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Spies and Lies: How China's Greatest Covert Operations Fooled the World
Spies and Lies by Alex Joske is a ground-breaking exposé of elite influence operations by China’s little-known Ministry of State Security. Revealing for the first time how the Chinese Communist Party has tasked its spies to deceive the world, it challenges the conventional account of China’s past, present and future.
Mere years ago, Western governments chose to cooperate with China in the hope that it would liberalize, setting aside concerns about human rights abuses, totalitarian ambitions and espionage. But the axiom of China's 'peaceful rise' has been fundamentally challenged by the Chinese Communist Party's authoritarian behavior under Xi Jinping.
How did we get it wrong for so long?
Spies and Lies pierces the Ministry of State Security's walls of secrecy and reveals how agents of the Chinese Communist Party have spent decades manipulating the West’s attitudes – from an Australian prime minister to the US Congress, prominent think tanks and the FBI – about China’s rise. Through interviews with defectors and intelligence officers, classified Chinese intelligence documents and original investigations, the book unmasks dozens of active Chinese intelligence officers along with global MSS fronts, including travel agencies, writers associations, publishing houses, alumni associations, newspapers, a Buddhist temple, a record company and charities.
Spies and Lies is an extraordinary insight into the most successful influence operation in history – one which has fooled the West for years – and is indispensable reading.
Mere years ago, Western governments chose to cooperate with China in the hope that it would liberalize, setting aside concerns about human rights abuses, totalitarian ambitions and espionage. But the axiom of China's 'peaceful rise' has been fundamentally challenged by the Chinese Communist Party's authoritarian behavior under Xi Jinping.
How did we get it wrong for so long?
Spies and Lies pierces the Ministry of State Security's walls of secrecy and reveals how agents of the Chinese Communist Party have spent decades manipulating the West’s attitudes – from an Australian prime minister to the US Congress, prominent think tanks and the FBI – about China’s rise. Through interviews with defectors and intelligence officers, classified Chinese intelligence documents and original investigations, the book unmasks dozens of active Chinese intelligence officers along with global MSS fronts, including travel agencies, writers associations, publishing houses, alumni associations, newspapers, a Buddhist temple, a record company and charities.
Spies and Lies is an extraordinary insight into the most successful influence operation in history – one which has fooled the West for years – and is indispensable reading.
304 pages, Paperback
Published October 11, 2022
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October 23, 2022
Spies and Lies by Alex Joske tells the story of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) and its influence campaigns. Where traditional intelligence operations might try to run agents or break into secure systems, a variety of political and organisational factors pushed the MSS towards an open narrative campaign. One that cultivated influence for access and co-opted western hopes for a liberalising China, to buy legitimacy and set the terms for China’s rise.
Joske has carved out an impressive reputation in his open-source analysis of China. Reading this book I was somewhat reminded of Des Ball’s contributions. The depth and detail are impressive. You get the sense the author knows a lot more than they can always say. At the same time, such works require a higher degree of trust in the author. There’s no easy way for most readers to check if the particular person they identify is who they say they are, or to tease apart the back story. You need to implicitly accept the authors judgement as you move across hundreds of little stories and events, and the way they weave them into a broader story.
One take away I have from Spies and Lies is an asymmetry between China and the West of action against passivity. China has no more absolute control or confidence in its path and people than any other country. Indeed its weaknesses are real and apparent. But its institutions have been active and deliberate in their effort to shape and push the agenda of others. The West by contrast has often been remarkably passive. I’m not entirely sure why. Perhaps we didn’t think China was enough of a threat to bother, but then persuasive efforts in the War on Terrorism also failed badly. Perhaps we thought that active persuasion would always do worse than the allure of our own system and its innate superiority of liberal, democratic capitalism?
Take the story of Australia’s former Prime Minister Bob Hawke (in office 1983-1991). Joske describes how, following his time in office, Hawke became a businessman with significant links into China. He did fairly well out of the arrangement, though some of his partners were MSS affiliated. Joske is quick to deny any suggestion that Hawke did anything untoward. Instead, he argues Hawke’s role helped normalise and justify China to Australians and the world. He’s right on that score. Yet, Hawke was famously one of the most persuasive, charismatic people of his generation. Intellectually and socially, few in China would have been a match for him. Did anyone in the West do anything to help people like Hawke to succeed in being influential on the ground across the Chinese system? Probably not. No doubt he was just left to wander in, as our governments hoped some good would come of it. Meanwhile on the other side, there seems a deliberate effort to engage and gain benefit to China from his presence and interactions. Again, nothing untoward is alleged to have occurred. Yet while China set out to influence and persuade the world, what did we do to influence and persuade China? Not just hoping it would happen on our terms, but actively and strategically?
