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After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State
In this trenchant challenge to social engineering, Paul Gottfried analyzes a the slaying of nineteenth-century liberalism by the managerial state. Many people, of course, realize that liberalism no longer connotes distributed powers and bourgeois moral standards, the need to protect civil society from an encroaching state, or the virtues of vigorous self-government. Many also know that today's "liberals" have far different goals from those of their predecessors, aiming as they do largely to combat prejudice, to provide social services and welfare benefits, and to defend expressive and "lifestyle" freedoms. Paul Gottfried does more than analyze these historical facts, however. He builds on them to show why it matters that the managerial state has replaced traditional the new regimes of social engineers, he maintains, are elitists, and their rule is consensual only in the sense that it is unopposed by any widespread organized opposition.
Throughout the western world, increasingly uprooted populations unthinkingly accept centralized controls in exchange for a variety of entitlements. In their frightening passivity, Gottfried locates the quandary for traditionalist and populist adversaries of the welfare state. How can opponents of administrative elites show the public that those who provide, however ineptly, for their material needs are the enemies of democratic self-rule and of independent decision making in family life? If we do not wake up, Gottfried warns, the political debate may soon be over, despite sporadic and ideologically confused populist rumblings in both Europe and the United States.
Throughout the western world, increasingly uprooted populations unthinkingly accept centralized controls in exchange for a variety of entitlements. In their frightening passivity, Gottfried locates the quandary for traditionalist and populist adversaries of the welfare state. How can opponents of administrative elites show the public that those who provide, however ineptly, for their material needs are the enemies of democratic self-rule and of independent decision making in family life? If we do not wake up, Gottfried warns, the political debate may soon be over, despite sporadic and ideologically confused populist rumblings in both Europe and the United States.
200 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1999
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900 people want to read
About the author
Paul Edward Gottfried
37 books137 followersPaul Edward Gottfried is the editor of Chronicles and a former Horace Raffensperger professor of humanities at Elizabethtown College in Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania.
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July 5, 2019
This is Gottfried’s first in a series of books trying to explain the current state of western civilization and possible future conflicts and failures. It is a pretty devastating book that up ends notions of the current government as liberal or democratic. Instead, ours is pluralist managerial therapeutic system that ignores the will of the people to fulfill moral crusades, but in doing so creates its own problems. Indeed, while somewhat impressed by the early pluralists, Gottfrieds finds the new ones to be a shell. Liberalism is simply a cover, and as events have shown, the elite have no loyalty to liberalism or democracy. Only by way of social programs is the order fine. Tellingly, Europe’s populist revolt (right and left) only gained strength once austerity was practiced after 2008.
Chapter 4 is brilliant, a combination of clear and biting analysis mixed with tight prose, which is not always the case in his later books. Chapter 4 argues in part that current Leftist actions are driven by a fear Nazis, despite the fact that Americans crushed the Nazis and the party had no mass traction in America. In chasing imagined Nazis, the pluralists are depicted as over zealous, unwilling to consider contrary opinions, and worst of all cheerfully blind to what will be wrought by their policies. They are people making personal opinions masked as expertise. Their messianic proclivities are masked by appeal to science and decency as they define it. Of all the pluralists, Gottfried despises Theodore Adorno the most, finding him hypocritical, narrow-minded, and something of a toady.
Much of what Gottfried’s general predictions on where conflicts would arise have been correct. That is because he has mostly mastered that rarest of talents, the ability to perceive what is actually happening instead of seeing what you want to see. Part of this is seeing the weaknesses of each side. Yet what of the predictions? In short, the acceleration of censorship, the impossibility of total censorship in a literate society, the misuse of fascism as a catch all boogeyman, the populist challenge to the intellectual order, the priority given to identity over openness of intellect, and most tellingly the failure of the populist challenge, but not precisely of the intellectual challenge,to the current order. It should be noted that the populism he saw getting the most traction in America was that which Donald Trump exercised, and this book was published in 2001. Since then, voices were drown out which remerged after 2008 in the wake of the financial crash and the openness of the Internet.
This book, and everything by Gottfried, has one major weakness. He does not address capitalism save in the abstract, which shows conservatism’s continued weakness in understanding its implications. While I do think there is a pluralist managerial therapeutic system, I do not think it trumps capitalism and consumerism as the dominant forces in our age, and the two have an uneasy relationship.
As I did in previous books, below are some choice quotations from what might be the shrewdest conservative thinker of our age.
“In their hands multiculturalism has become an instrument of control, one designed to privilege their own concerns and to stigmatize those who think differently.”
“In nontraditional societies without recognized moral authorities, intellectuals compete, according to Weber, to make their private value-preferences generally accepted. Such “assertions of a highest value [Ho¨chstwertsetzung]” become typical of a society which declares itself open to discussion but is searching at the same time for moral bearings.”
“With due respect to its former practitioners now suffering second thoughts, all phases of pluralism reveal the same endencies, the ascendancy of the managerial state and its restructuring of social relations. Whether a humanistic conception or an arrogant court religion, pluralism has consistently justified a socially intrusive public administration. And by its own politicizing momentum, it has contributed to a postliberal democratic age, to which pluralists continue to attach misleading liberal labels.”
“The sensitivity needed to practice “democracy” or to enter the political conversation continues to rise. Unlike his counterpart of 1960, today’s public personality must master gender-inclusive language, remain abreast of the changing designations for designated minorities, and say nothing to offend gays. The apparent reasons for these restraints are the growing compassion and openness being practiced by society. But the real reason may be widespread fear. People are afraid to engage in pathologically described dissent or to oppose the favored values of journalists and government administrators.”
“And for those thereafter engaged in debates about liberal democracy, it became convenient to treat one’s opponents as prejudiced and sick. Political debate, as Lasch notes, would be limited to increasingly narrow parameters of dissent, and whoever crossed those lines would be singled out as enemies of democracy and bearers of social disease. Defenders of welfare state democracy, who, like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., saw themselves as upholding the “vital center,” would thus acquire a new arrow for their quiver. Being a pro-welfare-state liberal internationalist betokened not only virtue but also mental well-being.”
