Jeśli dążymy do lepszej przyszłości, czas na nowo przeanalizować podróż ludzkości od samych jej początków.
Co więziło ludzkość w ubóstwie przez większość naszego istnienia? Co spowodowało ogromną metamorfozę standardu życia w ciągu ostatnich dwóch stuleci? I wreszcie co doprowadziło do pojawienia się ogromnych nierówności między poszczególnymi regionami świata?
Odpowiedzi na te pytania mogą zmienić nasz sposób postrzegania przeszłości i kształtowania przyszłości. W okresie, w którym nasz gatunek stoi w obliczu największego kryzysu ekologicznego w dziejach człowieka, książka Tajemnice podróży ludzkości przedstawia ważne i ponadczasowe prawdy, a także uniwersalne i głęboko humanistyczne zalecenia, które dają nadzieję na lepszą przyszłość: równość płci, inwestycje w edukację oraz godzenie różnorodności ze spójnością społeczną to warunki nie tylko rozkwitu naszego gatunku, ale także jego przetrwania.
گلر در این کتاب خواندنی یک ادعا و یک بررسی مهم رو انجام میده. او مدعی است که زندگی انسان تا دویست سیصد سال گذشته از یک سطح برخوردار بوده .بزرگترین نکتهای هم که برای تایید ادعاش بهش استناد میکنه نظریه مالتوس است. نظریه مالتوس هم به طور خلاصه میگه جمعیت بیشتر و بیشتر میشه و یک رشد تصاعدی رو تجربه میکنه اما از نظر غذا و خوراکیجات این رشد تصاعدی نیست و اساسا به پای جمعیت نمیرسه، پس در نتیجه جمعیت زیاد شده رو به کاهش میره و روز از نو روزی از نو! تا اینکه انقلاب صنعتی رخ میده و اساسا از نظر گلر این انقلاب صنعتی است که باعث پیشرفت بشر و شکستن و رد نظریه مالتوس میشه.اینها رو در بخش اول کتاب میخونیم.
بخش دوم کتاب میاد میگه خب کشورها پیشرفت کردند اما یه عده بیشتر و یه عده کمتر.چرا؟ چراییش رو میاد صحبت میکنه و دلایل این نابرابری رو توضیح میده. احتمالا ذهنتون رفت سمت «اسلحه،فولاد،میکرب از جرد دایموند» یا «چرا ملتها شکست میخورند از دارون عجم اغلو». ذهنتون درس حدس زده.قسمت دم کتاب مثل این دو کتاب معروف به چرایی نابرابری میپردازه. مطالب گلر از انسجام خوبی برخوردار بود که شخصا تو این سبک کتابها واسم خیلی مهمه.مسائل مختلف و متعددی هم مطرح میشه. من نمیتوانم برخی مواردش رو رد/تایید کنم چون اطلاعاتی در این زمینه ندارم، در واقع این ضعف کتاب نیست و ضعف منِ خواننده است. ولی از اینکه کتاب باعث شد محرک مطالعاتی در زمینههایی مثل انقلاب صنعتی واسم فراهم کنه خیلی زیاد راضیام. نظر نهاییم در مورد کتاب باید زمانی باشه که اطلاعاتمو بیشتر کنم . والسلام..
کلان روایت زندگی اجتماعی؛ چرا دوست داریم یک روایت منسجم از تاریخ بشر داشته باشیم؟
0- از این مدل کتابها زیاد دیده ایم، از "انسان خردمند" و "اسلحه فولاد میکروب" تا حتی کتابهای نوبلیستهای امسال اقتصاد. منظورم عجماوغلو و دوستان با کتابهای "چرا ملتها شکست میخورند" و "راه باریک" است. در این کتابها (کلی مثال دیگه هم داریم ازشون و به اندازه زیادی هم با فارسی ترجمه شده اند) نویسنده تلاش میکند یک روایت منسجم و کلان روایت/Grand Narrative از تاریخ بشر بدست بدهد. خیلی ادعای بزرگی است، اما منطقی میتواند باشد، بشر همواره با اسطوره و دین میتوانسته جهان را توضیح دهد و در این عصر مدرن، انحصار روایت تاریخ از دین و اسطوره گرفته شده است. وقتی نتوان تاریخ را با یک روایت واحد شرح داد، به وضعیتِ تاریخیِ نسبتا جاکَنشده و بیبنیاد میرسیم؛ اینجا علم مدرن (اعم از علوم تجربی و انسانیات و علوم اجتماعی و...) وارد کار میشود تا بدیل/Alternative معرفی کند. بدیهی است که روشِ ساخت و "توجیه" این کلان روایت در بستر و گفتمان دینی با علمی از زمین تا آسمان فرق دارد، اما شاید بتوان رانههای و علتهای واحدی را براشون برشمرد. رانهٔ انسجام در تاریخی که جزئی از آنیم.
1- این آقای ادد گلر هم در این کتاب بسیار مختصر تلاش میکند روایتی منسجم از تاریخ بشر را به دست بدهد. در مقام قیاس با دیگر کتب این ژانر (ژانر "کلان روایت تاریخ بشر") کتاب گلر کمادعاترین و در حد و اندازهترین است. یعنی چند ادعا دارد و در حد خود تلاش میکند آن ادعاها را مورد دفاع قرار دهد. مدعیات شاذ کم دارد و برای همین در اغلب اوقات کار سختی در پیش ندارد.
