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Central Problems of Philosophy
Free Will (Central Problems of Philosophy)
Free will remains one of the great problems in philosophy. Whether human choices and actions are causally determined or in some way free and the implications of opting for one position or the other on our moral, personal, and social lives continues to challenge philosophers. Written in a clear and uncomplicated style, this introduction to the problem of free will provides readers with a solid grasp of the central issues as well as the ability to analyse and evaluate the ideas and arguments involved. Free Will explores the determinist rejection of free will through detailed exposition of the central determinist argument and consideration of responses to each of its premises. At every stage familiar examples and case studies help frame and ground the argument. Focusing on a clear, single line of argument allows the author to demonstrate what scrupulous and persistent analytic philosophical inquiry looks and feels like in practice. The manner and approach used throughout encourage the reader to contribute to the debate as an engaged participant. Free Will will be welcomed by students looking for an engaging and clear introduction to the subject. As a rigorous exercise in philosophical argument it will serve the beginning philosophy student as an excellent spring board into the subject more generally.
- GenresPhilosophy
192 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2000
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Displaying 1 of 1 review
September 28, 2023
6.5/10.
Mcfee lays out a detailed argument for determinism and then refutes libertarian free will and compatibilism quite well. He has some very good points about how Heisenberg's uncertainty principle does not refute causality at the most basic level of matter, because we are uncertain about particles either (a) because our instruments cannot determine Planck length particles' position and velocity at the same time, given that we use comparatively massive photons to do so, or (b) we may just be unable to measure both position and velocity, because we are looking at the photon via a certain Kuhnian paradigm which really can't grasp particle physics.
Then the last 40% of the book doesn't go so well. Mcfee then goes back and tries to refute determinism via some very technical considerations, such as the following: if A causes B, and B causes C, then ceteris paribus, A causes C. But ceteris paribus is too wide, says Mcfee, so therefore we cannot say that state A can inevitably lead to state C. Therefore determinism is refuted because causal relationships are not deterministic.
He goes on with this argument for too long, and I got bored so I stopped reading and was pleased with what I learned in the first 60% of the book. I reply to Mcfee: A causes B, given the other conditions of the universe, which would also could be deduced from the first moment, given the laws of physics. Us not knowing the other conditions of the universe — the "ceteris paribus" of any causal relationship — does not preclude them actually existing and does not refute causal relationships. For example, water is converted into ice at 0 degrees celsius, given this universe. The universe is the ceteris paribus, but that does not refute the causal relationship between temperature and the molecular state of water. Likewise, the ceteris paribus for any given causal relationship does not refute the causal relationship, just gives its "environment" in which it is active.
Not a bad book by any means, as I love a good philosophy book which fuels concentration and growth of the mind, but nonetheless Mcfee's own contribution falls short.
P.S. Let's say determinism is true for the sake of argument. If this is the case, then your belief in determinism was not rationally chosen by you. Nor is your fellow non-determinist's belief in free will chosen by them. And in fact, you cannot convince them of determinism because their belief in free will was determined. But maybe it was determined for you, the determinist, to convince them, the non-determinist, of determinism . . .
Ponder that. For me, it seems that the logical end point of determinism is just to act as you would act otherwise, whether beholden to a Moral Law or not. Given determinism, you begin to just think about the determination of everything, and eventually you get so abstract and confused by overthinking [e.g. in the example above] that you just go back to your normal way of perception. As strange as this sounds, the logical conclusion of determinism ("in the moment", so to say) is to act as good as possible, because doing so would be determined and your effort would be determined. So then if you are virtuous, that is determined; but if you are lazy due to your determinism, then that non-action based off of a belief would also be determined. My point is this: being non-omniscient makes even the determinist attempt to act well under a given religious/metaphysical system, because they do not know their own outcome in the afterlife. They are "in the game" — a game which may be determined or not, but which it is to their advantage to do as best as they can as they do not know their own outcome.
Even the consideration of determinism will only ever come into the minds of 1% or less of people. If it came down to the masses, there would just be mass chaos because the herd cannot understand reasons and will be tricked by sophisms very easily, which is once again why religion is so important as a restraining influence on human behavior.
Mcfee lays out a detailed argument for determinism and then refutes libertarian free will and compatibilism quite well. He has some very good points about how Heisenberg's uncertainty principle does not refute causality at the most basic level of matter, because we are uncertain about particles either (a) because our instruments cannot determine Planck length particles' position and velocity at the same time, given that we use comparatively massive photons to do so, or (b) we may just be unable to measure both position and velocity, because we are looking at the photon via a certain Kuhnian paradigm which really can't grasp particle physics.
Then the last 40% of the book doesn't go so well. Mcfee then goes back and tries to refute determinism via some very technical considerations, such as the following: if A causes B, and B causes C, then ceteris paribus, A causes C. But ceteris paribus is too wide, says Mcfee, so therefore we cannot say that state A can inevitably lead to state C. Therefore determinism is refuted because causal relationships are not deterministic.
He goes on with this argument for too long, and I got bored so I stopped reading and was pleased with what I learned in the first 60% of the book. I reply to Mcfee: A causes B, given the other conditions of the universe, which would also could be deduced from the first moment, given the laws of physics. Us not knowing the other conditions of the universe — the "ceteris paribus" of any causal relationship — does not preclude them actually existing and does not refute causal relationships. For example, water is converted into ice at 0 degrees celsius, given this universe. The universe is the ceteris paribus, but that does not refute the causal relationship between temperature and the molecular state of water. Likewise, the ceteris paribus for any given causal relationship does not refute the causal relationship, just gives its "environment" in which it is active.
Not a bad book by any means, as I love a good philosophy book which fuels concentration and growth of the mind, but nonetheless Mcfee's own contribution falls short.
P.S. Let's say determinism is true for the sake of argument. If this is the case, then your belief in determinism was not rationally chosen by you. Nor is your fellow non-determinist's belief in free will chosen by them. And in fact, you cannot convince them of determinism because their belief in free will was determined. But maybe it was determined for you, the determinist, to convince them, the non-determinist, of determinism . . .
Ponder that. For me, it seems that the logical end point of determinism is just to act as you would act otherwise, whether beholden to a Moral Law or not. Given determinism, you begin to just think about the determination of everything, and eventually you get so abstract and confused by overthinking [e.g. in the example above] that you just go back to your normal way of perception. As strange as this sounds, the logical conclusion of determinism ("in the moment", so to say) is to act as good as possible, because doing so would be determined and your effort would be determined. So then if you are virtuous, that is determined; but if you are lazy due to your determinism, then that non-action based off of a belief would also be determined. My point is this: being non-omniscient makes even the determinist attempt to act well under a given religious/metaphysical system, because they do not know their own outcome in the afterlife. They are "in the game" — a game which may be determined or not, but which it is to their advantage to do as best as they can as they do not know their own outcome.
Even the consideration of determinism will only ever come into the minds of 1% or less of people. If it came down to the masses, there would just be mass chaos because the herd cannot understand reasons and will be tricked by sophisms very easily, which is once again why religion is so important as a restraining influence on human behavior.
Displaying 1 of 1 review