“The argumentative ruses adopted to consolidate the political status quo go from forcing an argument to actual intimidation. They begin by appealing to unproved premises, which the reader is nudged into accepting, move on to therapeutic criteria for right reasoning, and finally, as seen in recent hate speech and anti-Holocaust revisionist laws, end by reverting to the argumentum baculinum, which may mean arresting those considered criminally insensitive. At stake here is not the idle pastime of scribes. It is an attempt undertaken by prominent intellectuals to elevate pluralism into behavioral coercion.”
“What made such a plan seem workable was that for the early pluralists and their multicultural descendants society would have fewer and fewer traditional groups. The kind of pluralist society that Dewey and Kallen envisaged would go beyond rooted ethnic communities. It would become the evolving creation of “free” individual participants, setting goals under scientific direction and having their material interests monitored by a “conductor state.” The world as conceived by pluralists was there to be managed and to be made culturally safe for its framers: Eastern and Central European Jews fearful of traditional Gentile mores and the uprooted descendants of New England Calvinists looking for the New Jerusalem under scientific management.”
And lastly, the biggest gut punch of them all…
“The political class has forgotten that its subjects will serve it and its court religion to whatever extent it goes on feeding and protecting. As in Hobbes’s Leviathan, though subjects are materially driven and fear obsessed, their loyalty is not unconditional. It is only there when their needs are being met—or, more precisely, when people believe this is happening. Fearful subjects have given up liberty for security, but they may regret this choice if the sovereign loses their respect. This Hobbesian understanding of the nature and limits of authority goes back to the dawn of modern political thought, and it throws light on the populist insurgency that now confronts the managerial state.”
Chapter 4 is brilliant, a combination of clear and biting analysis mixed with tight prose, which is not always the case in his later books. Chapter 4 argues in part that current Leftist actions are driven by a fear Nazis, despite the fact that Americans crushed the Nazis and the party had no mass traction in America. In chasing imagined Nazis, the pluralists are depicted as over zealous, unwilling to consider contrary opinions, and worst of all cheerfully blind to what will be wrought by their policies. They are people making personal opinions masked as expertise. Their messianic proclivities are masked by appeal to science and decency as they define it. Of all the pluralists, Gottfried despises Theodore Adorno the most, finding him hypocritical, narrow-minded, and something of a toady.
Much of what Gottfried’s general predictions on where conflicts would arise have been correct. That is because he has mostly mastered that rarest of talents, the ability to perceive what is actually happening instead of seeing what you want to see. Part of this is seeing the weaknesses of each side. Yet what of the predictions? In short, the acceleration of censorship, the impossibility of total censorship in a literate society, the misuse of fascism as a catch all boogeyman, the populist challenge to the intellectual order, the priority given to identity over openness of intellect, and most tellingly the failure of the populist challenge, but not precisely of the intellectual challenge,to the current order. It should be noted that the populism he saw getting the most traction in America was that which Donald Trump exercised, and this book was published in 2001. Since then, voices were drown out which remerged after 2008 in the wake of the financial crash and the openness of the Internet.
This book, and everything by Gottfried, has one major weakness. He does not address capitalism save in the abstract, which shows conservatism’s continued weakness in understanding its implications. While I do think there is a pluralist managerial therapeutic system, I do not think it trumps capitalism and consumerism as the dominant forces in our age, and the two have an uneasy relationship.
As I did in previous books, below are some choice quotations from what might be the shrewdest conservative thinker of our age.
“In their hands multiculturalism has become an instrument of control, one designed to privilege their own concerns and to stigmatize those who think differently.”
“In nontraditional societies without recognized moral authorities, intellectuals compete, according to Weber, to make their private value-preferences generally accepted. Such “assertions of a highest value [Ho¨chstwertsetzung]” become typical of a society which declares itself open to discussion but is searching at the same time for moral bearings.”
“With due respect to its former practitioners now suffering second thoughts, all phases of pluralism reveal the same endencies, the ascendancy of the managerial state and its restructuring of social relations. Whether a humanistic conception or an arrogant court religion, pluralism has consistently justified a socially intrusive public administration. And by its own politicizing momentum, it has contributed to a postliberal democratic age, to which pluralists continue to attach misleading liberal labels.”
“The sensitivity needed to practice “democracy” or to enter the political conversation continues to rise. Unlike his counterpart of 1960, today’s public personality must master gender-inclusive language, remain abreast of the changing designations for designated minorities, and say nothing to offend gays. The apparent reasons for these restraints are the growing compassion and openness being practiced by society. But the real reason may be widespread fear. People are afraid to engage in pathologically described dissent or to oppose the favored values of journalists and government administrators.”
“And for those thereafter engaged in debates about liberal democracy, it became convenient to treat one’s opponents as prejudiced and sick. Political debate, as Lasch notes, would be limited to increasingly narrow parameters of dissent, and whoever crossed those lines would be singled out as enemies of democracy and bearers of social disease. Defenders of welfare state democracy, who, like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., saw themselves as upholding the “vital center,” would thus acquire a new arrow for their quiver. Being a pro-welfare-state liberal internationalist betokened not only virtue but also mental well-being.”
“The argumentative ruses adopted to consolidate the political status quo go from forcing an argument to actual intimidation. They begin by appealing to unproved premises, which the reader is nudged into accepting, move on to therapeutic criteria for right reasoning, and finally, as seen in recent hate speech and anti-Holocaust revisionist laws, end by reverting to the argumentum baculinum, which may mean arresting those considered criminally insensitive. At stake here is not the idle pastime of scribes. It is an attempt undertaken by prominent intellectuals to elevate pluralism into behavioral coercion.”
“What made such a plan seem workable was that for the early pluralists and their multicultural descendants society would have fewer and fewer traditional groups. The kind of pluralist society that Dewey and Kallen envisaged would go beyond rooted ethnic communities. It would become the evolving creation of “free” individual participants, setting goals under scientific direction and having their material interests monitored by a “conductor state.” The world as conceived by pluralists was there to be managed and to be made culturally safe for its framers: Eastern and Central European Jews fearful of traditional Gentile mores and the uprooted descendants of New England Calvinists looking for the New Jerusalem under scientific management.”
And lastly, the biggest gut punch of them all…
“The political class has forgotten that its subjects will serve it and its court religion to whatever extent it goes on feeding and protecting. As in Hobbes’s Leviathan, though subjects are materially driven and fear obsessed, their loyalty is not unconditional. It is only there when their needs are being met—or, more precisely, when people believe this is happening. Fearful subjects have given up liberty for security, but they may regret this choice if the sovereign loses their respect. This Hobbesian understanding of the nature and limits of authority goes back to the dawn of modern political thought, and it throws light on the populist insurgency that now confronts the managerial state.”