2- واقعا مطالعه این کلان روایتهای تاریخی مفید است آن هم از حیثهای مختلف. حتی برای کسی که بخواهد اندکی جهاز هاضمهٔ مفهومیِ غربیها رو بفهمه، مطالعه چند اثر که مدعیات کلان روایتی دارند، محتوای تحلیلی و تطبیقی خوبی را میتواند بسازد.
3- در تاریخ اندیشهٔ اقتصادی، بعد از آدام اسمیت که به نوعی سرسلسلهٔ اقتصاد به عنوان رشتهای خودبسنده است، به ریکاردو و مالتوس میرسیم. آدام اسمیت رو "اقتصاددان خوشبین" نام گذاری میکنیم و مالتوس را "اقتصاددان بدبین". مالتوس جمعیتشناس بوده است و با توجه به سابقهٔ تاریخی بشر و وضعیت پیشین جوامع انسانی، یک "دام مالتوسی" را برای جمعیت مدل میکند. یعنی جمعیت کم است و میتوان با افزایش جمعیت (فرزندآوری بیشتر) نیروی کار را بیشتر کرد. اما خب، بازده زمین کاهنده به مقیاس است (خیلی ساده بدون تکنولوژی و مواد زیستی، داریم در مورد ابتدای انقلاب صنعتی و اواسط قرن 18 حرف میزنیم، وقتی نیروی کار بیشتر میشود زمین نسبت به نیروی کار آخری که اضافه میکنیم، تولید نهایی کمتری خواهد داشت. خلاصه نیروی کار اضافه باعث تولید نزولی، به نفهوم مشتق فکر کنید، میشود). چون بازده نسبت به مقیاس زمین، که اصلیترین منبع تولید در عصر پیشا صنعتی است، کاهنده به مقیاس است، به نسبت با افزایش جمعیت تولید افزایش پیدا نمیکند و سرانهٔ تولید بسیار سرشکن میشود و قحطی رخ میدهد. قحطی رخ میدهد و جمعیت کاسته میشود و با کاسته شدن جمعیت دوباره انگیزه برای فرزندآوری بیشتر میشود. با این روند در یک چرخهٔ افزایش جمعیت و کاهش جمعیت گیر میکنیم. دادههای تاریخیِ پیش از مالتوس در توجیه نظریهٔ او همراه اند. یعنی در تاریخ بشر پیشا صنعتی این چرخههای افزایش و کاهش جمعیت را میبینیم. اما مالتوس اشتباه کرد چون تغییر ماهویِ زمانهٔ خود را نفهمید. در عصر صنعتی، تولید دیگر مبتنی بر زمین نیست که بازدهی ثابت یا کاهنده به مقیاس (نیروی کار) داشته باشد و دقیقا از نقطهای که مالتوس بود، دیگر نظریهٔ آن نمیتوانست ادامهٔ تاریخ بشر را توضیح دهد. شرح گلر از این نظریهٔ مالتوس خیلی خوب بود. کلی چیز میز دیگه هم تو کتاب هستا، ولی فقط این یکی رو الان شرح دادم.
4- ترجمهٔ علیرضا شفیعینسب که ترجمان منتشر کرده است خیلی خوب بود. البته متن انگلیسی نیز هیچ دستاندازی ندارد و متن رله و در دستی است.
راستی کتاب از منابع درسیِ دورهٔ "تاریخ اقتصادی جهان" از فرهاد نیلی بود. نیلی، فرهادشون، هرچی بگه خوبه. البته کلاسی و طرح درسی که امسال داره خیلی بهتر از طرح درسی بود که با ما داشت. قشنگ یادگیری داشته :)))
The Journey of Humanity by economist Oded Galor is a relatively short book covering the broad sweep of human economic history (it is also very readable and does not require any economics background). It seeks to explain two huge mysteries: (1) the mystery of growth whereby for ten thousand years following the invention of agriculture innovation led to larger populations but not higher per capita incomes—until growth took off exponentially in the Industrial Revolution and (2) the mystery of inequality whereby massive differences emerged between countries (he barely addresses inequality within countries, which is a smaller factor in global inequality).
Galor tells this big story while drawing on a range of recent academic research, much of it is his own but also Daron Acemoglu, Melissa Dell, and many other economists who are using modern empirical methods to exploit quasi natural experiments to study how (possibly) random differences in the past cast a shadow centuries or even millennia later. This thorough grounding in research sets it apart from some other more speculative big think books—although some of the research ends up confirming, or at least corroborating, various speculations.
For example, Thomas Malthus had a big idea in 1798 when he argued that innovation would increase the population but not per capita incomes because population would adjust up or down to keep people at subsistence. Galor, in this case drawing on his own peer-reviewed research, looks at quasi natural experiments like the correlation between millennia old “technology” (defined as the timing of the neolithic revolution or natural variety of crops) and data for 1500 (it’s highly correlated with population density but not at all correlated with per capita incomes, which themselves barely vary across places).
The explanation of the takeoff into sustained growth is a little bit less satisfying, but that’s partly what happens when you only have one first sustained takeoff—and it happens at a time when the world is globally connected so you don’t have the (somewhat) independent data points you have for studying other issues. Galor argues was a situation where small changes can lead to a large change—which he analogizes to “bifurcation theory” in mathematics.
