Taiwan, the United States, and the Hidden History of the Cold War in Asia: Divided Allies

by Hsiao-ting Lin

This book explores the challenges which faced the United States and Taiwanese alliance during the Cold War, addressing a wide range of events and influences of the period between the 1950s and 1970s.

Tackling seven main topics to outline the fluctuations of the U.S.–Taiwan relationship, this volume highlights the impact of the mainland counteroffensive, the offshore islands, Tibet, Taiwan’s secret operations in Asia, Taiwan’s Soviet and nuclear gambits, Chinese representation in the United Nations, and the Vietnam War. Utilizing multinational archival research, particularly the newly available materials from Taiwan and the United States, to reevaluate Taiwan’s foreign policy during the Cold War, revealing a pragmatic and opportunistic foreign policy disguised in nationalistic rhetoric. Moreover, this study represents a departure from previous scholarship, emphasizing the dictatorial and incompetent nature of the Chinese Nationalist regime, to provide fresh insights into the nature of U.S.–Taiwan relations.

Presenting a revisionist view of one of the strongest bilateral relationships of the Cold War, this will be an insightful resource for scholars and students of Chinese and East Asia History, Cold War History, Asian Studies, and International Relations.

260 pages, Kindle Edition

Published April 28, 2022

Reviews

[Nushrat · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book is undoubtedly well-researched and written. However, the lack of access to other literature written by people who are part of this very history provides narratives that confine to the KMT. For Instance, in chapter three on Tibet, p. 78, the author mentioned that “When Gyalo and his Family arrived in Manila, Local KMT mobilized overseas Chinese there to welcome them. An overwhelmed Gyalo then decided to skip the planned visit to Hong Kong and fly to Taipei from Manila”. However, Gyalo Thondup in his book argued that he visited Taiwan after his visa to Hong Kong was cancelled by the Portuguese (Thondup,2015,p.117). Similarly, at the beginning of the same chapter (p. 73), the author writes that “the Dalai Lama fled to India because of the anti-Chinese uprising”, this is only partially true. The Dalai Lama fled to India because of a threat to his life from the Chinese Communist Party (His Holiness the Dalai Lama,1991,p.123-143). Such a statement in the book could be misleading and this results from the author's failure to access the Tibetan equation. The chapter on Tibet suggests that even though the book provides an insightful reading about one of the important episodes of Taiwan and the United States relations during the Cold War using numerous archival sources, its inability to use the information provided by the Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama and Tsongka Lhamo Tsering and Chushi Gangdruk; people who are directly involved in the matter, make it vulnerable in producing bias argument concerning the issue of concern. I also do not understand why the author skipped books written by Tibetans who played an important part in this history. The author refers to John Garver and the information Graver provided on Tibet and Taiwan is wrong and some of that information was taken from the book Secret War in Tibet. If one wants to understand what KMT perspective is, then this book is indeed an important reading.

Additionally, How Kuomintang has caused chaos among Tibetans in exile by playing divide and rule and how this very act forces the Tibetan government in exile to take severe measures of prohibiting Tibetans from establishing relations is missing. This part is important in the context of why Taiwan and Tibet failed to establish any cordial relations during this period. The whole discussion about the anti-Taiwan campaign launched by the Tibetan government in exile during this period is missing.

I must admit that the book indeed has intriguing details to offer but details should be read with a pinch of salt.

[Hiro Fu · Rating 5 out of 5]

At a time when U.S.-Taiwan relations seem better than ever, Lin sheds light on this same relationship, only some 50 to 70 years earlier, during the height of the Cold War. Though political and international landscapes have drastically changed since the Cold War, most accounts on the U.S.-Taiwan relationship from both Taiwanese and American sources, would have us believe that the KMT regime was aligned with the U.S. on a crusade against Communism in China and the USSR, until the Nixon administration decided to “betray” (from a Taiwanese perspective) the ROC by recognizing the PRC. Lin’s work does not negate that the Chiangs indeed held ideological interests aligned with several U.S. administrations but shows how the ROC was just as ready to take bold actions that would break the US-Taiwan alliance if any of their plans had come to fruition. This is a well-researched and surprisingly digestible historical account that highlights the nuances in the relationship between Taipei and Washington. As Lin suggests in the postscript, his work is to help in the comprehension of “the nature of U.S.-Taiwan relations, as well as the mindsets and behaviors of top leaders in Taipei.” The unstable and often contradictory relationship described in this book does not necessarily imply how current relations between the two governments should be perceived but does well to remind us the realities of realpolitik.