September 30, 2019
Paul Gottfried's book is deeply unsettling and provides a wake-up call to Christians, who must resist the ever increasing social engineering, mind control and behaviour modification of nation states, multinational bodies; their royal secular priesthoods and mass of political pawns. Similar to Christopher Lasch's attack on 'progress', and a fine addendum to that tome; Gottfried describes the continuities and discontinuities of liberalism, pluralism, multiculturalism, etc. Particularly in North America and Western Europe.
Paul helps us by highlighting the nefarious forces behind and rotten fruits resulting from what Jacques Ellul called 'world opinion' and it's enforcement. This is an arbitrary new faith which chooses preferred narratives of oppressors and oppressed, flaming resentment and unburdened by forgiveness, mercy, a sense of history or personal responsibility; calls for 'revolutionary' action which can lead to nothing other than violence, continued contempt and tyranny- either soft or hard. This is an affront to The Gospel.
We see this in the labelling of opposing persons to 'world opinion' as racist, sexist, homophobe, transphobe, etc, pathologising them in an heretical spin on ''He's the worst of sinners''. Now it is ''He is a xenophobe'', one of those aforementioned and/or some semblance thereof. And they have their own type and means of 'conversion' as well as a form of 'conversion therapy'.
This becomes particularly worrisome when it is written into law, as is increasingly the case. Paul provides examples from different countries and highlights some of the awful effects. Unfortunately, this has only gotten worse since the publication of this book at the turn of the millenium.
In After Liberalsim, we discover that this malignant neo-religion has it's roots in the ideological works of men involved in 'critical theory'.
Most clearly in the myths of 'oppressor-oppressed', 'higher consciousness' and 'cultural hegemony' and the resulting reified notions of 'whiteness' and 'patriarchy', which flow from this tenuous ahistorical belief.
This is a framing that loses its power over us when it's false gods are exposed, when it is seen for what it is, named and shamed.
Then we must consciously and conscientously act against the new faith and it's works. It is important for Christians to know how and why Old Scratch is working so we don't fall into his trap.
Many well-intentioned 'Christians' who accept the worldviews and methods described by Gottfried are sadly doing just that, falling into his trap. As Ivan Illich has it- ''The corruption of the best is the worst.''
While Dr Gottfried (intentionally) doesn't offer much of a prescription for the future, The Gospel, in it's balanced pentecostal fullness, does:
Galatians 3:28- ''There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.''
Paul helps us by highlighting the nefarious forces behind and rotten fruits resulting from what Jacques Ellul called 'world opinion' and it's enforcement. This is an arbitrary new faith which chooses preferred narratives of oppressors and oppressed, flaming resentment and unburdened by forgiveness, mercy, a sense of history or personal responsibility; calls for 'revolutionary' action which can lead to nothing other than violence, continued contempt and tyranny- either soft or hard. This is an affront to The Gospel.
We see this in the labelling of opposing persons to 'world opinion' as racist, sexist, homophobe, transphobe, etc, pathologising them in an heretical spin on ''He's the worst of sinners''. Now it is ''He is a xenophobe'', one of those aforementioned and/or some semblance thereof. And they have their own type and means of 'conversion' as well as a form of 'conversion therapy'.
This becomes particularly worrisome when it is written into law, as is increasingly the case. Paul provides examples from different countries and highlights some of the awful effects. Unfortunately, this has only gotten worse since the publication of this book at the turn of the millenium.
In After Liberalsim, we discover that this malignant neo-religion has it's roots in the ideological works of men involved in 'critical theory'.
Most clearly in the myths of 'oppressor-oppressed', 'higher consciousness' and 'cultural hegemony' and the resulting reified notions of 'whiteness' and 'patriarchy', which flow from this tenuous ahistorical belief.
This is a framing that loses its power over us when it's false gods are exposed, when it is seen for what it is, named and shamed.
Then we must consciously and conscientously act against the new faith and it's works. It is important for Christians to know how and why Old Scratch is working so we don't fall into his trap.
Many well-intentioned 'Christians' who accept the worldviews and methods described by Gottfried are sadly doing just that, falling into his trap. As Ivan Illich has it- ''The corruption of the best is the worst.''
While Dr Gottfried (intentionally) doesn't offer much of a prescription for the future, The Gospel, in it's balanced pentecostal fullness, does:
Galatians 3:28- ''There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.''
June 20, 2023
Paul Gottfried's "After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State" presents a critical examination of the contemporary liberal democratic order and its transformation into what he terms the "managerial state." Gottfried delves into the historical development of liberalism, scrutinizing its theoretical underpinnings and the consequences of its massification. This review aims to provide an academic evaluation of Gottfried's arguments, discussing the book's strengths, weaknesses, and its significance within the fields of political theory, political philosophy, and democratic studies.
"After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State" by Paul Gottfried delves into the evolution of liberalism and its transformation into a mass democracy governed by managerial elites. Gottfried critically analyzes the ideological foundations of liberalism, challenging its premises and examining the social and political implications of its implementation. He explores the rise of a managerial class that governs and regulates society, exerting control over public policy and eroding democratic participation. Gottfried's analysis raises questions about the future of liberal democracy in an era marked by managerial dominance and declining civic engagement.
Gottfried's work stands out for its thorough historical analysis and its thought-provoking critique of liberal democracy. He engages with a range of political theorists, including Hayek, Weber, and Schumpeter, to construct a comprehensive understanding of the emergence of the managerial state. Gottfried's analysis prompts critical reflections on the limitations of liberal democracy and challenges readers to reconsider the nature of political power, governance, and civic engagement in contemporary society.
One of the notable strengths of "After Liberalism" lies in Gottfried's comprehensive historical analysis. He traces the intellectual lineage of liberalism, examining its philosophical foundations and historical development. By situating liberalism within its historical context, Gottfried sheds light on the inherent tensions and contradictions within the ideology and offers a nuanced critique of its massification.