An important part of Galor’s story for the takeoff is human capital. Child labor became less valuable because of machines and was abolished. Women’s labor became more valuable and they were paid more. All of this created more of an incentive to invest in children which ultimately led to a Demographic Transition where birth rates plummeted. (This section too has a lot of quasi natural experiments, like using distance from the village where the steam engine was invented to measure technology and its impact on subsequent demand for education.)
The second half of the book is about the rise of inequality between countries. He eschews any discussion of the growth theory of Solow, Lucas, Romer and the like and goes—which he briefly dismisses as “proximate”—and instead instead goes to the deeper, underlying theories: (1) institutions, (2) culture, (3) geography, and (4) population diversity.
The institutional discussion largely draws on work by Daron Acemoglu and co-authors on the importance of “inclusive” institutions instead of “extractive” institutions (describing their quasi natural experiment around settler mortality, leading to different types of colonization, different institutions, and income levels today.
The cultural discussion, together with Joseph Henrich’s excellent The WEIRDest People in the World: How the West Became Psychologically Peculiar and Particularly Prosperous, has made me take culture more seriously. He presents some quasi natural experimental evidence for the Max Weber’s thesis in the Protestant Ethic (including things like distance from Wittenberg as a random treatment for Protestantism) and an argument that better agricultural land has led people to have lower discount rates (again, similar types of evidence).
Geography tells the familiar story of the tsetse fly leading to no livestock in much of Africa, malaria degrading work, and the difference in native crops in Eurasia (possibly because of its East-West orientation) and the Americas (because of its North-South orientation). He also has some interesting links between culture and geography, for example linking societal views on gender equity to the type of soil they have which determined whether they used plows (handled by strong men) or hoes (handled by men or women).
Finally, the fourth underlying story is the one that Galor’s own research has advanced and the idea that is the most intriguing but frankly also feels the most speculative to me. Specifically he points out that migratory distance from Africa is closely related to population diversity—which is very high in Ethiopia but very low in Bolivia because of the “serial founder effect”. He argues that diversity has a plus (lots of ideas from combining different perspectives) and a minus (clashing) and that this leads to an inverted U-shaped relationship between population diversity and various economic outcomes like per capita income.
In many ways the evidence the book presents, drawing on a lot of peer-reviewed research, is much better than what we had even twenty years ago in thinking about economic growth. In other ways, however, a lot of the relationships between ancient variables and present ones (e.g., when was maize first introduced in Chinese areas and what was there economic status much later) could easily have alternative explanations or miss big points.
A book of this nature relies on fortuitous reversals that might make sense ex post but how sure are we? For example, Europe’s geography led to many competition states and China’s to a single unified state, the later was better for the economy through 1500 but the former was better after. Yes, there’s a decent story. But am I sure? Of course not.
Moreover there is a lot that it does not explain, that probably depends on the more mundane issues covered by more proximate theories of growth and some of the standard economic policy issues like the importance of avoiding and resolving crises. For example, why is the United States so much richer than Argentina? Or why did China take off when it did but Brazil did not? Or even just variations in income within regions.
Galor concludes with a short and relatively superficial discussion of the public policy implications of these ideas. From my perspective the fact that the book does not explain issues like the United States vs. Argentina also is related to its overly facile dismissal of the “Washington consensus”. Of course it ignored culture, institutions, population diversity and geography—but by the way most of those are not changeable and there is enormous variation within regions that are similar in those regards. Nothing about the deep roots of incomes is a reason why a country, for example, should run large budget deficits financed with short-term foreign borrowing or have a budget devoted to subsidies while neglecting primary education or have weak property rights.
Galor’s policy argument instead is that “As the great cogs that have governed the journey of humanity continue to turn, measures that enhance future orientation, education and innovation, along with gender equality, pluralism and respect for difference, hold the key for universal prosperity.” It’s hard to argue with this—and most of these are good in their own right even if they’re not key to growth. Moreover most of them are actually emphasized by international institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (at least today).
Ultimately, however, what I liked about the book is the way that it draws on a rich set of research that is attempting to turn history into social science. And in the process coming up with some surprising and interesting answers that even if they do not help us change the world can help us understand some of the most fascinating economic developments humanity has faced.
I am surprised by the good reviews that this book has, which can only be understood if the reader lacks training in the fields that the author analyzes. Or because we have lost our critical sense so much that we want to believe a such a simple fairy tale...
Although some compare this work with Sapiens (Harari) or Jared Diamond's already classic, the differences are immense. While the first proposed a macrocosmic vision of history in an informative but fresh way, and while the second knew how to combine different branches of knowledge with an innovative result, in this book we find none of that. Maybe it might be said that the bests sections of the book are those in which he copy/pastes some interesting (but very well known) facts about geography and history (some of them previously divulged by other popularizers before him, like Peter Watson or Diamond...)
The book is basically a pamphlet, unidirectional and flat, where an apology is made for the current world so "pink" that it intoxicates. For those who know history, the analysis of the industrial revolution (although it has a part of reason) is merely a perspective so one-sided that I can't believe it's clumsy as a result of mere simplification. See the bibliography and you will realize that most of the sources are of HIS harvest or from one-sided economists. There is an absolute lack of good historians in his bibliography. (And when they are cited is just an anecdote).
