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Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India's Most Crushing Military Disaster
Himalayan Blunder: The Angry Truth About India’s Most Crushing Military Disaster is Brigadier J. P. Dalvi’s retelling of the Sino-Indian war that took place in 1962 - a war that India lost. Dalvi fought the war as the Commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade in NEFA (North-East Frontier Agency).
His account of the war is graphic and telling. He was captured by the Chinese forces and held for seven months. As a participant of the war, he was privy to all that went on at the battlefield as well as behind the scenes. Based on his firsthand experiences, he recounts the events that occurred between September 8, 1962 and October 20, 1962.
As early as 1951, China silently and steadily began to work its way onto Indian soil. Even in the face of indisputable evidence, India insisted on maintaining cordial relations with the Chinese. China seemed only too happy to play along.
Dalvi narrates the manner in which India’s own political leadership traitorously worked against its cause. In no uncertain terms, he holds three men responsible for India’s defeat - Jawaharlal Nehru, Krishna Menon, and General Brij Mohan Kaul.
Issuing orders from Delhi, they seemed to be clueless about the situation on the battlefield. Undoubtedly, when they were rushed into battle, the Indian soldiers - underfed, ill-equipped, and unprepared as they were - never stood a chance against the powerful Chinese army. Regardless of that, the soldiers fought bravely and laid down their lives for their homeland.
Dalvi claims that the apathy and the sheer ineptitude of those at the helm of India’s political affairs sacrificed hundreds of valuable lives. Brigadier Dalvi’s detailed narrative of the massacre of the Indian soldiers, a horror that he witnessed firsthand, is heart-rending.
The book was published in 1969. Among all the books based on the subject of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, this book is considered to be one the most striking and authentic versions. Due to its sensitive subject matter and its portrayal of India’s leaders in a harshly negative light, the book was banned by the Indian Government upon its release.
His account of the war is graphic and telling. He was captured by the Chinese forces and held for seven months. As a participant of the war, he was privy to all that went on at the battlefield as well as behind the scenes. Based on his firsthand experiences, he recounts the events that occurred between September 8, 1962 and October 20, 1962.
As early as 1951, China silently and steadily began to work its way onto Indian soil. Even in the face of indisputable evidence, India insisted on maintaining cordial relations with the Chinese. China seemed only too happy to play along.
Dalvi narrates the manner in which India’s own political leadership traitorously worked against its cause. In no uncertain terms, he holds three men responsible for India’s defeat - Jawaharlal Nehru, Krishna Menon, and General Brij Mohan Kaul.
Issuing orders from Delhi, they seemed to be clueless about the situation on the battlefield. Undoubtedly, when they were rushed into battle, the Indian soldiers - underfed, ill-equipped, and unprepared as they were - never stood a chance against the powerful Chinese army. Regardless of that, the soldiers fought bravely and laid down their lives for their homeland.
Dalvi claims that the apathy and the sheer ineptitude of those at the helm of India’s political affairs sacrificed hundreds of valuable lives. Brigadier Dalvi’s detailed narrative of the massacre of the Indian soldiers, a horror that he witnessed firsthand, is heart-rending.
The book was published in 1969. Among all the books based on the subject of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, this book is considered to be one the most striking and authentic versions. Due to its sensitive subject matter and its portrayal of India’s leaders in a harshly negative light, the book was banned by the Indian Government upon its release.
506 pages, Hardcover
First published March 31, 1969
201 people are currently reading
3813 people want to read
About the author
J.P. Dalvi
2 books13 followersBrigadier John Parashram Dalvi was an Indian Army officer. During the Sino-Indian War of 1962, he was the commander of the Indian 7th Brigade, which was destroyed, leading Dalvi to be captured by the People's Liberation Army on 22 October 1962.
Dalvi was commissioned into the Baluch Regiment. To the end of World War II he served with the regiment's 5th Battalion. He took part in Field Marshal Sir William Slim's pursuit of Japanese Army. From October 1944 to March 1945 he saw fighting with 19th Indian Division notably at the Crossing of the Irrawaddy. For his services he was mentioned in despatches for gallant and distinguished service.
In 1945 he was selected to join the staff of General Sir Montagu Stopford, GOC XXXIII Corps and later GOC-in-C of 12th Army Burma
In 1947 he was posted as instructor to Indian Military Academy, Dehradun. He was then moved to 5 Gorkha Rifles as 2nd in command. In 1949 Dalvi was attached with Brigade of the Guards. In 1950, he was selected for Staff College, which he graduated in 1951. He then commanded the 4th Battalion, Brigade of the Guards and later 2nd Guards.
In October 1960 he was given an accelerated promotion to be appointed as Brigadier Administration to XV Corps. In January 1962, he was given the Command on 7th Infantry Brigade in NEFA and fought in the Sino-Indian War. He was taken Prisoner of War on 22 October 1962 and was repatriated in May 1963.
On his return to India, he authored a book about the 1962 war, titled The Himalayan Blunder: The curtain raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The book was banned in Indian almost immediately on its release, but this ban was later lifted. His book is in direct contradiction with the book authored by his erstwhile commanding officer, Brij Mohan Kaul. In his book Brig. Dalvi bitterly described about his return to India:
We landed in Dum Dum airport in Calcutta on May 4, 1963. We were received cordially, appropriately. But the silence there was disquieting. I realized later. We had to prove we weren't brainwashed by Chinese ideology. We had to prove we were still loyal to India. My own army maintained a suspicious distance. The irony cannot be harsher: this treatment from a country, which for more than a decade had brainwashed itself into holding the Chinese baton wherever it went.
He died of cancer in 1980.
Dalvi was commissioned into the Baluch Regiment. To the end of World War II he served with the regiment's 5th Battalion. He took part in Field Marshal Sir William Slim's pursuit of Japanese Army. From October 1944 to March 1945 he saw fighting with 19th Indian Division notably at the Crossing of the Irrawaddy. For his services he was mentioned in despatches for gallant and distinguished service.
In 1945 he was selected to join the staff of General Sir Montagu Stopford, GOC XXXIII Corps and later GOC-in-C of 12th Army Burma
In 1947 he was posted as instructor to Indian Military Academy, Dehradun. He was then moved to 5 Gorkha Rifles as 2nd in command. In 1949 Dalvi was attached with Brigade of the Guards. In 1950, he was selected for Staff College, which he graduated in 1951. He then commanded the 4th Battalion, Brigade of the Guards and later 2nd Guards.
In October 1960 he was given an accelerated promotion to be appointed as Brigadier Administration to XV Corps. In January 1962, he was given the Command on 7th Infantry Brigade in NEFA and fought in the Sino-Indian War. He was taken Prisoner of War on 22 October 1962 and was repatriated in May 1963.
On his return to India, he authored a book about the 1962 war, titled The Himalayan Blunder: The curtain raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The book was banned in Indian almost immediately on its release, but this ban was later lifted. His book is in direct contradiction with the book authored by his erstwhile commanding officer, Brij Mohan Kaul. In his book Brig. Dalvi bitterly described about his return to India:
We landed in Dum Dum airport in Calcutta on May 4, 1963. We were received cordially, appropriately. But the silence there was disquieting. I realized later. We had to prove we weren't brainwashed by Chinese ideology. We had to prove we were still loyal to India. My own army maintained a suspicious distance. The irony cannot be harsher: this treatment from a country, which for more than a decade had brainwashed itself into holding the Chinese baton wherever it went.
He died of cancer in 1980.
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December 4, 2013
Just finished "Himalayan Blunders" written by Brigadier John Dalvi. It was my first book on Indo-Sino War and I am thankful for orkut Non-Fiction community to suggest me for reading this book. Book was banned as soon as it got published and I know the reason after reading it. John was in charge of 7th Brigade who took the responsibility of Handling the Chinese crisis along the Tibetan border. The book is full of agony , frustration and anger which author experienced during those days.
He coined a term "Non - Violence war" given by the civil authority to him. "Higher Authority" which includes Prime Minister (Nehru) , Defence Minister (Menon) and General (Kaul) where the deciding one for the war. The book is divided into various part :
1. This part shows the Chinese aggression along the border of NEFA and Ladhak and how Nehru dismissed it as just a regular petrol done by Chinese. He carried along with the path of brotherhood and thus did some blundering mistakes like allowing senior generals from china to see all the establishment of Army along the NEFA. He also overlooked the requirement of Army for the arms and ammunition which lead army to use World War II arms against the Chinese. Kaul and Menon also overlooked the basic requirement which is needed to develop a strong front by India against China. Better roads , good clothing , arms and ammunition , better communication and co-ordination.
2. As Chinese were growing strong on NEFA front building better roads , better communication India were still in hope that Chinese will not attack India and thus Nehru pointed basic requirement as un necessary expenditure on part of Army. John further adds how Chinese slowly and slowly created a better fighting position and how Army were helpless despite of being sending continuous reminder to Higher Authority. In this part he also adds how Army generals were promoted to serve the interest of Nehru and Menon thus leaving a disarray in Army. Finally they were told to shift there bases from Punjab and Agra to NEFA as Chinese strike First on 15th sept. During 15th Sept and Till 10th Oct (day when Chinese finally attacked) there were no clear thoughts and chain of command. Nehru was on long trip to foreign land , Desai accompanying him , Menon was in New York and Kaul holidaying in Jammu. 7th Brigade was created during this period comprising of Rajputs , Sikhs and Punjabi's who had no knowledge of High altitude and Mountains. Gorkhas and Assam Regiment were ignored. 7th Brigade were told to shift there bases on Altitude which ranged from 10000 to 15000 Feet with no Roads and clothing they were just like a Police along the Border. For moving 2 Miles only it took days and every solider were supplied with a 40 Rounds of ammunition and basic clothing. There were no boots , gloves , kerosene , foods and medicine.
3. As they set up there bases along the borders, John quickly analyzed the preparation of Chinese and how they are planing a massive strike. He took a note of around 20,000 soldiers supported by good artillery and mortar regiment. He continuously sent a reminder about the poor preparation of Army against Chinese which felt on deaf people , he also added that it would be crime and murder of soldier to make them fight against this mighty Chinese. But Nehru and Menon insists that Chinese would not do anything and thus they should keep there present positions. Among all problems a major one was to keep Army in there present status by providing food , clothing , arms and shelter, which Civil authority ignored and thus keeping a 3000 soldiers in good condition was a challenge for John. He accounted that Air Force did very little to help the army and chosen dropping zone of Air Force took 2 3 days for them to collect things. The things dropped were of no use as only 20% of them could be collected and rest get lost in those chilling and windy conditions. John , recounted how Army was ignored and soldiers suffered pathetic condition with Brave Hearts.
4. After 10th October 1962 , everything changed Chinese finally attacked and killed Indian Soldiers who were short of Ammunition and communication. John , took some examples of the bravery shown by Sikhs , rajputs and Gorkhas. Along a Tsangle pass only 100 Rajputs controlled 2000 Chinese and made them run for there money , after 5th Attempt Chinese were able to overcome them as Rajputs were left with no ammunition to fight. Same were the story of Gorkhas and Sikhs who fought with waves of thousands of Chinese who attacked there post. One Chinese General Quoted after the War "Indian Army Need everything , Except Courage" ....
5. In Final chapter John , pin pointed the mistake done by Generals and Politicians who were responsible for the Death of some 2000 Soldiers along the Indo - Sino border. He also accounted that People of India were so ignorant about the tragedy and till now no one is blamed for this grave defeat which costs us loosing some 1200 miles of land to Chinese. He cited the example of random orders and poor infrastructure which could have been improved and arrogance of Nehru Menon made this defeat more painful. There were around 4 lakh soldiers in India and that point but only 3000 were trusted to defeat Chinese.
After "Love Story" this book made me cry with the plight of Army and condition in which our soldiers defended the border with all courage and bravery. It needs to be above Profession and Career to do something like this which we can only imagine. Wonder what takes these soldiers to give there life and protect us , as John summed up " The thought of Mother Nation, kept these Soldiers alive and fight"....
"Just a Plain Salute" .... Jai Hind
He coined a term "Non - Violence war" given by the civil authority to him. "Higher Authority" which includes Prime Minister (Nehru) , Defence Minister (Menon) and General (Kaul) where the deciding one for the war. The book is divided into various part :
1. This part shows the Chinese aggression along the border of NEFA and Ladhak and how Nehru dismissed it as just a regular petrol done by Chinese. He carried along with the path of brotherhood and thus did some blundering mistakes like allowing senior generals from china to see all the establishment of Army along the NEFA. He also overlooked the requirement of Army for the arms and ammunition which lead army to use World War II arms against the Chinese. Kaul and Menon also overlooked the basic requirement which is needed to develop a strong front by India against China. Better roads , good clothing , arms and ammunition , better communication and co-ordination.
2. As Chinese were growing strong on NEFA front building better roads , better communication India were still in hope that Chinese will not attack India and thus Nehru pointed basic requirement as un necessary expenditure on part of Army. John further adds how Chinese slowly and slowly created a better fighting position and how Army were helpless despite of being sending continuous reminder to Higher Authority. In this part he also adds how Army generals were promoted to serve the interest of Nehru and Menon thus leaving a disarray in Army. Finally they were told to shift there bases from Punjab and Agra to NEFA as Chinese strike First on 15th sept. During 15th Sept and Till 10th Oct (day when Chinese finally attacked) there were no clear thoughts and chain of command. Nehru was on long trip to foreign land , Desai accompanying him , Menon was in New York and Kaul holidaying in Jammu. 7th Brigade was created during this period comprising of Rajputs , Sikhs and Punjabi's who had no knowledge of High altitude and Mountains. Gorkhas and Assam Regiment were ignored. 7th Brigade were told to shift there bases on Altitude which ranged from 10000 to 15000 Feet with no Roads and clothing they were just like a Police along the Border. For moving 2 Miles only it took days and every solider were supplied with a 40 Rounds of ammunition and basic clothing. There were no boots , gloves , kerosene , foods and medicine.