Moreover, Gottfried's exploration of the rise of the managerial class is particularly insightful. He highlights the increasing concentration of power among technocratic elites and the subsequent erosion of democratic participation and accountability. Gottfried's analysis fosters critical reflections on the complex interplay between democratic ideals and the realities of contemporary governance, encouraging readers to critically assess the consequences of managerial dominance.
"While "After Liberalism" offers a thought-provoking analysis, it is not without its limitations. Some critics argue that Gottfried's critique of liberal democracy lacks a viable alternative or constructive proposals for addressing the challenges he raises. A more explicit engagement with potential solutions or alternative models of governance would strengthen the book's overall argument and enhance its relevance for policymakers and scholars seeking to address the shortcomings of contemporary democracy.
Additionally, Gottfried's writing style can be dense and scholarly, potentially making it challenging for some readers to engage with his arguments. A more accessible presentation of ideas, clearer connections between concepts, and concise explanations of key political terms would enhance the book's readability and facilitate broader readership engagement.
"After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State" holds significant importance within the fields of political theory, political philosophy, and democratic studies as a critical examination of the shortcomings and challenges faced by liberal democracy in the contemporary era. Gottfried's analysis prompts a reevaluation of democratic governance, highlighting the influence of managerial elites and the implications for democratic participation and accountability.
Paul Gottfried's "After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State" presents a rigorous critique of liberal democracy, illuminating the challenges posed by the rise of managerial elites and the erosion of democratic participation.
GPT
"After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State" by Paul Gottfried delves into the evolution of liberalism and its transformation into a mass democracy governed by managerial elites. Gottfried critically analyzes the ideological foundations of liberalism, challenging its premises and examining the social and political implications of its implementation. He explores the rise of a managerial class that governs and regulates society, exerting control over public policy and eroding democratic participation. Gottfried's analysis raises questions about the future of liberal democracy in an era marked by managerial dominance and declining civic engagement.
Gottfried's work stands out for its thorough historical analysis and its thought-provoking critique of liberal democracy. He engages with a range of political theorists, including Hayek, Weber, and Schumpeter, to construct a comprehensive understanding of the emergence of the managerial state. Gottfried's analysis prompts critical reflections on the limitations of liberal democracy and challenges readers to reconsider the nature of political power, governance, and civic engagement in contemporary society.
One of the notable strengths of "After Liberalism" lies in Gottfried's comprehensive historical analysis. He traces the intellectual lineage of liberalism, examining its philosophical foundations and historical development. By situating liberalism within its historical context, Gottfried sheds light on the inherent tensions and contradictions within the ideology and offers a nuanced critique of its massification.
Moreover, Gottfried's exploration of the rise of the managerial class is particularly insightful. He highlights the increasing concentration of power among technocratic elites and the subsequent erosion of democratic participation and accountability. Gottfried's analysis fosters critical reflections on the complex interplay between democratic ideals and the realities of contemporary governance, encouraging readers to critically assess the consequences of managerial dominance.
"While "After Liberalism" offers a thought-provoking analysis, it is not without its limitations. Some critics argue that Gottfried's critique of liberal democracy lacks a viable alternative or constructive proposals for addressing the challenges he raises. A more explicit engagement with potential solutions or alternative models of governance would strengthen the book's overall argument and enhance its relevance for policymakers and scholars seeking to address the shortcomings of contemporary democracy.
Additionally, Gottfried's writing style can be dense and scholarly, potentially making it challenging for some readers to engage with his arguments. A more accessible presentation of ideas, clearer connections between concepts, and concise explanations of key political terms would enhance the book's readability and facilitate broader readership engagement.
"After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State" holds significant importance within the fields of political theory, political philosophy, and democratic studies as a critical examination of the shortcomings and challenges faced by liberal democracy in the contemporary era. Gottfried's analysis prompts a reevaluation of democratic governance, highlighting the influence of managerial elites and the implications for democratic participation and accountability.
Paul Gottfried's "After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State" presents a rigorous critique of liberal democracy, illuminating the challenges posed by the rise of managerial elites and the erosion of democratic participation.
GPT
December 26, 2016
In After Liberalism, (1999), Paul Gottfried argues that our "liberal democracy" is neither liberal nor democratic; the term is merely a label intended to provide legitimacy for an evolving American managerial state that seeks to expand its power at home and abroad. The managerial state is not liberal-since there is no inviolable space into which it will not intrude and meddle-and it is not democratic, unless you think being administered and socialized by a custodial class-a fact that does not change despite periodic elections that rotate parties in power-constitutes self governance.
Gottfried stresses the managerial state is very powerful in no small measure because so much of the population is dependent upon it for the various services it provides. Interestingly, the managerial state uses the people’s material reliance upon it as leverage to advance various social/cultural goals that are often quite unpopular and controversial. Gottfried insists loudly that, contrary to the widespread notion of the state being a neutral broker, the managerial state definitely spearheads a self-serving, power-enhancing agenda of its own. And opponents of the managerial state and its “therapeutic” agenda-to be explained shortly-have very little power to oppose it.
Gottfried contextualizes classical (i.e. genuine) liberalism as a ideology/outlook that flourished as part of the 19c bourgeois order, and argues that the turbulent 20th century rise of mass democracy led to the political and cultural displacement of that order. Politically, the emerging managerial welfare state sought to reestablish order in a new fashion, embracing the idea of economic planning, the redistribution of resources, the jettisoning in practice of Constitutional limitations viewed as archaic straitjackets, and the socialization of the populace. And its technocratic conception of politics hinted at possibilities of global application. Culturally, the world of mass production/consumption helped unmoor the populace from specific cultural traditions, and helped foster an ethic of self-actualization that bred contempt and hostility towards bourgeois norms and resentment against those who were better situated. These trends fed into the democratic valorization of leveling, which undermined bourgeois standards and helped the push to redistribute resources. Though there are still residues of classical liberalism, the 20th century political and cultural assault on the old liberal bourgeois order was highly successful. And the liberal democratic managerial regime continues to attack what remains of bourgeois civil society in its quest for social reconstruction.
The social planners shrewdly appropriated the old “liberal” label, even though Gottfried thinks that they were generally guilty of patricide. Gottfried notes here the special importance of John Stuart Mill, who quite early on persuasively treated and valorized liberalism as the march of Progress, thereby making the word “liberal” expansive enough to encompass his own enthusiasms for social/economic planning, a global civilizing mission, and educational socialization. In Gottfried’s account of Mill one sees a technocratic sentimentalism that was to prove very influential.
