I thoroughly enjoyed this, and found it arresting, stimulating and accessible. A rare combination! In some ways, it is a history of the Second World War, albeit one that takes a unique approach. More than that, it is a book about relationships - especially those between the 'big three' Allied leaders, and how those relationships shaped both the progress of the war and our subsequent understanding of it. Furthermore, it is a book about Joseph Stalin, whose shadow lies heavily on almost every page.
Rees begins by reminding us that the role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War was long "denied a proper place in our culture because it was easier than facing up to a variety of unpalatable truths. Did we, for example, really contribute to the terrible fate that in 1945 befell Poland, the very country we went to war to protect? Especially when we were taught that this was a war about confronting tyranny?" He then asks, even more pointedly, whether the actions of our two great heroes, Roosevelt and Churchill, contributed to large swathes of Eastern Europe remaining under tyranny for another forty-five years. Rees insightfully contends that the best way to start unpacking these questions is to focus on Stalin, and this immediately brings the moral ambiguity of Britain and the USA's position into sharp focus. Stalin was as happy working with the Nazis as the Western democracies, being solely motivated by self-interest. Rees comments that "The Soviet Communists and the German Nazis had a lot in common - not ideologically, of course, but in practical terms. Each of them respected the importance of raw power. And each of them despised the values that a man like Franklin Roosevelt held most dear, such as freedom of speech and the rule of law." Stalin never attained such mutual interest and understanding with either Churchill or Roosevelt, and disturbingly was at his most relaxed when carving up Europe with von Ribbentrop. As with many uncomfortable truths in the Soviet Union, these facts were publicly ignored and suppressed.
The fundamental nature of Stalinism was obvious from the outset, and the injustices and atrocities committed after the end of the war mirrored those already committed in Eastern Poland between 1939 and 1941. Both Churchill and Roosevelt knew exactly what kind of man, and what kind of regime, they were dealing with, as neither was enthusiastic about the forced alliance with Stalin. Churchill memorably described it as akin to a pact with the Devil. The need for this alliance is unquestionable, and equally clear is the fact no one was going to be able to change either Stalin or his regime. But as Rees points out, what is much less justifiable is the apparent change in heart displayed by both Churchill and Roosevelt as time went on, culminating in their, apparently, sincere statements after Yalta in February 1945 that Stalin, "meant well to the world" and was "reasonable and sensible." This sea change forms the meat of the book, and it is worth quoting Rees at length: "Roosevelt and Churchill were sophisticated politicians, and it is wrong to suppose that they were simply duped by Stalin. No, something altogether more interesting - and more complicated - takes place in this history. Roosevelt and Churchill wanted to win the war at the least possible cost to their own respective countries, in both human and financial terms. Keeping Stalin 'on-side', particularly during the years before D-Day when the Soviets believed they were fighting the war almost on their own, was a difficult business and required, as Roosevelt would have put it, 'careful handling'. As a result, behind closed doors, the Western leaders felt it necessary to make hard political compromises. One of them was to promote propaganda that painted a rosy picture of the Soviet leader; another was deliberately to suppress material that told the truth about both Stalin and the nature of the Soviet regime. In the process, the Western leaders might easily, for the sake of convenience, have felt they had to 'distort the normal and healthy operation of their intellectual and moral judgements' as one senior British diplomat was memorably to put it during the war."
