Why Delusions Matter

by Lisa Bortolotti, Constantine Sandis (Series Editor)

When we talk about delusions we may refer to symptoms of mental health problems, such as clinical delusions in schizophrenia, or simply the beliefs that people cling to which are implausible and resistant to counterevidence; these can include anything from beliefs about the benefits of homeopathy to concerns about the threat of alien abduction. Why do people adopt delusional beliefs and why are they so reluctant to part with them? In Why Delusions Matter , Lisa Bortolotti explains what delusions really are and argues that, despite their negative reputation, they can also play a positive role in people's lives, imposing some meaning on adverse experiences and strengthening personal or social identities. In a clear and accessible style, Bortolotti contributes to the growing research on the philosophy of the cognitive sciences, offering a novel and nuanced view of delusions.

198 pages, Hardcover

Published August 10, 2023

About the author

I am Professor of Philosophy at the University of Birmingham.

My main research area is the philosophy of cognitive science, and in my work I have mostly focused on the limitations of human cognition and human agency including faulty reasoning, delusions, confabulations, irrational beliefs, poor knowledge of the self, distorted memories, unreliable self narratives, self deception, implicit bias, inconsistencies between attitudes and behaviour, unrealistic optimism and positive illusions.

I am also interested in the relationship between science and society and in the ethical issues emerging from biomedical research, psychiatry, reproduction, parenting, and the treatment of nonhuman animals.

I currently lead a 5-year project on Pragmatic and Epistemic Role of Factually Erroneous Cognitions and Thoughts (PERFECT), funded by a European Research Council Consolidator Grant (2014-2019).

My latest book is Irrationality (Polity Press, 2014). I am currently writing a new research monograph provisionally entitled The Epistemic Innocence of Imperfect Cognitions.