Gottfried views the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as failed managerial rivals to the American variant which came to be known as liberal democracy. Further, the aftermath of the war against Hitler along with the cold war against the Soviets helped strengthen and shape the social reformist dimensions of America’s managerial state. Left-wing, culturally radical Jewish Frankfurt school intellectuals who had fled to America from Nazi Germany waged war against “prejudice” by pathologizing opponents of the progressive state, demonizing an alleged “authoritarian personality” that threatened an explosion of anti-semitism and the reemergence of fascism if not rigorously countered. This psychological interpretation of/attack on unreconstructed opinions was used by an American managerial state that had decided to tackle anti-semitism and its much bigger problem of racial prejudice against blacks, issues that gained salience in the aftermath of Nazi atrocities and because of the ideological contest with the USSR. The global struggle against communism also provides context for the Immigration Act of 1965, which was intended as an extension of the civil rights movement and was responsive to global anti-colonial sentiment. Immigration expansion and the politics of inclusiveness at home helped raise to prominence a political creed that sanctified pluralism and global universalism. This now long-standing and evolving conception of pluralism is therapeutic, with the government deciding which groups obtain benefits (purported victims) and which suffer liabilities (purported victimizers), all in the name of general self esteem and maximal healing from the crimes of the non-pluralist past. Of course, this celebration of diversity is notoriously monochromatic, as critics and dissenters are marginalized and silenced. And a split has emerged within the managerial ranks, with the Left spearheading further “advances” such as multiculturalism and various lifestyle liberation agendas, and the conservative (neocon) establishment offering ineffective resistance to the mutating fruits of a therapeutic pluralism whose early triumphs during the anti-communist era are not only currently celebrated by establishment conservatives, but were actually advanced by the neocons back when they were known as cold war liberals. And since the neocons are global universalists who strive to export liberal democracy abroad, the evolving content of what this label represents means that both the establishment left and establishment right are complicit in the spread of coercive cultural radicalism abroad. This American brand of managerialism may not be as violent as its totalitarian competitors, but it is culturally far more corrosive. And since of the collapse of the Soviet Union, liberal democracy is uncontested as a managerial ideal and has gained many new converts on the Left.
The managerial/therapeutic regime is breathtakingly powerful. As Gottfried summarizes, its strength rests upon a multitiered following: “an underclass and now middle-class welfariate, a self-assertive public sector, and a vanguard of media and journalistic public defenders. Upon the basis of this following, the regime and its apologists have been able to marginalize their opposition. This is apparent on, among other places, the now respectable or moderate Right. There a tolerated opposition offers tepid criticism of the administrative state while warning against populist extremism.” In effect, the moderate Right not only is ineffective against the increasing cultural radicalism of the managerial state, it polices its own ranks against the possible emergence of real opposition to managerialism!
However, the liberal democratic managerial regime has its share of problems; in fact, one reason Gottfried thinks its defenders are so vicious in terms of shutting down dissent is because it is becoming increasingly obvious that positions to which they are committed do not hold up well under much scrutiny. Also, since the real legitimacy of the managerial regime which pretends to continue older traditions it has largely displaced rests almost entirely on its ability to “provide” materially for its constituents, it is especially vulnerable whenever the populace feels its physical safety is threatened or its standard of living is diminished. And there is much discontent over the never ending crusades on behalf of diversity and against intolerance, crusades that inevitably equate non-agreement with hostility and/or ignorance that must be overcome.
Gottfried is of course sympathetic to populist disruptions of the managerial agenda, though he is sober enough to argue that no new alternate paradigm to liberal democracy presently exists and that therapeutic pluralism is not going away anytime soon. In addition, Gottfried warns that in America, populist attempts to short circuit the liberal democratic agenda should not present themselves as primarily movements of identitarian cultural resistance, since-as Pat Buchanan’s experience shows-there is not enough cultural unity here to win elections this way. Gottfried thinks a “stripped down” populism that focuses on economic grievances and physical safety issues more so than identitarian politics-though cultural concerns need not be ignored entirely- holds out some promise as a way to contest the managerial state. Gottfried’s advocation of a stripped down populism in 1999 seems very prophetic after the 2016 election. For instance, the Trump campaign stressed trade and immigration issues, with immigration framed mainly in terms of economic consequences for American workers and safety concerns regarding criminals and terrorists. And though plenty of Christians rallied to Trump over the pressing issue of religious liberty, no one could possibly mistake the winning candidate as some sort of cultural conservative.
Because I find Gottfried such an illuminating thinker, I have made a point of reading 6 of his books. After Liberalism is the last of these books in my reading sequence, and the earliest one of the 6 that he wrote. For any prospective reader of Gottfried, I would say based on my experience that After Liberalism is the Gottfried book to start with. All his later books are meaningfully related to the compelling issues he raises here, and many of them elaborate on different aspects of After Liberalism’s wide ranging, broadly articulated argument. But though if one was to read just one Gottfried book this would be my recommendation, I would not stop here. All his books following After Liberalism are worthwhile, and new dimensions to Gottfried’s general argument emerge. (Consider for instance Gottfried’s treatment of the “Protestant deformation” in Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt.)
Gottfried stresses the managerial state is very powerful in no small measure because so much of the population is dependent upon it for the various services it provides. Interestingly, the managerial state uses the people’s material reliance upon it as leverage to advance various social/cultural goals that are often quite unpopular and controversial. Gottfried insists loudly that, contrary to the widespread notion of the state being a neutral broker, the managerial state definitely spearheads a self-serving, power-enhancing agenda of its own. And opponents of the managerial state and its “therapeutic” agenda-to be explained shortly-have very little power to oppose it.
Gottfried contextualizes classical (i.e. genuine) liberalism as a ideology/outlook that flourished as part of the 19c bourgeois order, and argues that the turbulent 20th century rise of mass democracy led to the political and cultural displacement of that order. Politically, the emerging managerial welfare state sought to reestablish order in a new fashion, embracing the idea of economic planning, the redistribution of resources, the jettisoning in practice of Constitutional limitations viewed as archaic straitjackets, and the socialization of the populace. And its technocratic conception of politics hinted at possibilities of global application. Culturally, the world of mass production/consumption helped unmoor the populace from specific cultural traditions, and helped foster an ethic of self-actualization that bred contempt and hostility towards bourgeois norms and resentment against those who were better situated. These trends fed into the democratic valorization of leveling, which undermined bourgeois standards and helped the push to redistribute resources. Though there are still residues of classical liberalism, the 20th century political and cultural assault on the old liberal bourgeois order was highly successful. And the liberal democratic managerial regime continues to attack what remains of bourgeois civil society in its quest for social reconstruction.
