Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? In their famous1998 paper "The Extended Mind," philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmersposed this question and answered it cognitive processes "ain'tall in the head." The environment has an active role in driving cognition;cognition is sometimes made up of neural, bodily, and environmental processes. Theirargument excited a vigorous debate among philosophers, both supporters anddetractors. This volume brings together for the first time the best responses toClark and Chalmers's bold proposal. These responses, together with the originalpaper by Clark and Chalmers, offer a valuable overview of the latest research on theextended mind thesis. The contributors first discuss (and answer) objections raisedto Clark and Chalmers's thesis. Andy Clark himself responds to critics in an essaythat uses the movie Memento's amnesia-aiding notes and tattoos to illustrate theworkings of the extended mind. Contributors then consider the different directionsin which the extended mind project might be taken, including the need for anapproach that focuses on cognitive activity and practice.ContributorsFred Adams, KenAizawa, David Chalmers, Andy Clark, Stephen Cowley, Susan Hurley, James Ladyman, Richard Menary, John Preston, Don Ross, Mark Rowlands, Rob Rupert, David Spurrett, John Sutton, Michael Wheeler, Rob Wilson
I was quite eager to read about this exciting idea, since it seems plausible and possibly explanatory, or at the very least thought-provoking and revealing, perhaps because of its non-intuitiveness. In the early part of the book, however, very little other than the initial idea of what an extended mind is was revealed to me; instead it was taken up with the derogatory back-and-forth of philosophers taking potshots at the ridiculous dogmatism and snobbery of each other, all the while the whole argument being about a definition. There is some subtle aspect of it that does, in fact, refer to how things actually are, which is important, but that for the most part is peripheral, as the authors in this volume go off chasing after whether it’s proper to include this thing in that category or apply that label to this process, and although it’s true that these definitions and categories are revealing and informative, I get so bored bickering after definitions beyond the minimal necessity to get at how things actually work. Hence, it took me over a year to drag myself through this entire volume.
Clark appears to be a little more reasonable in dealing with what’s important, but after posing the initial concept, he seems to expend all his energy defending the possibility, and very little expanding on why on earth we would want to consider external objects part of our cognitive system. It makes enough sense that I don’t think we necessarily need added justification in order to do so, but after being introduced to it, I would only want to hear more on the topic if it was informative. I would like for Clark to instead talk about what the ramifications and new explanations and perspectives we gain are. So Adams and Aizawa argue completely off the mark – oh well, surely they don’t need more than a paragraph or two before you go on to more interesting aspects that show that your theory is worthwhile, rather than just telling us over pages that it is? There are a few references to a cyberpunk future – so maybe the theory of the extended mind can guide us in how to interact with technology? Which inventions are needed, the potential benefits and hazards of the way we augment and rely on devices? I think the issue of the vulnerability of Otto’s notebook is one to take seriously – as we’re currently exporting our memory to devices and the internet, that reliance is dependent on the availability of those resources, so as far as our memory and knowledge is an integral part of our character, how does this changing structure of our memory change us? Clark is right that in principle having an external memory is still a cognitive system just as any restricted within the skull, but in practice there are differences that have consequences. Let’s talk about them!
One problem I perceive, exemplified much more strongly by some of these authors than others, is that they appear to think they are arguing about what the things actually are. And to some degree, there IS a way things actually are. There is an external world, and there are facts about what exists in it, and the properties of those things, and the events that actually happen. And yet, these discussions don’t seem to really be about that – they’re about how we characterize those things that actually happen. And while it’s definitely true that the manner in which you describe and categorize any thing or event makes a world of difference in your understanding and insight, it is misleading to believe that there is a true characterization that really, truly captures the way things are. Here is a post that I think summarizes some of the issues in this sort of argument: http://lesswrong.com/lw/no/how_an_alg...
To describe the mind as extended takes into consideration aspects of how cognition functions and reformulates our conception of it, and perhaps even changes how we engage in cognition itself. Yet I don’t think that the extended mind thesis is either true or false – it is, instead, either insightful or obscuring. And so while several authors in this volume essentially make this point – trying to get away from pinning down the actual way of things, focusing on what we can scientifically discover and understand and how much sense any particular thesis makes, overall the whole enterprise of this sort of debate tires me.
It is very interesting, and important to examine these concepts, as technology changes the way we think and remember, and many people are getting up in arms against these effects as they seem alien, or inhuman, or wrong in some way, because it is unlike how we have always been. http://people.csail.mit.edu/andyd/rec... For example, here's someone utilizing the fact of the extended mind to achieve some things and generate ideas and directions of study and culture, completely passing over the mind-numbingly pointless debate of how much the computer programs or visual aids "count" as cognitive in their own right or part of his cognitive system. Examining the theory of the extended mind and how it is true throughout history and in more ‘natural’ situations allows us to face interesting new ways of thinking and interfacing without the added hysteria of the unnatural, as well as to prepare us for what we need to do differently, what matters if we now function this way instead of that way, so that our use of this technology does not make us dumber, or inhuman, or worse people. Yet this is not what this book is about. This book is a series of jargon-addled dichotomous back-and-forths between philosophers arguing about who is right, and most importantly, who is wrong, about the way the mind actually is.
I almost really liked this book. It's a science book about the conscious mind and how various technology/artifact extends that mind And if we'd be less/more conscious without those artifacts And/or how the artifact might be considered A Part of the Conscious Mind. The simplest case is a notebook with instructions used be a man with a poor memory (mental disability) and from there, the authors are off to the races. This is an anthology and hence the authors speak in differing voices. This book is very technical and while it's very well referenced And unlike a physics book, the authors appear to want their readers to understand what they've written (smile), the book has Much Jargon which is only explained in context. So, like most technical books and almost all specific audience science books, much is expected of the reader. Still the references to earlier books and journal articles alone would make this a valuable reference for this field of study. Unfortunately, there is very little Narrative and though the authors cooperated the chapters do not always follow in nice progress or build upon one another. If you Are interested in the Conscious Mind, this should be on your reading list. Obviously, budget time to wade through its verbiage.
Kind of disappointed reading this book. I had really looked forward to it, however, it felt more like dueling philosophers than a practical application and theory text.
A sympathetic collection of essays, mostly in favour of, Clark & Chalmer's thesis that the mind isn't all in the brain. Thought-provoking and clear writing.