wroga. Bardzo szybko zostali włączeni w proceder przemytu broni, tworzenia nowych punktów zapalnych na Bliskim Wschodzie, bardzo często dlatego, że jako jedyni mieli rozległą wiedzę na temat użycia broni, którą Niemcy produkowali, i która jeszcze przez długi czas po zakończeniu wojny była w szerokim użyciu. Także świadomość specyfiki frontu wschodniego była przydatna i godna wykorzystania. Bliski Wschód, bo na nim skupia się autor stał się poletkiem zbrojnych aspiracji Stanów Zjednoczonych i ZSRR a byli naziści bardzo dobrze weszli w rolę szpiegów i ich ciemna strona została wykorzystana do maksimum.
Książka rzuca światło na skomplikowaną sieć powiązań i relacji, politycznych i ekonomicznych, pokazuje jak działają tryby gry politycznej i jak moralność ma wiele znaczeń.
Muszę przyznać, że wymagająca jest to lektura. Mnogość nazwisk, zależności sprawia, że trzeba czytać ją uważnie i z koncentracją. Autor nie bawi się z czytelnikiem, tylko „atakuje" bezpośrednio i bez wrażliwości, obnaża nasze wyobrażenia o świecie polityki, dyplomacji, państwowych i osobistych interesów, burząc podwaliny naszej naiwności.
A fascinating topic and hats off to the author for remarkable research. However, the delivery is clunky and poorly executed. Very muddling at times. Names of people and what they did are repeated ad nauseam which smacks of poor editing. There are interesting nuggets on Nasser's hiring of former Nazi scientists to create a potent rocket missile threat to Israel but failed to get off the ground (the rockets in the military parades were mere window dressing). What might surprise many is Mossad made successful overtures to some of those who had been part of the Nazi regime. They approached the likes of Otto Skorzeny -- the SS General who led the rescue of Mussolini from his mountain top prison -- to ensure Nasser's programme never came about. Also the lengths that the West German government led by Adenauer went to to keep State Secretary Hans Globke's part in the Nazi anti-Jewish laws and the Holocaust from being mentioned in Eichmann's trial. Finally there is pleasure to be derived from the unpleasant final years of Alois Brunner -- Eichmann's deputy and responsible for the deportation of 100,000+ Jews across Europe -- after he fled to Syria. Initially they drew on his dubious qualities of being an expert in torture to pass on to their home grown torture students. Despite several requests to extradite him the regime lied and said he was not there. He eventually fell out of favour even with Assad Senior and was confined to a windowless basement where he "yelled and cried often." He finally died in 2001 and as the author writes: "The spent criminal ended his life in far worse conditions than any Western state would have given him, and yet, far better than how his Jewish victims were murdered."
A bit too detailed with names and situations - I think a more focused narrative would have made this book more compelling. But it's horrifying to think how much former Nazis were able to integrate into intelligence services for the next twenty years, since the West was hysterical about communism, and the Soviets were greedy for territory and influence (so was the West, too). I found it interesting how so many Middle Eastern countries hosted former Nazis, until they became more trouble than they were worth. I had no idea so many Nazis helped arm the FLN, until France began to assassinate them and made room for China and Russia to fill in the gaps. It was also not surprising that so many Nazis chose different sides (communist or not) depending on who they hated more, but that they didn't think their former comrades could be working for the other side to their detriment. And, of course, it was fascinating to read about Mossad's assassination attempts, and even working relationships with former Nazis to bring down the German scientists in Egypt.
Excellent book! As in his last publication, the plots against Hitler, in Fugitives Orbach knows how to transform complicated historical events into a fascinating story. The book describes the lives of former members of the Nazi intelligence services post World War II. Orbach describes their part and influence on the Cold War and the various conflicts in the middle east, including the Algerian independence struggle and the Arab–Israeli conflict. His wide knowledge of the European. Arab and Israeli history, makes the book a rich resource of endless interesting historical facts, and Orbach's skill as a storyteller, helps the reader to stay focused between the various characters, places and organizations. Highly recommended!
i’ve never read a book that turned such interesting content into such unreadable dreck. had to force myself to read every page, and learned very little while doing so. do not recommend
edit: my copy had a “epilogue to the 2024 edition” which is not only wildly self important but also deeply annoying as i’d hoped to be done with the book. the author uses the space to attempt to tie his work into current events, but fails to make a meaningful point or tie it to anything in the book. feels like it’s there to pad out the length and justify a new print run
Reading this as authoritarianism, white supremacy and general bigotry become fashionable again it is hard to escape the vile character attributes of those who sign up to these beliefs.
Just as challenging is the "ends justify the means" thinking of those who accommodated adherents of these defunct doctrines post war, compromising themselves and their respective missions. This is the terrain Fugitives covers in considerable depth.
I could never have foreseen that such repulsive and debased ideology would reemerge, yet here we are.
What happened afterwards? Here is the rest of the story! Others and myself and other history buffs are fairly well-read when it comes to WW II and Holocaust history, but what came next and what happened to inhuman National Socialists and members of the Schutzstaffel and Sicherheitsdienst (SS and SD)-- at least the ones not successfully hunted down? Well-written and researched.
This was a decent book about Nazis after WWII. If you are unaware of the history of Gehlen in West German spy operations, and Operation Damocles involving Nazis working for the Egyptian missile program, the book is interesting. If you already have a passing knowledge about this there is little new. The only thing I found new was the degree of jealousy and in-fighting in the ex-Nazi fraternity.
An excellent book. It is great to know when we have real enemies, and when we are "chasing after the wind". An excellent history book for those who want to know more about the escape routes of the Nazis after the Holocaust
Początek książki oraz jej opis, obiecał wiele ciekawych godzin, spędzonych przy czytaniu, ale niestety koszmarnie sucho. Fakty, daty, postaci - było ich sporo, ale książka absolutnie nie zachwyciła mnie. Może warto póżniej wrócić i przeczytać jeszcze raz, ale na razie taka niska ocena.
Fascinating and horrifying in equal measure. The world of post WW2 espionage seems to have been grim, seedy, corrupt and inept in almost equal measure.