The 'great man' view of history might be unpopular in academic circles, but it's hard not to see some validity in it when reading this. Rees does a great job of unpacking the characters of the main protagonists, especially Stalin and Roosevelt. Stalin was a terrifying individual, and it is striking how readily and unashamedly he resorted to straightforward brutality, even in front of the other Allied leaders. He was also a shrewd politician, and 'handled' Churchill and Roosevelt much more ably than they could manage him. I was reminded of a statement in Tim Bouverie's excellent book on appeasement, that Chamberlain had never encountered someone quite like Hitler during his political life. I think that also holds for Churchill and Roosevelt's interactions with Stalin. Embarrassingly, Churchill was to state explicitly that where Chamberlain had failed with Hitler, he would succeed with Stalin. Equally embarrassingly, Roosevelt convinced himself that he had established a connection with Stalin and could 'handle' him. The subject also tends to expose the less attractive aspects of Roosevelt's personality. While undoubtedly a great leader, he had an unfortunate tendency towards duplicity and outright dishonesty when it suited him. He constructed barriers of deniability between himself and any ideas he floated by using emissaries like Hopkins and Harriman, and had a habit of concealment, preferring to retain control of events by keeping others in the dark. As Rees concludes, "Stalin was practical, suspicious and looking for the advantage of the moment; Roosevelt presented an extraordinary mix of crafty, workaday politician and idealistic dreamer." Churchill's character isn't as filled out as the other two Allied leaders, which seems appropriate in the wider context of Britain, as decreasing in power and influence compared to the Soviet Union and USA. This became especially clear during the Tehran Conference, when, in the words of Lord Moran, "The PM is appalled by his own impotence."
While the book is primarily about the relationship between the three Allied leaders, Poland is an important member of the supporting cast, and one who appears on the stage at the most inconvenient moments. Soviet aggression in Poland was treated differently to German aggression, and the diplomatic traffic from the time indicates the reluctance to guarantee to the Poles that Britain aimed to recover all their territory. Partly pragmatic, this was also reflective of the fact that considering Poland's Eastern boundary as somewhat 'fluid' might be to Britain's advantage. This is significant "because the Second World War took on the mantle of an entirely 'moral' war, almost a modern-day crusade against evil...but from the first, behind the scenes there was a clear balance to be struck between 'morality' and traditional, old-fashioned, national self-interest."
Rees does a fine job of outlining all the main events (Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam, and so on) that are relevant to the developing relationship between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill. As none of those individual events is the focus of the book, none of them is considered in much detail. However, Rees has constructed a coherent narrative that enables the reader to understand the significance that each piece makes to the whole. The Atlantic Conference and the resulting Atlantic Charter only served to highlight the clash between the conflicting priorities of doing what is right and doing what is in our self-interest. As Rees memorably puts it, the Atlantic Charter represents nobility of ideal, while much of the relationship with Stalin was purely pragmatic politics. The Charter also represents the conflict evident within Roosevelt, between the practical and hard-headed politician and the internationalist-statesman visionary. In any case, the gulf between these stated ideals and the reality of Soviet conduct in Eastern Europe as the war went on was to be a source of intense embarrassment and discomfort to the Western democracies.
The Tehran conference, rather than Yalta, is convincingly pinpointed as the moment when the Allies determined the fate of post-war Europe, and the boundaries of Poland and Germany agreed there were largely those realised in 1945. This was utterly opposed to the views expressed, particularly by Churchill, only two years earlier. Partly this reflected the fact that the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe was a fait accompli, but also represented a stated change in attitude towards both the Soviet Union in general and Stalin in particular. We must conclude that both Roosevelt and Churchill were unwise and wrong in their approach. As Rees puts it passionately, "If Churchill had stated, in effect: 'We accept that the Soviet claims for Poland and other disputed territory such as the Baltic States are wrong - they are unjust - but there is no practical method of putting this right', that would have been the reality. But he felt he could not say that - this was, remember, a 'moral' war - and it was thought essential for the Allies to present a united front to the world to prevent their enemies gaining heart from public discord between them. So Churchill persuaded himself that Stalin and the Soviets had changed. He (and Roosevelt) leapt on any sign that Stalin was a person who kept his word and who wanted to deal cooperatively and honestly with the West to make a better post-war world."