The social planners shrewdly appropriated the old “liberal” label, even though Gottfried thinks that they were generally guilty of patricide. Gottfried notes here the special importance of John Stuart Mill, who quite early on persuasively treated and valorized liberalism as the march of Progress, thereby making the word “liberal” expansive enough to encompass his own enthusiasms for social/economic planning, a global civilizing mission, and educational socialization. In Gottfried’s account of Mill one sees a technocratic sentimentalism that was to prove very influential.
Gottfried views the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as failed managerial rivals to the American variant which came to be known as liberal democracy. Further, the aftermath of the war against Hitler along with the cold war against the Soviets helped strengthen and shape the social reformist dimensions of America’s managerial state. Left-wing, culturally radical Jewish Frankfurt school intellectuals who had fled to America from Nazi Germany waged war against “prejudice” by pathologizing opponents of the progressive state, demonizing an alleged “authoritarian personality” that threatened an explosion of anti-semitism and the reemergence of fascism if not rigorously countered. This psychological interpretation of/attack on unreconstructed opinions was used by an American managerial state that had decided to tackle anti-semitism and its much bigger problem of racial prejudice against blacks, issues that gained salience in the aftermath of Nazi atrocities and because of the ideological contest with the USSR. The global struggle against communism also provides context for the Immigration Act of 1965, which was intended as an extension of the civil rights movement and was responsive to global anti-colonial sentiment. Immigration expansion and the politics of inclusiveness at home helped raise to prominence a political creed that sanctified pluralism and global universalism. This now long-standing and evolving conception of pluralism is therapeutic, with the government deciding which groups obtain benefits (purported victims) and which suffer liabilities (purported victimizers), all in the name of general self esteem and maximal healing from the crimes of the non-pluralist past. Of course, this celebration of diversity is notoriously monochromatic, as critics and dissenters are marginalized and silenced. And a split has emerged within the managerial ranks, with the Left spearheading further “advances” such as multiculturalism and various lifestyle liberation agendas, and the conservative (neocon) establishment offering ineffective resistance to the mutating fruits of a therapeutic pluralism whose early triumphs during the anti-communist era are not only currently celebrated by establishment conservatives, but were actually advanced by the neocons back when they were known as cold war liberals. And since the neocons are global universalists who strive to export liberal democracy abroad, the evolving content of what this label represents means that both the establishment left and establishment right are complicit in the spread of coercive cultural radicalism abroad. This American brand of managerialism may not be as violent as its totalitarian competitors, but it is culturally far more corrosive. And since of the collapse of the Soviet Union, liberal democracy is uncontested as a managerial ideal and has gained many new converts on the Left.
The managerial/therapeutic regime is breathtakingly powerful. As Gottfried summarizes, its strength rests upon a multitiered following: “an underclass and now middle-class welfariate, a self-assertive public sector, and a vanguard of media and journalistic public defenders. Upon the basis of this following, the regime and its apologists have been able to marginalize their opposition. This is apparent on, among other places, the now respectable or moderate Right. There a tolerated opposition offers tepid criticism of the administrative state while warning against populist extremism.” In effect, the moderate Right not only is ineffective against the increasing cultural radicalism of the managerial state, it polices its own ranks against the possible emergence of real opposition to managerialism!
However, the liberal democratic managerial regime has its share of problems; in fact, one reason Gottfried thinks its defenders are so vicious in terms of shutting down dissent is because it is becoming increasingly obvious that positions to which they are committed do not hold up well under much scrutiny. Also, since the real legitimacy of the managerial regime which pretends to continue older traditions it has largely displaced rests almost entirely on its ability to “provide” materially for its constituents, it is especially vulnerable whenever the populace feels its physical safety is threatened or its standard of living is diminished. And there is much discontent over the never ending crusades on behalf of diversity and against intolerance, crusades that inevitably equate non-agreement with hostility and/or ignorance that must be overcome.
Gottfried is of course sympathetic to populist disruptions of the managerial agenda, though he is sober enough to argue that no new alternate paradigm to liberal democracy presently exists and that therapeutic pluralism is not going away anytime soon. In addition, Gottfried warns that in America, populist attempts to short circuit the liberal democratic agenda should not present themselves as primarily movements of identitarian cultural resistance, since-as Pat Buchanan’s experience shows-there is not enough cultural unity here to win elections this way. Gottfried thinks a “stripped down” populism that focuses on economic grievances and physical safety issues more so than identitarian politics-though cultural concerns need not be ignored entirely- holds out some promise as a way to contest the managerial state. Gottfried’s advocation of a stripped down populism in 1999 seems very prophetic after the 2016 election. For instance, the Trump campaign stressed trade and immigration issues, with immigration framed mainly in terms of economic consequences for American workers and safety concerns regarding criminals and terrorists. And though plenty of Christians rallied to Trump over the pressing issue of religious liberty, no one could possibly mistake the winning candidate as some sort of cultural conservative.
Because I find Gottfried such an illuminating thinker, I have made a point of reading 6 of his books. After Liberalism is the last of these books in my reading sequence, and the earliest one of the 6 that he wrote. For any prospective reader of Gottfried, I would say based on my experience that After Liberalism is the Gottfried book to start with. All his later books are meaningfully related to the compelling issues he raises here, and many of them elaborate on different aspects of After Liberalism’s wide ranging, broadly articulated argument. But though if one was to read just one Gottfried book this would be my recommendation, I would not stop here. All his books following After Liberalism are worthwhile, and new dimensions to Gottfried’s general argument emerge. (Consider for instance Gottfried’s treatment of the “Protestant deformation” in Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt.)
