What do you think?
Rate this book
Ten Philosophical Mistakes
An illuminating critique of modern thought from America's "Philosopher for Everyman" (Time).
Ten Philosophical Mistakes examines ten errors in modern thought and shows how they have led to serious consequences in our everyday lives. It teaches how they came about, how to avoid them, and how to counter their negative effects.
Ten Philosophical Mistakes examines ten errors in modern thought and shows how they have led to serious consequences in our everyday lives. It teaches how they came about, how to avoid them, and how to counter their negative effects.
200 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1985
108 people are currently reading
1740 people want to read
About the author
Mortimer J. Adler
592 books1,049 followersNumerous published works of American educator and philosopher Mortimer Jerome Adler include
How to Read a Book
(1940) and
The Conditions of Philosophy
(1965).
This popular author worked with thought of Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas. He lived for the longest stretches in cities of New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and San Mateo. He worked for Columbia University, the University of Chicago, Encyclopædia Britannica, and own institute for philosophical research.
Born to Jewish immigrants, he dropped out school at 14 years of age in 1917 to a copy boy for the New York Sun with the ultimate aspiration to a journalist. Adler quickly returned to school to take writing classes at night and discovered the works of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and other men, whom he came to call heroes. He went to study at Columbia University and contributed to the student literary magazine, The Morningside, (a poem "Choice" in 1922 when Charles A. Wagner was editor-in-chief and Whittaker Chambers an associate editor). Though he failed to pass the required swimming test for a bachelor's degree (a matter that was rectified when Columbia gave him an honorary degree in 1983), he stayed at the university and eventually received an instructorship and finally a doctorate in psychology. While at Columbia University, Adler wrote his first book: Dialectic, published in 1927.
In 1930 Robert Hutchins, the newly appointed president of the University of Chicago, whom Adler had befriended some years earlier, arranged for Chicago’s law school to hire him as a professor of the philosophy of law; the philosophers at Chicago (who included James H. Tufts, E.A. Burtt, and George H. Mead) had "entertained grave doubts as to Mr. Adler's competence in the field [of philosophy]" and resisted Adler's appointment to the University's Department of Philosophy. Adler was the first "non-lawyer" to join the law school faculty. Adler also taught philosophy to business executives at the Aspen Institute.
Adler and Hutchins went on to found the Great Books of the Western World program and the Great Books Foundation. Adler founded and served as director of the Institute for Philosophical Research in 1952. He also served on the Board of Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica since its inception in 1949, and succeeded Hutchins as its chairman from 1974. As the director of editorial planning for the fifteenth edition of Britannica from 1965, he was instrumental in the major reorganization of knowledge embodied in that edition. He introduced the Paideia Proposal which resulted in his founding the Paideia Program, a grade-school curriculum centered around guided reading and discussion of difficult works (as judged for each grade). With Max Weismann, he founded The Center for the Study of The Great Ideas.
Adler long strove to bring philosophy to the masses, and some of his works (such as How to Read a Book) became popular bestsellers. He was also an advocate of economic democracy and wrote an influential preface to Louis Kelso's The Capitalist Manifesto. Adler was often aided in his thinking and writing by Arthur Rubin, an old friend from his Columbia undergraduate days. In his own words:
Unlike many of my contemporaries, I never write books for my fellow professors to read. I have no interest in the academic audience at all. I'm interested in Joe Doakes. A general audience can read any book I write—and they do.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mortimer...
This popular author worked with thought of Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas. He lived for the longest stretches in cities of New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and San Mateo. He worked for Columbia University, the University of Chicago, Encyclopædia Britannica, and own institute for philosophical research.
Born to Jewish immigrants, he dropped out school at 14 years of age in 1917 to a copy boy for the New York Sun with the ultimate aspiration to a journalist. Adler quickly returned to school to take writing classes at night and discovered the works of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and other men, whom he came to call heroes. He went to study at Columbia University and contributed to the student literary magazine, The Morningside, (a poem "Choice" in 1922 when Charles A. Wagner was editor-in-chief and Whittaker Chambers an associate editor). Though he failed to pass the required swimming test for a bachelor's degree (a matter that was rectified when Columbia gave him an honorary degree in 1983), he stayed at the university and eventually received an instructorship and finally a doctorate in psychology. While at Columbia University, Adler wrote his first book: Dialectic, published in 1927.
In 1930 Robert Hutchins, the newly appointed president of the University of Chicago, whom Adler had befriended some years earlier, arranged for Chicago’s law school to hire him as a professor of the philosophy of law; the philosophers at Chicago (who included James H. Tufts, E.A. Burtt, and George H. Mead) had "entertained grave doubts as to Mr. Adler's competence in the field [of philosophy]" and resisted Adler's appointment to the University's Department of Philosophy. Adler was the first "non-lawyer" to join the law school faculty. Adler also taught philosophy to business executives at the Aspen Institute.
Adler and Hutchins went on to found the Great Books of the Western World program and the Great Books Foundation. Adler founded and served as director of the Institute for Philosophical Research in 1952. He also served on the Board of Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica since its inception in 1949, and succeeded Hutchins as its chairman from 1974. As the director of editorial planning for the fifteenth edition of Britannica from 1965, he was instrumental in the major reorganization of knowledge embodied in that edition. He introduced the Paideia Proposal which resulted in his founding the Paideia Program, a grade-school curriculum centered around guided reading and discussion of difficult works (as judged for each grade). With Max Weismann, he founded The Center for the Study of The Great Ideas.
Adler long strove to bring philosophy to the masses, and some of his works (such as How to Read a Book) became popular bestsellers. He was also an advocate of economic democracy and wrote an influential preface to Louis Kelso's The Capitalist Manifesto. Adler was often aided in his thinking and writing by Arthur Rubin, an old friend from his Columbia undergraduate days. In his own words:
Unlike many of my contemporaries, I never write books for my fellow professors to read. I have no interest in the academic audience at all. I'm interested in Joe Doakes. A general audience can read any book I write—and they do.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mortimer...
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 82 reviews
April 28, 2015
'Ten Philosophical Mistakes' looks at the faulty foundations of ten modern philosophical problems.
1. Denial of human consciousness
2. The mistake about the human mind
3. The failure to recognize that ideas are meanings
4. The mistake of not acknowledging the contributions of philosophy are as important as those of the sciences.
5. The mistake that makes good and evil subjective
6. The mistake in the identification of happiness
7. The misunderstanding between freedom of choice and determinism
8. The denial of human nature
9. Failure to understand how the basic forms of human association are both natural and conventional
10. The fallacy of reductionism
1. Denial of human consciousness
2. The mistake about the human mind
3. The failure to recognize that ideas are meanings
4. The mistake of not acknowledging the contributions of philosophy are as important as those of the sciences.
5. The mistake that makes good and evil subjective
6. The mistake in the identification of happiness
7. The misunderstanding between freedom of choice and determinism
8. The denial of human nature
9. Failure to understand how the basic forms of human association are both natural and conventional
10. The fallacy of reductionism
March 8, 2013
This short, authoritative text surveys some of the major gaps and problems in modern thought.
I bought a used copy of this book in 2010, as part of my first gush of excitement over learning about the Britannica Great Books series and Adler's role in bringing it to fruition. I bought several of Adler's books and downloaded a number of his papers and interviews. As I continue to work my way through them, I remain convinced that he was one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century.
But are thinkers important? What difference does it make? One person thinks one thing, someone else thinks something else; so what?
At a number of places in this book, Adler states why it makes a difference. For example, in chapter 10 on "Human Existence", about whether a human being is a single thing or a congeries of parts, he notes, "Without the kind of identifiable identity that belongs to the individual thing as a subject of change, human beings, having obviously mutable existence, could not be held morally responsible for their acts." This is an important practical consequence of holding one view or another here.
The mission of the book is simple: to show how, with 10 major ideas, such as "Knowledge and Opinion", "Moral Values", and "Happiness and Contentment", the opinions of modern philosophy are incorrect.
In the case of Knowledge and Opinion, Adler takes aim at the knots into which philosophy has tied itself over the question of whether and how we know what we know--if we do indeed know it. He identifies the key authors of the philosophical mistakes here as David Hume and Immanuel Kant. Hume, in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), determined that the only knowledge that can properly be so called is that arrived at through mathematics, logic, and certain empirical sciences. Philosophy, theology, and other non-numeric fields "can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." Kant, deeply affected by Hume's work but finding his result repugnant, responded by developing an elaborate idealistic philosophy of his own that was intended to rehabilitate these junked fields of knowledge.