3. As they set up there bases along the borders, John quickly analyzed the preparation of Chinese and how they are planing a massive strike. He took a note of around 20,000 soldiers supported by good artillery and mortar regiment. He continuously sent a reminder about the poor preparation of Army against Chinese which felt on deaf people , he also added that it would be crime and murder of soldier to make them fight against this mighty Chinese. But Nehru and Menon insists that Chinese would not do anything and thus they should keep there present positions. Among all problems a major one was to keep Army in there present status by providing food , clothing , arms and shelter, which Civil authority ignored and thus keeping a 3000 soldiers in good condition was a challenge for John. He accounted that Air Force did very little to help the army and chosen dropping zone of Air Force took 2 3 days for them to collect things. The things dropped were of no use as only 20% of them could be collected and rest get lost in those chilling and windy conditions. John , recounted how Army was ignored and soldiers suffered pathetic condition with Brave Hearts.
4. After 10th October 1962 , everything changed Chinese finally attacked and killed Indian Soldiers who were short of Ammunition and communication. John , took some examples of the bravery shown by Sikhs , rajputs and Gorkhas. Along a Tsangle pass only 100 Rajputs controlled 2000 Chinese and made them run for there money , after 5th Attempt Chinese were able to overcome them as Rajputs were left with no ammunition to fight. Same were the story of Gorkhas and Sikhs who fought with waves of thousands of Chinese who attacked there post. One Chinese General Quoted after the War "Indian Army Need everything , Except Courage" ....
5. In Final chapter John , pin pointed the mistake done by Generals and Politicians who were responsible for the Death of some 2000 Soldiers along the Indo - Sino border. He also accounted that People of India were so ignorant about the tragedy and till now no one is blamed for this grave defeat which costs us loosing some 1200 miles of land to Chinese. He cited the example of random orders and poor infrastructure which could have been improved and arrogance of Nehru Menon made this defeat more painful. There were around 4 lakh soldiers in India and that point but only 3000 were trusted to defeat Chinese.
After "Love Story" this book made me cry with the plight of Army and condition in which our soldiers defended the border with all courage and bravery. It needs to be above Profession and Career to do something like this which we can only imagine. Wonder what takes these soldiers to give there life and protect us , as John summed up " The thought of Mother Nation, kept these Soldiers alive and fight"....
"Just a Plain Salute" .... Jai Hind
April 27, 2022
When my father read this book, he was shocked! His views on Nehru's leadership completely changed when he got to know the reality. As rightly pointed out by a reviewer, the presentation of the content is not in the best order and it might not be a perfect book per se, the book stands as one of the major first-hand accounts of the Indo-Sino war. The author has narrated his personal experiences, acts and that of his brave soldier colleagues, counterparts and also the political leadership of India. The author is direct in his accusations and he provides arguments and evidence in the defence of his claims. A good book that explains why and how India lost the war in 1962.
June 19, 2020
“Don’t worry, Sir, despite the Chinese superiority, the Rajputs will not let you or the country down. We will fight till we have nothing more to fight with. If you get back, please see that the culprits who landed us in this mess get their punishment”, last words of Lt. Col. Rikh on the night before D-day.
This is not just a book, but a magnum opus on the Sino-Indian clash of 1962. The episodes unfold like a thriller movie.
Even a village headman’s daughter’s wedding is better planned and in order than the Sino-Indian clash of 1962. It was the Govt as well as the higher order of the army which was mainly responsible for the embarrassment of India. The reckless decisions taken by the-then Govt ignoring the recommendations of the army and frontline warriors are unbelievable even to an ordinary mind. It’s absolutely unimaginable as to how the soldiers were sacrificed in cold blood!
In the terrain of the mighty Himalayan foothills where the average height is around 15,000 ft, our soldiers fought without food, with only pocket ammunitions, without a place to take cover, without snow clothing, without snow boots and without any kind of support. For about a week the army witnessed the build up of Chinese armies and given their own conditions the Jawans knew that their fate was sealed. Even then they didn’t back down. The author, being the only commanding officer, had to helplessly watch his entire brigade of Rajputs, Bengalees, Punjabis, Gorkhas getting killed in action.
We all might have had some idea on the war of 1962 but this particular narrative comes straight from the horse’s mouth, who was the only senior officer to be present in the frontline right from the beginning till he was taken as a PoW. A man of unquestionable integrity, the only affiliation he had was to the country and not government.
This book is also a reflection of how clear, logical and sharp the mind of a soldier usually is. Equipped with a razor sharp memory and lucid language, the author narrates the entire history till the show down. A soldier is known to always adhere to his code of conduct. So readers can imagine what must have this soldier faced when he addresses the leaders of the nation directly with first names without any salutation.
The book doesn’t only focus on the war preparations (if that can at all be called a preparation) but gives a detailed account from the independence days to the annexation of Tibet; from being the only nation apart from Russia to champion China’s cause in the world theatre, to the formulation of “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai” policy.
The path of India was doomed since 15th August 1947. The clash off of 1962 was a wake-up call for the country. Had there not been a 1962, it is scary to imagine what would have happened in 1965.
This book is HIGHLY recommended. Even those without any political knowledge on this issue would find it easy to comprehend the entire scene.
India is still paying the price of negligence of it’s own the-then leaders.
This is not just a book, but a magnum opus on the Sino-Indian clash of 1962. The episodes unfold like a thriller movie.
Even a village headman’s daughter’s wedding is better planned and in order than the Sino-Indian clash of 1962. It was the Govt as well as the higher order of the army which was mainly responsible for the embarrassment of India. The reckless decisions taken by the-then Govt ignoring the recommendations of the army and frontline warriors are unbelievable even to an ordinary mind. It’s absolutely unimaginable as to how the soldiers were sacrificed in cold blood!
In the terrain of the mighty Himalayan foothills where the average height is around 15,000 ft, our soldiers fought without food, with only pocket ammunitions, without a place to take cover, without snow clothing, without snow boots and without any kind of support. For about a week the army witnessed the build up of Chinese armies and given their own conditions the Jawans knew that their fate was sealed. Even then they didn’t back down. The author, being the only commanding officer, had to helplessly watch his entire brigade of Rajputs, Bengalees, Punjabis, Gorkhas getting killed in action.
We all might have had some idea on the war of 1962 but this particular narrative comes straight from the horse’s mouth, who was the only senior officer to be present in the frontline right from the beginning till he was taken as a PoW. A man of unquestionable integrity, the only affiliation he had was to the country and not government.
This book is also a reflection of how clear, logical and sharp the mind of a soldier usually is. Equipped with a razor sharp memory and lucid language, the author narrates the entire history till the show down. A soldier is known to always adhere to his code of conduct. So readers can imagine what must have this soldier faced when he addresses the leaders of the nation directly with first names without any salutation.
The book doesn’t only focus on the war preparations (if that can at all be called a preparation) but gives a detailed account from the independence days to the annexation of Tibet; from being the only nation apart from Russia to champion China’s cause in the world theatre, to the formulation of “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai” policy.
The path of India was doomed since 15th August 1947. The clash off of 1962 was a wake-up call for the country. Had there not been a 1962, it is scary to imagine what would have happened in 1965.
This book is HIGHLY recommended. Even those without any political knowledge on this issue would find it easy to comprehend the entire scene.
India is still paying the price of negligence of it’s own the-then leaders.
February 5, 2010
A must read for all! Readers can understand the hidden politics of the politicians and the horrible life of the soldiers at the Himalayan border.
Every politician must read this book to know what he/she should not do.
After reading this, my impression of Nehru changed to a great extent! People should have changed their mind set slowly after the release of this book. But even today, many projects are being named after him! That is the great irony.
Every politician must read this book to know what he/she should not do.
After reading this, my impression of Nehru changed to a great extent! People should have changed their mind set slowly after the release of this book. But even today, many projects are being named after him! That is the great irony.
August 20, 2020
When I started on this book, I was harkened back to the autumn of 1991, when as a young Captain in the Army Medical Corps I had trudged from Gorsum (at the foot of the Lumpo- Hathungla complex) up to the Lumpo Garrison. That climb took me about 2 hours, which even though wasn't too back-breaking, was still a challenge for a guy uninitiated to the majestic and rugged heights of the mighty Eastern Himalayas. Reading the Himalayan Blunder, I can only empathize with the brave hearts of the Indian Army when they were forcibly set up before the marauding Chinese Army, literally as cannon fodder by inept political masters, an unforgiving and ill-informed public opinion, a shrill media and a pliant military leadership who failed miserably in giving a proper higher direction of war.
Under the stewardship of Prime Minister Nehru, who was aspiring to be a world leader and a statesman of repute, the Indian Government was more inclined towards projecting itself as a holier-than-thou entity through the practice of the since failed ideology of the Non-Aligned Movement. Dalvi does not mince words when he describes the flawed policies of the Congress Government of that time when they acted naïve about the Chinese and blindly trusted their offer of friendship. As early as the late '50s the Chinese had started flexing their muscles which started with the annexation of Tibet. Without the buffer of Tibet being there, the North East was a virtual walkthrough for the PLA. The occupation of large areas of Aksai Chin by the Chinese and the subsequent fatal skirmishes at Galwan should have alerted the Indian Government. This sadly did not happen. Moreover, there was all-round neglect as far as the development of infrastructure in the North East was concerned with almost nonexistent roads in that foreboding terrain. Since Independence there was a neglect of the Indian Armed Forces, so much so that the personal weapon of an Infantry soldier of the Indian Army was the bolt action, First World War vintage Lee- Enfield Rifle!!! The soldiers were neither trained for nor equipped for fighting in the tough high-altitude terrain of the Himalayas.
After a succession of less than competent Defense Ministers that India had after Independence, it was the turn of Mr V K Krishna Menon to take over the mantle. Dalvi says that Mr Menon's helming the Ministry was widely welcomed by the Army, who saw in him a Western-educated, sophisticated and articulate individual who they hoped would understand the requirements of the Services and turn the Military around. But alas, that was not to be. Menon turned out to be a protégé of Nehru and he was more interested in dealing with Foreign Affairs as compared to dealing with the requirements of the Armed Forces and planning for the future of the Defense of the Nation. Invariably there was all-round neglect of the security of the country which would prove to be very costly for the Armed Forces and the country at large. Menon, it turned out was a very impetuous man, who could not carry the Military top brass along. Neither did he have the good sense to accept the professional inputs being given by the top military hierarchy who were much better informed on matters about the tactical manoeuvres and the deployment of the Armed Forces. The principle of Civilian supremacy over the defence forces was carried a bit too far, wherein the political and the civilian dispensation in the Ministry of Defense called all the shots about all matters Military. The unfortunate part was that the top military hierarchy too did not have the moral courage to stand up to the shenanigans of the ill-informed civilian bureaucracy, which sadly contributed to the debacle of 1962 in no small way.
The flagrant interference of the Government in Military matters was carried to such an extent that there was widespread lobbying for promotions of Officers to the senior ranks. This invariably led to less competent officers being placed in sensitive command appointments where they could not do full justice to their operational duties. General Brij Mohan Kaul was a favourite of Nehru who was thrust upon the beleaguered 7 Brigade in the Thagla area right in the midst of the hostilities. It must have been one of those rare occasions in Military History wherein a General officer was prancing about in the frontlines right in front of the enemy!!
Brig John Dalvi was appointed the commander of 7 Brigade in early 1962. The brigade was tasked with the unenviable task of defending an almost 300 km frontage in the inhospitable and rugged terrain ahead of Tawang (this town is in the West Kameng district of the present-day Arunachal Pradesh) The Chinese were making ominous moves in Tibet, close to the undefined and disputed LAC, right from 1959 onwards. Unfortunately, neither the political bosses in Delhi nor the Army took these ominous signs seriously. Nehru was probably lulled into a kind of soporific state of inaction by the display of bonhomie and the promise put forth by Chou-en-Lai that the Chinese had no interest in invading India. But all the while China was building up her infrastructure right up to the Indian border in Tibet. They were amassing well-trained troops and advanced war-like military stores, while the Indians were twiddling their thumbs until it was too late. It was on 8 Sep 1962 that the Chinese made their first move in the Thagla ridge area. They laid claim to the Dhola post. The Indians considered the Thagla ridge-line to be the LAC whereas the Chinese interpreted the LAC as being along the watershed formed by the NamkaChu river which flowed along the foot of the Thagla massif in a West to East direction. The Chinese came over the Thagla ridge and made themselves comfortable on the northern bank of the NamkaChu river.
At this point, the 7 Brigade did not have a full complement of its troops. They were moved post-haste from Misammari (which is in Assam and almost 600 km away) to the area where the Chinese had ingressed. It is essential to mention here that there were no proper roads in the sector and it took almost 2 weeks for the Brigade to fetch up. A large part of the move had to be done on foot, with the soldiers lugging their weapons, stores and other administrative loads on their backs. This sordid state of affairs was compounded by the fact that the average altitude of the various localities in this sector was in the vicinity of more than 12000 feet above sea level. It is particularly hazardous for troops to operate in such inhospitable terrain and high altitudes without proper acclimatization. The ill-fated troops were moved from the plains without proper winter clothing into the bone-chilling cold of the mighty Himalayas. Even before the Chinese could inflict any casualty on the hapless Indian soldiers, a large number of them fell prey to the biting cold and respiratory illnesses caused due to the sudden exposure to the rarefied atmosphere in the high altitude areas.