Lurking behind much of this book’s tale is the question of how the West got China wrong. Was it a policy failure in seeking engagement? Was it an Intelligence failure in not identifying the specific threats and individuals? Or perhaps a broader social failure to realise what kind of country China really is. Perhaps it is all three. I don’t have the knowledge to tease out how well the intelligence communities acted, though their emphasis on change over the last few years suggests they’ve found a need to significantly adjust. Socially too many around the world have shifted their views of China. Many in our business, academic and political establishments simply did not do due diligence in who they worked with, who they met and who they took money from. Thankfully that is slowly changing.
The policy question is perhaps harder. Joske’ notes that in Australia having ‘reset’ the relationship, and had the veil of innocence removed, the aim is not to cut all ties, but to balance the opportunities with clear understanding of the risks. Historically, while the specifics can certainly be questioned was the broader effort to engage China, to hope that it may change a mistake? I’m not sure. Certainly the MSS seems to have sold the West a story it wanted to hear. Yet we know from history that many authoritarian regimes are always far weaker and less coherent than they would like us to believe, and that letting in cracks of sunlight can warp the whole structure. Joske doesn’t directly engage those questions, but the book is a useful window into thinking through part of how we approached these issues, and the opportunities and costs of each method.
This is a quick read (200 pages) and given the nature of the material and clear writing style you can breeze through it. The final chapter is particularly interesting and I appreciated Joske taking a step back to consider the implications and ways to respond. His points about the bias towards classified over open-source and shortfalls in long term China literacy are well taken. An impressive and useful contribution. Deliberately it tries to only tell one small tale of the biggest story of this century, but it does so effectively. Recommended.
Joske has carved out an impressive reputation in his open-source analysis of China. Reading this book I was somewhat reminded of Des Ball’s contributions. The depth and detail are impressive. You get the sense the author knows a lot more than they can always say. At the same time, such works require a higher degree of trust in the author. There’s no easy way for most readers to check if the particular person they identify is who they say they are, or to tease apart the back story. You need to implicitly accept the authors judgement as you move across hundreds of little stories and events, and the way they weave them into a broader story.
One take away I have from Spies and Lies is an asymmetry between China and the West of action against passivity. China has no more absolute control or confidence in its path and people than any other country. Indeed its weaknesses are real and apparent. But its institutions have been active and deliberate in their effort to shape and push the agenda of others. The West by contrast has often been remarkably passive. I’m not entirely sure why. Perhaps we didn’t think China was enough of a threat to bother, but then persuasive efforts in the War on Terrorism also failed badly. Perhaps we thought that active persuasion would always do worse than the allure of our own system and its innate superiority of liberal, democratic capitalism?
Take the story of Australia’s former Prime Minister Bob Hawke (in office 1983-1991). Joske describes how, following his time in office, Hawke became a businessman with significant links into China. He did fairly well out of the arrangement, though some of his partners were MSS affiliated. Joske is quick to deny any suggestion that Hawke did anything untoward. Instead, he argues Hawke’s role helped normalise and justify China to Australians and the world. He’s right on that score. Yet, Hawke was famously one of the most persuasive, charismatic people of his generation. Intellectually and socially, few in China would have been a match for him. Did anyone in the West do anything to help people like Hawke to succeed in being influential on the ground across the Chinese system? Probably not. No doubt he was just left to wander in, as our governments hoped some good would come of it. Meanwhile on the other side, there seems a deliberate effort to engage and gain benefit to China from his presence and interactions. Again, nothing untoward is alleged to have occurred. Yet while China set out to influence and persuade the world, what did we do to influence and persuade China? Not just hoping it would happen on our terms, but actively and strategically?