Galor is unable to move away from his time and his world. When he talks about technology, he does not differentiate between types; when he talks about education he is only thinking of the current (and A very determined) pattern; and a long etcetera. Please, how can you reduce the increase in schooling and the disappearance of the gender gap only to decimononic industrialists? What about the political revolutionary process, what about the weakening of religious power, what about ideologies...? Please, Galor, Marxists advocated the kind of education you say was only defended by industrialists! Obviously you don't know that... And, do you really think that legislation and the New States didn't play a fundamental role? If you aren't lying consciously, you have been driven mad. I understand know why only economists clap their hands. You are saying, basically, that businessmen are the saviors of humanity. If you had said the same about proletarians, kings or peasants, i would have critized it too. There is so much Oded Galor forgets or ignores... it all comes down to weak correlations! But, anyway, they look so PERFECT that people could believe this is the truth.
It seems that, for him, human life is mere Darwinism of competition and struggle where we have (almost all) reached total perfection. For him, life is just economics and technology (and a strange scientific delusion about biological variety related to progress). All is about reproduction, money and commodities. That's all, People in the past were miserable and bitter ("indistinguishable from a squirrel", in his words...but since the INdustrial Revolution, happiness and completennes has arrived. And he is going to tell us how it is possible and why some territories haven't (still) reach this utopy. He often highlights that nothing bad could happen to this utopy if we go on ahead, without asking ourselves anything (!), the unstoppable way chosen by entrepeneurs, banks and industrialists. According to him progress will always bring more democracy (which one? China will soon be a democracy) and no matter if we have suffered colonization or wars (he forgets more than one hundred conflicts) because progress has brought us more comfort. That's all, no more questioning.
I admit that, in part, this book brings me sadness. Such a vaunted author and yet does not have the slightest ingredients to be considered a critical or insightful work. And no, don't get confused. It is not an ideological problem (type: socialism versus liberalism). The problem is that it plays with some very reductionist elements (although there is something true in his discourse) to draw tricky conclusions, which have been said since the beginning.
In short, the entire book is flooded with a series of a priori (and general historical ignorance) that is only saved because, in the second part, at least comments certain anecdotal facts. True facts (in part), well known to historians (by the way). The thing is that, even here, they are a kind of puzzle that he makes fit as he wants within the utopian logic from which he started from the outset.
Don't get us wrong. It is not that something in his approach to economic development is not true (although there are things that a historian would never accept), it is that the perspective is scientific, ahistorical, anti-philosophical, uncritical... It looks like political propaganda, politically correct...aiming at understanding the whole with broken toys.
Shameful, one of the most pamphleteering outreach works I've ever seen. Either Galor really believes he has unlocked the secret of the cosmos or this is populist pamphlet of the worst ilk...
(And, still, I repeat that the second part has many entertaining "stories", but if you have a certain historical culture, you may even know them... Harari, Diamond, Watson and others have already commented on them)
This book is the culmination and summary of 30 years of research - everything published in the best peer-reviewed journals. These many articles that form the backbone of the book are based on complicated mathematical models and/or statistical analysis. Yet, the book contains not a single equation or formula. It is very easy to read, well written, and no prior knowledge is needed. Galor is quite often named as potential candidate for the Nobelprize. With this book he got a remarkable and unprecedented deal (for an economist) with his publisher: it was translated at the very same time into almost 30 languages.
If you know Harari's bestseller Sapiens - read this book also. You will soon realize it is scientifically way more serious. And if you did not read Harari - read Galor first.
Why did humanity get prosperous after hundreds of thousands of years of stagnation? And why do we observe such high levels of inequality between regions and countries today? These are the two main questions that Galor aims to answer in his Journey of Humanity.
His answer as to why, after for 99.9% of human history, we broke out of the so-called Malthusian trap is that innovation was slowly increasing over the course of humanity until at a certain point parents decided to invest in the education and upbringing of their kids to equip them for a world that suddenly required high human capital. This lead to falling fertility rates and the subsequent escape of the age-old poverty trap, seeing per-capita living standards rising for the first time in human history. Before, any of the ingenious human inventions only led to temporary income increases which in turn led to higher fertility rates and these eventually brought per-capita income down close to subsistence levels - because more mouths needed to be fed.
With regards to the second question he states that cultural and institutional factors matter, and they do explain a large part of the variation in prosperity that we observe today, but eventually these are in turn dependent on other features such as climate and geography - alas they evolved "endogenously". For Galor they do not matter as much as they do for other pundits in the very long run, as these obstacles to growth can be overcome.
Summarizing a history of 300,000 years in this relatively short book is a big challenge, but the Israeli-American economist Oded Galor attempted it anyway. I found his ideas about human evolution, the effects of inequality, and the importance of diversity to be interesting and relevant. His references to Malthus and non-Western societies also added more depth to the story. However, the book lacks some depth and clarity when discussing complex topics, which may make it less easy to understand compared to the works of that other Israeli author, Yuval Noah Harari.
Note: for someone reading approximately 100 books per year (such as me) I apparently already read this book 2 years ago which was a surprise to me as I couldn't recollect having it read before. If this is a sign of me getting older or just the fact that it didn't make such an impression on me I really don't know - I hope for the last but fear the former ...
The reading experience here is much like studying a college textbook, a little tough for the casual reader. Yet the theory and information presented is well-expressed, fascinating and ultimately hopeful for what the future holds for humanity.