The Chinese had almost 2 Divisions of Army (almost 20,000 troops) ranged on the Thagla massif against a force of less than 1000 Indian Infantrymen who were on the south bank of the NamkaChu. It is in this hopeless situation where the political dispensation and higher command of the Army failed the Indian soldier. It was obvious that the Indians stood no chance of putting up a meaningful resistance to the massive buildup of the Chinese Army who was arrayed against them. This was conveyed in no uncertain terms to the higher command of the Army who in turn was supposed to have conveyed it to the political dispensation. Nehru along with Menon took an unbending stance that the Chinese have to be evicted from the Thagla feature post-haste. The representation that the Brigade did not have the wherewithal to carry out this task fell on deaf ears. What is more, they insisted that Indian soldiers move to the north bank of the river. The local commanders including Brig Dalvi had to accede to this order against their better judgement. The Chinese were waiting for just this kind of an opportunity to use it as a fig leaf of an excuse. They responded with a massive full-on attack against the beleaguered Brigade on the early morning of 20 Oct 1969. It was a massacre of the Indian soldiers that happened in those killing fields. Scores of Indian soldiers including Brig Dalvi were taken prisoners of War.
The tragedy of the whole situation was that neither political masters nor the Army top Brass provided a level playing field for the humble Indian soldier to put up even a nominal resistance. It was like sacrificing a whole brigade of troops at the altar of sheer ineptitude and lack of foresight of the powers that be.
It was in the fitness of things that neither Nehru nor Mr Menon recovered from the ignominy of 1962. This book by Dalvi was initially published in 1969 when it was understandably banned by the Indian Government. Naturally, the Congress dispensation at that time could not stomach the bitter truth of the true nature of Nehru, who was till the '62 debacle considered to be an indestructible force in Indian politics. The '62 debacle shattered the carefully nurtured image of Nehru and more of his follies that beleaguer India to this day keep getting exposed even now. Dalvi says that it was important that he penned this book because he wanted the nation to know the truth. It is only through such exposes that we learn the mistakes that we have made and hopefully try not to repeat them in future.
This book has a special place in my heart- mainly because I empathize with my brothers-in-arms who underwent the avoidable ordeal in the autumn of '62. Moreover, I have served in the same locales that are described in the book. I have seen how difficult terrain it is. Even when I had visited the area in 1991, the communication in terms of roads and telephone connections were so bad. I dread to even imagine the situation that must have prevailed in 1962 when the conditions must have been even more primitive and harsh. The fight put up by the brave Indian soldier even in the face of such insurmountable difficulties and odds is mind-boggling, to say the least. One can only shed a tear and offer a prayer for those magnificent souls who sacrificed their lives even in a situation where an ungrateful nation forced them to fight with their hands tied to their backs.
This book is a must-read for all Indians. We need to know how we and our brave soldiers were let down by the people whom we had placed on high pedestals. Awareness of the follies of the past is essential to make sure that we as a Nation do not once again end up in similar sordid situations.
Under the stewardship of Prime Minister Nehru, who was aspiring to be a world leader and a statesman of repute, the Indian Government was more inclined towards projecting itself as a holier-than-thou entity through the practice of the since failed ideology of the Non-Aligned Movement. Dalvi does not mince words when he describes the flawed policies of the Congress Government of that time when they acted naïve about the Chinese and blindly trusted their offer of friendship. As early as the late '50s the Chinese had started flexing their muscles which started with the annexation of Tibet. Without the buffer of Tibet being there, the North East was a virtual walkthrough for the PLA. The occupation of large areas of Aksai Chin by the Chinese and the subsequent fatal skirmishes at Galwan should have alerted the Indian Government. This sadly did not happen. Moreover, there was all-round neglect as far as the development of infrastructure in the North East was concerned with almost nonexistent roads in that foreboding terrain. Since Independence there was a neglect of the Indian Armed Forces, so much so that the personal weapon of an Infantry soldier of the Indian Army was the bolt action, First World War vintage Lee- Enfield Rifle!!! The soldiers were neither trained for nor equipped for fighting in the tough high-altitude terrain of the Himalayas.
After a succession of less than competent Defense Ministers that India had after Independence, it was the turn of Mr V K Krishna Menon to take over the mantle. Dalvi says that Mr Menon's helming the Ministry was widely welcomed by the Army, who saw in him a Western-educated, sophisticated and articulate individual who they hoped would understand the requirements of the Services and turn the Military around. But alas, that was not to be. Menon turned out to be a protégé of Nehru and he was more interested in dealing with Foreign Affairs as compared to dealing with the requirements of the Armed Forces and planning for the future of the Defense of the Nation. Invariably there was all-round neglect of the security of the country which would prove to be very costly for the Armed Forces and the country at large. Menon, it turned out was a very impetuous man, who could not carry the Military top brass along. Neither did he have the good sense to accept the professional inputs being given by the top military hierarchy who were much better informed on matters about the tactical manoeuvres and the deployment of the Armed Forces. The principle of Civilian supremacy over the defence forces was carried a bit too far, wherein the political and the civilian dispensation in the Ministry of Defense called all the shots about all matters Military. The unfortunate part was that the top military hierarchy too did not have the moral courage to stand up to the shenanigans of the ill-informed civilian bureaucracy, which sadly contributed to the debacle of 1962 in no small way.
The flagrant interference of the Government in Military matters was carried to such an extent that there was widespread lobbying for promotions of Officers to the senior ranks. This invariably led to less competent officers being placed in sensitive command appointments where they could not do full justice to their operational duties. General Brij Mohan Kaul was a favourite of Nehru who was thrust upon the beleaguered 7 Brigade in the Thagla area right in the midst of the hostilities. It must have been one of those rare occasions in Military History wherein a General officer was prancing about in the frontlines right in front of the enemy!!
Brig John Dalvi was appointed the commander of 7 Brigade in early 1962. The brigade was tasked with the unenviable task of defending an almost 300 km frontage in the inhospitable and rugged terrain ahead of Tawang (this town is in the West Kameng district of the present-day Arunachal Pradesh) The Chinese were making ominous moves in Tibet, close to the undefined and disputed LAC, right from 1959 onwards. Unfortunately, neither the political bosses in Delhi nor the Army took these ominous signs seriously. Nehru was probably lulled into a kind of soporific state of inaction by the display of bonhomie and the promise put forth by Chou-en-Lai that the Chinese had no interest in invading India. But all the while China was building up her infrastructure right up to the Indian border in Tibet. They were amassing well-trained troops and advanced war-like military stores, while the Indians were twiddling their thumbs until it was too late. It was on 8 Sep 1962 that the Chinese made their first move in the Thagla ridge area. They laid claim to the Dhola post. The Indians considered the Thagla ridge-line to be the LAC whereas the Chinese interpreted the LAC as being along the watershed formed by the NamkaChu river which flowed along the foot of the Thagla massif in a West to East direction. The Chinese came over the Thagla ridge and made themselves comfortable on the northern bank of the NamkaChu river.
At this point, the 7 Brigade did not have a full complement of its troops. They were moved post-haste from Misammari (which is in Assam and almost 600 km away) to the area where the Chinese had ingressed. It is essential to mention here that there were no proper roads in the sector and it took almost 2 weeks for the Brigade to fetch up. A large part of the move had to be done on foot, with the soldiers lugging their weapons, stores and other administrative loads on their backs. This sordid state of affairs was compounded by the fact that the average altitude of the various localities in this sector was in the vicinity of more than 12000 feet above sea level. It is particularly hazardous for troops to operate in such inhospitable terrain and high altitudes without proper acclimatization. The ill-fated troops were moved from the plains without proper winter clothing into the bone-chilling cold of the mighty Himalayas. Even before the Chinese could inflict any casualty on the hapless Indian soldiers, a large number of them fell prey to the biting cold and respiratory illnesses caused due to the sudden exposure to the rarefied atmosphere in the high altitude areas.
The Chinese had almost 2 Divisions of Army (almost 20,000 troops) ranged on the Thagla massif against a force of less than 1000 Indian Infantrymen who were on the south bank of the NamkaChu. It is in this hopeless situation where the political dispensation and higher command of the Army failed the Indian soldier. It was obvious that the Indians stood no chance of putting up a meaningful resistance to the massive buildup of the Chinese Army who was arrayed against them. This was conveyed in no uncertain terms to the higher command of the Army who in turn was supposed to have conveyed it to the political dispensation. Nehru along with Menon took an unbending stance that the Chinese have to be evicted from the Thagla feature post-haste. The representation that the Brigade did not have the wherewithal to carry out this task fell on deaf ears. What is more, they insisted that Indian soldiers move to the north bank of the river. The local commanders including Brig Dalvi had to accede to this order against their better judgement. The Chinese were waiting for just this kind of an opportunity to use it as a fig leaf of an excuse. They responded with a massive full-on attack against the beleaguered Brigade on the early morning of 20 Oct 1969. It was a massacre of the Indian soldiers that happened in those killing fields. Scores of Indian soldiers including Brig Dalvi were taken prisoners of War.
The tragedy of the whole situation was that neither political masters nor the Army top Brass provided a level playing field for the humble Indian soldier to put up even a nominal resistance. It was like sacrificing a whole brigade of troops at the altar of sheer ineptitude and lack of foresight of the powers that be.
It was in the fitness of things that neither Nehru nor Mr Menon recovered from the ignominy of 1962. This book by Dalvi was initially published in 1969 when it was understandably banned by the Indian Government. Naturally, the Congress dispensation at that time could not stomach the bitter truth of the true nature of Nehru, who was till the '62 debacle considered to be an indestructible force in Indian politics. The '62 debacle shattered the carefully nurtured image of Nehru and more of his follies that beleaguer India to this day keep getting exposed even now. Dalvi says that it was important that he penned this book because he wanted the nation to know the truth. It is only through such exposes that we learn the mistakes that we have made and hopefully try not to repeat them in future.
This book has a special place in my heart- mainly because I empathize with my brothers-in-arms who underwent the avoidable ordeal in the autumn of '62. Moreover, I have served in the same locales that are described in the book. I have seen how difficult terrain it is. Even when I had visited the area in 1991, the communication in terms of roads and telephone connections were so bad. I dread to even imagine the situation that must have prevailed in 1962 when the conditions must have been even more primitive and harsh. The fight put up by the brave Indian soldier even in the face of such insurmountable difficulties and odds is mind-boggling, to say the least. One can only shed a tear and offer a prayer for those magnificent souls who sacrificed their lives even in a situation where an ungrateful nation forced them to fight with their hands tied to their backs.
This book is a must-read for all Indians. We need to know how we and our brave soldiers were let down by the people whom we had placed on high pedestals. Awareness of the follies of the past is essential to make sure that we as a Nation do not once again end up in similar sordid situations.
February 15, 2014
Just sample the following rules of engagement
(a) Persuade them to leave Indian territory
(b) If Chinese do not comply, dig-in opposite to them to scare them from attempting further incursion
(c) Fire is permitted only in self-defense and that too with minimum force
These were the orders to 7th infantry brigade from the higher command to counter the heavily armed, well administered, well prepared Chinese incursion in the Namka Chu valley of Thagla region of NEFA. The orders spelled total annihilation to the loosely held and massively under strength Indian formations which lacked even the basic high altitude clothing. The orders taken by a pacifist Prime Minister, an arrogant Defence Minister and a politically connected General caused the rout of a proud Brigade with many of its men dying like animals in a cage.
Himalayan blunder is lucid blow by blow account of the events, circumstances and actors which led India to the most crushing and humiliating defeats. Very rarely we come across books written on India’s war history and rarest of rare ones do highlight the failures.
The book starts of with a narrative on controversial McMohan line dividing border between India and China followed by the Chinese annexation of Tibbet and India’s luke warm protest to it.
Majority of the text then deals with china’s expansionist attitude and Indian Army’s alarm signals to their civilian command. Nehru administration downplayed the warnings from the very start and even during the crisis. By the time the so called “higher command” realised the extent of damage done, it was too late to do anything. It was then that India broke her non-alignment stance and asked the western powers for immediate help.
Brig. Dalvi has written in the simplest manner, the darkest chapter in post independent India. Many a times author has been repetitive but that can be ignored since the gentleman is a soldier and not a professional writer. It’s an angry man’s memoir the shape of which had been laid in prisoner of war camp. One can feel the anger, frustration and dejection being felt by Brig. Dalvi in almost every page, all negative feelings arising out of misplaced convictions, unpreparedness, total failure of leadership machinery and civilian supremacy in matters dealing with military. The decision makers had neither the training, inclination to listen and the experience of high altitude mountain warfare.
The book was released in 1969 and immediately banned. Maybe the country had not till then forgotten the sores and the key culprits were still in the public eye. Almost three decades after the new generation is better able to understand this chapter and hopefully draw some lesson out of it.
Those who forget their history are condemned to repeat it. Let’s not repeat it…lets not head for another Namka Chu blood bath.
(a) Persuade them to leave Indian territory
(b) If Chinese do not comply, dig-in opposite to them to scare them from attempting further incursion
(c) Fire is permitted only in self-defense and that too with minimum force
These were the orders to 7th infantry brigade from the higher command to counter the heavily armed, well administered, well prepared Chinese incursion in the Namka Chu valley of Thagla region of NEFA. The orders spelled total annihilation to the loosely held and massively under strength Indian formations which lacked even the basic high altitude clothing. The orders taken by a pacifist Prime Minister, an arrogant Defence Minister and a politically connected General caused the rout of a proud Brigade with many of its men dying like animals in a cage.