On Yalta, Rees concludes that it was not the point at which "dirty deals were done as the war came to an end - dirty deals that brought dishonour to the otherwise noble enterprise of fighting the Nazis." The central issues and challenges related both to the rest of the war and the post-war world had already been discussed and resolved in principle at Tehran. Little was discussed at Yalta that was substantially new, but the conference did represent the final high point in the West's optimistic dealings with Stalin before new Cold War realities took hold. Churchill was especially aware of this, as Roosevelt was already dying (he would pass away two months later). Regarding Yalta itself, Churchill was not taken with it and amusingly referred to it as "the Riviera of Hades...if we had spent ten years on research, we could not have found a worse place in the world."
The military progress of the war is also weaved skilfully into the narrative, with the Soviet desire for a second front as a constant refrain. Another theme is the gradual strengthening of the Soviet position as they simultaneously pushed Germany westwards and grew in military ability and power. Interestingly, there is a contrast between Hitler and Stalin here as the former interfered more and more in military affairs, while the latter was on the opposite trajectory (which he made up for with a massive dose of paranoia at what his generals might be planning).
Rees raises some pointed questions on how Churchill and Roosevelt conducted themselves towards Stalin, asking, "What would Stalin have done if the Western Allies had kept to their original line and postponed any commitment on borders until the war was over?... Would he have thrown away all cooperation with Churchill and Roosevelt merely because they would not - without the consent of the Poles - agree to move the borders of the whole country? That is surely unlikely. But, it might be argued, what would have been the point in causing this angst when Stalin would shortly have possession of all this territory and could do what he liked anyway? There was never any serious chance of the West fighting the Red Army to get this land back. However, there is a clear difference between recognising that one country has occupied another country by force majeure and legitimising that occupation. Maybe it is naïve to expect politicians to stick to the principles they have freely signed up to - like those enshrined in the Atlantic Charter - but the corrosive cynicism that results when they don't is often worse." There is no better example of this cynicism than in Britain and the USA's treatment of the Poles. This was absolutely shameful, from the failure to fight their corner in discussions with Stalin, to the cover-up of Katyn, to the gradual sidelining of the Polish government in exile, to their eventual exclusion from the Victory Parade in London in 1946.
Rees concludes his book by asking whether the Western Allied leaders could have prevented Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe by acting differently during their partnership with Stalin. Practically, the only way to prevent this would have been to occupy this territory before the Red Army could do so - and the only way to that was to bring D-Day forward at least to 1943 or to enter into a partnership with a German government from which the Nazis had been removed. Neither of these scenarios seems feasible. Nevertheless, Rees is surely right to contend that "there was a middle way which might have been pursued politically during the war...which recognised the value of the Soviet Union as a fighting ally, but which reaffirmed the policy that, as Churchill put it in January 1942, the Western Allies adhered 'to those principles of freedom and democracy outlined in the Atlantic Charter and that these principles must become especially active whenever any question of transferring territory is raised.' Ultimately, this course of action might have accomplished little in practical terms. Perhaps Stalin would still have exercised control over much of Eastern Europe. But for sure, the Western Allies would at least have lived up to the principles that they said they were fighting the war to protect." This forces us to question the extent to which the Second World War was a 'moral' war. For sure, the Nazi regime was immoral beyond imagining, and the principles enshrined in the Atlantic Charter were noble. But adding the Soviet Union to the mix undoubtedly taints the actions of the Western leaders, many of whom turned out to be ignoble, even wrong and immoral, in themselves.
Laurence Rees has written an uncomfortable and thought-provoking book, and in reading it, I found myself repeatedly reflecting on the enduring power of the stories we would rather tell about ourselves, rather than seeking the truth. We need to stop seeing the Second World War merely as a 'moral' war but also as a more conventional one, where power politics and national self-interest were major factors. As Rees himself puts it, "The central popular myth that surrounds the war, a kind of Hollywood version of the history, is that this is a simple story of an alliance of good people who fought an alliance of bad people. It's an immensely consoling way of looking at the past, and it's sad to let it go. But let it go we must."