I received an arc of this new book in exchange for my honest review.
Până acum două sute de ani omenirea s-a aflat sub imperiul capcanei malthusiene. Orice creștere a venitului și a nivelului de trai ca urmare a unei inovații tehnologice erau rapid anulate de creșterea populației. Nivelul de trai revenea la pragul de subzistență. Dimensiunea populației creștea lent, însă. Ceea ce se va dovedi decisiv pe termen lung.
O populație mai mare crește probabilitatea apariției inovațiior tehnologice. Dimensiunea populației și ritmul inovațiilor tehnologice au crescut lent până când a fost atins un punct critic, moment în care s-a pus în mișcare o așa-numită "tranziție de fază". E o metafora împrumutată din fizică. Trecerea de la starea lichidă la starea gazoasă este o tranziție de fază. Acea traziție de fază a început cu industrializarea care a solicitat mai multă forță de muncă calificată, care a stimulat la rândul ei apariția educației de masă. Alfabetizarea și nevoia de specialiști au dus la scăderea natalității. Venitul suplimentar era investit în educația copiilor, nu într-o familie mai numeroasă. Tranziția demografică este adevărata tranziție de fază. Omenirea a ieșit din capcana malthusiană. Creșterea nivelului de trai nu a mai fost anulată de creșterea populației.
Acesta este șirul de argumente al autorului, redat în câteva cuvinte. Se bazează pe teoria matematică a bifurcației.
Written by one of the most influential economists in the field of growth and development, this book is breathtaking in its scope and ambition. Oded Galor’s initial research in the early 1990s highlighted the negative effects of income inequality on economic growth, with the research being published just as the topic was about to become fashionable. Not surprisingly, that paper remains one of the most widely cited in the field. Subsequently, he developed, with peers and doctoral students, a series of progressively more ambitious mathematical models, and rigorous empirical research on the interactions between technological progress, income inequality, and economic growth ultimately leading to a research agenda that went well beyond just encapsulating the 20th century to first, the industrial revolution, then Malthusian epoch, and ultimately covering the entire history of humanity. It would not be an understatement that he is possibly one of the most ambitious thinkers today. This book synthesizes much of his own work complemented by a very active area of quantitative and empirical research in economics, history, and quantitative anthropology, that has benefitted from the data revolution.
The book is in two parts – the first part begins with the evolution of homo-sapiens and their movement out of Africa, the emergence of settled agriculture in various parts of the world, the slow beginnings of technological progress, ultimately triggering the industrial revolution, and culminating in modern economic growth with a glance to what the future might hold. While some of this might seem similar in these respects to other books by Jared Diamond, David Landes, and Hariri, the viewpoint here is quite distinct. In Galor’s view once the neolithic revolution was in place, the wheels were set in motion for the industrial revolution and the subsequent burst of technological progress. Wars, plagues, etc affect the speed and the location of the regime switch and are not details to be bogged down with. Central to his view of the world is not just technological progress but the dynamics of the inter-relationship between technological progress, education, and fertility rates – all affecting each other in non-linear ways. In this respect the first part, while encapsulating much of his own highly cited research, also sets it apart from other big-think books.
The second part of the book works its way in reverse. Having established that the humans, given their initial evolution of the brain and nature’s bounty, were inevitably on the path to the industrial revolution and declining fertility, why Europe, and the UK in particular? Why did Europe and its offshoots leave the rest of the world behind so suddenly? Here, in each chapter, he goes further and further back in time – beginning with colonization and its disparate effect on political institutions – which is attributed to geographical differences. Going further back, he also looks at the emergence of cultures that were more well adapted for the industrial revolution vs others (e.g. the importance of long-term orientation and individualism). He highlights the role of geography drawing on a large research body that has been very persuasive in documenting the importance of soil types, climates, different types of crop suitability, and ultimately going back to the neolithic revolution. Last, and perhaps most ambitiously, he argues that the non-phenotypical (non-observable) genetic diversity within the population leads to a tradeoff between trust and innovation. It is important to note what he refers to here is genetic diversity within a population group (e.g. within Caucasian Scots). This genetic diversity is a well-known function of the distance of the migratory path for humans from Africa (as has been documented by geneticists).
The book is very distinct in terms of how it is written – it starts from the emergence of humans, and the first half works its way forward to the present day. The second half moves in reverse – working its way back to the emergence of Homo-sapiens out of Africa. To its credit, the book while including a multitude of anecdotes is well-paced with the main text being an eminently reasonable 240 pages.
You may or may not agree with portions of the text but will certainly be forced to think about the progress of humanity differently.
The Journey of Humanity takes on the huge task of explaining how humanity got to this point, which the author calls the Mystery of Growth. The second half explains why this growth has not been universal across nations, which the author calls the Mystery of Inequality.
From the Malthusian (hunter-gatherer) epoch to the Neolithic (agricultural) Revolution to the Industrial Revolution and concluding now in the Technological Era, the book looks closely at what drives lifestyle improvements. Has the Demographic Transition, where families have less children due to the cost of training them in advanced skills, promoted prosperity? Did allowing non-native citizens to share in the nation’s wealth increase or decrease growth?
These and more questions are answered within The Journey of Humanity. However, the author does not provide a suggested solution beyond a rather simplistic “don’t force a developed world solution on a developing world’s entirely different culture”. In addition, the book is written like a college textbook with a large and technical vocabulary that may trouble some readers looking for a more popular science level of prose. 3 stars.
