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Audiobook
Published May 24, 2022
The decision-making was excruciating, and again, the mindset had to be one part steady on the trigger, and he other part ready to lunge for the firing key. How do you balance those things?This is not limited to combat decisions. I know I’ve unnerved some when after quickly going around the table with my “What do you think?” question, I have enough information to make a decision. Not anywhere in the same realm as combat decisions, but the same skill set cultivated from my early training as a nuclear reactor operator where sometimes specific immediate actions must be taken following rapid assessment of multiple data streams. Stavridis follows, “Decision-making it hard to begin with at sea - it’s vastly harder if you become emotionally cluttered.” Further, “Learning how to telegraph success, using optimism as a force-multiplier in decision-making, and knowing when to ‘find the exit’ are all key themes that echo through these choices.”
For me, it was something I learned from the senior captains I worked for - forcing time to slow down. The best military decision-makers have the ability to swiftly synthesize sensor data from radars, sonars, and communications nets; mentally check it against the intelligence from the vast US surveillance system; correlate the threat; discern the intentions of the enemy; and act decisively either in suppressing fire or release batteries
And yet, given his untimely and much-mourned end [a duel, under conditions that would have been foolhardy even in that day], it is also worth drawing a cautionary lesson from his character. No one has ever been always in the right and always successful, and points of pride have tripped up many talented and ambitious people, ending many glittering careers.Stavridis concludes that despite the risks Decatur took, he was able to find a balance. Stavradis recalls touring Afghanistan at NATO commander and seeing again and again in the faces of the young soldiers, Marines, sailors and airmen there “the audacity of a young Decatur”, and thinking “my job, as a vastly superior officer, was to temper that keen sense of personal bravery, and focus the chain of command on the need for the balance of planning and the grounding in higher values of the institution that must be observed and enforced.”
No leader of people, no matter how brave, can truly go it alone, and Farragut’s reporting style makes clear he had earned the trust and eager followership of those who served with him. Highlighting his crews’ dedicated devotion rather than puffing up his own decisiveness was typical of Farragut and showed that he well understood the importance of organizational execution based on truest earned over time. Having skin in the game not only raises the acuity of a desk ion-maker, but also inspires his teammates.
When faced with a circumstance where he could have kept himself safe while still serving in his role, Miller instead made a tougher, nobler choice. He rose above the barriers that society had placed in front of him, and put himself in harm’s way for our country. We should give the highest honors to the people who make decisions like Dorie Miller. That is a legacy unfulfilled, and a worthy goal for our Navy to seek.
Choices need to be made on the merits of the moment, with an open and innovative mind. Pete Bucher did not make his choice out of cowardice; he made a painful cost-benefit calculation that resistance would waste lives and not protect the national secrets on his ship. Butcher’s decision protected his crew and ultimately served the interests of the nation by destroying as much classified material as possible before the Peublo was boarded - just as Bucher knew it would be when the North Koreans cut off all possible escape routes. After a great deal of thought, I’ve concluded that condemning eighty young men to die for the pride of the Navy would not have made him a hero; it would have made him a modern Ahab, obsessed with self-destruction.Stavridis continues with an obvious, if unfortunately not always followed, observation
The lessons of Bucher’s decision echo in every category of human activity, military, or otherwise. Relying on established practice is a comfortable thing to do. It simplifies decision-making and establishes a sense of order in a chaotic universe. Indeed, large organizations need structure refined over time by learning best practices. But leaving those traditions unexamined for a long time leads to ossified thinking. Organizations need to be in a constant state of keeping what works and removing what does not. Failing to do so is worse than laziness; it is an abdication of leadership.This is the essence - many organizations do make the attempt to see what new ideas can be applied, but that failing to remove what does not work? Less of an imperative.
In order to do her job effectively, she had to let everyone else do theirs - doubly difficult in the complex, stressful, and high-stakes setting of a hostage crisis. Once the president authorized the use of lethal for e, responsibility fell to her as the senior commander on the scene to decide when and how to apply the force at her disposal.Admiral Howard knew she would be responsible, and as in all commands, responsible even for things she couldn’t directly control. All the more amazing considering she had been in command of the Combined Task Force only a week when this unfolded.
By authorizing the SEALs to shoot, she was delegating that authority at least two levels down - to Commander Castellano [CO of the Bainbridge], who with eyes on the lifeboat, would judge the threat to the captain, and to the SEAL snipers, whose split-second execution would result in either a “perfect op” or the devastating loss of a hostage and deep public embarrassment.
When I ask myself what I would have done differently, the short answer is not much. I, too, would have recognized the lack of information, the press of time, the glare of publicity, the poor job the Navy chain of command was doing, and that I was facing a clear career-ending moment. [And on the unfortunately political response…] But firing and publicly humiliating him is overkill, and hurts him, of course, but hurts the Navy as well. It sends a bad signal to other Commanding Officers. I think it was a mistake on the part of the Navy, on balance.