Himalayan blunder is lucid blow by blow account of the events, circumstances and actors which led India to the most crushing and humiliating defeats. Very rarely we come across books written on India’s war history and rarest of rare ones do highlight the failures.
The book starts of with a narrative on controversial McMohan line dividing border between India and China followed by the Chinese annexation of Tibbet and India’s luke warm protest to it.
Majority of the text then deals with china’s expansionist attitude and Indian Army’s alarm signals to their civilian command. Nehru administration downplayed the warnings from the very start and even during the crisis. By the time the so called “higher command” realised the extent of damage done, it was too late to do anything. It was then that India broke her non-alignment stance and asked the western powers for immediate help.
Brig. Dalvi has written in the simplest manner, the darkest chapter in post independent India. Many a times author has been repetitive but that can be ignored since the gentleman is a soldier and not a professional writer. It’s an angry man’s memoir the shape of which had been laid in prisoner of war camp. One can feel the anger, frustration and dejection being felt by Brig. Dalvi in almost every page, all negative feelings arising out of misplaced convictions, unpreparedness, total failure of leadership machinery and civilian supremacy in matters dealing with military. The decision makers had neither the training, inclination to listen and the experience of high altitude mountain warfare.
The book was released in 1969 and immediately banned. Maybe the country had not till then forgotten the sores and the key culprits were still in the public eye. Almost three decades after the new generation is better able to understand this chapter and hopefully draw some lesson out of it.
Those who forget their history are condemned to repeat it. Let’s not repeat it…lets not head for another Namka Chu blood bath.
September 11, 2019
I have read this book in Hindi. Kannada and english one is also there. Those who want to know about Sino-Indian war should read this book. Book is written by Army man. Read this book to know how Congress govt and Nehru failed our nation. This book should be taught in every defense institute and every politician should read it. Quite a detail book. A must read.
July 11, 2012
ARE WE HEADING FOR ANOTHER HIMALAYAN BLUNDER
Musings
By
VIKRAM KARVE
This morning while browsing through my bookcase I chanced upon one of my favourite military autobiographies – HIMALAYAN BLUNDER by Brig JP Dalvi. The television was on, my favourite news channel was blaring away, and as I started reading Himalayan Blunder, leafing through the pages of the book, I was filled with a sense of déjà vu. The events unfolding before my eyes, on TV News Channels, and the events chronicled in the book – the coincidence was startling. And as I read on further, drawing parallels between what was written in the book and the intriguing happenings hogging the headlines in newspapers and dominating the TV news-channels 24/7 for the last few days, I wondered to myself: “Are we heading for another Himalayan Blunder?” Is history going to repeat itself after 50 years?
I have heard a saying: THOSE WHO DO NOT LEARN FROM HISTORY ARE CONDEMNED TO REPEAT IT. That is why I feel that Himalayan Blunder is a must read for the powers that be – political, civil and military. I am sure most of them must have read Himalayan Blunder, but even then, it would be worthwhile to read the book carefully once again to draw parallels between what happened in 1962 and what is happening now and learn lessons so that similar mistakes are not repeated again and we do not have another “Himalayan Blunder” in the making.
Himalayan Blunder is a fascinating war memoir of the 1962 Conflict between India and China in which India suffered a humiliating defeat. Brigadier Dalvi was the Commander of the Indian Army’s 7th Infantry Brigade which was annihilated by the Chinese Army. I feel that it always better to read history written by those who actually lived it rather than those who recorded it merely by academic research since first person accounts have an air of authenticity about them which lends them credibility. I have read four first-hand accounts of the 1962 War [ The Untold Story By BM Kaul, Himalayan Blunder by JP Dalvi, The Unfought War of 1962 By JR Saigal and The Fall of Towang By Niranjan Prasad] and, out of all these, I found Dalvi’s Himalayan Blunder the most illuminating and enthralling, as well as most soul-searching and analytic. In my opinion, Himalayan Blunder is a military masterpiece, arguably the best book by an Indian military author.
Himalayan Blunder tells you of the debacle that happened when ill-equipped, unprepared, confused and demoralized soldiers were rushed into battle against a strong adversary in an ad hoc manner because military decisions were influenced more by political prophecy rather than military strategy.
Dalvi tells his story with remarkable wit and exceptional candour. His candid storytelling style captivates you and once you start reading you get so engrossed that the book becomes unputdownable. There is no military jargon or gobbledygook. Dalvi writes straight from the heart and that is why this book will not only educate you but also will move you emotionally, strike a chord and get you thinking. From the way he writes it is evident that besides being a soldier, the author was a thinker and a scholar, extremely well-read and well-informed, and possessed a witty sense of humour, and has interspersed his book with anecdotes, quotes and similes. Sample this – he writes that a Corps Commander was sacked because “he refused to be a dog in obedience and a lion in action”.
Why did India suffer such a crushing defeat in the 1962 war with China? It seems to be the same story we are witnessing now – the civil-military divide, the lack of appreciation of ground realities by the Delhi-Centric powers that be and the trust deficit between various stakeholders.
Books like the Himalayan Blunder will make us aware of our mistakes of the past so that we don’t repeat them. In such matters, let history not repeat itself. That is why we cannot to afford to ignore the lessons of history - if we do so it will be to our own peril.
I am going to read HIMALAYAN BLUNDER once again. Why don’t you too?
VIKRAM KARVE
Copyright © Vikram Karve 2012
Vikram Karve has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identified as the author of this work.
© vikram karve., all rights reserved.
Did you like this post?
I am sure you will like the 27 fiction short stories from my recently published anthology of Short Fiction COCKTAIL
To order your COCKTAIL please click any of the links below:
http://www.flipkart.com/cocktail-vikr...
http://www.indiaplaza.in/cocktail-vik...
http://www.apkpublishers.com/books/sh...
COCKTAIL ebook
If you prefer reading ebooks on Kindle or your ebook reader, please order Cocktail E-book by clicking the links below:
AMAZON
http://www.amazon.com/dp/B005MGERZ6
SMASHWORDS
http://www.smashwords.com/books/view/...
Foodie Book: Appetite for a Stroll
If your are a Foodie you will like my book of Food Adventures APPETITE FOR A STROLL. Do order a copy from FLIPKART:
http://www.flipkart.com/appetite-stro...
About Vikram Karve
A creative person with a zest for life, Vikram Karve is a retired Naval Officer turned full time writer. Educated at IIT Delhi, ITBHU Varanasi, The Lawrence School Lovedale and Bishops School Pune, Vikram has published two books: COCKTAIL a collection of fiction short stories about relationships (2011) and APPETITE FOR A STROLL a book of Foodie Adventures (2008) and is currently working on his novel and a book of vignettes and short fiction. An avid blogger, he has written a number of fiction short stories, creative non-fiction articles on a variety of topics including food, travel, philosophy, academics, technology, management, health, pet parenting, teaching stories and self help in magazines and published a large number of professional research papers in journals and edited in-house journals for many years, before the advent of blogging. Vikram has taught at a University as a Professor for almost 15 years and now teaches as a visiting faculty and devotes most of his time to creative writing. Vikram lives in Pune India with his family and muse - his pet dog Sherry with whom he takes long walks thinking creative thoughts.
Vikram Karve Academic and Creative Writing Journal: http://karvediat.blogspot.com
Professional Profile Vikram Karve: http://www.linkedin.com/in/karve
Vikram Karve Facebook Page: https://www.facebook.com/vikramkarve
Vikram Karve Creative Writing Blog: http://vikramkarve.sulekha.com/blog/p...
Email: vikramkarve@sify.com
© vikram karve., all rights reserved.
Musings
By
VIKRAM KARVE
This morning while browsing through my bookcase I chanced upon one of my favourite military autobiographies – HIMALAYAN BLUNDER by Brig JP Dalvi. The television was on, my favourite news channel was blaring away, and as I started reading Himalayan Blunder, leafing through the pages of the book, I was filled with a sense of déjà vu. The events unfolding before my eyes, on TV News Channels, and the events chronicled in the book – the coincidence was startling. And as I read on further, drawing parallels between what was written in the book and the intriguing happenings hogging the headlines in newspapers and dominating the TV news-channels 24/7 for the last few days, I wondered to myself: “Are we heading for another Himalayan Blunder?” Is history going to repeat itself after 50 years?
I have heard a saying: THOSE WHO DO NOT LEARN FROM HISTORY ARE CONDEMNED TO REPEAT IT. That is why I feel that Himalayan Blunder is a must read for the powers that be – political, civil and military. I am sure most of them must have read Himalayan Blunder, but even then, it would be worthwhile to read the book carefully once again to draw parallels between what happened in 1962 and what is happening now and learn lessons so that similar mistakes are not repeated again and we do not have another “Himalayan Blunder” in the making.
Himalayan Blunder is a fascinating war memoir of the 1962 Conflict between India and China in which India suffered a humiliating defeat. Brigadier Dalvi was the Commander of the Indian Army’s 7th Infantry Brigade which was annihilated by the Chinese Army. I feel that it always better to read history written by those who actually lived it rather than those who recorded it merely by academic research since first person accounts have an air of authenticity about them which lends them credibility. I have read four first-hand accounts of the 1962 War [ The Untold Story By BM Kaul, Himalayan Blunder by JP Dalvi, The Unfought War of 1962 By JR Saigal and The Fall of Towang By Niranjan Prasad] and, out of all these, I found Dalvi’s Himalayan Blunder the most illuminating and enthralling, as well as most soul-searching and analytic. In my opinion, Himalayan Blunder is a military masterpiece, arguably the best book by an Indian military author.
Himalayan Blunder tells you of the debacle that happened when ill-equipped, unprepared, confused and demoralized soldiers were rushed into battle against a strong adversary in an ad hoc manner because military decisions were influenced more by political prophecy rather than military strategy.
Dalvi tells his story with remarkable wit and exceptional candour. His candid storytelling style captivates you and once you start reading you get so engrossed that the book becomes unputdownable. There is no military jargon or gobbledygook. Dalvi writes straight from the heart and that is why this book will not only educate you but also will move you emotionally, strike a chord and get you thinking. From the way he writes it is evident that besides being a soldier, the author was a thinker and a scholar, extremely well-read and well-informed, and possessed a witty sense of humour, and has interspersed his book with anecdotes, quotes and similes. Sample this – he writes that a Corps Commander was sacked because “he refused to be a dog in obedience and a lion in action”.
Why did India suffer such a crushing defeat in the 1962 war with China? It seems to be the same story we are witnessing now – the civil-military divide, the lack of appreciation of ground realities by the Delhi-Centric powers that be and the trust deficit between various stakeholders.
Books like the Himalayan Blunder will make us aware of our mistakes of the past so that we don’t repeat them. In such matters, let history not repeat itself. That is why we cannot to afford to ignore the lessons of history - if we do so it will be to our own peril.
I am going to read HIMALAYAN BLUNDER once again. Why don’t you too?
VIKRAM KARVE
Copyright © Vikram Karve 2012
Vikram Karve has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identified as the author of this work.
© vikram karve., all rights reserved.
Did you like this post?
I am sure you will like the 27 fiction short stories from my recently published anthology of Short Fiction COCKTAIL
To order your COCKTAIL please click any of the links below:
http://www.flipkart.com/cocktail-vikr...
http://www.indiaplaza.in/cocktail-vik...
http://www.apkpublishers.com/books/sh...
COCKTAIL ebook
If you prefer reading ebooks on Kindle or your ebook reader, please order Cocktail E-book by clicking the links below:
AMAZON
http://www.amazon.com/dp/B005MGERZ6
SMASHWORDS
http://www.smashwords.com/books/view/...
Foodie Book: Appetite for a Stroll
If your are a Foodie you will like my book of Food Adventures APPETITE FOR A STROLL. Do order a copy from FLIPKART:
http://www.flipkart.com/appetite-stro...
About Vikram Karve
A creative person with a zest for life, Vikram Karve is a retired Naval Officer turned full time writer. Educated at IIT Delhi, ITBHU Varanasi, The Lawrence School Lovedale and Bishops School Pune, Vikram has published two books: COCKTAIL a collection of fiction short stories about relationships (2011) and APPETITE FOR A STROLL a book of Foodie Adventures (2008) and is currently working on his novel and a book of vignettes and short fiction. An avid blogger, he has written a number of fiction short stories, creative non-fiction articles on a variety of topics including food, travel, philosophy, academics, technology, management, health, pet parenting, teaching stories and self help in magazines and published a large number of professional research papers in journals and edited in-house journals for many years, before the advent of blogging. Vikram has taught at a University as a Professor for almost 15 years and now teaches as a visiting faculty and devotes most of his time to creative writing. Vikram lives in Pune India with his family and muse - his pet dog Sherry with whom he takes long walks thinking creative thoughts.
Vikram Karve Academic and Creative Writing Journal: http://karvediat.blogspot.com
Professional Profile Vikram Karve: http://www.linkedin.com/in/karve
Vikram Karve Facebook Page: https://www.facebook.com/vikramkarve
Vikram Karve Creative Writing Blog: http://vikramkarve.sulekha.com/blog/p...
Email: vikramkarve@sify.com
© vikram karve., all rights reserved.
May 3, 2020
I had got this book almost 7 years ago, and finally found some time during the lock down situation to give it a go, and this is really a fantastic book which give us a detailed view of an army man Brigadier Dalvi regarding the events which transpired during defeat of India by Chine in Oct of 1962.
The book is really engrossing, and you don't feel like stopping once you have started with the book, Brig Dalvi goes into very finer details as to what exactly lead to our defeat in 1962.
He highlights the fact the army had no resources, no plan and were completely micro managed from the top echelons of government, even the Gen Kaul who was link of army with defense ministry , was not giving accurate picture of our preparedness to the government. Although Kaul knew the state of affairs on ground, he did not give an accurate picture, and this ultimately to the disaster of 1962.