Lurking behind much of this book’s tale is the question of how the West got China wrong. Was it a policy failure in seeking engagement? Was it an Intelligence failure in not identifying the specific threats and individuals? Or perhaps a broader social failure to realise what kind of country China really is. Perhaps it is all three. I don’t have the knowledge to tease out how well the intelligence communities acted, though their emphasis on change over the last few years suggests they’ve found a need to significantly adjust. Socially too many around the world have shifted their views of China. Many in our business, academic and political establishments simply did not do due diligence in who they worked with, who they met and who they took money from. Thankfully that is slowly changing.
The policy question is perhaps harder. Joske’ notes that in Australia having ‘reset’ the relationship, and had the veil of innocence removed, the aim is not to cut all ties, but to balance the opportunities with clear understanding of the risks. Historically, while the specifics can certainly be questioned was the broader effort to engage China, to hope that it may change a mistake? I’m not sure. Certainly the MSS seems to have sold the West a story it wanted to hear. Yet we know from history that many authoritarian regimes are always far weaker and less coherent than they would like us to believe, and that letting in cracks of sunlight can warp the whole structure. Joske doesn’t directly engage those questions, but the book is a useful window into thinking through part of how we approached these issues, and the opportunities and costs of each method.
This is a quick read (200 pages) and given the nature of the material and clear writing style you can breeze through it. The final chapter is particularly interesting and I appreciated Joske taking a step back to consider the implications and ways to respond. His points about the bias towards classified over open-source and shortfalls in long term China literacy are well taken. An impressive and useful contribution. Deliberately it tries to only tell one small tale of the biggest story of this century, but it does so effectively. Recommended.
April 22, 2025
yea it's good amazing research just so much detail. only read to chapter 6 cos the library told me off. I'll get to the rest of it later I swear.
February 3, 2023
Spies and Lies illuminates the history and pervasive reach of Chinese influence operations world wide using dozens of examples often focusing on the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) Social Investigation Bureau (12th Bureau) and its various front organizations. These examples demonstrate how China cynically promoted the hope that China would become democratic and "rise peacefully" if developed democracies treated China as if this were already the case.
Individually, the examples are quite readable but the sequence of stories left me a little lost in detail without a clear understanding of the network of Chinese intelligence organizations and front organizations and Chinese intelligence officials and the collaborators who wove between them. I also had difficulty evaluating the degree of certainly of each claim since the footnotes were often in Chinese or referred to a journalistic source with which I was unfamiliar. A website with a clickable network diagram would be an excellent addendum for this book.
Individually, the examples are quite readable but the sequence of stories left me a little lost in detail without a clear understanding of the network of Chinese intelligence organizations and front organizations and Chinese intelligence officials and the collaborators who wove between them. I also had difficulty evaluating the degree of certainly of each claim since the footnotes were often in Chinese or referred to a journalistic source with which I was unfamiliar. A website with a clickable network diagram would be an excellent addendum for this book.
November 19, 2022
Scary Read For Sure
This was a frightening and eye-opening book.
Very important, timely, and interesting book on espionage.
Joske was an excellent journalist, and I look forward to more of their books.
4.8/5
This was a frightening and eye-opening book.
Very important, timely, and interesting book on espionage.
Joske was an excellent journalist, and I look forward to more of their books.
4.8/5
December 31, 2022
3.8/5 -- This is a thoroughly researched book that supports its central argument: the CCP wants to influence foreign civil perception, foreign national policy, and foreign leadership's interpretation of the CCP (actions, intent, history). Joske makes the case that the Ministry of State Security is the CCP's prime influence operations agency and that more advantage is gained from IO than traditional espionage. The MSS wields influence by providing access to high ranking CCP members, reflexive control (e.g. China's Peaceful Rise... requires all other nations to modify behavior to obtain a peaceful outcome), and access to foreign centers of influence (e.g. think tanks, former/current/future political office holders and aides) where MSS agents are really their cover story but "make friends and see what happens."
The book provides many vignettes on how the CCP has successfully and unsuccessfully employed influence/information campaigns, but the overall flow is like a collection of news articles. I think what would have made this stronger is some contextual analysis for each chapter and comparison to the scope, scale, and methods of of other competitors' influence operations.
The book provides many vignettes on how the CCP has successfully and unsuccessfully employed influence/information campaigns, but the overall flow is like a collection of news articles. I think what would have made this stronger is some contextual analysis for each chapter and comparison to the scope, scale, and methods of of other competitors' influence operations.