Thanks to Dutton Books and NetGalley for a copy in exchange for my honest review.
Nu. Nu prea bine. Foarte repetitiva. Învârte informație deja știută, o parte din ea chiar din gimnaziu, multă provine din carti deja scrise de Jared Diamond sau Robert Kaplan. Argumente fragile, insuficient dezvoltate. Dacă tot a fost în căutarea acelui fenomen care poate explica de ce unele natiuni au prosperat si alte nu, despre el trebuia sa vorbească. O face doar in ultimul capitol, pe scurt. Un fel de eseu străveziu.
El profesor Oded Galor, en este más que ameno ensayo, nos presenta su teoría acerca del crecimiento y la desigualdad. Muy bien presentado, con el apoyo necesario en datos estadísticos, y una narración muy bien hilvanada. Muy recomendable.
אני עוקב אחרי אורי כץ כבר עשר שנים, מאז תקופת פייפאל - נחשפתי לימין כלכלי משכיל שלא מתבייש בעצמו, ורז לב הכיר לי את הבלוג, ומאז - ובעוצמה כפולה מאז המעבר לכפר סבא - אני מטפח בתוכי קרנף ליברלי שנהנה לקרוא דעות שבעבר תפסתי כהשחתה מוסרית לא אטרקטיבית שאסור אסור לדבר עליה בחברה, בטח לא בחברה מעורבת
הספר מעניין ברובו, ועוסק בשני נושאים מרכזיים - המלכודת המלתוסיאנית והבריחה ממנה, ומפץ הציליויזציות - הסיבה לפערים העצומים במהירות הבריחה של חלקי העולם השונים.
אני חושב שהסיבה שלקח לי כל כך הרבה זמן והייתי צריך להכריח את עצמי לסיים היא שכמעט לא חידשו לי כאן כלום. הרבה מאד היה מוכר לי מהבלוגים של אורי. החלקים של מפץ הציליויזציות נראו לי כמו העתק חיוור של רובים חיידקים ופלדה, ובקטע שבו נטען שסיבה יסודית לפער בין האומות היא המגוון האנושי, היה חסר לי מאד דיון רציני בטענה הגזענית המתבקשת (למה רק מגוון, אולי גם הבדל משמעותי בין האומות והגזעים?) - כמובן שהייתי שמח לפסילה גורפת של איחסה כזה, אבל גם אם לא נראה לי שעדיפה איזשהי התייחסות...
עוד משהו שמאד הפריע לי - בסוג כזה של ספר, שיושב אצלי על אותו מדף מנטאלי כמו רובים חיידקים וקיצור תולדות, אתה מצפה לתיאור עבודות, תובנות ואנקדוטות של הוגים ענקיים - אדם סמית, לוק, קיינס, אולי אפילו בודהה. בספר הזה יש כאלה, אבל לצידן שזורות התייחסות להברקות, תובנות ומחקרים של כותבי הספר עצמן - רק כנראה כדי לרכך את האנטגוניזם הם קוראים לעצמם בשמות פרטיים. מעבר לזה שקשה לי להאמין בלוקל-פטריוטיזם הזה של חידושים כל כך רבים שבאו מציון, יש לי בעיה סגנונית עם הספר - אני רק יכול לנחש את עוצמת ההייטריות שנח-הררי היה סופג מאורי עצמו אם היה משלב בספר שלו "ואז הבין יובל משהו שלא עלה על דעתם של חוקרים קודמים..."
An astonishingly clear sighted and concise examination of the origins of wealth and inequality, that systematically traces the path back to the fundamental causes of the state of the world today. Brilliant read, most recommended.
No creo que este libro vaya a satisfacer del todo a nadie, ni a profanos en la materia ni a entendidos y especialistas. Los primeros encontraran el libro lleno de lugares comunes, y lo poco que no conocían solo les servirá para unir las fronteras de los conocimientos que ya poseían a poco que fueran aplicados en el instituto u observadores de la realidad cotidiana; a los segundos, porque no hay nada nuevo ni original. Quizá esto último sea lo más decepcionante, la constante sensación de repetición y pereza intelectual.
La historia y la sociología sean quizá dos de las disciplinas que más se ajusten al zeitgeist reinante, y este ensayo se ajusta con absoluta precisión a la ortodoxia de nuestros días. No encontraréis ninguna reflexión incómoda que pueda aparecer por la interpretación de unos datos objetivos, como por ejemplo hacía Noah Harari -con el cual, por cierto, discrepo en casi todo, en especial cuando trata el tema que me toca. Galor es superficial y predecible, bastante aburrido por su convencional aproximación al tema. Aunque, eso sí, cumple con lo que se propone, a saber, explicar el crecimiento de la humanidad y la consecuente desigualdad económica.
Por supuesto, desde el enfoque más occidental, anglosajón y protestante, pese a ser israelí y, presupongo, judío.
O livro eh legal, principalmente pra quem nunca teve muito contato com o assunto. Mas sinto que não aprendi muita coisa com ele.
A primeira parte eh uma mistura de sapiens com história econômica de graduação. A segunda parte é basicamente um curso de desenvolvimento de mestrado/doutorado.
A very good but perhaps not great book. Does a good job staying focused on the biggest of human stories, evolution, survival, growth, inequality and the future while remaining interesting throughout.