He lays the biggest fault at the door of then defense minister Mr Krishan Menon, who was more diplomat than defense minister, and who had the ambitions of becoming the next PM of India, he shows what kind of ostrich shell the whole hierarchy of government was living under.
I felt really amazed at the state of affairs which Brig Dalvi represents in this book, because there was a complete breakdown in communication between army and government during the war, our PM and our defense minister were consoling themselves with the fantasy that China will never attack them, and when they did attack it was rude awakening, and this brought about a paradigm shift in how government communicated with army.
But the price we had to pay was too heavy.
A must read books to understand what all went wrong in 1962.
The book is really engrossing, and you don't feel like stopping once you have started with the book, Brig Dalvi goes into very finer details as to what exactly lead to our defeat in 1962.
He highlights the fact the army had no resources, no plan and were completely micro managed from the top echelons of government, even the Gen Kaul who was link of army with defense ministry , was not giving accurate picture of our preparedness to the government. Although Kaul knew the state of affairs on ground, he did not give an accurate picture, and this ultimately to the disaster of 1962.
He lays the biggest fault at the door of then defense minister Mr Krishan Menon, who was more diplomat than defense minister, and who had the ambitions of becoming the next PM of India, he shows what kind of ostrich shell the whole hierarchy of government was living under.
I felt really amazed at the state of affairs which Brig Dalvi represents in this book, because there was a complete breakdown in communication between army and government during the war, our PM and our defense minister were consoling themselves with the fantasy that China will never attack them, and when they did attack it was rude awakening, and this brought about a paradigm shift in how government communicated with army.
But the price we had to pay was too heavy.
A must read books to understand what all went wrong in 1962.
August 20, 2014
Extremely repetitive content. I have complete trust on what J P Dalvi says but the tone is so negative and harsh. This is true that the Dalvi was implicated and made a scapegoat in this whole episode and his frustrations and pain flow on pages of the book. Still I believe he could have gone a bit soft. Plus the Chinese side of story doesn't come out that well in this one.
I have started with Neil Maxwell's "India's China war" and that is good so far.
I have my respect for the gallantry and resolve of J P Dalvi. But still that question is not answered, why didn't he resigned at first place where as in the book he asks why others (of higher posts) didn't resign :-).
Still a good one to read and have at shelves.
I have started with Neil Maxwell's "India's China war" and that is good so far.
I have my respect for the gallantry and resolve of J P Dalvi. But still that question is not answered, why didn't he resigned at first place where as in the book he asks why others (of higher posts) didn't resign :-).
Still a good one to read and have at shelves.
May 3, 2019
The book authored by Brigadier John Parshurama Dalvi commander of India's Seventh infantry brigade which was decimated by the PLA on day one of the chinese attack. After being captured as PoW and released in May 1963, brigadier Dalvi writes his detailed account of the 1962 Sino-India war in which he lists out the shortcomings of the then Indian political leadership terming the war as India's most crushing military disaster. The book was immediately only for the ban to be lifted in 1968.
July 11, 2012
HIMALAYAN BLUNDER
Book Review
By
VIKRAM KARVE
This morning while browsing through my bookcase I chanced upon one of my favourite military autobiographies – HIMALAYAN BLUNDER by Brig JP Dalvi. The television was on, my favourite news channel was blaring away, and as I started reading Himalayan Blunder, leafing through the pages of the book, I was filled with a sense of déjà vu. The events unfolding before my eyes, on TV News Channels, and the events chronicled in the book – the coincidence was startling. And as I read on further, drawing parallels between what was written in the book and the intriguing happenings hogging the headlines in newspapers and dominating the TV news-channels 24/7 for the last few days, I wondered to myself: “Are we heading for another Himalayan Blunder?” Is history going to repeat itself after 50 years?
I have heard a saying: THOSE WHO DO NOT LEARN FROM HISTORY ARE CONDEMNED TO REPEAT IT. That is why I feel that Himalayan Blunder is a must read for the powers that be – political, civil and military. I am sure most of them must have read Himalayan Blunder, but even then, it would be worthwhile to read the book carefully once again to draw parallels between what happened in 1962 and what is happening now and learn lessons so that similar mistakes are not repeated again and we do not have another “Himalayan Blunder” in the making.
Himalayan Blunder is a fascinating war memoir of the 1962 Conflict between India and China in which India suffered a humiliating defeat. Brigadier Dalvi was the Commander of the Indian Army’s 7th Infantry Brigade which was annihilated by the Chinese Army. I feel that it always better to read history written by those who actually lived it rather than those who recorded it merely by academic research since first person accounts have an air of authenticity about them which lends them credibility. I have read four first-hand accounts of the 1962 War [ The Untold Story By BM Kaul, Himalayan Blunder by JP Dalvi, The Unfought War of 1962 By JR Saigal and The Fall of Towang By Niranjan Prasad] and, out of all these, I found Dalvi’s Himalayan Blunder the most illuminating and enthralling, as well as most soul-searching and analytic. In my opinion, Himalayan Blunder is a military masterpiece, arguably the best book by an Indian military author.
Himalayan Blunder tells you of the debacle that happened when ill-equipped, unprepared, confused and demoralized soldiers were rushed into battle against a strong adversary in an ad hoc manner because military decisions were influenced more by political prophecy rather than military strategy.
Dalvi tells his story with remarkable wit and exceptional candour. His candid storytelling style captivates you and once you start reading you get so engrossed that the book becomes unputdownable. There is no military jargon or gobbledygook. Dalvi writes straight from the heart and that is why this book will not only educate you but also will move you emotionally, strike a chord and get you thinking. From the way he writes it is evident that besides being a soldier, the author was a thinker and a scholar, extremely well-read and well-informed, and possessed a witty sense of humour, and has interspersed his book with anecdotes, quotes and similes. Sample this – he writes that a Corps Commander was sacked because “he refused to be a dog in obedience and a lion in action”.
Why did India suffer such a crushing defeat in the 1962 war with China? It seems to be the same story we are witnessing now – the civil-military divide, the lack of appreciation of ground realities by the Delhi-Centric powers that be and the trust deficit between various stakeholders.
Books like the Himalayan Blunder will make us aware of our mistakes of the past so that we don’t repeat them. In such matters, let history not repeat itself. That is why we cannot to afford to ignore the lessons of history - if we do so it will be to our own peril.
I am going to read HIMALAYAN BLUNDER once again. Why don’t you too?
VIKRAM KARVE
Copyright © Vikram Karve 2012
Vikram Karve has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identified as the author of this work.
© vikram karve., all rights reserved.
Did you like this post?
I am sure you will like the 27 fiction short stories from my recently published anthology of Short Fiction COCKTAIL
To order your COCKTAIL please click any of the links below:
http://www.flipkart.com/cocktail-vikr...
http://www.indiaplaza.in/cocktail-vik...
http://www.apkpublishers.com/books/sh...
COCKTAIL ebook
If you prefer reading ebooks on Kindle or your ebook reader, please order Cocktail E-book by clicking the links below:
AMAZON
http://www.amazon.com/dp/B005MGERZ6
SMASHWORDS
http://www.smashwords.com/books/view/...
Foodie Book: Appetite for a Stroll
If your are a Foodie you will like my book of Food Adventures APPETITE FOR A STROLL. Do order a copy from FLIPKART:
http://www.flipkart.com/appetite-stro...
About Vikram Karve
A creative person with a zest for life, Vikram Karve is a retired Naval Officer turned full time writer. Educated at IIT Delhi, ITBHU Varanasi, The Lawrence School Lovedale and Bishops School Pune, Vikram has published two books: COCKTAIL a collection of fiction short stories about relationships (2011) and APPETITE FOR A STROLL a book of Foodie Adventures (2008) and is currently working on his novel and a book of vignettes and short fiction. An avid blogger, he has written a number of fiction short stories, creative non-fiction articles on a variety of topics including food, travel, philosophy, academics, technology, management, health, pet parenting, teaching stories and self help in magazines and published a large number of professional research papers in journals and edited in-house journals for many years, before the advent of blogging. Vikram has taught at a University as a Professor for almost 15 years and now teaches as a visiting faculty and devotes most of his time to creative writing. Vikram lives in Pune India with his family and muse - his pet dog Sherry with whom he takes long walks thinking creative thoughts.
Vikram Karve Academic and Creative Writing Journal: http://karvediat.blogspot.com
Professional Profile Vikram Karve: http://www.linkedin.com/in/karve
Vikram Karve Facebook Page: https://www.facebook.com/vikramkarve
Vikram Karve Creative Writing Blog: http://vikramkarve.sulekha.com/blog/p...
Email: vikramkarve@sify.com
© vikram karve., all rights reserved.
Book Review
By
VIKRAM KARVE
This morning while browsing through my bookcase I chanced upon one of my favourite military autobiographies – HIMALAYAN BLUNDER by Brig JP Dalvi. The television was on, my favourite news channel was blaring away, and as I started reading Himalayan Blunder, leafing through the pages of the book, I was filled with a sense of déjà vu. The events unfolding before my eyes, on TV News Channels, and the events chronicled in the book – the coincidence was startling. And as I read on further, drawing parallels between what was written in the book and the intriguing happenings hogging the headlines in newspapers and dominating the TV news-channels 24/7 for the last few days, I wondered to myself: “Are we heading for another Himalayan Blunder?” Is history going to repeat itself after 50 years?
I have heard a saying: THOSE WHO DO NOT LEARN FROM HISTORY ARE CONDEMNED TO REPEAT IT. That is why I feel that Himalayan Blunder is a must read for the powers that be – political, civil and military. I am sure most of them must have read Himalayan Blunder, but even then, it would be worthwhile to read the book carefully once again to draw parallels between what happened in 1962 and what is happening now and learn lessons so that similar mistakes are not repeated again and we do not have another “Himalayan Blunder” in the making.
Himalayan Blunder is a fascinating war memoir of the 1962 Conflict between India and China in which India suffered a humiliating defeat. Brigadier Dalvi was the Commander of the Indian Army’s 7th Infantry Brigade which was annihilated by the Chinese Army. I feel that it always better to read history written by those who actually lived it rather than those who recorded it merely by academic research since first person accounts have an air of authenticity about them which lends them credibility. I have read four first-hand accounts of the 1962 War [ The Untold Story By BM Kaul, Himalayan Blunder by JP Dalvi, The Unfought War of 1962 By JR Saigal and The Fall of Towang By Niranjan Prasad] and, out of all these, I found Dalvi’s Himalayan Blunder the most illuminating and enthralling, as well as most soul-searching and analytic. In my opinion, Himalayan Blunder is a military masterpiece, arguably the best book by an Indian military author.
Himalayan Blunder tells you of the debacle that happened when ill-equipped, unprepared, confused and demoralized soldiers were rushed into battle against a strong adversary in an ad hoc manner because military decisions were influenced more by political prophecy rather than military strategy.
Dalvi tells his story with remarkable wit and exceptional candour. His candid storytelling style captivates you and once you start reading you get so engrossed that the book becomes unputdownable. There is no military jargon or gobbledygook. Dalvi writes straight from the heart and that is why this book will not only educate you but also will move you emotionally, strike a chord and get you thinking. From the way he writes it is evident that besides being a soldier, the author was a thinker and a scholar, extremely well-read and well-informed, and possessed a witty sense of humour, and has interspersed his book with anecdotes, quotes and similes. Sample this – he writes that a Corps Commander was sacked because “he refused to be a dog in obedience and a lion in action”.
Why did India suffer such a crushing defeat in the 1962 war with China? It seems to be the same story we are witnessing now – the civil-military divide, the lack of appreciation of ground realities by the Delhi-Centric powers that be and the trust deficit between various stakeholders.
Books like the Himalayan Blunder will make us aware of our mistakes of the past so that we don’t repeat them. In such matters, let history not repeat itself. That is why we cannot to afford to ignore the lessons of history - if we do so it will be to our own peril.
I am going to read HIMALAYAN BLUNDER once again. Why don’t you too?
VIKRAM KARVE
Copyright © Vikram Karve 2012
Vikram Karve has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 to be identified as the author of this work.
© vikram karve., all rights reserved.
Did you like this post?
I am sure you will like the 27 fiction short stories from my recently published anthology of Short Fiction COCKTAIL
To order your COCKTAIL please click any of the links below:
http://www.flipkart.com/cocktail-vikr...
http://www.indiaplaza.in/cocktail-vik...
http://www.apkpublishers.com/books/sh...
COCKTAIL ebook
If you prefer reading ebooks on Kindle or your ebook reader, please order Cocktail E-book by clicking the links below:
AMAZON
http://www.amazon.com/dp/B005MGERZ6
SMASHWORDS
http://www.smashwords.com/books/view/...
Foodie Book: Appetite for a Stroll
If your are a Foodie you will like my book of Food Adventures APPETITE FOR A STROLL. Do order a copy from FLIPKART:
http://www.flipkart.com/appetite-stro...
About Vikram Karve
A creative person with a zest for life, Vikram Karve is a retired Naval Officer turned full time writer. Educated at IIT Delhi, ITBHU Varanasi, The Lawrence School Lovedale and Bishops School Pune, Vikram has published two books: COCKTAIL a collection of fiction short stories about relationships (2011) and APPETITE FOR A STROLL a book of Foodie Adventures (2008) and is currently working on his novel and a book of vignettes and short fiction. An avid blogger, he has written a number of fiction short stories, creative non-fiction articles on a variety of topics including food, travel, philosophy, academics, technology, management, health, pet parenting, teaching stories and self help in magazines and published a large number of professional research papers in journals and edited in-house journals for many years, before the advent of blogging. Vikram has taught at a University as a Professor for almost 15 years and now teaches as a visiting faculty and devotes most of his time to creative writing. Vikram lives in Pune India with his family and muse - his pet dog Sherry with whom he takes long walks thinking creative thoughts.