April 11, 2024
There’s probably a good story to be told here, but as it stands this book is a muddled mess. Do yourself a favor and skip to the concluding chapter for an overview of the author’s theme and his recommendations for mitigating the effects of Chinese influence campaigns. Or just skip the book altogether.
October 24, 2022
3.5 stars. Certainly a master class in OSINT, Spies and Lies points to the need for the US to invest in similar intelligence work. And while I'm a fan of Joske's reports, this book didn't seem to fit together properly or flow well. There is lots of great stuff in here, but often difficult to parse through.
March 24, 2023
fascinating book and very economical in its writing. I think it could benefit from a longer pagecount or more in-depth notes. Clearly written for a more policymaking/business interest, in my view, and I think it has that feel, but in pursuit of that the book can be too quick to take contentious positions on characterizations of modern China that seems at least up for debate. To what extent was MSS / CRF driven by this dogged conservative-marxist desire to mislead the west, and to what extent was it more just a way of exerting some control over reformist elements that really did exist? The latter possibility seems more credible in light of, as Joske describes in the book, CRF and related organizations' deep penetration by the CIA / FBI. As a corrective to narratives of "peaceful rise" and inevitable reform it is great, but I think if more words were spent on engaging with potential rebuttals to the quite hawkish framing of PRC motivations and mechanisms and negotiating the argument, I think it could be more persuasive. Still a great insight, and as others have mentioned fascinating for the ways in which it describes a new approach to offensive intelligence on behalf of the MSS, unique for its divergence from Soviet strategies and careful tailoring to the environments of commercial and liberal societies.
March 29, 2023
This book is interesting, but the author's understanding of Chinese politics is quite shallow, and everything is interpreted in the worst possible light.
The young author, who came of age during the Xi era, apparently assumes that the party has been a monolith throughout history and that all talk of a "peaceful rise" and "democratic reform within the party" are manufactured lies from the start, intended to confuse the party's gullible Western assets. According to this assumption, anyone who shows a dovish/liberal side is a lying undercover agent. As much as I may dislike the current leadership, I do not agree with this judgement. Before Xi, there used to be a genuine dovish/liberal faction within the party. Just look at Cai Xia, a former professor at the Central Party School during the Jiang/Hu era who is now in exile; Ren Zhiqiang, one of the most influential microbloggers in China who is now serving an 18-year prison sentence; or Wu Jianmin, the dovish diplomat who is now regarded as a traitor by the wolf warrior generation. "China was on the verge of a color revolution before Xi Da Da saved the party" is the consensus among Chinese conservative circles these days.
Additionally, the author assumes that all scholars accompanied by MSS agents on multiple occasions are MSS assets themselves. This assumption is problematic. In China, everyone is under state surveillance to varying degrees, and the party is never comfortable with the idea of free scholarly exchange. It would not surprise me if they tried to surveil all such exchanges, and some scholars who frequently co-appear with MSS agents might be victims instead of accomplices.
The author also believes that the dynamics of the interactions between foreigners and MSS-infiltrated organizations are one-sided, meaning that the MSS dupes foreigners while the foreigners leave zero impact on wider Chinese society. This is also not true. Western think tanks like the RAND/Carnegie Endowment (criticized as "useful idiots" by the author) are strongly feared as vehicles for color revolution in China. If they were fully manipulated by the MSS and had no real impact, this would not be the case.
Given all the materials in the book, the author fails to compare the MSS influence campaigns with their western counterparts. It is not new that think tanks focusing on international relations/grand strategies are strongly linked to the military/intelligence apparatus. There are a ton of such entities in Washington DC alone. Influence campaign focusing on "high value individuals" is also not new. Take a look at the Israel lobby in the US. Is the operations of the MSS truly that shocking?
It is understandable that the author wants to raise awareness about the MSS issue, but he is probably going too far in his accusations and inadequate in his explanations. For your interest, the author has a poor track record on making rigorous, evidence-based accusations - on one occasion he has to make an official apology for his false accusations on the ASPI website. Please take his specific accusations with a grain of salt.