In Adler's view, the work of both these thinkers was founded on mistakes early in their chain of reasoning. He says of Kant that he "had no awareness of the distinction between empirical concepts and theoretical constructs"--that is, between concepts derived from sense-experience and concepts that are purely abstract and not capable of being manifested to the senses in any way. Adler notes that many constructs of modern physics fall into the latter category, such as quarks, mesons, and black holes. Not distinguishing between these kinds of concepts, Adler says, led Kant to turn his back on reality and formulate a view of the world that was purely mental. But in reality, according to Adler, reality exists.
As implied by the book's title, these issues are not matters of opinion; modern thinkers--and some ancient ones--made definite mistakes that led to erroneous conclusions. Adler is setting out to correct these mistakes and lead the reader to the correct conclusion in each case.
Is he right to think this? Here I'm not sure. This book, published when the author was 82, is a mature work by a diligent thinker who was deeply versed in the source texts and the whole tradition of thought. He does not suffer from the deficit of which he accuses other modern thinkers--including such heavyweights as Thomas Hobbes, Rene Descartes, and John Locke--namely, of not having thoroughly read the classic philosophical works, particularly those of Aristotle. In many cases, he says, Aristotle has the answer to these modern problems; it's just that modern thinkers aren't aware of it. And that lack of awareness has caused them to wander fruitlessly down many a long cul-de-sac. But can Adler really be so certain?
I wouldn't dare contradict a man of Adler's superior learning and depth of acquaintance with the material, but I do have my doubts. My own observation is that every philosopher is tempted at some point to overplay his hand and treat his conclusions as rock-solid. And the better the philosopher, the greater this temptation is likely to be. We now treat Aristotle's celestial mechanics as a historical curiosity, but he felt it was quite solid because several independent lines of observation and reasoning all led to the same conclusions. And Aristotle was perhaps the greatest thinker in Western history.
My own more modest philosophical training has been in the context of Buddhism. I'm no expert there, but I do know that Buddhist thinkers have been closely examining the question of the nature of our identity and our existence for thousands of years, and I feel sure that their view of Adler's take on "Human Existence" would be that while it is astute and well argued, it is only peeling the skin off the onion. He's not in a position to be offering a final conclusion.
Likewise with the question of reality. Adler is critical and dismissive of idealism as a philosophy; he is a realist. But in Buddhism the nature of reality is not a simple question. It has depths that can really only be discovered in one's experience, via meditation. There are ways in which our everyday experience is dreamlike, and yet we don't regard dreams as real.
Be all that as it may. Adler may be offering his little book as a set of answers to these thorny philosophical problems, but its real value is merely in drawing our attention to them and discussing them. He lays out issues and he gets you thinking, and he does it with simple, vigorous, nontechnical prose. But I'm sure he doesn't want us to take his word for any of these assertions. If we have questions and doubts about what he's saying, then good--we're thinking. I'm sure nothing would have pleased Adler more.
I bought a used copy of this book in 2010, as part of my first gush of excitement over learning about the Britannica Great Books series and Adler's role in bringing it to fruition. I bought several of Adler's books and downloaded a number of his papers and interviews. As I continue to work my way through them, I remain convinced that he was one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century.
But are thinkers important? What difference does it make? One person thinks one thing, someone else thinks something else; so what?
At a number of places in this book, Adler states why it makes a difference. For example, in chapter 10 on "Human Existence", about whether a human being is a single thing or a congeries of parts, he notes, "Without the kind of identifiable identity that belongs to the individual thing as a subject of change, human beings, having obviously mutable existence, could not be held morally responsible for their acts." This is an important practical consequence of holding one view or another here.
The mission of the book is simple: to show how, with 10 major ideas, such as "Knowledge and Opinion", "Moral Values", and "Happiness and Contentment", the opinions of modern philosophy are incorrect.
In the case of Knowledge and Opinion, Adler takes aim at the knots into which philosophy has tied itself over the question of whether and how we know what we know--if we do indeed know it. He identifies the key authors of the philosophical mistakes here as David Hume and Immanuel Kant. Hume, in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), determined that the only knowledge that can properly be so called is that arrived at through mathematics, logic, and certain empirical sciences. Philosophy, theology, and other non-numeric fields "can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." Kant, deeply affected by Hume's work but finding his result repugnant, responded by developing an elaborate idealistic philosophy of his own that was intended to rehabilitate these junked fields of knowledge.
In Adler's view, the work of both these thinkers was founded on mistakes early in their chain of reasoning. He says of Kant that he "had no awareness of the distinction between empirical concepts and theoretical constructs"--that is, between concepts derived from sense-experience and concepts that are purely abstract and not capable of being manifested to the senses in any way. Adler notes that many constructs of modern physics fall into the latter category, such as quarks, mesons, and black holes. Not distinguishing between these kinds of concepts, Adler says, led Kant to turn his back on reality and formulate a view of the world that was purely mental. But in reality, according to Adler, reality exists.
As implied by the book's title, these issues are not matters of opinion; modern thinkers--and some ancient ones--made definite mistakes that led to erroneous conclusions. Adler is setting out to correct these mistakes and lead the reader to the correct conclusion in each case.
Is he right to think this? Here I'm not sure. This book, published when the author was 82, is a mature work by a diligent thinker who was deeply versed in the source texts and the whole tradition of thought. He does not suffer from the deficit of which he accuses other modern thinkers--including such heavyweights as Thomas Hobbes, Rene Descartes, and John Locke--namely, of not having thoroughly read the classic philosophical works, particularly those of Aristotle. In many cases, he says, Aristotle has the answer to these modern problems; it's just that modern thinkers aren't aware of it. And that lack of awareness has caused them to wander fruitlessly down many a long cul-de-sac. But can Adler really be so certain?
I wouldn't dare contradict a man of Adler's superior learning and depth of acquaintance with the material, but I do have my doubts. My own observation is that every philosopher is tempted at some point to overplay his hand and treat his conclusions as rock-solid. And the better the philosopher, the greater this temptation is likely to be. We now treat Aristotle's celestial mechanics as a historical curiosity, but he felt it was quite solid because several independent lines of observation and reasoning all led to the same conclusions. And Aristotle was perhaps the greatest thinker in Western history.
My own more modest philosophical training has been in the context of Buddhism. I'm no expert there, but I do know that Buddhist thinkers have been closely examining the question of the nature of our identity and our existence for thousands of years, and I feel sure that their view of Adler's take on "Human Existence" would be that while it is astute and well argued, it is only peeling the skin off the onion. He's not in a position to be offering a final conclusion.
Likewise with the question of reality. Adler is critical and dismissive of idealism as a philosophy; he is a realist. But in Buddhism the nature of reality is not a simple question. It has depths that can really only be discovered in one's experience, via meditation. There are ways in which our everyday experience is dreamlike, and yet we don't regard dreams as real.
Be all that as it may. Adler may be offering his little book as a set of answers to these thorny philosophical problems, but its real value is merely in drawing our attention to them and discussing them. He lays out issues and he gets you thinking, and he does it with simple, vigorous, nontechnical prose. But I'm sure he doesn't want us to take his word for any of these assertions. If we have questions and doubts about what he's saying, then good--we're thinking. I'm sure nothing would have pleased Adler more.
March 16, 2009
A foe of modern philosophy, Adler takes on Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Kant. These Enlightenment writers, by ignoring earlier ones – that is to say, Aristotle and Aquinas – made basic errors in reasoning that still plague us. Adler uproots these errors in order to get the philosophical project back on track. For this uneven book it’s perhaps better to separate the bad from the good.
The bad:
Surprisingly, this book, presented in two parts, has no index. It has an epilogue which is key to the author’s intent, and therefore would have been better as part of the prologue. Adler’s reputation as an “everyman’s” philosopher isn’t especially justified. Many subjects in the book have been explained much more clearly elsewhere.
The first part deals with mental activity. The first chapter, about concept formation, is hardest, although it had to lead off because subsequent chapters draw from it. Adler criticizes Locke for confusing ideas with objects, but it’s unclear why an “idea” must in all cases be a means and not an end. He seems to hold Locke to a sophisticated theory of concepts. And the consequences of the confusion, too, seem overstated.
In some cases, I don’t see the necessity of Adler’s reasoning. Is it really proper to class speculative philosophy with speculative physics? Is reductionism really better handled by an explanation of subatomic particles than a consideration of emergent properties? Is a self-evident categorical imperative really necessary to ground moral statements? His emphasis is misplaced as well. Why get worked up over a priori synthetic categories when Kant’s noumena had even dimmer implications for the possibility of knowing reality?
The good:
The second part makes much better reading. The chapters which relate to man include interesting topics which the author handles well. One chapter discusses happiness, and Adler draws a well sketched distinction between philosophical happiness and psychological contentment. In the next chapter, the author takes up free will, presenting a remarkably good critique of determinism.
