Immersed in Her Own Fiction
As with every book I’ve read by an anti-trans activist (ATA), I could write a book of equal length detailing the misunderstandings, misrepresentations, bias, prejudice, and factual inaccuracies contained in it. I have neither the time nor the patience to do so, so I’ll focus on a few of the most egregious problems with Stock’s book and pass over the rest in silence.
Like all ATAs, Stock objects to something she calls ‘gender identity theory,’ and like all ATAs, she has either failed to understand current scientific thinking on the subject (the 'theory') or deliberately misrepresented it.
It’s safe to say that anyone who argues that trans activists (TAs) are ‘denying biology/science/reality’ has misunderstood what they're saying. This is the first and most obvious problem with Stock’s book. No one is denying that, at the biological level, reproduction is determined by chromosomes, gonads, gametes, hormones, and internal and external reproductive anatomy. What TAs (and the science) are saying is that there is a difference between all this biology and a person’s lived experience as a particular gender. This is the difference between the small organic structures known as chromosomes and the consciousness of the person who is aware that they are an organism with small organic structures known as chromosomes. Or like the difference between a physical book and the meaning of the words contained in the book. I don’t really care what you think of ‘gender identity theory,’ you cannot equate these two very different things (biology, controlled by chemical reactions; and consciousness, controlled by perceptions) and that's what the terms are referring to.
When we talk about sex, we’re talking specifically about all the biology responsible for reproductive processes at the cellular level; when we talk about gender, we’re talking specifically about our shared experience as conscious, self-aware people who live in a culture that has a lot to say about what people with particular biological features should do. When we say: ‘gender is a social construct,’ this is what we mean: our understanding of ourselves as reproductive beings cannot be divorced from the way we talk about reproduction; our ‘discourse’ shapes how we think and feel about it.
Stock and all the other ATAs would instead like you to equate these two things (sex = gender) and pretend that nothing we think, feel, or say about our roles as reproductive beings has any relevance. It all begins and ends with biology. Gender is just some sort of airy epiphenomenon detached from 'reality.' This is biological essentialism; it’s reductive, it’s regressive, and it’s simply not true. Stock should know better, as a feminist, and perhaps if she’d understood what TAs are saying she would have. But she hasn’t. Reality does matter. But not just biological reality; ALL of it. It’s not TAs who are denying reality in this debate; it’s ATAs.
The argument that TAs are ‘denying reality’ is even more absurd when you remember that there are thousands of researchers all over the world with PhDs in various branches of biology, medicine, neurology, cognition, psychology, sociology, anthropology, etc., actively utilizing this distinction every day in their research. How Stock, a philosopher, has managed to convince herself that she’s in a position to tell all these scientists that they’re not doing science is only one of the many baffling mysteries of her book.
To illustrate her ignorance with a quote:
“If I’m right about the identification model, not everyone has a gender identity.”
She’s not right, according to the science, and everyone does have a gender identity.
Gender identity has been used in the field of gender science for at least 50+ years now, and there it has a particular meaning, which is (more or less) a person’s self-understanding when it comes to gender. As everyone who is not in a vegetative state has some kind of understanding of themselves in relation to cultural norms for gender, it is absolutely certain that every person has a gender identity of one sort or another. That’s just how the term is used by researchers. The only conclusion I can draw from Stock’s peculiar statement is that she is unfamiliar with the entire field of gender science. A rather glaring oversight if you’re going to write a book about 'gender identity theory.'
Gender identity, in this sense, is no different from other forms of identity, like racial identity, religious identity, etc. They all refer to a person’s self-understanding in relation to cultural norms in some specific area and how that impacts their perceptions, self-esteem, etc. Gender identity is not a ‘thing,’ like a little tumor in the brain that some people have and some people don't, but a portion of one’s total self-understanding—that portion relating to gender. What makes gender identity unusual and different from most other areas of identity is that it seems to be strongly influenced by an innate (biological, genetic or epigenetic) bias: people seem to come into the world predisposed to model one gender or another, whether that’s ‘boy/man,’ ‘girl/woman,’ or something more ambiguous. This innate bias is what Stoller is referring to in his 1968 book, Sex and Gender, as ‘core gender identity,’ and it’s best understood, in my opinion, as an innate gender orientation equivalent to (but on the other side of) sexual orientation.