Vikram Karve Academic and Creative Writing Journal: http://karvediat.blogspot.com
Professional Profile Vikram Karve: http://www.linkedin.com/in/karve
Vikram Karve Facebook Page: https://www.facebook.com/vikramkarve
Vikram Karve Creative Writing Blog: http://vikramkarve.sulekha.com/blog/p...
Email: vikramkarve@sify.com
© vikram karve., all rights reserved.
October 26, 2020
A very interesting read... gives insights on the political complexities and its consequences... unfortunately, the quagmire remains unresolved since the brunt faced by the frontline is hardly felt by the those at the top of the pyramid..
November 3, 2013
This is an excellent book for various reasons.
Firstly, Indian war books are rare. This is not a genre that is appreciated in common discussions. There are no star war analysts or writers. And those who pretend to be so on mass television, tend to be ill informed or come with set agendas.
Secondly, this book talks about a history, which is impossible to find anywhere else. School books, contemporary history texts and op-eds almost always skip the ignominy of China war. There could be many reasons - the narrative does not fit in with what the government ordained history is. Or in some cases, influential commentators in this field are directly related to the chief villains of this war!
Thirdly, this book busts a key myth about India's hallowed politicians post 1947. For a whole generation, which has been Ram Guha-ed into reading post modern history (one should still read him, for he still covers amazing breadth as well as reasonable depth), there is no alternative source to vet the competence of India's political class from 1947 to 1962. This book explains why China war was not an event where it went wrong (popular version in whatever literature is available on the subject). The book explains how the China War was not lost in 1962, but steadily through the 15 years preceding it.
Fourthly, the book makes it clear that India's loss against China was not military but political. Foreign policy decisions aimed at grandstanding and projecting one individual as world savior, key ministerial appointments based on friendships and old equations and a complete breakdown of decision making over many years backed by zero knowledge of armed conflicts stand out as key failures.
The book is written by an author perhaps most qualified to write one on the subject, given his personal role in the war. The writing becomes cliched once in a while and gets repetitive, but then the author isn't a professional writer to start off.
It is a must read for anyone interested in understanding how the country has shaped up post-independence. It is also a must read for those who love to throw titles like "country's best leader" based on no critical analysis of personalities.
Firstly, Indian war books are rare. This is not a genre that is appreciated in common discussions. There are no star war analysts or writers. And those who pretend to be so on mass television, tend to be ill informed or come with set agendas.
Secondly, this book talks about a history, which is impossible to find anywhere else. School books, contemporary history texts and op-eds almost always skip the ignominy of China war. There could be many reasons - the narrative does not fit in with what the government ordained history is. Or in some cases, influential commentators in this field are directly related to the chief villains of this war!
Thirdly, this book busts a key myth about India's hallowed politicians post 1947. For a whole generation, which has been Ram Guha-ed into reading post modern history (one should still read him, for he still covers amazing breadth as well as reasonable depth), there is no alternative source to vet the competence of India's political class from 1947 to 1962. This book explains why China war was not an event where it went wrong (popular version in whatever literature is available on the subject). The book explains how the China War was not lost in 1962, but steadily through the 15 years preceding it.
Fourthly, the book makes it clear that India's loss against China was not military but political. Foreign policy decisions aimed at grandstanding and projecting one individual as world savior, key ministerial appointments based on friendships and old equations and a complete breakdown of decision making over many years backed by zero knowledge of armed conflicts stand out as key failures.
The book is written by an author perhaps most qualified to write one on the subject, given his personal role in the war. The writing becomes cliched once in a while and gets repetitive, but then the author isn't a professional writer to start off.
It is a must read for anyone interested in understanding how the country has shaped up post-independence. It is also a must read for those who love to throw titles like "country's best leader" based on no critical analysis of personalities.
January 17, 2014
What makes a nation great ?
The book provides a beautiful answer to the question above. Our humble army men, doing a thankless job, without ration, ammunition,boots or winter clothing, defending few useless pieces of logs and redeeming the follies of few spineless, arrogant men with their blood, sacrificed themselves fighting valiantly for the honour of the country.
JP Dalvi rightly asks what more can a nation ask of its soldiers.
Not many of those who sacrificed their lives are remembered by the people today. 1962 is a distant memory.
I bow my head in respect to our great martyrs.
Sadly, India is not out of woods yet. 51 years after the 1962 "Blunder", our foreign policies,economic policies and defense policies are out of sync with each other and of the ground realities. In 2010, Government of India refused to make public the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat committee report regarding the 1962 "Blunder".
I am lucky that I chanced upon the book. Reading it has been a turbulent journey through the emotions of heart. I am really grateful that the book helped me change my notions of a leader by explaining what exactly a leader should not be.
The only thing I found amiss from the book was some references to the military terms which should have been provided in an appendix. Some maps( pre and post 1914 McMohan Line Indian Maps,Tibetian maps and Chinese maps) would also greatly enhance the understanding of the whole saga.
Overall, thank you Mr. Dalvi.
May your soul rest in peace. Jai Hind.
The book provides a beautiful answer to the question above. Our humble army men, doing a thankless job, without ration, ammunition,boots or winter clothing, defending few useless pieces of logs and redeeming the follies of few spineless, arrogant men with their blood, sacrificed themselves fighting valiantly for the honour of the country.
JP Dalvi rightly asks what more can a nation ask of its soldiers.
Not many of those who sacrificed their lives are remembered by the people today. 1962 is a distant memory.
I bow my head in respect to our great martyrs.
Sadly, India is not out of woods yet. 51 years after the 1962 "Blunder", our foreign policies,economic policies and defense policies are out of sync with each other and of the ground realities. In 2010, Government of India refused to make public the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat committee report regarding the 1962 "Blunder".
I am lucky that I chanced upon the book. Reading it has been a turbulent journey through the emotions of heart. I am really grateful that the book helped me change my notions of a leader by explaining what exactly a leader should not be.
The only thing I found amiss from the book was some references to the military terms which should have been provided in an appendix. Some maps( pre and post 1914 McMohan Line Indian Maps,Tibetian maps and Chinese maps) would also greatly enhance the understanding of the whole saga.
Overall, thank you Mr. Dalvi.
May your soul rest in peace. Jai Hind.
July 7, 2020
The book speaks about the struggling of Indian army in 1951.
This also tells how Congress and Nehru ruined our India.
21 June 2020
ಸದ್ಯದ ಪರಿಸ್ಥಿತಿಯಲ್ಲಿ 1962ರ ಭಾರತ ಚೀನಾ ಯುದ್ಧ ನೆನಪಿಗೆ ಬಂತು. ಹಾಗೆಂದೆ ಮತ್ತೊಮ್ಮೆ "ಹಿಮಾಲಯನ್ ಬ್ಲಂಡರ್" ಕನ್ನಡ ಆವೃತ್ತಿಯನ್ನು ಹಿಡಿದು ಕೂತೆ. ಅದ್ಭುತ ಮತ್ತು ಘೋರವಾದ ಸತ್ಯವನ್ನು ಕೆನ್ನಡಕ್ಕೆ ಭಾಷಾಂತರಿಸಿದ ರವಿ ಬೆಳಗರೆ ಆವರಿಗೆ ಧನ್ಯವಾದಗಳು.
ಪುಸ್ತಕದ ಪ್ರತಿಯೊಂದು ಪುಟ ಅಂದರೆ ಕಡಿಮೆಯಾದೀತು. ಪ್ರತಿಯೊಂದು ಪ್ಯಾರಾಗ್ರಾಫಿನಲ್ಲೂ ಪ್ರಧಾನಿ ನೆಹರು, ರಕ್ಷಣಾ ಮಂತ್ರಿ ಕೃಷ್ಣ ಮೆನನ್ ಮತ್ತು ಸೇನಾ ಮುಖ್ಯಸ್ಥ ಬಿ.ಎಂ.ಕೌಲ್ ಮಾಡಿದ ಅಕ್ಷಮ್ಯ ಅಪರಾಧಗಳು, ತನ್ಮೂಲಕ ಭಾರತದ ತೇಜೋವಧೆ ಮತ್ತು ತವಾಂಗ್ ಪ್ರದೇಶದ ಥಾಗ್ಲಾ ಪರ್ವತ ಶ್ರೇಣಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಭಾರತೀಯ ಸೈನಿಕರಿಗಾದ ಪ್ರಾಣ ಮತ್ತು ಮಾನಹಾನಿ ಪ್ರಸ್ತುತಗೊಂಡಿದೆ.
ಬ್ರಿಗೇಡಿಯರ್ ಜಾನ್ ಪರಶುರಾಮ್ ದಳವಿಯವರು ಇತಿಹಾಸದಲ್ಲಿ ಆದ ಅಕ್ಷಮ್ಯ ಪ್ರಮಾದಗಳನ್ನು ನೋವಿನಿಂದಲೇ ಚಿತ್ರಿಸಿದ್ದಾರೆ. ದೆಹಲಿಯ ಎ.ಸಿ. ಕೋಣೆಯಲ್ಲಿ ಕೂತು ವೀರಾವೇಷದ ಬೇಜವಾಬ್ದಾರಿಯಿಂದ ವರ್ತಿಸಿದ ಮೂವರಿಗೂ ಶತ್ರುವಿನ ಎದುರಿಗೆ ಕಾಡತೂಸು (ಬುಲೆಟ್), ಗ್ರೆನೇಡ್, ಹಿಮದ ಪರ್ವತದಲ್ಲಿ ಹಾಕಲು ಸರಿಯಾದ ಶೂ ಇಲ್ಲದ ಸೈನಿಕನ ಪರಿಸ್ಥಿತಿ ಅರ್ಥವಾಗಲೇ ಇಲ್ಲ...!!!
ಪುಸ್ತಕದ ಮುನ್ನುಡಿಯ ಸಾಲುಗಳು ನಾವು ಮಾಡಬಹುದಾದ ಸಣ್ಣ ಕರ್ತವ್ಯವನ್ನು ಹೇಳುತ್ತದೆ - 'ನಿಮಗಿನ್ನೂ ಈ ದೇಶದ ಆ ತಲೆಮಾರಿನ ನಾಯಕರ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಗೌರವವಿದ್ದರೆ, ನೆಹರೂ ಮತ್ತು ಮೆನನ್ ಎಂಬ ಹೆಸರುಗಳಿಗೆ ಪೂಜನೀಯ ಭಾವವಿದ್ದದ್ದೇ ಆದರೆ ಈ ಪುಸ್ತಕವನ್ನು ಮುಚ್ಚಿಟ್ಟುಬಿಡಿ. ಹತ್ತಿರದಲ್ಲಿರುವ ಮಗುವಿನ ಕೈಗೆ ಕೊಡಿ. ಈ ದೇಶದ ಒಂದು ನಿಜವಾದ ಇತಿಹಾಸದ ಜಾಡನ್ನು ಓದಿಕೊಂಡು ಬೆಳೆಯಲಿ'.
2020 ರಲ್ಲಿ ಆ ತಲೆಮಾರಿಗೆ ತದ್ವಿರುದ್ಧವಾದ ನರೇಂದ್ರ ಮೋದಿ, ರಾಜನಾಥ್ ಸಿಂಗ್ ಮತ್ತು ಮೇಜರ್ ಮುಕುಂದ್ ನರವಣೆ ಇದ್ದಾರೆ ಎಂಬುದನ್ನು ನಾವು ನೆನಪಲ್ಲಿಟ್ಟುಕೊಳ್ಳಬೇಕು.
This also tells how Congress and Nehru ruined our India.
21 June 2020
ಸದ್ಯದ ಪರಿಸ್ಥಿತಿಯಲ್ಲಿ 1962ರ ಭಾರತ ಚೀನಾ ಯುದ್ಧ ನೆನಪಿಗೆ ಬಂತು. ಹಾಗೆಂದೆ ಮತ್ತೊಮ್ಮೆ "ಹಿಮಾಲಯನ್ ಬ್ಲಂಡರ್" ಕನ್ನಡ ಆವೃತ್ತಿಯನ್ನು ಹಿಡಿದು ಕೂತೆ. ಅದ್ಭುತ ಮತ್ತು ಘೋರವಾದ ಸತ್ಯವನ್ನು ಕೆನ್ನಡಕ್ಕೆ ಭಾಷಾಂತರಿಸಿದ ರವಿ ಬೆಳಗರೆ ಆವರಿಗೆ ಧನ್ಯವಾದಗಳು.
ಪುಸ್ತಕದ ಪ್ರತಿಯೊಂದು ಪುಟ ಅಂದರೆ ಕಡಿಮೆಯಾದೀತು. ಪ್ರತಿಯೊಂದು ಪ್ಯಾರಾಗ್ರಾಫಿನಲ್ಲೂ ಪ್ರಧಾನಿ ನೆಹರು, ರಕ್ಷಣಾ ಮಂತ್ರಿ ಕೃಷ್ಣ ಮೆನನ್ ಮತ್ತು ಸೇನಾ ಮುಖ್ಯಸ್ಥ ಬಿ.ಎಂ.ಕೌಲ್ ಮಾಡಿದ ಅಕ್ಷಮ್ಯ ಅಪರಾಧಗಳು, ತನ್ಮೂಲಕ ಭಾರತದ ತೇಜೋವಧೆ ಮತ್ತು ತವಾಂಗ್ ಪ್ರದೇಶದ ಥಾಗ್ಲಾ ಪರ್ವತ ಶ್ರೇಣಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಭಾರತೀಯ ಸೈನಿಕರಿಗಾದ ಪ್ರಾಣ ಮತ್ತು ಮಾನಹಾನಿ ಪ್ರಸ್ತುತಗೊಂಡಿದೆ.
