Heads I win, tails I don't lose much. This is the central idea of the book. Some people refer to this concept as asymmetric risk/reward, but Mohnish Pabrai has gone to great lengths to illustrate how this principle can be internalized and applied to real world situations. For example, he begins by discussing the case of Patels in the United States:
"Less than one in five hundred Americans is a Patel. It is thus amazing that over half of all the motels in the entire country are owned and operated by Patels. What is even more stunning is that there were virtually no Patels in the United States just 35 years ago."
Patels did this by running motels by themselves and their families, moving into 2-3 rooms, and keeping operating costs and prices low. They also didn't have to put much capital up for these motels because they could borrow 80% of the cost from a bank.
Another example of this ethos that Pabrai espouses:
"I asked him how the stereotypical Marwari approaches investing capital in a venture? He said, quite nonchalantly, that Marwari businesspeople, even with only a fifth-grade education, simply expect all their invested capital to be returned in the form of dividends in no more than three years. They expect that, after having gotten their money back, their principal investment continues to be worth at least what they invested in it. They expect these to be ultra low-risk bets."
"If you simply used this Marwari formula before making any investments, let me assure you of two things: 1. You’d take a quick pass on most investments offered to you; and 2. Starting with very little capital, after a few decades you’ll be very wealthy. Enough said."
Although these principles are simple, they are difficult to practice largely due to psychology:
"the psychological warfare with our brains really gets heated after we buy a stock. The most potent weapon in your arsenal to fight these powerful forces is to buy painfully simple businesses with painfully simple theses for why you’re likely to make a great deal of money and unlikely to lose much. I always write the thesis down. If it takes more than a short paragraph, there is a fundamental problem. If it requires me to fire up Excel, it is a big red flag that strongly suggests that I ought to take a pass."
Some other takeaways from the book:
1. Lower risk means higher returns (the opposite of what academics espouse)
2. Similar to Ben Graham, Pabrai thinks most of the time gaps to intrinsic value close within 18 months, although he waits up to 3 years. If the gap has not closed by then, it's likely better to move onto a new idea:
Once two years have passed and cash flows are still at $20,000 a year, you ought to be open to a sale at $200,000 or higher if you have a compelling investment alternative for the proceeds. Once three years have passed, all the shackles are off. At this point, I would be open to selling at any reasonable price—even if it means a big loss on the investment. Markets are mostly efficient and, in most instances, an undervalued asset will move up and trade around (or even above) its intrinsic value once the clouds have lifted. Most clouds of uncertainty will dissipate in two to three years.
3. Wall Street loves businesses with low risk and low uncertainty, but often these businesses trade at very high valuations because of the relative ease in forecasting their earnings. By contrast, Pabrai thinks the rewards are highest in businesses with low risk and high uncertainty. Businesses with high risk and low uncertainty or high risk and high uncertainty ought to be avoided entirely.
4. Pabrai would rather bet on great cloners than great innovators:
"If I were given just two investment choices of Google or Microsoft at present prices, it is a no-brainer decision for me. I’d pick Microsoft all day long. It is a battle between an innovator versus a cloner. Good cloners are great businesses. Innovation is a crapshoot, but cloning is for sure."
5. Investing is not a team sport:
"There is simply no way our 150 + IQ team of 10 would all (1) agree that AmEx was a strong buy; or (2) ever be willing to bet 40 percent of fund assets on this deeply distressed business—even if, by some miracle, they reached consensus to make the investment. Finally, even if this team did agree to put 5 percent of assets into AmEx, what would they do if the price declined another 30 percent? This is not a hypothetical question. In 1973, when Buffett bought a large stake in the Washington Post, he saw the price cut in half after he had acquired most of his stake. More recently, Berkshire saw the price of USG stock go from $18 to less than $4 (a 75+ percent drop) after they had acquired their stake. It later rose to over $120."