March 15, 2022
It’s incredible that Gottfried can fit so much profound and prolific insight in such a small book while also not diverging from a simple thesis: both “liberal” and “democracy” function as a “political formula” to mask their opposite - an unelected managerial class whose explicit purpose is the molding of its citizenry. He analyzes with the perspective of a true Machiavellian while not falling into a reductive materialist analysis - he understands how elites retain power, but sees their ideology not as a tool (he disproves this by noting the unpopularity of things like mass immigration) but as a genuine project of a utopian society that is being ushered in via continual revolution. Further, Gottfried’s citation of French and German primary sources, his knowledge of world politics, and the fairness of his appraisals of his rivals’ sources reveals the breadth of his historical scope. A favorite of the year so far.
June 11, 2011
Gottfried's thesis is that self-government is dead. Modern intellectuals (journalists and professors) give marching orders to teachers, who condition students to accept the more dubious aspects of the multicultural project by tempting them with goodies from the welfare state, to which individuals are unable to resist. Self-government is over, says Gottfried, and liberals have been able to define liberalism in an unprecedented manner, and in so doing, have declared certain parts of politics off-limits, while also radically redefining the "vital center." Meh.
December 19, 2022
I am, once again, behind on reviews. I finished this a while ago. Paul Gottfried got my attention, and that of other antifascists, when journalists pointed to him as a substantial influence on Richard Spencer and the altright, including, possibly, coming up with the term “alternative right,” as in alternative to the neoconservative ascendancy that was just about to reach its peak around the time this book came out. It’s murky, how much Gottfried actually knew Spencer, but they traveled in similar paleoconservative circles before Spencer became briefly prominent. Gottfried has gone on record abjuring the altright, saying their project is not his.
Unlike most of these distancing maneuvers, this one comes off as reasonably legitimate. There are two main reasons for this. One is that Paul Gottfried is a Jew. There’s no shortage of right-wing Jews out there, and I’ll talk about the antisemitic cast of Gottfried’s main argument, but I don’t think Gottfried is the particular kind of craven that would cause a Jew to make common cause with Nazis, and he’s not the sort of Jew Nazis would necessarily let in (Spencer might, but he’s a fancylad with a following he can count on the fingers of his hands, at this point). The other, more substantive, reason is that Gottfried seems to come from the branch of paleoconservative that is deeply and sincerely opposed to the sort of mass political mobilization and rapid sweeping political changes that help distinguish fascism from more normative conservatism.
Among other things, Gottfried sticks to something more closely resembling the historical and the empirical in this book than is common on the contemporary right (or, for that matter, among ideologues across the spectrum). As far as Gottfried is concerned, by the turn of the twenty-first century, the verdict was in, and the more pessimistic predictions of the founding fathers and assorted classical liberal figures were correct: let the mass of people participate in politics, and they will just vote rich people’s money into their pockets. Race enters into it less than one might think, except as something to potentially break the spell of welfarist lassitude- more anon. This is just democracy, Gottfried sighs, it’s the role of the statesman to see his way forward despite it.
So, unlike fascists, Gottfried doesn’t really believe in the volk. There’s a little bit of that thing you see in right-wing writers ranging from Nock to Kirk to Rothbard, a certain nostalgia for simple folk and their (supposedly) unquestioned hierarchy, but like those three, that nostalgia is also a nostalgia for the (again, supposed) quietude of that past. But at the same time, Gottfried speaks well of populism. This is where Gottfried does, in fact, link up with fascism, and why Spencer et al would have found his work useful to them.
What’s his motivation, you might wonder- if the volk aren’t noble, and in any event the damage is done, what is Gottfried bothering with? It’s because he hates the managerial elite who supposedly brought this state of affairs about. He spends almost half of the book trying to definitively delink the liberalism of most twentieth century figures from “classical liberalism,” and I tend to think that he did this less because it mattered so much — he resignedly calls the likes of John Dewey, Herbert Croly et al “liberals” in spite of all — but because it lets him obsessively pore over the rhetoric of the progressive movement, the new dealers, the great society types, and social liberals of his own time, and the awfulness and strangeness of their creed(s). The managerial elite overthrew the old capitalist elite, and with it the latter’s (notionally) purer liberalism. They bribe the volk with welfare and sap their values and vitality, in the name of their odd cosmopolitan value set, somewhere between antinomianism and Gnosticism. We know this story.
What little hope Gottfried sees — and where he links up with fascism, where he really did influence or at least prefigure how the altright and numerous other far right formations today understand and pursue their project — is in hitting the managerial class where it is, supposedly, weak: culture. The cultural rules of the managerial elite become more important and more flagrantly arbitrary as their power grows, Gottfried argues. The real nature, the kind of Fabian/gnostic elitism of our educated credentialed elites, comes to the fore, and as Pat Buchanan showed, you could rally the good salt of the earth folks to object to…
The funny part is, the thing that impelled Gottfried to write this was the defeat of Bob Dole at the hands of Bill Clinton in 1996. Talk about distinctions with little difference! I guess Clinton was “more PMC,” to be reductive, a baby boomer, a philanderer, an erstwhile protester with an ambitious wife. What were the good right-populist folk supposed to be objecting to, then? What were the secretly radical managerial elite foisting on them? Meaningful advances even in bourgeois assimilationist gay rights, like marriage equality, were years away from being on the table, and the black freedom movement was an increasingly bitter (and bowdlerized) memory. The late nineties were not a time for the coddling of criminals, so we don’t get the kind of panic around that reactionaries made use of before and after. Gottfried grumbles some about how “government” never shrinks, employs too many people even as Clinton is gutting social services, but you can tell his heart is barely in it, compared to undoing the social and cultural power of the managerial elite.
No, it’s the usual peccadilloes that make it impossible to fully respect paleocons, even when they make a positive contrast with neocons in some areas. Gottfried is offended by the idea of civil rights, and raises the specter of hate crime laws. Beyond being wrong (and wrong-headed- “law and order” types should beg for hate crime legislation, especially if they’re also traditionalist conservatives ie people who want to legislate affect and feeling, but we know why they don’t), it’s honestly just kind of lame. What kind of pathos are we expected to take from business owners no longer being able to legally visit police and/or personal and/or mob violence on customers for being the wrong race? Why is that a “freedom” we should give a damn about, even in the most abstract way?