The young author, who came of age during the Xi era, apparently assumes that the party has been a monolith throughout history and that all talk of a "peaceful rise" and "democratic reform within the party" are manufactured lies from the start, intended to confuse the party's gullible Western assets. According to this assumption, anyone who shows a dovish/liberal side is a lying undercover agent. As much as I may dislike the current leadership, I do not agree with this judgement. Before Xi, there used to be a genuine dovish/liberal faction within the party. Just look at Cai Xia, a former professor at the Central Party School during the Jiang/Hu era who is now in exile; Ren Zhiqiang, one of the most influential microbloggers in China who is now serving an 18-year prison sentence; or Wu Jianmin, the dovish diplomat who is now regarded as a traitor by the wolf warrior generation. "China was on the verge of a color revolution before Xi Da Da saved the party" is the consensus among Chinese conservative circles these days.
Additionally, the author assumes that all scholars accompanied by MSS agents on multiple occasions are MSS assets themselves. This assumption is problematic. In China, everyone is under state surveillance to varying degrees, and the party is never comfortable with the idea of free scholarly exchange. It would not surprise me if they tried to surveil all such exchanges, and some scholars who frequently co-appear with MSS agents might be victims instead of accomplices.
The author also believes that the dynamics of the interactions between foreigners and MSS-infiltrated organizations are one-sided, meaning that the MSS dupes foreigners while the foreigners leave zero impact on wider Chinese society. This is also not true. Western think tanks like the RAND/Carnegie Endowment (criticized as "useful idiots" by the author) are strongly feared as vehicles for color revolution in China. If they were fully manipulated by the MSS and had no real impact, this would not be the case.
Given all the materials in the book, the author fails to compare the MSS influence campaigns with their western counterparts. It is not new that think tanks focusing on international relations/grand strategies are strongly linked to the military/intelligence apparatus. There are a ton of such entities in Washington DC alone. Influence campaign focusing on "high value individuals" is also not new. Take a look at the Israel lobby in the US. Is the operations of the MSS truly that shocking?
It is understandable that the author wants to raise awareness about the MSS issue, but he is probably going too far in his accusations and inadequate in his explanations. For your interest, the author has a poor track record on making rigorous, evidence-based accusations - on one occasion he has to make an official apology for his false accusations on the ASPI website. Please take his specific accusations with a grain of salt.
July 9, 2023
Acronym laden look at modern China’s rise onto the espionage world stage via its use of all and any kind of cultural front group. Long winded and boringly methodical. Joske certainly knows his subject but more insight and ‘agent in the field’ examples would help set the scene. Gideons Spies - Thomas Gordon re Mossad - a far superior and accessible read.
March 8, 2024
Spies and Lies draws back the veil on China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) and its global network of spies and front organizations. A primary aim of the MSS is to lure the West into believing that China aims to achieve a “peaceful rise” and a democratic transition. However, the actual goal of the MSS’s master, the Chinese Community Party, is to achieve a transition to a new world order, with the People’s Republic of China at its helm. Australian China analyst Alex Joske urges the West to take greater heed of MSS operations and thwart its ambitions.
October 21, 2023
Joske fills critical gaps in the West's understanding of Chinese intelligence and influence operations while providing sharp, and needed, criticism of politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders who interact with the Chinese government. During much of the 1980s to the 2010s the U.S. policy towards China assumed that greater interaction would lead to a democratic China. It is clear today that this optimistic view discounted the strong possibility that the CCP would maintain strong control over the government, economy, and policy and use the lull in tension to wait for opportunistic times to advance China's national security interests on key issues. The U.S. should have hedged more against China in diversifying supply chains and developing strong relationships with our East Asian allies, but was distracted by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and toxic domestic politics.
Despite Joske's excellent research, analysis, and criticism, Spies and Lies has several flaws and would be best appreciated by a reader already well-versed on Chinese foreign policy and national security. Some, if not many, of the subjects of Joske's criticism undoubtedly knew they were interacting with Chinese government officials or agents of the Chinese government, even if they did not know they were talking to Chinese intelligence officers conducting an influence campaign. Given the nature of the Chinese government and the CCP, Western politicians, officials, and experts likely reasonably saw interactions with biased officials as better than no interaction, and treated the views they received accordingly. Joske also fails to consider that, just as there is a range of political opinions in the U.S., there is also a range of political opinions in China. Just because Chinese intelligence may have adopted a false narrative of "reform and opening up" to get close to Western officials does not mean that other Chinese did not believe in, and attempt to advance, policies to that effect.