Adler’s focus on the “little things at the beginning” of any mistake is a solid keystone. So his general criticism of modern philosophers, including Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz, who build idiosyncratic systems from the ground up, is well placed. Even in the first part, the author doesn’t get hung up too long on one problem alone, and the book has the distinct advantage of getting better as it goes along.
Conclusion:
My score reflects my own experience. Non-fiction writers appeal differently to different people, and other readers may like the writing better. This is a book of uneven chapters, some opaque and others illuminating. I’d recommend it first to people who have at least some background in philosophy and a familiarity with the writings of the seventeenth-century philosophers.
The bad:
Surprisingly, this book, presented in two parts, has no index. It has an epilogue which is key to the author’s intent, and therefore would have been better as part of the prologue. Adler’s reputation as an “everyman’s” philosopher isn’t especially justified. Many subjects in the book have been explained much more clearly elsewhere.
The first part deals with mental activity. The first chapter, about concept formation, is hardest, although it had to lead off because subsequent chapters draw from it. Adler criticizes Locke for confusing ideas with objects, but it’s unclear why an “idea” must in all cases be a means and not an end. He seems to hold Locke to a sophisticated theory of concepts. And the consequences of the confusion, too, seem overstated.
In some cases, I don’t see the necessity of Adler’s reasoning. Is it really proper to class speculative philosophy with speculative physics? Is reductionism really better handled by an explanation of subatomic particles than a consideration of emergent properties? Is a self-evident categorical imperative really necessary to ground moral statements? His emphasis is misplaced as well. Why get worked up over a priori synthetic categories when Kant’s noumena had even dimmer implications for the possibility of knowing reality?
The good:
The second part makes much better reading. The chapters which relate to man include interesting topics which the author handles well. One chapter discusses happiness, and Adler draws a well sketched distinction between philosophical happiness and psychological contentment. In the next chapter, the author takes up free will, presenting a remarkably good critique of determinism.
Adler’s focus on the “little things at the beginning” of any mistake is a solid keystone. So his general criticism of modern philosophers, including Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz, who build idiosyncratic systems from the ground up, is well placed. Even in the first part, the author doesn’t get hung up too long on one problem alone, and the book has the distinct advantage of getting better as it goes along.
Conclusion:
My score reflects my own experience. Non-fiction writers appeal differently to different people, and other readers may like the writing better. This is a book of uneven chapters, some opaque and others illuminating. I’d recommend it first to people who have at least some background in philosophy and a familiarity with the writings of the seventeenth-century philosophers.
May 11, 2015
Adler identifies himself as a student of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, admitting that a better title for this book would be 'Ten Subjects About Which Philosophical Mistakes Have Been Made'. I was intrigued by the title of the book when I bought it. There is a chapter for each of the philosophical mistakes Adler finds in modern philosophy. By modern philosophy Adler means primarily John Locke, David Hume and Immanuel Kant although a few others are mentioned. I hope the following cursory summaries of the chapters are somewhat accurate.
The first chapter (Consciousness And Its Objects) contests John Locke's proposition that we only directly know our ideas, that is, what we see, hear, feel, smell, so forth. Adler contends that we are not conscious of, and therefore do not know, how we interpret sensations to be objects such as trees and tables.
The second chapter (Intellect And Sense) insists that while intellect, that which interprets sensory data, is dependent upon the brain, it is separate. There is not much support given for this assertion.
The third chapter (Words And Meaning) claims meaning for words are learned by association of sounds or marks with objects that we experience. Then he says that our intellect is able to use common nouns (universals) as well as proper nouns (particulars) even though we do not directly see a class or kind of object (universal), we see individual objects (particulars) which are actually proper nouns.
The fourth chapter (Knowledge And Opinion) begins by saying that knowledge must be certain and immutable. Mathematical theorems are an example of such. However he admits that scientific knowledge is very creditable even though it is not certain and may be modified by future investigations.
The fifth chapter (Moral Values) argues that moral knowledge is not subjective and relative as Spinoza and Hume claimed. And hedonism is not all that's good as Epicurus and JS Mill claimed. The knowledge of good and evil is objective and is based upon human needs. We should desire what is good for us, that is, what we need. All that is yet necessary is for a list of such needs to be enumerated.
The sixth chapter (Happiness And Contentment) says that happiness is different from contentment. Happiness is the total good and contentment is a psychological good. Happiness is possession of goods that one NEEDS. Contentment is possession of goods that one WANTS. The pursuit of happiness is pursuit of things one NEEDS. The common good is the same for all people, regardless of culture. Good will and good fortune suffice for achieving happiness.
The seventh chapter (Freedom And Choice) claims that determinists (scientists) misunderstand choice. Free choice does not mean by chance or without cause. Human will (intellect?) makes choices which are not determined and not by chance, but by reason.
The eighth chapter (Human Nature) states that animal behavior is dictated by instinct; human behavior is not. There is great variation in human behavior because humans have 'potentialities'. Adler has trouble enumerating the human needs upon which morals are to be based. Humans need to eat, drink and sleep, but that's as far as he gets. He might have added security, sex and families.
The ninth chapter (Human Society): The political philosophical 'state of nature' (all humans are autonomous) is myth. The 'social contract' is also a myth. Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau erred using these myths. The family is a natural society based upon need. The tribe is an alliance of families.
The tenth chapter (Human Existence) examines the problem of parts and wholes: the chair of our experience which is composed of the molecules, atoms and particles of physics. Which is more real? What is reality? The basic particles were declared by Heisenberg to be 'potentialities' and so are less real than the objects of our experience; parts are less real than wholes.
Epilogue (Modern Science And Ancient Wisdom) questions the meaning of identity in existence. Can the human being composed of molecules be held morally responsible?
Modern philosophy has made very little progress in metaphysics and moral philosophy since the Middle Ages. He recommends more study of Aristotle (with modifications made from modern science) and Thomas Aquinas.
This is a thoughtful work which prompts me to examine my own notions. The above summary does not do justice to the discussion. I agreed with some of his assertions but not all.
The first chapter (Consciousness And Its Objects) contests John Locke's proposition that we only directly know our ideas, that is, what we see, hear, feel, smell, so forth. Adler contends that we are not conscious of, and therefore do not know, how we interpret sensations to be objects such as trees and tables.
The second chapter (Intellect And Sense) insists that while intellect, that which interprets sensory data, is dependent upon the brain, it is separate. There is not much support given for this assertion.
The third chapter (Words And Meaning) claims meaning for words are learned by association of sounds or marks with objects that we experience. Then he says that our intellect is able to use common nouns (universals) as well as proper nouns (particulars) even though we do not directly see a class or kind of object (universal), we see individual objects (particulars) which are actually proper nouns.
The fourth chapter (Knowledge And Opinion) begins by saying that knowledge must be certain and immutable. Mathematical theorems are an example of such. However he admits that scientific knowledge is very creditable even though it is not certain and may be modified by future investigations.
The fifth chapter (Moral Values) argues that moral knowledge is not subjective and relative as Spinoza and Hume claimed. And hedonism is not all that's good as Epicurus and JS Mill claimed. The knowledge of good and evil is objective and is based upon human needs. We should desire what is good for us, that is, what we need. All that is yet necessary is for a list of such needs to be enumerated.
The sixth chapter (Happiness And Contentment) says that happiness is different from contentment. Happiness is the total good and contentment is a psychological good. Happiness is possession of goods that one NEEDS. Contentment is possession of goods that one WANTS. The pursuit of happiness is pursuit of things one NEEDS. The common good is the same for all people, regardless of culture. Good will and good fortune suffice for achieving happiness.
The seventh chapter (Freedom And Choice) claims that determinists (scientists) misunderstand choice. Free choice does not mean by chance or without cause. Human will (intellect?) makes choices which are not determined and not by chance, but by reason.
The eighth chapter (Human Nature) states that animal behavior is dictated by instinct; human behavior is not. There is great variation in human behavior because humans have 'potentialities'. Adler has trouble enumerating the human needs upon which morals are to be based. Humans need to eat, drink and sleep, but that's as far as he gets. He might have added security, sex and families.
The ninth chapter (Human Society): The political philosophical 'state of nature' (all humans are autonomous) is myth. The 'social contract' is also a myth. Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau erred using these myths. The family is a natural society based upon need. The tribe is an alliance of families.
The tenth chapter (Human Existence) examines the problem of parts and wholes: the chair of our experience which is composed of the molecules, atoms and particles of physics. Which is more real? What is reality? The basic particles were declared by Heisenberg to be 'potentialities' and so are less real than the objects of our experience; parts are less real than wholes.
Epilogue (Modern Science And Ancient Wisdom) questions the meaning of identity in existence. Can the human being composed of molecules be held morally responsible?