ಬ್ರಿಗೇಡಿಯರ್ ಜಾನ್ ಪರಶುರಾಮ್ ದಳವಿಯವರು ಇತಿಹಾಸದಲ್ಲಿ ಆದ ಅಕ್ಷಮ್ಯ ಪ್ರಮಾದಗಳನ್ನು ನೋವಿನಿಂದಲೇ ಚಿತ್ರಿಸಿದ್ದಾರೆ. ದೆಹಲಿಯ ಎ.ಸಿ. ಕೋಣೆಯಲ್ಲಿ ಕೂತು ವೀರಾವೇಷದ ಬೇಜವಾಬ್ದಾರಿಯಿಂದ ವರ್ತಿಸಿದ ಮೂವರಿಗೂ ಶತ್ರುವಿನ ಎದುರಿಗೆ ಕಾಡತೂಸು (ಬುಲೆಟ್), ಗ್ರೆನೇಡ್, ಹಿಮದ ಪರ್ವತದಲ್ಲಿ ಹಾಕಲು ಸರಿಯಾದ ಶೂ ಇಲ್ಲದ ಸೈನಿಕನ ಪರಿಸ್ಥಿತಿ ಅರ್ಥವಾಗಲೇ ಇಲ್ಲ...!!!
ಪುಸ್ತಕದ ಮುನ್ನುಡಿಯ ಸಾಲುಗಳು ನಾವು ಮಾಡಬಹುದಾದ ಸಣ್ಣ ಕರ್ತವ್ಯವನ್ನು ಹೇಳುತ್ತದೆ - 'ನಿಮಗಿನ್ನೂ ಈ ದೇಶದ ಆ ತಲೆಮಾರಿನ ನಾಯಕರ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಗೌರವವಿದ್ದರೆ, ನೆಹರೂ ಮತ್ತು ಮೆನನ್ ಎಂಬ ಹೆಸರುಗಳಿಗೆ ಪೂಜನೀಯ ಭಾವವಿದ್ದದ್ದೇ ಆದರೆ ಈ ಪುಸ್ತಕವನ್ನು ಮುಚ್ಚಿಟ್ಟುಬಿಡಿ. ಹತ್ತಿರದಲ್ಲಿರುವ ಮಗುವಿನ ಕೈಗೆ ಕೊಡಿ. ಈ ದೇಶದ ಒಂದು ನಿಜವಾದ ಇತಿಹಾಸದ ಜಾಡನ್ನು ಓದಿಕೊಂಡು ಬೆಳೆಯಲಿ'.
2020 ರಲ್ಲಿ ಆ ತಲೆಮಾರಿಗೆ ತದ್ವಿರುದ್ಧವಾದ ನರೇಂದ್ರ ಮೋದಿ, ರಾಜನಾಥ್ ಸಿಂಗ್ ಮತ್ತು ಮೇಜರ್ ಮುಕುಂದ್ ನರವಣೆ ಇದ್ದಾರೆ ಎಂಬುದನ್ನು ನಾವು ನೆನಪಲ್ಲಿಟ್ಟುಕೊಳ್ಳಬೇಕು.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
October 17, 2014
Everything except the fighting spirit of the Indian soldier failed in the events leading up to the brief Sino-Indian War of 1962 in which our country were over run by the mighty Chinese.
It's a classic case of lack of foresight, planning, co-ordination between the babus and the military brass, tattered infrastructure, abysmal condition of the Indian soldier (lack of woolen clothes, limited food supplies, old WW II era guns, limited ammunition and mortar) and the lack of willingness of the civilian government to accept the Chinese as a much powerful opponent and remove the veil of friendship with them while they were amassing troops on the borders. In short the events leading unto 1962 were a recipe for a disaster.
The book is written by a Brigadier who was in action and was held prisoner by the Chinese for a short duration after the war.
It's a must read book for anyone interested in understanding India better.
It's a classic case of lack of foresight, planning, co-ordination between the babus and the military brass, tattered infrastructure, abysmal condition of the Indian soldier (lack of woolen clothes, limited food supplies, old WW II era guns, limited ammunition and mortar) and the lack of willingness of the civilian government to accept the Chinese as a much powerful opponent and remove the veil of friendship with them while they were amassing troops on the borders. In short the events leading unto 1962 were a recipe for a disaster.
The book is written by a Brigadier who was in action and was held prisoner by the Chinese for a short duration after the war.
It's a must read book for anyone interested in understanding India better.
January 1, 2019
So I got to know that the book was actually banned by then congress regime. If you go by the Brigadier J. P Dalvi then yes, the war could have been averted. Brig. Dalvi has painstakingly convinced me at least that it was the fault of Nehru and Krishna Menon's misguided foreign policy and Nehru's mistaken belief that China will never attack India.
This looked to be an attempt by the brigadier to clean the murky waters of the happenings during and leading to the Sino-Indian war.
Brig. Dalvi remained in chinese captive camps for about 7 months after which he was repatriated.
You can't only blame the policymakers the top military chiefs were also responsible for the defeat.
And finally it is a good book on Indo-Sino war laying down the failures of governance.
This looked to be an attempt by the brigadier to clean the murky waters of the happenings during and leading to the Sino-Indian war.
Brig. Dalvi remained in chinese captive camps for about 7 months after which he was repatriated.
You can't only blame the policymakers the top military chiefs were also responsible for the defeat.
And finally it is a good book on Indo-Sino war laying down the failures of governance.
November 19, 2013
The key mistakes of Indo-sino conflict like Nehru's ignorance of patel's warning, Appointment of Mennon & Gen.Kaul, setting up forward post on controversial DHOLA area, Lack of infrastructure planning for the war time are explained in detail.
The author has nailed every possible events that led up to the war.
Kudos to our army Jawans who fought the Indo-Sino war bravely despite the screw up of our political leadership!
A VERY GOOD READ!
The author has nailed every possible events that led up to the war.
Kudos to our army Jawans who fought the Indo-Sino war bravely despite the screw up of our political leadership!
A VERY GOOD READ!
October 16, 2014
The book is unique in a sense that it is written by the Brigadier who actually led the force in NEFA. The book is well written and provides an indepth analysis of India's Chinese Policies, its apathy towards its army and most importantly how Mr. Nehru, Mr. Menon and Mr. Kaul created an environment of self deception for them, the parliament and the Indian public which ultimately led to India's defeat... I would have rated it 5 star had it not been repetitive.
Want to read
June 10, 2010[Through Atanu:]
Apparently, Ms. IG banned this book because it exposed her father. I hope Indians will wake up to the truth, and shove the dynasty to the rightful place it deserves to be in.
Not sure if this book is available in the stores now.
Apparently, Ms. IG banned this book because it exposed her father. I hope Indians will wake up to the truth, and shove the dynasty to the rightful place it deserves to be in.
Not sure if this book is available in the stores now.
September 28, 2021
The true story of India's defeat at the hands of the Chinese. How the situation was allowed to worsen by the Politicians, Army at some length, and Bureaucrats is angrily described by the author who himself was at commanding position.
October 30, 2013
HIstorical description from the point of view of a army personal.
March 14, 2014
Brutally honest.
February 5, 2018
A must read book for every Indian to know the truth about Indo-sino war of 1962.
September 17, 2016
In October 1950, the newly born People's Republic of China brought "freedom " to Tibet by sending in some 20,000 troops. This "liberation" was offered to Tibetans by the People's Republic of China by overwhelming the tiny Tibetan army. Subsequent consolidation of Chinese control was cemented in 1959 resulting in the destruction of thousands of Tibetan monastaries. The Chinese move apparently took India by surprise. Tibet appealed for help but India refused and advised the Tibetans to negotiate a peaceful settlement.
At that time in 1950, author John P. Dalvi was a student at the Defense Services Staff College in Wellington (near Ooty), Tamil Nadu. He writes about an interesting incident in which a general from the British old-guard made some prescient remarks that some of the students would be fighting the Chinese before their retirement.
On the morning of October 20th 1962, Brigadier John Dalvi found his garrison at the receiving end of a massive assault by the Chinese Army and was overrun within a matter of hours. Two days later, without food for more than 50 hours, having climbed from an elevation 10,000 feet to 18,000 feet and then back down to 10,000 feet in an attempt to get back to the Dhola post from Namkachu and then back to Lumpu, he was captured and taken a prisoner of war. This book is an extraordinary military account of the events leading up to the debacle resulting in the Chinese advancing 160 miles into Indian territory. How did it come about that so many Indian troops were sent shivering to the front in light cotton uniforms issued for Punjab's fiery plains? How did the Chinese Army manage, in a week long assault, seize much of Arunachal Pradesh, as well as a slab of Kashmir in the western Himalayas, and kill more than 3,000 Indian officers and men? How did it come about that the Indian Army that had distinguished itself in the Second World War come to function as a rag-a-tag unit? The answers are to be found in this telling account. Brigadier Dalvi's book highlights how a divided military leadership controlled by civilian authorities without a clearly defined strategy or policy to respond to border issues resulted in this blunder of Himalayan proportions.
This eminently readable narrative by Brigadier Dalvi is severely handicapped by the absence of a map (in the version that I own.) However, in this day and age of Google Maps, it was an adventure in itself to follow along the progress of the Brigadier and his troops as he describes his fateful journey from Dirang to Towang via the Sela Pass using Google Earth. The three-dimensional view of the mountains gives one an idea of how treacherous the road must have been. The march of his garrison from Towang to Namkachu can not be appreciated without getting a visual of the terrain.
I thoroughly enjoyed reading the book and would heartily recommend this to any military history buff, irrespective of their interest (or lack thereof) in China or India.
At that time in 1950, author John P. Dalvi was a student at the Defense Services Staff College in Wellington (near Ooty), Tamil Nadu. He writes about an interesting incident in which a general from the British old-guard made some prescient remarks that some of the students would be fighting the Chinese before their retirement.
On the morning of October 20th 1962, Brigadier John Dalvi found his garrison at the receiving end of a massive assault by the Chinese Army and was overrun within a matter of hours. Two days later, without food for more than 50 hours, having climbed from an elevation 10,000 feet to 18,000 feet and then back down to 10,000 feet in an attempt to get back to the Dhola post from Namkachu and then back to Lumpu, he was captured and taken a prisoner of war. This book is an extraordinary military account of the events leading up to the debacle resulting in the Chinese advancing 160 miles into Indian territory. How did it come about that so many Indian troops were sent shivering to the front in light cotton uniforms issued for Punjab's fiery plains? How did the Chinese Army manage, in a week long assault, seize much of Arunachal Pradesh, as well as a slab of Kashmir in the western Himalayas, and kill more than 3,000 Indian officers and men? How did it come about that the Indian Army that had distinguished itself in the Second World War come to function as a rag-a-tag unit? The answers are to be found in this telling account. Brigadier Dalvi's book highlights how a divided military leadership controlled by civilian authorities without a clearly defined strategy or policy to respond to border issues resulted in this blunder of Himalayan proportions.
This eminently readable narrative by Brigadier Dalvi is severely handicapped by the absence of a map (in the version that I own.) However, in this day and age of Google Maps, it was an adventure in itself to follow along the progress of the Brigadier and his troops as he describes his fateful journey from Dirang to Towang via the Sela Pass using Google Earth. The three-dimensional view of the mountains gives one an idea of how treacherous the road must have been. The march of his garrison from Towang to Namkachu can not be appreciated without getting a visual of the terrain.
I thoroughly enjoyed reading the book and would heartily recommend this to any military history buff, irrespective of their interest (or lack thereof) in China or India.
August 18, 2019
Great book. It's an account which tells us how Nehru's policies not only make India defeat in war but make India lags in every sphere.
January 18, 2019
Brigadier John Dalvi was the commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade that was deployed to Tawang before the war and was wiped out during it. Brigadier Dalvi was himself a prisoner of war for eight months.
Himalayan Blunder is an account of the military and political situation as experienced by in 1962 in the lead up to the Chinese offensives on October 20. The book explores some of the themes of civil-military relations, civilian supremacy, and the politicisation of intelligence and defence policy that would be later be explored by HR McMaster in his book on the Vietnam War. But, while McMaster's Dereliction of Duty, with its harsh criticism of McGeorge Bundy, Maxwell Taylor and Robert McNamara reads like an attempt to absolve the US Army for 'defeat' in Vietnam, Dalvi's account doesn't spare the Indian Army for its own failures.
Dalvi's book can also be compared to Marc Bloch's Strange Defeat, his account of the fall of France in 1940. Again, some distinctions emerge. Dalvi doesn't suffer from Bloch's despair, making it kinder towards its characters despite the criticism heaped upon them. Bloch's account was written during his time as a resistance fighter in Occupied France and Dalvi's, while framed during his period in captivity, was published after the army's redemption 1965 war.
As for the book itself, Dalvi's explores the political failures of post-independence India that leads to what he describes as poorly developed national aims. He lays the blame for this on not just the prime minister but on the whole country for being complacent and for being overcome by Nehru's brilliance. Additionally, he lays the blame on Krishna Menon, India's defence minister for politicising the military and for inadequately preparing it for a war in the mountains against a 'first-rate land power' and he blames Lt. Gen. Kaul for his failure as the commander of the army responsible for the eastern front.