Joske's research also relies heavily on well-known incidents and narratives, such as the Katrina Leung and Christine Fang, to describe Chinese government tactics to influence U.S. national security and politics. With Joske's language ability and excellent research skills he could have focused more on filling in more gaps in the public and academic understanding of MSS influence operations rather than highlight examples that highlight more the institutional failures of the FBI, and less perhaps any strategic brilliance by the Chinese government.
Spies and Lies is worth reading as long as the reader thinks critically about Joske's narrative. Western government officials are likely not as naive as Joske portrays them, even if some are, and the Western officials should not assume that all Chinese officials and scholars who have the opportunity to interact with the West are doing so under false pretenses.
Despite Joske's excellent research, analysis, and criticism, Spies and Lies has several flaws and would be best appreciated by a reader already well-versed on Chinese foreign policy and national security. Some, if not many, of the subjects of Joske's criticism undoubtedly knew they were interacting with Chinese government officials or agents of the Chinese government, even if they did not know they were talking to Chinese intelligence officers conducting an influence campaign. Given the nature of the Chinese government and the CCP, Western politicians, officials, and experts likely reasonably saw interactions with biased officials as better than no interaction, and treated the views they received accordingly. Joske also fails to consider that, just as there is a range of political opinions in the U.S., there is also a range of political opinions in China. Just because Chinese intelligence may have adopted a false narrative of "reform and opening up" to get close to Western officials does not mean that other Chinese did not believe in, and attempt to advance, policies to that effect.
Joske's research also relies heavily on well-known incidents and narratives, such as the Katrina Leung and Christine Fang, to describe Chinese government tactics to influence U.S. national security and politics. With Joske's language ability and excellent research skills he could have focused more on filling in more gaps in the public and academic understanding of MSS influence operations rather than highlight examples that highlight more the institutional failures of the FBI, and less perhaps any strategic brilliance by the Chinese government.
Spies and Lies is worth reading as long as the reader thinks critically about Joske's narrative. Western government officials are likely not as naive as Joske portrays them, even if some are, and the Western officials should not assume that all Chinese officials and scholars who have the opportunity to interact with the West are doing so under false pretenses.
April 27, 2023
The problem with this book is that it takes as a foundational assumption that China's current turn towards greater autocracy and more aggressive foreign policy was pre-ordained and part of a grand plan since the Deng Xiaoping era. From that perspective, all of China's actions can be framed as part of this sinister conspiracy. But that's not how governments made up of humans work. There are different people with different perspectives and aspirations and they have differing levels of power throughout any particular period. There were liberals and reformers - they ended up losing out from today's viewpoint, but it stretches the imagination to believe they were all playing a part in a grand deception to fool foreigners and buy China time to grow and gain power. Doesn't mean there weren't spies and attempts to influence foreign perceptions of China - of course, every country does that. But not every foreign exchange student visa and international conference attended was the rest of the world falling prey to China's evil long game. Because the author treats it this way, he misses out on a lot of nuance and the actual opportunities the rest of the world had to influence China's development.
November 22, 2024
Alex Joske’s Spies and Lies: How China's Greatest Covert Operations Fooled the World delves into China’s covert operations led by its Ministry of State Security (MSS). The book examines how China influences global institutions and political elites through misinformation and espionage. Using detailed research and investigative reporting, Joske sheds light on how these operations have reshaped the world's understanding of China's strategies, raising important questions about international security and transparency.
I went into this book thinking it would be fascinating, but my interest faded quickly. Despite the promising topic, the book failed to keep me engaged. The constant flood of acronyms was overwhelming, and I couldn’t muster the energy to keep looking them up or remembering them. The writing style was another sticking point—it felt clunky and made an otherwise intriguing subject difficult to enjoy.
This book even put me off reading for about a week. While the events and revelations in the book might hold value, the way they were presented didn’t click with me at all. I actually hated it. Maybe others would rate it 3/5 or higher, but for me, it’s sadly a 1/5. It’s the worst book I’ve read in years, personally, I wouldn’t recommend it.
I went into this book thinking it would be fascinating, but my interest faded quickly. Despite the promising topic, the book failed to keep me engaged. The constant flood of acronyms was overwhelming, and I couldn’t muster the energy to keep looking them up or remembering them. The writing style was another sticking point—it felt clunky and made an otherwise intriguing subject difficult to enjoy.