Modern philosophy has made very little progress in metaphysics and moral philosophy since the Middle Ages. He recommends more study of Aristotle (with modifications made from modern science) and Thomas Aquinas.
This is a thoughtful work which prompts me to examine my own notions. The above summary does not do justice to the discussion. I agreed with some of his assertions but not all.
May 14, 2021
One of Charlotte Mason’s key ideas was that education is the science of relations.
In Mortimer J. Adler’s book Ten Philosophical Mistakes, the first chapter discusses whether there is actually objective reality. Can I truly know that anything that happens outside of my own mind is real; that it has a separate, independent existence and isn’t just something my imagination has constructed?
This caught my eye towards the end of the chapter:
“When we correct the initial error that generates all these results, we find ourselves living together in the world of physical reality, a world with which we have direct acquaintance in our perceptual experiences. We not only have bodily contact with one another in this world; we also communicate with one another about it when we discuss perceptual objects we can handle together…[as well as] past events or happenings that we remember, imaginary object as well as things we imagine that may also exist or be capable of real existence, and all objects of thought.”
So reality, in that sense, is about being able to form relationships. If matter really exists, we have a relationship with real objects. (Is that what you call objective reality?) We can touch things, see things, and so on; we believe that those things actually exist, and that they go on existing even when we are no longer around.
We can have relationships with real people, individuals who matter. We can communicate with them about not only the things we see and touch, but the things we think about. We aren’t trapped inside our own minds, and we aren’t imagining each other.
We can have a relationship with the One that Francis Schaeffer called the space-time God, the God Who Is There. He is as objectively real as the material objects we touch, and as the human beings around us. We also believe that God has communicated with us.
“As important as Schaeffer viewed worldviews and religious first principles, he was, at the end of the day, most concerned with objective reality and reality of the sort knowable to all mankind. He was, thus, a realist. ” “Francis Schaeffer’s Real Reality”, at The Calvinist International
To quote the late Robin Williams: “Reality. What a concept.”
In Mortimer J. Adler’s book Ten Philosophical Mistakes, the first chapter discusses whether there is actually objective reality. Can I truly know that anything that happens outside of my own mind is real; that it has a separate, independent existence and isn’t just something my imagination has constructed?
This caught my eye towards the end of the chapter:
“When we correct the initial error that generates all these results, we find ourselves living together in the world of physical reality, a world with which we have direct acquaintance in our perceptual experiences. We not only have bodily contact with one another in this world; we also communicate with one another about it when we discuss perceptual objects we can handle together…[as well as] past events or happenings that we remember, imaginary object as well as things we imagine that may also exist or be capable of real existence, and all objects of thought.”
So reality, in that sense, is about being able to form relationships. If matter really exists, we have a relationship with real objects. (Is that what you call objective reality?) We can touch things, see things, and so on; we believe that those things actually exist, and that they go on existing even when we are no longer around.
We can have relationships with real people, individuals who matter. We can communicate with them about not only the things we see and touch, but the things we think about. We aren’t trapped inside our own minds, and we aren’t imagining each other.
We can have a relationship with the One that Francis Schaeffer called the space-time God, the God Who Is There. He is as objectively real as the material objects we touch, and as the human beings around us. We also believe that God has communicated with us.
“As important as Schaeffer viewed worldviews and religious first principles, he was, at the end of the day, most concerned with objective reality and reality of the sort knowable to all mankind. He was, thus, a realist. ” “Francis Schaeffer’s Real Reality”, at The Calvinist International
To quote the late Robin Williams: “Reality. What a concept.”
February 4, 2022
Very entertaining and thought-provoking. The book was definitely slow to read because of the constant need to read every paragraph twice in order to fully grasp the ideas and concepts, presented in the chapters.
Currently reading
July 24, 2009Actually re-reading this. I love that Adler writes clearly, if at times too black-and-white. However I can't get over the first chapter (Consciousness And Its Objects). It seems insane. He claims to defend common sense and yet his "right" view seems more absurd than Locke's "wrong" view. He claims that I cannot apprehend my own images, dreams, memories, and concepts, but that I actually apprehend the objects of imagination, dreaming, remembering, conceptualizing. Aren't the aforementioned words by common-sense definition those very objects? It seems he's playing a simple semantic game by changing the meanings of these words (memories, concepts, etc.) and replacing them with "objects of consciousness". The previous words then become "that by which" we apprehend these mental objects, which to me merely names the various brain centers responsible for memories, conceptualizing, dreaming, imagining, etc. Then he claims that these objects are objective, that two or more people can apprehend the very same objects simultaneously (mental telepathy?). I tried going back to the passage in Aquinas where he got the "that which"/"that by which" distinction, and Aquinas applies this only to perception, not to conception or imagination or hallucination, etc. Granted I did not read further through Aquinas (His writing is dryer than reading the U.S. tax code in the Sahara), but still I suspect Adler is making a similar error by applying aspects of perception to all other mental phenomena. The rest of the chapters of this book I recall finding very clear and interesting.
December 15, 2016
Betrand Russell says in his Problems of Philosophy that, despite the predilections of some fusty philosophical bone-pickers, a modern philosophical education should begin with Kant. Adler wrote this book in part to show what a tragic mistake that is. All sort of errors in modern thought derive from not being conversant with the great thinkers of the past, and Adler shows time and again how a little dose of Aristotle is good for what ails you. This book, along with Adler's other book Aristotle for Everybody, would form a great introduction to the classic Aristotelian-Thomist synthesis in philosophy and its applicability to many of the seemingly insoluble problems of modern thought.
September 12, 2020
How have the moderns erred? Let me count the ways.
Adler presents the errors of the modern philosophers, especially Locke, Hume, and Kant, and corrects these errors using Aristotle and Aquinas. The strength of a book like this is not in its philosophical rigor but in the presentation of difficult philosophical disputes in very readable way, without dumbing things down. This would be a great place to start if one were just getting interested in philosophy.
Adler presents the errors of the modern philosophers, especially Locke, Hume, and Kant, and corrects these errors using Aristotle and Aquinas. The strength of a book like this is not in its philosophical rigor but in the presentation of difficult philosophical disputes in very readable way, without dumbing things down. This would be a great place to start if one were just getting interested in philosophy.
February 14, 2021
An eye opener against some basic mistakes made by celebrated philosophers that resulted in major consequences in our daily lives. Adler knows deeply what he is talking about. He leads us to understand those simple “lapses” in a way that it’s easy to anyone understand.
Luckily I read this book before getting deeper into modern philosophy. Certainly I’ll focus more on anything written before the XVII century for a long time.
Luckily I read this book before getting deeper into modern philosophy. Certainly I’ll focus more on anything written before the XVII century for a long time.
March 27, 2020
This begins with an amusing one-page note, "To the Reader," which says: "A completely accurate, but also more cumbersome, title would have been: Ten Subjects About Which Philosophical Mistakes Have Been Made." The author mentions that the first five subjects are given a longer treatment because errors pertaining to them "are more fundamental and give rise to more serious consequences in modern thought." He then says, "I have not tried to argue for or prove the truths that I have offered...I rely upon the reader's common sense to discern that the corrections have the ring of truth." Therein lies the problem for me: Many of the author's assertions just don't ring truthfully to my ear.
The first fifty pages or so focus on the distinction between (a) immediate sensory perceptions that are not "about" anything other than themselves, and (b) "ideas" that have objects. Ideas are instruments for understanding other things, he insists; we do not understand our ideas themselves. This is bewildering to me. If we do not have ideas about our ideas, I have no idea what philosophy is.
The fifth chapter, "Moral Values," was most interesting to me. I was happy with his distinction between subjective and objective, relative and absolute, because of how simply and clearly it was phrased (even though I personally prefer different definitions of these terms.)
I understand his concerns that, without agreement on human needs, "we would have no basis for a global doctrine that calls for the protection of human rights" and "we would be left exposed to the harsh doctrine that might makes right." (p. 127) But what I see in the world (speaking descriptively) is that we do argue about what rights ought to be protected, and we do all too often find that firepower, not moral wisdom, determines what befalls us. These are things that actually happen in the world, and I'm never satisfied by waving away the problem by saying that the good is universal and obvious. We might wish that it were so, because that would solve all our problems, but it is not. Evidently, the good is variable and mysterious; that's why people argue and fight. And if you believe that there is a transcendent good, fine, but if you can't point to it in a way that causes everyone to agree that you're pointing to the correct thing, then you haven't solved the problem of the arguing and the fighting.