Himalayan Blunder is an account of the military and political situation as experienced by in 1962 in the lead up to the Chinese offensives on October 20. The book explores some of the themes of civil-military relations, civilian supremacy, and the politicisation of intelligence and defence policy that would be later be explored by HR McMaster in his book on the Vietnam War. But, while McMaster's Dereliction of Duty, with its harsh criticism of McGeorge Bundy, Maxwell Taylor and Robert McNamara reads like an attempt to absolve the US Army for 'defeat' in Vietnam, Dalvi's account doesn't spare the Indian Army for its own failures.
Dalvi's book can also be compared to Marc Bloch's Strange Defeat, his account of the fall of France in 1940. Again, some distinctions emerge. Dalvi doesn't suffer from Bloch's despair, making it kinder towards its characters despite the criticism heaped upon them. Bloch's account was written during his time as a resistance fighter in Occupied France and Dalvi's, while framed during his period in captivity, was published after the army's redemption 1965 war.
As for the book itself, Dalvi's explores the political failures of post-independence India that leads to what he describes as poorly developed national aims. He lays the blame for this on not just the prime minister but on the whole country for being complacent and for being overcome by Nehru's brilliance. Additionally, he lays the blame on Krishna Menon, India's defence minister for politicising the military and for inadequately preparing it for a war in the mountains against a 'first-rate land power' and he blames Lt. Gen. Kaul for his failure as the commander of the army responsible for the eastern front.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
February 7, 2017
This is the most chilling and humiliating account of India’s war with China in the year 1962. Famously known as Indo-Sino war or Battle of Thagla. Author Brigadier John P. Dalvi was the person who led his 7 Infantry brigade in defending the lands of India and eventually became the war prisoner of China. This book documents the anguish of a war hero that was treated lesser than a human being by the political leadership of India during 1962-63.
As per Dalvi’s account we get to read the most disturbing aspects of the dire military conditions of the India during that time. A belligerent army like India, though totally unprepared, has been ordered to throw the Chinese army out of the borders which India claimed was within the Indian boundary. The Chinese launched a devastating strike against India and occupied most of the territories and pushed back the Indian army within no time. Dalvi was an upstanding officer in the Indian army was firmly believed that China does not have any right over Tibet and that the McMahon line ought to be India’s north east frontier.
It was October 20, 1959, when Havaldar Karam Singh and his 20 strong troops doing their routine border patrolling when all of a sudden nine men from the patrol team were buried under in a matter of seconds in a hailstorm of bullets. Karam singh was taken as a war prisoner. This was the beginning of the Chinese aggression for the very first time; post their war with the Korea. Though it needed time to prepare for the war with India to claim few land areas, it was pushing all its limits to wage a fully fledged war against India. Whereas Nehru, the then Prime Minister of India was preaching the peace to the world.
Read the full review here
As per Dalvi’s account we get to read the most disturbing aspects of the dire military conditions of the India during that time. A belligerent army like India, though totally unprepared, has been ordered to throw the Chinese army out of the borders which India claimed was within the Indian boundary. The Chinese launched a devastating strike against India and occupied most of the territories and pushed back the Indian army within no time. Dalvi was an upstanding officer in the Indian army was firmly believed that China does not have any right over Tibet and that the McMahon line ought to be India’s north east frontier.
It was October 20, 1959, when Havaldar Karam Singh and his 20 strong troops doing their routine border patrolling when all of a sudden nine men from the patrol team were buried under in a matter of seconds in a hailstorm of bullets. Karam singh was taken as a war prisoner. This was the beginning of the Chinese aggression for the very first time; post their war with the Korea. Though it needed time to prepare for the war with India to claim few land areas, it was pushing all its limits to wage a fully fledged war against India. Whereas Nehru, the then Prime Minister of India was preaching the peace to the world.
Read the full review here
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April 3, 2018HIMALAYAN BLUNDER – An appreciation
At the start, let me say that some books just cannot be starred and this is one of them. I had heard about this book a long time ago, but only recently had the opportunity to read it and it took me some time to fully comprehend what Brig. Dalvi had to convey.
Perhaps, not till the Napoleonic wars one comes across historical books about warfare written by those who were a part of battles. Least of all, there are practically no history books of Indian kings written by historians, let alone military historians, of their times for the past two thousand years. Brig. Dalvi’s close involvement with the Sino-Indian affairs through his long stint in the Army Head Quarters in the 50s and later on active duty in Ladakh, followed by his assignment as the Commanding Officer of the 7th Brigade that took the main thrust of the Chinese attack of 20th October 1962, and his own ultimate humiliation of any army officer to be taken as a prisoner of war, made him just the right man to narrate those events that led the grand old army of the World War II to its most crushing defeat in less than twenty years.
This book was born in a Prisoner of War Camp on a cold, bleaks night of 21st November 1962, when the Chinese Major in-charge woke him up in his solitary confinement, writes Brig. Dalvi, to inform him that the war had ended. The general outline was formed during the months of incarceration following his release seven months later, when he resolved that the Indian people must hear the truth from the only senior officer who was there throughout, who had no axe to grind, no reputation to save and was too junior to find a place in history. It was not the Indian soldier that faltered, as the general population was made to perceive, but those who held the reins in the government and complete breakdown of the military chain of command in the NEFA sector
However, reading it some fifty years after the war, the book is still an eye-opener. Only a few pages into the book made me ask some very fundamental questions. Although Pandit Nehru was and still is the receiver of all the brickbats being the Prime Minister, along with the Defence Minister Krishna Menon and General B.M. Kaul, GOC of Eastern Command, but what about the rest of the parliamentarians? Not one, other than Sardar Patel, was able to see through the Chinese designs. On 7th November 1950 he wrote an almost prophetic letter to Pandit Nehru, which is reproduced in the Appendix of the book, about his assessment of the Chinese intentions in Tibet. Sadly, he died barely a month after; else the course of history might have been different. It is ironical that the best brains that sat down to write the Constitution of India and had the perfect institutions required in a democracy in place, failed to see what was quite imminent to any military strategist. In one month’s time the whole image of the nation built over the past 15 years lay in tatters. Pandit Nehru could never recover from this humiliation.
Brig Dalvi reflects that having won independence without firing a shot, an average Indian politician has hardly any clue about military strategy or how battles are fought. The same can be said of the civilian population at large, which would be mere cliché for the population of the Western nations where conscription is a must. Generally, the countries with standing armies do not have compulsory conscription and its civilian population is often ill-informed about the armed forces. While narrating the events leading up to the final invasion by the Chinese, Brig Dalvi has attempted to educate the readers in great detail how the army works, integration of the National Policy with Military Strategy in both war and peace, and how important it was to maintain the chain of command and hierarchy, particularly at the highest level.
It is hard to believe what Brig. Dalvi writes, “It is an astonishing historical fact that most invaders have been allowed to enter undefended borders and battles have invariably been fought well inside our frontiers”. One could add that the same was true of Pakistan’s invasion of Kashmir in 1948. The battle of Thagla ridge might as well have been the first time that India fought to defend its borders. When the soldiers were asked to ‘evict the Chinese’ with pouch (army terminology of minimum) ammunition, it just reflected assessment of the situation by those in power. It reflected upon the psyche of those in command of battle formations who chose to be quite submissive to the civilian control even at the height of military conflict. When General Thapar accepted the written order handed over to him by a joint secretary at a time when the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and the Finance Minister were out of the country, it was the last straw. Brig. Dalvi observes, “To be right and overruled is not forgiven to persons in responsible positions!”
The 1962 Chinese invasion might be long behind us, but it still haunts the Indian psyche and the blame game still goes on. History is replete with many ifs. The whole story can never be known unless one has access to the Chinese plans that led up to their final assault. Brig. Dalvi records that so emboldened were the Chinese in their advantageous position, they lit bonfires to keep themselves warm on the night before the attack. The last time this happened was probably in 1802, when the French lit fires in front of the Russians on the night preceding the famous Battle of Austerlitz.
But had we learnt our lessons from it? Three years later the Indian army redeemed itself after the 1965 war with Pakistan when the then Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, gave the full command to the Army Chief once the war began. Hardly anyone remembers that even one of the Indian army’s ablest soldiers, Sam Maneckshaw, was court-martialed with trumped up charges around these times. Fortunately, the three generals who sat through the court martial were men of grit and integrity. The 1971 war of Bangladesh under his command has become a case study in practically all military academies around the world.
In the end, Brig. Dalvi quotes the British military historian, Corelli Barnett, “It is generally true that the Army is an extension of society; military disaster is often national decline exposed in the violence of battle”.
I consider this book a “Must Read” for our current generation to ask and understand what the armed forces truly stand for. Although the face of modern warfare has radically changed since the Indo-Chinese conflict, there is still a lot to take away from this book at all levels.
Also: Read my blog: An Officer and an Executive
At the start, let me say that some books just cannot be starred and this is one of them. I had heard about this book a long time ago, but only recently had the opportunity to read it and it took me some time to fully comprehend what Brig. Dalvi had to convey.
Perhaps, not till the Napoleonic wars one comes across historical books about warfare written by those who were a part of battles. Least of all, there are practically no history books of Indian kings written by historians, let alone military historians, of their times for the past two thousand years. Brig. Dalvi’s close involvement with the Sino-Indian affairs through his long stint in the Army Head Quarters in the 50s and later on active duty in Ladakh, followed by his assignment as the Commanding Officer of the 7th Brigade that took the main thrust of the Chinese attack of 20th October 1962, and his own ultimate humiliation of any army officer to be taken as a prisoner of war, made him just the right man to narrate those events that led the grand old army of the World War II to its most crushing defeat in less than twenty years.
This book was born in a Prisoner of War Camp on a cold, bleaks night of 21st November 1962, when the Chinese Major in-charge woke him up in his solitary confinement, writes Brig. Dalvi, to inform him that the war had ended. The general outline was formed during the months of incarceration following his release seven months later, when he resolved that the Indian people must hear the truth from the only senior officer who was there throughout, who had no axe to grind, no reputation to save and was too junior to find a place in history. It was not the Indian soldier that faltered, as the general population was made to perceive, but those who held the reins in the government and complete breakdown of the military chain of command in the NEFA sector
However, reading it some fifty years after the war, the book is still an eye-opener. Only a few pages into the book made me ask some very fundamental questions. Although Pandit Nehru was and still is the receiver of all the brickbats being the Prime Minister, along with the Defence Minister Krishna Menon and General B.M. Kaul, GOC of Eastern Command, but what about the rest of the parliamentarians? Not one, other than Sardar Patel, was able to see through the Chinese designs. On 7th November 1950 he wrote an almost prophetic letter to Pandit Nehru, which is reproduced in the Appendix of the book, about his assessment of the Chinese intentions in Tibet. Sadly, he died barely a month after; else the course of history might have been different. It is ironical that the best brains that sat down to write the Constitution of India and had the perfect institutions required in a democracy in place, failed to see what was quite imminent to any military strategist. In one month’s time the whole image of the nation built over the past 15 years lay in tatters. Pandit Nehru could never recover from this humiliation.
Brig Dalvi reflects that having won independence without firing a shot, an average Indian politician has hardly any clue about military strategy or how battles are fought. The same can be said of the civilian population at large, which would be mere cliché for the population of the Western nations where conscription is a must. Generally, the countries with standing armies do not have compulsory conscription and its civilian population is often ill-informed about the armed forces. While narrating the events leading up to the final invasion by the Chinese, Brig Dalvi has attempted to educate the readers in great detail how the army works, integration of the National Policy with Military Strategy in both war and peace, and how important it was to maintain the chain of command and hierarchy, particularly at the highest level.
It is hard to believe what Brig. Dalvi writes, “It is an astonishing historical fact that most invaders have been allowed to enter undefended borders and battles have invariably been fought well inside our frontiers”. One could add that the same was true of Pakistan’s invasion of Kashmir in 1948. The battle of Thagla ridge might as well have been the first time that India fought to defend its borders. When the soldiers were asked to ‘evict the Chinese’ with pouch (army terminology of minimum) ammunition, it just reflected assessment of the situation by those in power. It reflected upon the psyche of those in command of battle formations who chose to be quite submissive to the civilian control even at the height of military conflict. When General Thapar accepted the written order handed over to him by a joint secretary at a time when the Prime Minister, Defence Minister and the Finance Minister were out of the country, it was the last straw. Brig. Dalvi observes, “To be right and overruled is not forgiven to persons in responsible positions!”
The 1962 Chinese invasion might be long behind us, but it still haunts the Indian psyche and the blame game still goes on. History is replete with many ifs. The whole story can never be known unless one has access to the Chinese plans that led up to their final assault. Brig. Dalvi records that so emboldened were the Chinese in their advantageous position, they lit bonfires to keep themselves warm on the night before the attack. The last time this happened was probably in 1802, when the French lit fires in front of the Russians on the night preceding the famous Battle of Austerlitz.
But had we learnt our lessons from it? Three years later the Indian army redeemed itself after the 1965 war with Pakistan when the then Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, gave the full command to the Army Chief once the war began. Hardly anyone remembers that even one of the Indian army’s ablest soldiers, Sam Maneckshaw, was court-martialed with trumped up charges around these times. Fortunately, the three generals who sat through the court martial were men of grit and integrity. The 1971 war of Bangladesh under his command has become a case study in practically all military academies around the world.
In the end, Brig. Dalvi quotes the British military historian, Corelli Barnett, “It is generally true that the Army is an extension of society; military disaster is often national decline exposed in the violence of battle”.
I consider this book a “Must Read” for our current generation to ask and understand what the armed forces truly stand for. Although the face of modern warfare has radically changed since the Indo-Chinese conflict, there is still a lot to take away from this book at all levels.
Also: Read my blog: An Officer and an Executive
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