This book even put me off reading for about a week. While the events and revelations in the book might hold value, the way they were presented didn’t click with me at all. I actually hated it. Maybe others would rate it 3/5 or higher, but for me, it’s sadly a 1/5. It’s the worst book I’ve read in years, personally, I wouldn’t recommend it.
March 15, 2023
The title is a bit of an exaggeration, but it was still an interesting read. Heavily sourced, albeit mostly from news and journal articles, with many from the Chinese press - it clearly illustrates China's focus on HUMINT-driven influence operations. The history shows China's progress from rank amateurism to a greater professional capability in the use of human assets, front organizations, and other traditional elements of strategic HUMINT with a focus on influencing other countries' opinions and perceptions of China. The well-known case of the FBI's CI debacle with Katrina Leung is mentioned several times along the way, with her connections serving as a means of illustrating Chinese intelligence's links with various other organizations. Overall, an interesting read, but weakened by a little too much speculative connecting of threads - perhaps inevitable given the subject matter. A far more interesting story is alluded to a few times, but no details provided at all - that of an extensive penetration of Chinese intelligence and government organizations by CIA assets. I'm sure it will take a long time before that one is told with any substance.
November 12, 2022
I wanted to give 3.5 stars.
The book is jam-packed with facts and some impressive analyses, particularly from an OSINT point view. It is quite eye-opening and really demonstrates the west's ignorance (negligence?) on the PRC's intelligence operations, particularly because of how subtle and long-term much of it is.
The main drawback was that a lot of it was challenging to digest, and felt more like a whitepaper than a book. I think Alex is so used to reading and writing reports that he is still learning how to write for a book. Although very informative, it does seem the readability varied from chapter to chapter, like he was learning how to write a book while writing this book.
Overall, the book was worth the read and I learned a lot about the CCP's approach to intelligence with a focus on the UFWD and MSS. I suspect his next book will be easier to digest but just as jam-packed with facts and analysis. I look forward to reading more of his work.
The book is jam-packed with facts and some impressive analyses, particularly from an OSINT point view. It is quite eye-opening and really demonstrates the west's ignorance (negligence?) on the PRC's intelligence operations, particularly because of how subtle and long-term much of it is.
The main drawback was that a lot of it was challenging to digest, and felt more like a whitepaper than a book. I think Alex is so used to reading and writing reports that he is still learning how to write for a book. Although very informative, it does seem the readability varied from chapter to chapter, like he was learning how to write a book while writing this book.
Overall, the book was worth the read and I learned a lot about the CCP's approach to intelligence with a focus on the UFWD and MSS. I suspect his next book will be easier to digest but just as jam-packed with facts and analysis. I look forward to reading more of his work.
February 23, 2023
I think that the value of this book for the general reader is not so much in the evidence that Joske presents, much of which is very hard to check if you don’t read Mandarin (and even if you do, I suspect), but in presenting a novel paradigm of covert hostile operations. We in the liberal democracies are very susceptible to rumours of liberal forces within China that just need our encouragement and perhaps the PRC will become more liberal. Joske asserts that China’s spies are capitalising on this eagerness to engage (often uncritically) in order to influence our politics in favour of the CCP. An important contribution on an important topic.
June 10, 2023
After several chapters, the content gets repetitive and starts to feel like a dry report. Books like this rely on people trust the author. But since the book relies on open source information, I spot checked some references in each chapter, they are properly cited. Now, in terms of United Front Work, for Chinese it’s not a secret at all. Not only its approach is not a secret for Chinese, numerous Chinese tv shows and movies have boasted its long tradition of infiltrating enemies’ backyard and effectively influencing key personnel. As a matter of fact, that’s an important contribution to wining the civil war.
June 19, 2023
It is amazing how much Joske was able to piece together from open sources, although you have to imagine that his work will be used as a negative template to improve operational security going forward.
On the one hand it seems like “influence operations” shouldn’t be anything to worry about in a free society; on the other hand he makes a strong case that for years the CCP deliberately encouraged an incorrect perception amongst foreigners that China would liberalise politically as it became wealthier. Hopefully the fact books like this are getting written means that going forward there will be more skepticism and less wishful thinking in the west about what is going on in China.