The book is free of jargon, but it's completely abstract, and it appears to be aimed at philosophy students. It doesn't hook onto any contemporary issues that explain why a non-academic should care. Other than his references to philosophers in a certain canon (Kant, Hume, Locke, Spinoza), the author gives little indication of his place or time. (The United States, 1985.) At the end of Chapter 4, "Knowledge and Opinion," in promoting the notion that philosophers pursue truth and not mere opinion, he betrays a concern that, if we do not make it clear that philosophy is a search for truth, then philosophy as a discipline will be devalued. ("The importance...is that the relegation of theoretical philosophy to the realm of mere opinion amounts to a cultural disaster in an age that is so dominated by increasing specialization in all other fields of learning. If philosophical speculation is not respected in its claim to have a hold upon the truth about reality, our culture will cease to have generalists." (p.107)) This is a sales pitch for maintaining philosophy departments in universities; after all, if we do not bolster philosophers, then surely other fields of learning will dominate the knowledge market.
It serves less well as a pitch to readers outside academia as to why they should care about philosophy as a discipline. At the end of Chapter 6, "Happiness and Contentment," he does hit a pragmatic activist note: It's not enough to have "a will rightly directed to happiness as the ultimate goal and habitually disposed to choose the right means for achieving it" (p. 143), as we must also more concretely focus on helping ourselves and others out of poverty and specific oppressions (p. 144). This fairly uncontroversial statement is, however, still abstract. His examples are the abolition of slavery and universal suffrage; these weren't calls to action in 1985. This only demonstrates that philosophers can make assessments in hindsight. It doesn't persuade me that if we avoid certain specified philosophical mistakes then we are more likely to end up on the right side of history.
The first fifty pages or so focus on the distinction between (a) immediate sensory perceptions that are not "about" anything other than themselves, and (b) "ideas" that have objects. Ideas are instruments for understanding other things, he insists; we do not understand our ideas themselves. This is bewildering to me. If we do not have ideas about our ideas, I have no idea what philosophy is.
The fifth chapter, "Moral Values," was most interesting to me. I was happy with his distinction between subjective and objective, relative and absolute, because of how simply and clearly it was phrased (even though I personally prefer different definitions of these terms.)
The subjective is that which differs for you, for me, and for everyone else. In contrast, the objective is that which is the same for you, for me, and for everyone else.I disagreed with the way he ended the chapter, though. "Whatever we need is really good for us. There are no wrong needs. We never need anything to an excess that is really bad for us. The needs that are inherent in our nature are all right desires." (p. 124) If this were true, it would indeed vastly simplify moral philosophy. But it does not have the ring of truth for me. Chemical addiction immediately comes to my mind as a counterexample. The very conundrum is that the body comes to need a chemical that is actually bad for it. Addicts can arrive at a point at which they are physically (not just psychologically) unable to quit without medical assistance; the body may die if it has any more but may also die if it doesn't have more. Other examples include the need for a surgery that carries a serious risk, or the need for a food or medicine to which one is allergic. When we open up this topic to consider psychological, interpersonal, social, cultural, economic, and political needs, we see that the conflicts between different needs are innumerable. We need all kinds of things that bite back in some way, whether immediately or down the pipeline. "The good" almost never rises up obvious and uncomplicated. Because of this, we're not yet in a place to assert that "our natural needs are the basis of our natural rights" (p. 127).
The relative is that which varies from time to time and alters with alterations in the circumstances. In contrast, the absolute is that which does not vary from time to time and does not alter with alterations in the circumstances.
I understand his concerns that, without agreement on human needs, "we would have no basis for a global doctrine that calls for the protection of human rights" and "we would be left exposed to the harsh doctrine that might makes right." (p. 127) But what I see in the world (speaking descriptively) is that we do argue about what rights ought to be protected, and we do all too often find that firepower, not moral wisdom, determines what befalls us. These are things that actually happen in the world, and I'm never satisfied by waving away the problem by saying that the good is universal and obvious. We might wish that it were so, because that would solve all our problems, but it is not. Evidently, the good is variable and mysterious; that's why people argue and fight. And if you believe that there is a transcendent good, fine, but if you can't point to it in a way that causes everyone to agree that you're pointing to the correct thing, then you haven't solved the problem of the arguing and the fighting.
The book is free of jargon, but it's completely abstract, and it appears to be aimed at philosophy students. It doesn't hook onto any contemporary issues that explain why a non-academic should care. Other than his references to philosophers in a certain canon (Kant, Hume, Locke, Spinoza), the author gives little indication of his place or time. (The United States, 1985.) At the end of Chapter 4, "Knowledge and Opinion," in promoting the notion that philosophers pursue truth and not mere opinion, he betrays a concern that, if we do not make it clear that philosophy is a search for truth, then philosophy as a discipline will be devalued. ("The importance...is that the relegation of theoretical philosophy to the realm of mere opinion amounts to a cultural disaster in an age that is so dominated by increasing specialization in all other fields of learning. If philosophical speculation is not respected in its claim to have a hold upon the truth about reality, our culture will cease to have generalists." (p.107)) This is a sales pitch for maintaining philosophy departments in universities; after all, if we do not bolster philosophers, then surely other fields of learning will dominate the knowledge market.
It serves less well as a pitch to readers outside academia as to why they should care about philosophy as a discipline. At the end of Chapter 6, "Happiness and Contentment," he does hit a pragmatic activist note: It's not enough to have "a will rightly directed to happiness as the ultimate goal and habitually disposed to choose the right means for achieving it" (p. 143), as we must also more concretely focus on helping ourselves and others out of poverty and specific oppressions (p. 144). This fairly uncontroversial statement is, however, still abstract. His examples are the abolition of slavery and universal suffrage; these weren't calls to action in 1985. This only demonstrates that philosophers can make assessments in hindsight. It doesn't persuade me that if we avoid certain specified philosophical mistakes then we are more likely to end up on the right side of history.
January 16, 2013
The writing is pretty good, and he provides a good overview of major ideas in philosophical thought, but Adler fails to offer sound reasoning for the arguments that he makes. In the introduction, Adler states that he will discuss ten mistakes that modern philosophers have made that have warped the way that people reason. Although Adler proceeds to survey ten issues that he calls "philosophical mistakes," in almost every case, Adler fails to provide compelling evidence for the position that he takes. Instead, he states his own beliefs as truth and dismisses any disagreement as a "mistake."
For example, in the first chapter, Adler discusses Locke's theory of ideas and how they are the object immediately before our minds when we think about things. Although Adler describes Locke's theory well, he disagrees with Locke's statement that these ideas are the only things we encounter for sure, which are private and not observable by other people - in Adler's opinion, our ideas come from the real objects around us that are public and those objects are the things by which we know and perceive things. However, he goes so far as to call Locke's perfectly legitimate statement that "our ideas are the only thing we have certainty about" a mistake because it leads to either extreme skepticism or solipsism, which he calls untenable. However, it is not true that Locke's theory necessarily results in skepticism or solipsism, and there is no evidence that shows either of those two beliefs to be false, so Adler has no justification for calling Locke's theory of ideas an "error" or a "philosophical mistake." Furthermore, the only difference between Adler's position and Locke's theory is an assumption that the "real world" exists, which makes Adler's position actually less sound than Locke's.
This kind of reasoning occurs in almost every chapter of the book, and leads to a flawed conclusion where Adler presents his philosophy as the only viable position to take. Thus this book gets two stars for its adequate presentation of philosophical ideas and clear writing, but no more due to the lack of sound reasoning throughout the book.
For example, in the first chapter, Adler discusses Locke's theory of ideas and how they are the object immediately before our minds when we think about things. Although Adler describes Locke's theory well, he disagrees with Locke's statement that these ideas are the only things we encounter for sure, which are private and not observable by other people - in Adler's opinion, our ideas come from the real objects around us that are public and those objects are the things by which we know and perceive things. However, he goes so far as to call Locke's perfectly legitimate statement that "our ideas are the only thing we have certainty about" a mistake because it leads to either extreme skepticism or solipsism, which he calls untenable. However, it is not true that Locke's theory necessarily results in skepticism or solipsism, and there is no evidence that shows either of those two beliefs to be false, so Adler has no justification for calling Locke's theory of ideas an "error" or a "philosophical mistake." Furthermore, the only difference between Adler's position and Locke's theory is an assumption that the "real world" exists, which makes Adler's position actually less sound than Locke's.
This kind of reasoning occurs in almost every chapter of the book, and leads to a flawed conclusion where Adler presents his philosophy as the only viable position to take. Thus this book gets two stars for its adequate presentation of philosophical ideas and clear writing, but no more due to the lack of sound reasoning throughout the book.
