I've been thinking about a couple of recent essays in analytic aesthetics that both favorably cite a remark from this book, a remark that I find very weird. Here's the remark, plus some context:
Nehamas is critical of the Kantian idea that when you make an aesthetic judgment, you make it with a "demand" that everyone agree with it, even if there's no way to convince people to agree with it in the way that you could with a straightforward empirical claim. That Kantian claim is probably too strong, but Nehamas's reaction to it swings too far in the opposite direction, where he says that the very idea of universal agreement is not only highly unlikely, or even impossible, but a NIGHTMARE:
But that dream [of universal aesthetic agreement] is a nightmare, already described by Aldous Huxley, a brave new world where everyone is happy ‘nowadays’ except for the Savage, who claims for himself the right to his own taste and, with it, the right to unhappiness. Imagine, if you can, a world where everyone likes, or loves, the same things, where every disagreement about beauty can be resolved. That would be a desolate, desperate world. Such a world, even if Shakespeare, Titian, and Bach were to be part of it—impossible with artists too complex an ambiguous to provoke a uniform reaction—would be no better (but also no worse) than a world where everyone tuned in to Baywatch or turned on Wayne Newton at the same time [really?]. What is truly frightful is not what everyone likes but simply the fact that everyone likes it. Even the idea that everyone might share one of my judgments sends shivers down my spine, although it is no less repulsive than the possibility that one other person might accept all of them. (p. 84)
The "nightmarishness" of this possibility seems overblown. And surely the claim "what is truly frightful is not what everyone likes but simply the fact that everyone likes it" is just false—we can find aesthetic judgments that everyone who considers them agrees to, maybe like some of Hume's proposed comparisons, like Milton being better than Ogilby, or (my own candidate) the sun rising over Mount Tam as viewed from Bolinas Lagoon is more beautiful than the sun rising over the scorched Sierra hills after a wildfire. Why would agreement about those judgments be frightful? Disagreement can itself be pleasurable, and lead to aesthetic enlightenment, but it should hardly turn into an end in itself.
Cavell, I think, offers a way to keep the proper place for agreement in aesthetic judgment that doesn't need the Kantian "demand" for agreement, and that doesn't recoil into Nehamas's fear of agreement in aesthetic judgments. Cavell talks about the "hope of agreement", which I think strikes the right balance—we can hope for agreement even when we have good reason to think it won't happen. (Nehamas discusses the role of hoping for agreement in aesthetic judgment in a couple places but doesn't recognize how it shows there is another way of thinking about agreement beyond the strong Kantian requirement.)