There is a bold target to hit - a unified theory of humanity from stagnation to sustained growth. Highlighting what underlying forces drive this, by providing deep insights backed by data not just the usual surface level explanations. So, a big topic and clearly one with a positive grand arc! The author clearly sees human progress and thinks it is a good thing, as do I.
It is a good sign that the author comes very close to his goal. I have only minor quibbles thuth be told. We have an engaging and at times original book, with the story of growth told forwards and inequality told backwards - all the way back to Africa, novel. Those first steps out of Africa become very important.
We begin with the evolution of powerful brains, why only once? And move quickly into more economic based talk where the author is more comfortable, yes we have had material improvements since we walked out of Africa, yet not pet person until recently. Humanity was gripped in the Mathulsean poverty trap until recent centuries.
Material gains driven by more people and a demand for more invention where cancelled out by more mouths to feed until an eqlibrium was established. The data does work consistently when combined with the timing of neolithic and agriculturial revolutions.
We have the big civilisations first in water based areas. Homogenous civilisations. Control, stability. Europe for example could only thrive much later with better technology as competition drove growth and sutible differences in political institutions, coupled with fewer though better educated children, allowed for the escape from the poverty trap.
The escape out of the trap would require a large population size and, population diversity. The core of his original argument and data is this population diversity aspect. The other reasons are well accepted, and if I may say better explained in say Youval Harari's "Sapiens" or individually in specialist books.
The claims on how important genetic diversity is are up for debate. He claims a sweet spot on a hump shaped graph. Not too diverse or a lack of social cohesion hampers growth, nor too homogenous as a lack of niches and variation will do the same, especially once new technologies are added to the mix.
The USA today comes out as the best place to live! The GDP weighting here must have an outsized effect. The author is clear that no one factor is determinate but that they have an cosiderible effect, even now. He states that about a quarter of average income per Capita is due to this diversity, with local climate 20%, diesese prevelance 7%, ethno-cultural reasons 20%, and poltical institutions 10% being the other top drivers. So it's a huge effect if proved true.
It leads to interesting policy questions, can we foster diversity to increase $$$ or drop it in, say Ethiopia for the same reason? The author states that just knowing it is there can allow us to educate and design policy to correct for such cases.
I found the section on Climate change a bit short, pretty much just says will be fine if we get rich as the rich societies in Europe went green per person once wealthy... hmmm I'll need a lot more than that.
Though he was great with data from natural experiments, repeatadly.
Also very good on colonialism - with the brutality highlighted through death rates, and interesting data on the differences of extractive eliete takeover (Spanish in south and central America) vs 'empty land' via genocide (British in North America or Australia) on the development and success of new institutions there. Agrees with Francis Fukiama here on South America. Another good sign.
Insightful on why Western development economics and politics are wrong when enforced on other countries, these are shell copies of western institutions on populations that are not ready, they don't have the social or political bedrock ready yet, deep history won't let it work, not recent history but the distant past. These are good thoughts, something is there no doubt, but I'm sure we have counter examples that disprove it as a rule.
Very good for all who want to understand the journey of humanity, a good update and complement to other famous world histories, but as always more research needed!
2.75/5 This book presents an intriguing thesis, that it was human capital that chiefly drove development and industrialisation throughout human history. Factors like diversity, geography, culture, institutions, and randomness all played a role in dictating the level and growth of human capital in a population.
Galor argues that for most of history we were stuck in a Malthusian poverty trap—as innovations led to increased food production and a surplus of food populations grew, and this growth erased the surplus. This human standard of living remained relatively constant over time. However, in early modern Europe, enough innovations combined with the right environmental and institutional conditions for industrialisation to take place.
I think the argument is quite coherent, I just wish the book focused on it more. It is less of an explanation of Galor’s theory, and more of a literature review of the various causes of development. Anyone with a base understanding of development economics and history can skip portions of the book.
Finally, I am not convinced about his argument on diversity as measured by migratory distance from Africa. The relatively minor difference in physical traits across human population groups has little explanatory power in dictating development, as phenotypic diversity doesn’t necessitate different cultural outlooks.
Overall the book does a pretty good job of summarising mainstream views on development, subtly outlines Galor’s unified growth theory, and does a lot of storytelling about human innovation
Goed, bij tijd en wijle tamelijk technisch boek over hoe onze enorme welvaart de laatste 200 jaar is ontstaan en hoe het komt dat er tegelijkertijd zo’n enorme ongelijkheid kon ontstaan. De auteur richt zich vooral op internationale en veel minder op lokale ongelijkheid. De overgangen van jagen-verzamelen naar landbouw en vervolgens via de industriële revolutie naar onze ontwikkelde, zijn bekende kost. Zijn analyse van de ‘Malthusiaanse stagnatie’ is belangrijk om op je in te laten werken. Al de 300.000 jaar dat sapiens nu bestaan hebben alle mensen in absolute armoede geleefd. Een toename van de productie leidde tot een bevolkingstoename, waardoor het meerdere aan voedsel door meer monden moest worden gedeeld. Nieuw voor mij is het grote belang dat hij laat zien van het steeds groeiende belang van de ontwikkeling van het menselijk kapitaal, als minstens zo belangrijke factor naast de technologische vooruitgang. Ook laat hij overtuigend zien waarom de landen die juist succesvol waren met de landbouw, bij de opkomst van de industrie moesten afhaken. Het succes van de landbouw was een belemmering voor urbanisatie, die nodig is om industrialisatie op gang te brengen. Daarnaast analyseert hij uitgebreid de invloed van instituties, culturen en de geografie. Uiteindelijk schetst hij een optimistisch beeld. De enorme tegenslagen die de mensheid heeft ontmoet, of zichzelf heeft aangedaan: epidemieën, zoals de pest; twee wereldoorlogen in de 20ste eeuw: deze betekenen uiteindelijk slechts een kortstondige stagnatie van de weg omhoog, uit de krochten van de armoede van vroeger.