September 3, 2014
This is a bold proposition from start to finish. The idea that any Philosopher can find the others mistakes and, somehow, has it better is perhaps brash. I found it interesting to walk through this work. I found most interesting was discussing various conceptions of man's "State of Nature" which some use a very interesting view of man as an individual to then bolster anarchism, libertarianism, etc.; yet science shows us man's social origins so this "State of Nature" seems like a ridiculous notion. He also makes an assertion which I recall from Nietzsche about Philosophy being concerned as much about what ought to be as with what is. He makes claims which I have trouble accepting. I am uncomfortable when Philosophy becomes a purely speculative and academic process. I think we need to think about what ought and what we are capable of. Our ideas of virtue in the past might not represent what man is, or is really capable of, or how man thrives best. (I am use man to refer to humans not just males.) I am glad that he did make clear his Aristotelian position in the book, since, until he did, I always felt like something was being hidden. I was left bothered by what I felt to be an inadequate definition of happiness. Perhaps, I missed it, but it seemed crucial to his arguments at points, and I am unclear what he meant. For someone so clear in so many ways, this seems to be a glaring omission.
Read
July 26, 2011I think a survey course in philosophy might be in order prior to reading portions of this challenging read. The early chapters dispute specific philosophers such as Kant, Lock and Hume. Broadly Adler explores conclusions depending on whether they are derived by pure inward thought or through interaction with the outside world. Adler feels that depending on which of these methods a philosopher advocates, he will typically take it to an extreme (think of Plato and the allegory of the Cave).
Ideas derive from the physical, inward contemplation and the physical with can only be contemplated intellectually (i.e. quantum mechanics). Also fictitious items are also part of our reality as they are part of what we are and influence how we perceive reality – is not Captain Ahab a real character?
The latter chapters of the book deal with broader issues such as if there is human nature and human existence without as much finger pointing at specific philosophers.
I enjoyed reading this book, but, frankly I am too dumb to digest and argue its points intelligently. I think I need to re-read this before I can recommend it…and my brain is tired and I need to move on to some fluff.
Ideas derive from the physical, inward contemplation and the physical with can only be contemplated intellectually (i.e. quantum mechanics). Also fictitious items are also part of our reality as they are part of what we are and influence how we perceive reality – is not Captain Ahab a real character?
The latter chapters of the book deal with broader issues such as if there is human nature and human existence without as much finger pointing at specific philosophers.
I enjoyed reading this book, but, frankly I am too dumb to digest and argue its points intelligently. I think I need to re-read this before I can recommend it…and my brain is tired and I need to move on to some fluff.
September 15, 2023
chapter 1
corrects errors in thinking proposed by Locke that lead to Solipsism by adjusting the premise.
Thoughts are not the object of our conscienesous; we perceive objects by our thoughts...regardless if it is an imaginative idea or an actual table sitting in the room. Because it is impossible to know the thoughts of other people (without them telling you their thoughts through a different medium: i.e. verbal expression, written note), the only way to agree upon a reality that exist outside of our minds is to recognize that our thoughts are that by which objects are perceived, and are NOT the object of our mind.
chapter 2
the error of reductionism/materialism is addressed by stating that the mind does more than just sense.
Distinguished that man is not just different from animals in degree, but in kind.
corrects errors in thinking proposed by Locke that lead to Solipsism by adjusting the premise.
Thoughts are not the object of our conscienesous; we perceive objects by our thoughts...regardless if it is an imaginative idea or an actual table sitting in the room. Because it is impossible to know the thoughts of other people (without them telling you their thoughts through a different medium: i.e. verbal expression, written note), the only way to agree upon a reality that exist outside of our minds is to recognize that our thoughts are that by which objects are perceived, and are NOT the object of our mind.
chapter 2
the error of reductionism/materialism is addressed by stating that the mind does more than just sense.
Distinguished that man is not just different from animals in degree, but in kind.
May 14, 2010
Adler is a clear thinker, a philsopher who refuses to shroud his thinking with jargon.
I have read this book every decade since its publication and I always walk away freshed.
I need to buy some of his other books-some I have read and some I have not read.
I have read this book every decade since its publication and I always walk away freshed.
I need to buy some of his other books-some I have read and some I have not read.
July 19, 2009
Second half was better than the first. It took me awhile to get into it, but the bits about happiness and contentment and human nature were great.
Want to read
December 14, 2009Recommended by James Schall in Another Sort of Learning, Bibliography.
Want to read
March 26, 2012I registered a book at BookCrossing.com!
http://www.BookCrossing.com/journal/2540214
http://www.BookCrossing.com/journal/2540214
November 27, 2022
Obtuse; difficult to understand; purposefully arcane; the author is an inveterate Aristotelian, dismissing 2,000 years of philosophy as largely erroneous and needing to refer to Aristotle to correct its mistakes. The book lacks clarity and bullet points to make the reader understand and to justify calling Adler the “philosopher for Everyman.”
September 11, 2023
This one loses a star for not having a bibliography or further reading section. Otherwise I don't think you can do better for an overview of the ways philosophy post-Descartes departed from the Medieval synthesis to the sorrow of us all.
December 29, 2021
Adler is gifted in communicating the meaning and implications of difficult philosophical ideas, as well as evaluating and analyzing them. He also knows how to read a book, how to speak, and how to listen.
June 7, 2024
ADLER REJECTS A NUMBER OF POST-ENLIGHTENMENT “TRUTHS”
Mortimer Jerome Adler (1902-2001) was an American philosopher, educator, and popular author, who worked at various times for Columbia University, the University of Chicago, Encyclopædia Britannica, and his own Institute for Philosophical Research.
He wrote in the introductory section of this 1985 book, “Readers will find that there are more than ten philosophical mistakes considered and corrected in this book. But there are ten subjects about which these mistakes are made… I have not tried to argue for or prove the truths that I have offered as corrections of the errors pointed out. I rely upon the reader’s common sense to discern that the corrections have the ring of truth.”
He said in the Prologue, “Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas had in mind the philosophical mistakes… with which this book is concerned. All of them are modern philosophical errors, mistakes made by philosophers since the seventeenth century… all of these mistakes are typically, if not wholly, modern in origin and in the serious consequences to which they have led modern thought… They affect our understanding of ourselves, our lives, our institutions, and our experience… Many of us have unwittingly harbored some of these mistakes in our minds without knowing whence or how they came there.” (Pg. xiii-xiv)
He outlines, “The mistake about consciousness … is, perhaps, the crucial one… [people] tend to suppose that they are directly aware of the contents of their own minds… Such feelings, however are utterly different from their perceptions, memories, imaginations, dreams, and thoughts or concepts… The second mistake [is the]… failure to distinguish between perceptual and conceptual thought---between perceiving the sensible objects that we encounter… and thinking about objects that cannot be perceived or imagined… The third set… consists of errors that would not have been made in the philosophy of language… had it not been for the first two mistakes… The fourth mistake draws the line that divides knowledge from mere opinion in such a way that it puts mathematics, investigative science, and history on one side of that line and everything else on the other side… The fifth mistake also draws a line between what is genuine knowledge and mere opinion…
“The sixth mistake consists in the identification of happiness… with the purely psychological state of contentment… The seventh mistake… is one of understanding… accompanied, on the part of the determinists, by a mistaken view of the relation between free choice and moral responsibility… The eighth mistake consists in the astounding denial of human nature… The ninth mistake concerns the origin of various forms of human association—the family, the tribe or village, and the state or civil society… The tenth mistake … consists in an error that can be called the fallacy of reductionism… maintaining the only the ultimate component parts have reality and that the wholes they constitute are mere appearances, or even illusory.” (Pg. xvi-xix)
He rejects Hume’s assertion of “the absurdity of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and general ideas,” stating, “Those who regard the human mind as having intellectual as well as sensitive powers have no difficulty whatsoever in meeting Hume’s challenge head-on. By means of an abstract concept, we understand what is common to all the particular cows, trees, and chairs that we can perceive or imagine.” (Pg. 41-42)
He asserts, “It is necessary to correct the mistaken view of the human mind first advanced by Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume in order to defend the proposition that man differs radically in kind from all other animals. The difference is one in kind rather than one of degree because only the human mind includes intellectual as well as sensitive powers. The difference in kind id radical because man’s intellectual powers are not related to the action of the brain and nervous system in the same way that man’s sensory power are.” (Pg. 51-52)
He states that “The twentieth-century followers of Hobbes… For them, the only referential significance that name words can have involves … reference to the really existent… All the rest of the words in our vocabulary have only sense, but not reference… How do these modern linguistic philosophers reach such an absurd conclusion?... The only explanation… is that it lies in their ignorance of the distinction between formal and instrumental signs and in their consequent failure to understand that the words which become names through direct acquaintance with the objects named refer to whatever objects are signified by the ideas in our mind functioning as formal signs of those objects. Accordingly, all the words that name the objects of thought… do have referential significance.” (Pg. 79-80)
