I came to this book as a management consultant with a healthy dose of scepticism for management consulting.
Buried in the book is an important story about the rise of neoliberalism from the ideas of academics such as Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman, the translation of these ideas into public policy under politicians such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, and the emergence of 'New Public Management' and everything that entailed - including, most significantly in this context, the outsourcing of swathes of government activity to the private sector and the subsequent erosion of public sector capability. All the elements of this story are here - but this isn't quite the story the authors tell. Instead, they take one facet of the story (the rise of the 'consulting industry' over the past few decades) and concentrate their firepower on it.
I believe the widespread scepticism of consulting is warranted. Any industry in which so much government and other funding is invested should be the subject of of intense scrutiny. And the authors highlight numerous highly concerning examples of poor performance, conflicts of interest and other infractions on the part of consultants. Nonetheless, I found the book had major issues that weakened it's arguments.
First, it lacked a coherent definition of what consulting is. At the outset, the authors' say their focus is on the largest and best known consulting firms such as 'the big three' (McKinsey, Bain, BCG) and 'the big four' (EY, PwC, KPMG, Deloitte). Initially, that's true - although, with so much attention on the conflict of interest between the big four's consulting arms and their audit arms, I started to wonder if consulting in itself was really the issue. But then they rattle off example after example of what I wouldn't consider to be consulting; in particular, outsourcing of government services (e.g. prisons) to firms such as Serco and of IT (e.g. healthcare.gov) to firms such as CGI Group. Eventually, it becomes clear this book isn't about the 'consulting industry' so much as it's about government outsourcing (to consulting firms, yes, but also to many other companies) - a worthy subject for a book, just not the book I was expecting based on the title, the blurb and the reviews I'd read.
Second, in their attacks on these 'consulting firms', the authors are polemical to the point of coming across as one-sided. Rather than demonstrating to the reader that consulting firms are - I'm struggling to think of a better word - bad, they take it as their starting point. As a result, evidence that seems flimsy or neutral on its own is treated as damning. For example, "a survey that found 75 per cent of consultants ‘agreed that public servants do not have the required expertise that consultants have’" is taken not as possible evidence of the erosion of public sector capability (as is referenced elsewhere in the book) but as evidence that "graduate consulting programmes instil confidence in the practices of consultology". The use of that term "consultology" (their word for the charlatanism they accuse consultants of) only adds to the impression they are treating consulting less as an object of serious inquiry, as I would hope any author would approach the topic of a ~250 page book, than as the target for a take-down.
This one-sidedness also came through in the examples the authors provided. Their main example of consultants creating value for their clients was a British consultant creating a computer system to enable Chile's Allende government to centrally plan the national economy - a system that, due to the Pinochet coup, was never used. One of their main examples of consultants not creating value was CGI Group's botched rollout of healthcare.gov (a key part of the market-based healthcare reforms known as ObamaCare). While it was poorly implemented, healthcare.gov is now in use and has contributed to millions of additional Americans getting healthcare. This gave the impression the authors may have been defining 'value' based not on outcomes but on alignment with their political views.
Third, the authors don't adequately engage with the question of why public servants hire consultants. Given the entry requirements and competition for positions in the public service, you would expect public servants to be relatively well educated and intelligent, as they are in my experience. Consistent with this, the authors say we can't simply conclude public servants are "idiots" (so far, so good). They also point out that many public servants are sceptical of consultants (almost always true, in my experience). And yet ultimately they conclude public servants are the victims of consultants adept at creating "an impression of value" rather than creating actual value - which would seem to conflict with their earlier statements that public servants are not idiots and that they are sceptical of consultants. It may be true that some consultants make their living by creating only an impression of value - but couldn't we say the same about public servants themselves (not to mention politicians and academics)? And yet, a more convincing answer to why public servants hire consultants is right there, earlier in the book - it's because the ideas of neoliberal academics and the actions of politicians both right and left have changed the incentives public servants face (for example, by capping the number of employees government agencies can hire, thereby forcing them to outsource if they want to fulfil their responsibilities). This raises the questions of whether consultants are the main issue here or just one manifestation of a deeper issue (that being neoliberalism).
A good example of the authors not sufficiently engaging with the question of why public servants hire consultants is their repeated suggestion that public servants hire academics instead of consultants. Given public servants already can and do draw on academics, it would have been interesting to explore the question of why they don't do so more often.
In short, the authors take a complex story of neoliberal ideas filtering through government over many decades, and make it a black-and-white story of consultants being "a Big Con". Ultimately I was left wondering if the authors had felt the need to dumb down their arguments for a non-academic audience.
Interestingly, I found the authors' arguments more persuasive when I read them in short articles promoting the book (on the Guardian and the ABC, for example). And the final chapter of the book (the conclusion) was more compelling than the book as a whole. It's as though the authors have taken an article's worth of insights and stretched them out to book length. Rather than bolstering their arguments, this seems to have weakened them.