I have read several books about the origins of humanity and society, but this book showed me for the first time the real impact that education has on the mitigation of inequality between different social classes. It also reflects the key role as main driver that education played for the Industrial revolution and for the evolution of technology since then. I cannot recommend this book enough for someone who wants to understand how education can have an impact in mitigating society inequilities and evolution of humanity.
Had high expectations, and the book showed a lot of promise with a unified theory of growth. And some chapters were pretty interesting, particularly on how fertility and genetic diversity has evolved with relation to growth.
I was pretty disappointed on the chapters on institutions and culture. There didn't seem to be a unified theory here, but rather a review of important papers (Acemoglu, Putnam etc.) which were a bit too familiar to the reader of comparative litterature. I get that this is a book with a huge scope (grand historical development), but I was simply a bit too bored when reading the description of various papers that got the label "growth".
What I also missed was a clear taxonomy on what factors matter the most. Again, I get that the scope is huge and the world is complex, but I'm missing a bit that Galor explains what matters most (which I see in Fukuyama 2011, Jared Diamond "Guns Germs and Steel" and Sowell "Wealth, Poverty and Politics"). I'm not going away from the book with a clear argument on what drives growth - which is OK, but disappointed when the book itself promises a unified theory, but ends a bit scattered.
Furthermore, too many examples were a bit cliché - institutions seen in North and South Korea, trust seen in North and South Italy. I'm missing a bit more strange examples to give some new flavor to these classic topics.
If you haven't read Sapiens or books mentioned before, this could be a pretty good read - but if your already familiar with the topic to some extent (and my knowledge is modest), perhaps you should start with Diamond or Fukuyama instead.
2.5 stars, but I think that I'm a bit harsh, because I'm very sympathetic to Galor's writing, field and person.
הספר מציג נקודת מבט מעניינת על התפתחות האנושות, אך לתחושתי פעם אחר פעם "יורים חץ ואז מסמנים את המטרה". זו גישה קלאסית של כלכלנים, שחבל שלא מערבת היסטוריונים או מתמטיקאים בתהליך. הם בודקים קורלציה בין משתנים שונים ומשונים, שמכילים הטיות יסודיות מאופן איסופם. על תהליך השגת הנתונים והאימות שלהם הם לא מדברים כלל. החלק האחרון, שבו הם דנים על המגוון האנושי, היה חלק מאוד מאוד מפוקפק מבחינת ניתוח הנתונים, לפחות כפי שהשתקף בספר. בגדול, הם שיחקו בנתונים כדי לראות בדיוק את מה שהם חיפשו. הספר עצמו כתוב בטון מאוד יהיר וכמעט שלא פתוח בכלל לביקורת עצמית במהלכו: לא על הנתונים, לא על שאלות המחקר, לא על המסקנות. לפי המשתקף בספר, מדובר בתורה מהר סיני שנחתה יום אחד במשרדו של עודד גלאור. הם אפילו אומרים מפורשות: מי שלא מאמין לנו הוא מסוכן (עמוד 263). בקיצור, ממליץ לחפש ספר "בריא" יותר (מבחינת המתודולוגיה והשיח הביקורתי על התוצאות) בנושא.
Una irresponsable crónica del crecimiento del nivel de vida de la humanidad.
El autor, ferviente defensor del liberalismo y el capitalismo radicales, otorga todas las bondades de la época moderna a una supuesta filantropía de los empresarios. Ningunea los movimentos sociales. Minimiza la influencia y presión del comunismo en la obtención de derechos civiles y económicos. Defiende el crecimiento infinito. Y frivoliza con el cambio climático: hace recaer en los países subdesarrollados el ponerle freno mediante el control de natalidad, y confía en las capacidades del mundo moderno y la tecnología para corregirlo.
What got my attention and led me to read this book was a citation that seemed to show that Oded Galor had discovered the writings of the forgotten German Communist Karl August Wittfogel. It turns out that I was misinformed.
The reference to Wittfogel — who really did have some fantastic insights into human history — is very brief. Instead Galor cites popular historians like Jared Diamond far more often. His book, like Diamond’s, ranges over tens of thousands of years of human history and manages to make several interesting points. But it’s repetitive, in many ways unoriginal, and sadly not very memorable. I wish I had liked it more.
This guy is a big thinker that threads together disparate themes in a largely original way. A ‘theory of everything’ proposition that I’m a sucker for. A one-star deduction for using “indeed” too much and for being an optimism fanboy (it goes against my nature, what can I say?). His interview is worth listening to.
3.5 stars for me. Not an unpleasant read so still recommended but insights weren´t as profound as I´d hoped. Author builds very much on Jared Diamond and Why Nations Fails thinking.