If we can accept that sexual orientation may be innate, there is no good reason to reject the hypothesis that gender orientation is also innate, and a good deal of scientific evidence already exists to support that claim (such as twin studies, early childhood developmental studies, and neuroanatomical studies). The power of this innate bias is particularly clear in the David Reimer case, and in the case of intersex people, who often have a strong identification with one gender or the other regardless of their particular anatomical characteristics, chromosomal makeup, or how they were raised. To put this in better perspective, we can say that a person is born with an innate bias toward finding one (or more) particular gender(s) attractive (sexual orientation) but that from this innate bias, over time, one develops a sexual identity (as, for example, a lesbian) which is not merely one’s sexual preference (a physiological response to stimuli) but all of the other things that go along with it in our culture (such as an awareness of a history of oppression, internalized homophobia, etc.). Gender orientation -> gender identity; sexual orientation -> sexual identity; biology -> psychosocial self-understanding.
To give Stock a hand, then, what she’s actually objecting to is not gender identity (a person’s self-understanding) but what I’m calling gender orientation (the innate bias toward internalizing one gender role or the other). As the importance of mastering one’s reproductive role (in the case of humans, through imitation) can hardly be overstated, one can’t readily dismiss such a bias as a mere ‘feeling’ unless one is also ready to dismiss similar very strong, innate feelings, such as feelings of attraction toward one gender/sex or another (sexual orientation) or the feeling of fear one experiences when faced by a tiger. Sexual desire is a feeling, but we wouldn’t (hopefully) force anyone to have sexual relations with someone they're not attracted to and tell them their ‘feelings’ are irrelevant. Nor would we (hopefully) force women to bear children if they 'didn’t feel like it' or work without pay if they 'didn't feel like it.' The entire social world is constructed around ‘feelings’ (justice, freedom, etc.) and nobody seems to object when people make important, life-altering decisions based on them—except when it comes to gender. When it comes to how one feels about one’s place in the social-reproductive landscape, ATAs couldn’t consider a person's feelings any less relevant.
These gender feelings (the desire to be considered a man or woman or other gender, regardless of one’s physical characteristics) are quite strong (speaking from personal experience) and people are quite willing to die for them, which is why suicide rates skyrocket in the trans community when people are forced to repress them. Other people are quite ready to murder trans people for having those feelings, too, whether directly or through the denial of adequate healthcare and legal protections. (One hopes that ATAs would take those feelings seriously. Alas, one is likely to be disappointed, since many ATAs deny that transphobia exists.)
As an aside (since I’m here), when a trans person says they ‘feel like a man (or a woman)’ they are not referring to some kind of specific sensory quality, like a texture or smell; they’re referring to a feeling of rightness or wrongness about how they fit in the world. This is a cognitive feeling, the same kind of feeling that lets you know you’re doing something you don't like. (No one demands to know what that 'feels' like before you stop doing it.) No trans person is claiming, therefore, that men or women ‘feel’ a particular way, like a bowl of warm porridge; only that it feels wrong and unpleasant to be forced to live and identify as a kind of person they’re not. I really shouldn’t have to explain it, but … “I feel like a woman” is a metaphor, like “I feel on top of the world.” It's not meant to be taken literally. (“Throw her in the loony bin, she thinks she’s on Mt. Everest!”) “I feel like a man/woman” is simply the easiest and most comprehensible way to communicate a feeling which is otherwise extremely difficult to describe.
As an alternative to ‘gender identity theory’ (people have an innate sense of their own gender), Stock proposes that trans people (and their allies) are ‘immersed in a fiction’:
“My hypothesis is that at least some of the time many trans and non-trans people alike are immersed in a fiction; the fiction that they themselves, or others around them, have literally changed sex.”