He suggests, “By these criteria for distinguishing between knowledge and opinion, how much knowledge do any of us have? Most of us would admit that we have precious little… The solution, it seems to me, lies in recognizing the sense in which the word ‘knowledge’ signifies something that is quite distinct from anything that can be called an opinion … When the criteria for calling anything knowledge are such exacting criteria as the certitude, incorrigibility, and immutability of the truth that is known, then the few things that are knowledge stand far apart from everything that might be called opinion.” (Pg. 84-85)
He points out, “Kant [thought]… that he had succeeded in establishing and explaining the certitude and incorrigibility of Euclidean geometry, simple arithmetic, and Newtonian physics… The discovery and development of the non-Euclidian geometries and of modern number theory should suffice to show how utterly factitious was Kant’s invention… Similarly, the replacement of Newtonian physics by modern relativistic physics… should also suffice… How anyone in the twentieth century can take Kant’s transcendental philosophy seriously is baffling…” (Pg. 97-98)
He observes, “all real goods are things to which we have a natural right… If all goods were merely apparent… we could not avoid the relativism and subjectivism that would reduce moral judgments to mere opinion… Nothing more needs to be said to underline the practical importance of correcting the mistakes that reduce moral judgments to mere opinion, thereby establishing the objectivity and universality of moral values and giving moral philosophy the status of knowledge.” (Pg. 127)
He notes, “Happiness can then be defined as a whole life enriched by the cumulative possession of all the real goods that every human being needs and by the satisfaction of those individual wants that result in obtaining apparent goods that are innocuous. The pursuit of happiness... consists in the effort to discharge our moral obligation to seek whatever if really good for us and nothing else unless it is something… that does not interfere with our obtaining all the real goods we need.” (Pg. 133-134)
He contends, “the position taken by the exponents of free choice is sounder than the position taken by the soft-determinists. There are still other considerations… One turns on … those who regard moral philosophy as genuine knowledge… moral virtue… is an indispensable … ingredient in the pursuit of happiness. What merit would attach to moral virtue is the acts that form such habitual tendencies and dispositions were not acts of free choice on the part of the individual who was in the process of acquiring moral virtue? Persons of vicious moral character would have their characters formed … by acts entirely determined, and that could not have been otherwise…” (Pg. 154)
He concludes, “Not only is the conflict between the view of the physical world advanced by physical science and the view held by common sense reconciled. We also reach the conclusion that the perceptible individual things of common experience have a higher degree of actual reality. This applies also to the sensible qualities … that we experience things as having. They are not merely figments of our consciousness with no status at all in the real world… With this conclusion reached, the challenge to the reality of human experience and to the identifiable identity of the individual person is removed. There can be no question about the moral responsibility that each of us bears for his or her actions.” (Pg. 190)
This book will be of keen interest to students of philosophy.
Mortimer Jerome Adler (1902-2001) was an American philosopher, educator, and popular author, who worked at various times for Columbia University, the University of Chicago, Encyclopædia Britannica, and his own Institute for Philosophical Research.
He wrote in the introductory section of this 1985 book, “Readers will find that there are more than ten philosophical mistakes considered and corrected in this book. But there are ten subjects about which these mistakes are made… I have not tried to argue for or prove the truths that I have offered as corrections of the errors pointed out. I rely upon the reader’s common sense to discern that the corrections have the ring of truth.”
He said in the Prologue, “Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas had in mind the philosophical mistakes… with which this book is concerned. All of them are modern philosophical errors, mistakes made by philosophers since the seventeenth century… all of these mistakes are typically, if not wholly, modern in origin and in the serious consequences to which they have led modern thought… They affect our understanding of ourselves, our lives, our institutions, and our experience… Many of us have unwittingly harbored some of these mistakes in our minds without knowing whence or how they came there.” (Pg. xiii-xiv)
He outlines, “The mistake about consciousness … is, perhaps, the crucial one… [people] tend to suppose that they are directly aware of the contents of their own minds… Such feelings, however are utterly different from their perceptions, memories, imaginations, dreams, and thoughts or concepts… The second mistake [is the]… failure to distinguish between perceptual and conceptual thought---between perceiving the sensible objects that we encounter… and thinking about objects that cannot be perceived or imagined… The third set… consists of errors that would not have been made in the philosophy of language… had it not been for the first two mistakes… The fourth mistake draws the line that divides knowledge from mere opinion in such a way that it puts mathematics, investigative science, and history on one side of that line and everything else on the other side… The fifth mistake also draws a line between what is genuine knowledge and mere opinion…
“The sixth mistake consists in the identification of happiness… with the purely psychological state of contentment… The seventh mistake… is one of understanding… accompanied, on the part of the determinists, by a mistaken view of the relation between free choice and moral responsibility… The eighth mistake consists in the astounding denial of human nature… The ninth mistake concerns the origin of various forms of human association—the family, the tribe or village, and the state or civil society… The tenth mistake … consists in an error that can be called the fallacy of reductionism… maintaining the only the ultimate component parts have reality and that the wholes they constitute are mere appearances, or even illusory.” (Pg. xvi-xix)
He rejects Hume’s assertion of “the absurdity of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and general ideas,” stating, “Those who regard the human mind as having intellectual as well as sensitive powers have no difficulty whatsoever in meeting Hume’s challenge head-on. By means of an abstract concept, we understand what is common to all the particular cows, trees, and chairs that we can perceive or imagine.” (Pg. 41-42)
He asserts, “It is necessary to correct the mistaken view of the human mind first advanced by Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume in order to defend the proposition that man differs radically in kind from all other animals. The difference is one in kind rather than one of degree because only the human mind includes intellectual as well as sensitive powers. The difference in kind id radical because man’s intellectual powers are not related to the action of the brain and nervous system in the same way that man’s sensory power are.” (Pg. 51-52)
He states that “The twentieth-century followers of Hobbes… For them, the only referential significance that name words can have involves … reference to the really existent… All the rest of the words in our vocabulary have only sense, but not reference… How do these modern linguistic philosophers reach such an absurd conclusion?... The only explanation… is that it lies in their ignorance of the distinction between formal and instrumental signs and in their consequent failure to understand that the words which become names through direct acquaintance with the objects named refer to whatever objects are signified by the ideas in our mind functioning as formal signs of those objects. Accordingly, all the words that name the objects of thought… do have referential significance.” (Pg. 79-80)
He suggests, “By these criteria for distinguishing between knowledge and opinion, how much knowledge do any of us have? Most of us would admit that we have precious little… The solution, it seems to me, lies in recognizing the sense in which the word ‘knowledge’ signifies something that is quite distinct from anything that can be called an opinion … When the criteria for calling anything knowledge are such exacting criteria as the certitude, incorrigibility, and immutability of the truth that is known, then the few things that are knowledge stand far apart from everything that might be called opinion.” (Pg. 84-85)
He points out, “Kant [thought]… that he had succeeded in establishing and explaining the certitude and incorrigibility of Euclidean geometry, simple arithmetic, and Newtonian physics… The discovery and development of the non-Euclidian geometries and of modern number theory should suffice to show how utterly factitious was Kant’s invention… Similarly, the replacement of Newtonian physics by modern relativistic physics… should also suffice… How anyone in the twentieth century can take Kant’s transcendental philosophy seriously is baffling…” (Pg. 97-98)
He observes, “all real goods are things to which we have a natural right… If all goods were merely apparent… we could not avoid the relativism and subjectivism that would reduce moral judgments to mere opinion… Nothing more needs to be said to underline the practical importance of correcting the mistakes that reduce moral judgments to mere opinion, thereby establishing the objectivity and universality of moral values and giving moral philosophy the status of knowledge.” (Pg. 127)
He notes, “Happiness can then be defined as a whole life enriched by the cumulative possession of all the real goods that every human being needs and by the satisfaction of those individual wants that result in obtaining apparent goods that are innocuous. The pursuit of happiness... consists in the effort to discharge our moral obligation to seek whatever if really good for us and nothing else unless it is something… that does not interfere with our obtaining all the real goods we need.” (Pg. 133-134)
He contends, “the position taken by the exponents of free choice is sounder than the position taken by the soft-determinists. There are still other considerations… One turns on … those who regard moral philosophy as genuine knowledge… moral virtue… is an indispensable … ingredient in the pursuit of happiness. What merit would attach to moral virtue is the acts that form such habitual tendencies and dispositions were not acts of free choice on the part of the individual who was in the process of acquiring moral virtue? Persons of vicious moral character would have their characters formed … by acts entirely determined, and that could not have been otherwise…” (Pg. 154)
He concludes, “Not only is the conflict between the view of the physical world advanced by physical science and the view held by common sense reconciled. We also reach the conclusion that the perceptible individual things of common experience have a higher degree of actual reality. This applies also to the sensible qualities … that we experience things as having. They are not merely figments of our consciousness with no status at all in the real world… With this conclusion reached, the challenge to the reality of human experience and to the identifiable identity of the individual person is removed. There can be no question about the moral responsibility that each of us bears for his or her actions.” (Pg. 190)
This book will be of keen interest to students of philosophy.