On the one hand it seems like “influence operations” shouldn’t be anything to worry about in a free society; on the other hand he makes a strong case that for years the CCP deliberately encouraged an incorrect perception amongst foreigners that China would liberalise politically as it became wealthier. Hopefully the fact books like this are getting written means that going forward there will be more skepticism and less wishful thinking in the west about what is going on in China.
January 16, 2025
A very informative read of how China is using scholars, diaspora communities, grooming western people of standing and up and coming policy makers, slogans such as “peaceful rise” and hijacking Buddhism to front the Chinese Communist Party policies.
By pretending to steer towards democracy they use western gullibility to front their agendas, and why use spies and buy people when you can be very friendly in a legal way and cater to people’s egos and goodwill? If the author is right in his assumptions, this book is a wake up call about where China is headed.
By pretending to steer towards democracy they use western gullibility to front their agendas, and why use spies and buy people when you can be very friendly in a legal way and cater to people’s egos and goodwill? If the author is right in his assumptions, this book is a wake up call about where China is headed.
November 25, 2022
Very disappointing book esp after the hype
Nil real revelations …..just 200pgs of PRC of China’s spy agency is trying to influence the world’s scholars, policy makers, politicians etc.
I would have thought that any self respecting spy agency (West or East) would be doing this.
Seriously, one could just replace some PRC names with American names and orgs and write the same book.
Very repetitive, nil engrossing narrative arc (if an any arc at all)
Save your time
2 stars
Nil real revelations …..just 200pgs of PRC of China’s spy agency is trying to influence the world’s scholars, policy makers, politicians etc.
I would have thought that any self respecting spy agency (West or East) would be doing this.
Seriously, one could just replace some PRC names with American names and orgs and write the same book.
Very repetitive, nil engrossing narrative arc (if an any arc at all)
Save your time
2 stars
August 19, 2023
The author has used open source material to expose how the MSS, Ministry of State Security (the Chinese CIA) spreads influence especially to scholars and thought leaders in the West. Much of this effort by MSS operators is only boarder line illegal. But it is almost always disingenuous and deceitful. The goal is to shape events to be favorable to China and often, unwittingly, at the expense of others.
December 1, 2023
Another book about how the Communist Chinese Party has spent enormously trying to influence the West by lying about what agencies in their government do. Much of this was a repeat of other similar books I have read like Hidden Hand, so it wasn't as eye opening.
Note: I listened to this on an Audio book, which I would not recommend, because, I felt, the speaker went to fast. This made it hard to keep up with all the people and organization names that were mentioned.
Note: I listened to this on an Audio book, which I would not recommend, because, I felt, the speaker went to fast. This made it hard to keep up with all the people and organization names that were mentioned.
January 7, 2024
Despite the somewhat silly title, this book by Alex Joske is an extraordinarily insightful work on the MSS and is an absolute must read for policy makers.
Zheng Bijian’s China reform Forum has fooled the world for too long and has unfortunately tricked two generations of political and economic elites into believing “China’s peaceful rise and its inevitable democratic reform”. The world has only just begun to wake up.
Zheng Bijian’s China reform Forum has fooled the world for too long and has unfortunately tricked two generations of political and economic elites into believing “China’s peaceful rise and its inevitable democratic reform”. The world has only just begun to wake up.
April 17, 2023
Inside look at China’s rise through the recently revealed depths of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS). The MSS’ influence has operated under the radar for years, hoodwinking an Australian PM, the US Congress, and numerous other people and agencies, according to this new book. The subtlety of methods borrows a page out of the slowly boiling frog in the pot analogy. Read this eye opening book and see what what you may have been missing in your China studies!
April 6, 2024
“Slowly but surely, the misguided assumptions and narratives that informed decades of engagement with China are being discarded,” and this book is an important contribution to that effort. Faster, please.
May 27, 2025
Good Read
I liked how the information was presented in an engaging way. The author's research was very thorough which helped me to understand the events leading to what was being talked about.
I liked how the information was presented in an engaging way. The author's research was very thorough which helped me to understand the events leading to what was being talked about.
July 16, 2025
3.5 stars. Pretty interesting account of China's intelligence activities in the United States, including schmoozing with the Democratic Party. Joske also offers suggestions for countering these activities.
October 26, 2025
Terrible. Joske makes little attempt to explain any details of what he was talking about; the assumed knowledge here is astronomical. Nothing he said gave any evidence of why we should care about this. So so bland.
might-read
November 5, 2022WSJ
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