Stock proposes that trans people immerse themselves in this fiction to escape gender dysphoria. The problem is, there is no good reason to accept her hypothesis, and why it seems any more plausible than having an innate sense of gender is anyone's guess.
Stock seems to locate the origin of gender dysphoria in a ‘misalignment’ with gender norms and ideals. But every person is misaligned to one degree or another, and it doesn’t explain why some people, in particular, identify so strongly with an opposite sex stereotype (or androgynous stereotype) that they will go so far as to immerse themselves in this fiction. Many people very far from cultural norms do not so immerse themselves (e.g., butch lesbians, feminine gay men), and many who largely conform to cultural norms do so immerse themselves (e.g., late transitioning trans people who have lived most of their adult lives unexceptionally as a member of their assigned sex). How does Stock explain this discrepancy? She doesn’t.
Another reason she proposes for gender dysphoria is sexual harassment, and certainly a great many, if not most, young women have experienced unwanted attention from men. But very few of these women go so far as to try to ‘identify out of womanhood’ (to quote a popular gender critical phrase). What sets these people apart? No idea.
Why do some feminine gay men (to raise another of Stock’s ad hoc etiologies) deal with their internalized homophobia by identifying as women when certainly many, if not most, gay men must learn to deal with internalized homophobia growing up in a homophobic culture? And what good would it do them, in any case, to ‘identify out of being gay’ in a highly transphobic culture? It doesn’t make sense to deal with your internalized homophobia by hefting a dump truck's worth of internalized transphobia. For that matter, why aren’t trans people identifying out of being trans into being gay or lesbian to escape their internalized transphobia? It's a mystery.
And why would young women try to avoid unwanted attention from men by adopting an identity which earns them unwanted attention—of a different sort—from just about everyone they meet—family, friends, teachers, employers, landlords, medical workers, law enforcement officers, etc.? Is it really easier to be a trans man in this culture than to be a cis woman? Wouldn't it be easier to take self-defense? Stock has no way to explain any of these obvious objections.
She also doesn’t explain why gender dysphoria is the one type of mental discomfort which leads to immersing yourself in a fiction. Why don’t poor people ‘immerse themselves in a fiction’ of being rich? Why don’t dissatisfied employees immerse themselves in the fiction that their job is quite nice, actually? Why don’t sick people immerse themselves in the fiction that they’re well? Why don’t trans people immerse themselves in the fiction that they’re not discriminated against? Stock doesn’t bother to explain why gender dysphoria, alone, out of all the forms of discomfort people experience, leads people to immerse themselves in a fiction. Her hypothesis creates a bigger mystery than the mystery it proposes to solve.
It also doesn’t accurately reflect the lived experience of trans people. As a trans person, I have never been able to avoid the awareness that I have a body I don’t want to have. I have never spent hours or days or weeks floating along in the fiction that I have the body I want. I don’t think I could string two minutes together maintaining the kind of suspension of disbelief that would be required. I do immerse myself in fiction all the time—watching Netflix, reading a book—but these experiences have nothing to do with pretending I don’t have a body I don’t want to have; they simply help me take my mind off a fact I can’t do anything about. If I get upset if a person misgenders me, it’s not because they’re spoiling my immersion, but because it reminds me of a painful fact I’d rather not think about. If you point out that someone is disabled and they get irritated, is it because you’ve ruined their immersion in the fantasy that they are not disabled? Or is it, perhaps, that they think you’re being incredibly rude?
Stock not only does nothing to address any of the problems with her theory, but she doesn’t even bother to provide any evidence that it may be true. It’s just something that occurred to her one day that seemed superficially plausible and which she presented without any further serious reflection. Hardly surprising, I suppose, considering:
“For most of my professional life, I have focused on exploring questions to do with fiction and imagination.”
To a hammer, everything looks like a nail.