October 17, 2021
Its sweeping title notwithstanding, Adler’s book “Ten Philosophical Mistakes” addresses one particular problem in philosophy: the relationship between consciousness and existence. The book has two parts, the first discussing the world and our understanding of it. The second discusses human nature.
In the first part, the author aims to criticize the empiricism tradition started by John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and David Hume. Empiricism considers experiences (sensory input) as the only source of knowledge. The extreme ones even deny any objective existence. Personal sensory experiences are the only thing we have to go by. Adler argues that there is an objective existence, which is why humans can share common ideas and knowledge. When we sense, remember, or imagine things, we have no problem maintaining consistency. And we can hold a conversation about the perception, memory, and imaginations among people with certainty that we are talking about the same thing. Therefore, there must be a common foundation, which is the objective existence.
On this point, Adler not only disagrees with Empiricism but also is at odds with rationalism and even Kant, who introduces the a priori knowledge that is separated from reality. However, I am not sure Adler is original on this view. For example, Marx considers ideas and knowledge as the combination of mental activities and objective existence. Ideas are the reflection of existence in our minds. Furthermore, we actively conduct experiments and explorations to better understand reality.
In the second part, Adler attends to human nature. He argues that we do have free will (otherwise, we cannot justify individual accountability as our moral foundation). Our behaviors should be divided into “needs” (for physical subsistence) and “wants” (optional satisfaction). Finally, human existence is a higher form than physical existence (particles and fields) and cannot be explained by the latter. As a physicist in training, I find it hard to agree with this view. The idea is probably better described by the emergence theory, which says a complex system, while still obeys physical laws, has properties that are not sensitive to the underlying composition but are driven by its higher-lever structures.
Overall, I don’t think reading this book is cost-effective, although I do not consider his view wrong. The book is not as important as it claims to be. The writing is not dense but simply verbose. Each chapter can be reduced to a paragraph. I read to the end just to have a glimpse of how philosophers talk. However, I cannot be sure it represents the best philosophical work.
In the first part, the author aims to criticize the empiricism tradition started by John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and David Hume. Empiricism considers experiences (sensory input) as the only source of knowledge. The extreme ones even deny any objective existence. Personal sensory experiences are the only thing we have to go by. Adler argues that there is an objective existence, which is why humans can share common ideas and knowledge. When we sense, remember, or imagine things, we have no problem maintaining consistency. And we can hold a conversation about the perception, memory, and imaginations among people with certainty that we are talking about the same thing. Therefore, there must be a common foundation, which is the objective existence.
On this point, Adler not only disagrees with Empiricism but also is at odds with rationalism and even Kant, who introduces the a priori knowledge that is separated from reality. However, I am not sure Adler is original on this view. For example, Marx considers ideas and knowledge as the combination of mental activities and objective existence. Ideas are the reflection of existence in our minds. Furthermore, we actively conduct experiments and explorations to better understand reality.
In the second part, Adler attends to human nature. He argues that we do have free will (otherwise, we cannot justify individual accountability as our moral foundation). Our behaviors should be divided into “needs” (for physical subsistence) and “wants” (optional satisfaction). Finally, human existence is a higher form than physical existence (particles and fields) and cannot be explained by the latter. As a physicist in training, I find it hard to agree with this view. The idea is probably better described by the emergence theory, which says a complex system, while still obeys physical laws, has properties that are not sensitive to the underlying composition but are driven by its higher-lever structures.
Overall, I don’t think reading this book is cost-effective, although I do not consider his view wrong. The book is not as important as it claims to be. The writing is not dense but simply verbose. Each chapter can be reduced to a paragraph. I read to the end just to have a glimpse of how philosophers talk. However, I cannot be sure it represents the best philosophical work.
January 25, 2013
I thought that this was a good book. From reading other reviews I noticed that many thought this book (Part I) was a dismantling of the likes of Hume, Locke etc. I did not see it as that. He clearly gives credit to these philosophers when the logical outworking of an idea is tenable. However, it doesn't make sense to support ideas that are clearly in error. He also provides support of why certain ideas have error.
All in all, he is simply arguing that the plague of modern philosophy is to not retrace errors to the source. Many of today's philosophers simply pile on more falsities to explain away contradictions. He mentions that he would describe himself as an Aristotelian BUT he does not agree with all of Aristotle's philosophical ideas.
All in all, he is simply arguing that the plague of modern philosophy is to not retrace errors to the source. Many of today's philosophers simply pile on more falsities to explain away contradictions. He mentions that he would describe himself as an Aristotelian BUT he does not agree with all of Aristotle's philosophical ideas.
February 2, 2014
After I picked this book up at a book-sale, I opened it up and gave it a chance, I immediately found that reading Adler is like a stroll down a smooth going trail. But with that said, though it was easy to go from point A to point B, I often would wonder what I had just read after finishing the chapter. So yeah, though the writing was smooth and flowing, Adler didn't always seem to figure out the clearest and most memorable ways to explain the 'mistakes' and his solution to them, especially in the first half of the book. Yet, still I'd like to read the book again, if for no other reason than it is interesting reading critiques on modern philosophical ideas from a "common sense" philosopher who feels the ancients (Aristotle and Aquinas)are much more philosophically sound.
May 17, 2021
Adler somehow makes things more complicated by explaining them in a supposedly easy to understand way. He is careful to avoid technical language, and often the chapters have no clear structure to make it easy to follow. It’s like comparing maps from the Middle Ages to modern maps, where the old maps give the important details but lose a lot of the accuracy.
This could also be titled ‘An Aristotelian responds to modern philosophy,’ which would be okay if Adler was more explicit about his own position. I also found that it was much too at home with 1960s American suburbia, about which I have an aesthetic distaste for.
All that said there are some real gems of observations on this book, just not enough to push it up to a 3 star for me.
This could also be titled ‘An Aristotelian responds to modern philosophy,’ which would be okay if Adler was more explicit about his own position. I also found that it was much too at home with 1960s American suburbia, about which I have an aesthetic distaste for.
All that said there are some real gems of observations on this book, just not enough to push it up to a 3 star for me.
June 9, 2023
Mortimer Adler has taught and written numerous books about philosophy (Six Great Ideas is one of my all time favorites), and here he identifies what he believes to be ten mistakes made in thought and reasoning, committed by almost everyone. Great quote by Thomas Aquinas paraphrasing Aristotle about the potential impact of even relatively minor mistakes: “Little errors in the beginning lead to serious consequences in the end.” While there’s no doubt that Mr. Adler is an excellent writer, this proved to be a difficult read (though the summary presented in the introduction was helpful). A couple of those errors: believing that all thoughts and ideas are conscious ones; and assuming that being able to name something is the same as understanding it (aka nominal fallacy).
March 19, 2015
Ten philosophical mistakes
The premise of Adlers book is to highlight shuttle but devastating errors in the philosophy derived mostly from the 16th and 17th centuries in such areas as truth, knowledge, existence, and consciousness. An obvious fan of Aristotle, Adler believes much of the errors from the later era are due to those philosophers footballing Aristotle and Aquinas as outdated in their schemes of thought. Adler goes on to show how even a slight correction of some blatant mistakes made by greats such as Hume, Locke, and Descartes can be easily fixed. Mistakes Aristotle himself had avoided.
The premise of Adlers book is to highlight shuttle but devastating errors in the philosophy derived mostly from the 16th and 17th centuries in such areas as truth, knowledge, existence, and consciousness. An obvious fan of Aristotle, Adler believes much of the errors from the later era are due to those philosophers footballing Aristotle and Aquinas as outdated in their schemes of thought. Adler goes on to show how even a slight correction of some blatant mistakes made by greats such as Hume, Locke, and Descartes can be easily fixed. Mistakes Aristotle himself had avoided.
April 2, 2008
Adler's famous saying was that, "Philosophy is everbody's business." He was right. Whether we consciously think of it or not we all hold to a philosophy of everything life. The only question is whether we are going to think well or poorly about them. Adler was a master at communicating difficult ideas on a level even a student in junior high school could understand without leaving out key parts of an important issue. This book touches on ten of the most important ideas that effect us all, and permeate our culture whether we realize it or not.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 82 reviews