Well, bigotry is certainly a part of it. I don’t know how personally bigoted Gottfried was or is (I believe he is still among the living). He doesn’t go on as much about the behavior of black people, sexual minorities, immigrants etc as you might expect. Bigotry, and the enforcement of a world defined by personal and sectarian ascriptions, was part of the power displaced by the professional managerial elite that serves as Gottfried’s great bugbear. The lord of the manor, or the planter, or the ward heeler, or whoever, should be allowed to enforce his bigotries and make use of the bigotries of his underlings to enforce his rule. Take that off the table, and you get the rationalism of the H.R. manager (which most often serves to sweep subtler, but ubiquitous and powerful, bigotries under the rug). The way to break the power of these managers is to mobilize these bigotries — often channeled against the openings that liberal managerial hypocrisy leaves wide open and unguarded — which are held to be the true feelings of “the people.” People power, if you will.
And this is where the antisemitism that Gottfried doesn’t deploy, but which is endemic to the far right and which his epigone Spencer has put so many chips on, comes in. You need to have a super-group to explain why the “naturally” superior, however defined — the aryans, the aristocracy, the landowner/industrialist/capitalist elite that the likes of Gottfried and Nock seemed to prefer — ever lost power. For most of them, it can’t be the real agency of the subordinate classes, otherwise they’d have to admit that the subordinate are powerful, capable of making their own decisions, and therefore do not deserve to be subordinate. There has to be some counter-elite. Because they are, in some sense, white, and because of longstanding prejudices and myths, Jews fit that role almost uniquely. Eric Voegelin, and a small school that follows him, puts Gnosticism in that same role. Gottfried comes close to that, not exactly summoning Basilides the False but basically making contemporary liberalism a sort of semi-esoteric cult, working in secret. But that’s usually several degrees too complex for people, especially because even a madman like Voegelin couldn’t bring himself to say that progressives were literally gnostics, with a lineage going back all the way. So, Jews it is, and even if it starts out targeting someone else, the Jews invariably get dragged in.
The version of this Trump, numerous right-populists the world over, and the altright has been pursuing is generally less well thought out than Gottfried’s version. You have to figure the old fucker probably furrowed a brow to see that one of the earlier instantiations of this dynamic involved a fight about video games and how many boyfriends a lady game designer had or did not have. But for all Gottfried’s erudition and delves into the history of liberal ideology, the whole edifice was always in the service of things just as stupid and small — petty bigotry, the personal domination of small-scale tyrants, silly grudges, pedantic rules-lawyering, the martinet’s dread of liberation — as “ethics in video game journalism.” As above, so below, or something. ***’
Unlike most of these distancing maneuvers, this one comes off as reasonably legitimate. There are two main reasons for this. One is that Paul Gottfried is a Jew. There’s no shortage of right-wing Jews out there, and I’ll talk about the antisemitic cast of Gottfried’s main argument, but I don’t think Gottfried is the particular kind of craven that would cause a Jew to make common cause with Nazis, and he’s not the sort of Jew Nazis would necessarily let in (Spencer might, but he’s a fancylad with a following he can count on the fingers of his hands, at this point). The other, more substantive, reason is that Gottfried seems to come from the branch of paleoconservative that is deeply and sincerely opposed to the sort of mass political mobilization and rapid sweeping political changes that help distinguish fascism from more normative conservatism.
Among other things, Gottfried sticks to something more closely resembling the historical and the empirical in this book than is common on the contemporary right (or, for that matter, among ideologues across the spectrum). As far as Gottfried is concerned, by the turn of the twenty-first century, the verdict was in, and the more pessimistic predictions of the founding fathers and assorted classical liberal figures were correct: let the mass of people participate in politics, and they will just vote rich people’s money into their pockets. Race enters into it less than one might think, except as something to potentially break the spell of welfarist lassitude- more anon. This is just democracy, Gottfried sighs, it’s the role of the statesman to see his way forward despite it.
So, unlike fascists, Gottfried doesn’t really believe in the volk. There’s a little bit of that thing you see in right-wing writers ranging from Nock to Kirk to Rothbard, a certain nostalgia for simple folk and their (supposedly) unquestioned hierarchy, but like those three, that nostalgia is also a nostalgia for the (again, supposed) quietude of that past. But at the same time, Gottfried speaks well of populism. This is where Gottfried does, in fact, link up with fascism, and why Spencer et al would have found his work useful to them.
What’s his motivation, you might wonder- if the volk aren’t noble, and in any event the damage is done, what is Gottfried bothering with? It’s because he hates the managerial elite who supposedly brought this state of affairs about. He spends almost half of the book trying to definitively delink the liberalism of most twentieth century figures from “classical liberalism,” and I tend to think that he did this less because it mattered so much — he resignedly calls the likes of John Dewey, Herbert Croly et al “liberals” in spite of all — but because it lets him obsessively pore over the rhetoric of the progressive movement, the new dealers, the great society types, and social liberals of his own time, and the awfulness and strangeness of their creed(s). The managerial elite overthrew the old capitalist elite, and with it the latter’s (notionally) purer liberalism. They bribe the volk with welfare and sap their values and vitality, in the name of their odd cosmopolitan value set, somewhere between antinomianism and Gnosticism. We know this story.
What little hope Gottfried sees — and where he links up with fascism, where he really did influence or at least prefigure how the altright and numerous other far right formations today understand and pursue their project — is in hitting the managerial class where it is, supposedly, weak: culture. The cultural rules of the managerial elite become more important and more flagrantly arbitrary as their power grows, Gottfried argues. The real nature, the kind of Fabian/gnostic elitism of our educated credentialed elites, comes to the fore, and as Pat Buchanan showed, you could rally the good salt of the earth folks to object to…
The funny part is, the thing that impelled Gottfried to write this was the defeat of Bob Dole at the hands of Bill Clinton in 1996. Talk about distinctions with little difference! I guess Clinton was “more PMC,” to be reductive, a baby boomer, a philanderer, an erstwhile protester with an ambitious wife. What were the good right-populist folk supposed to be objecting to, then? What were the secretly radical managerial elite foisting on them? Meaningful advances even in bourgeois assimilationist gay rights, like marriage equality, were years away from being on the table, and the black freedom movement was an increasingly bitter (and bowdlerized) memory. The late nineties were not a time for the coddling of criminals, so we don’t get the kind of panic around that reactionaries made use of before and after. Gottfried grumbles some about how “government” never shrinks, employs too many people even as Clinton is gutting social services, but you can tell his heart is barely in it, compared to undoing the social and cultural power of the managerial elite.
No, it’s the usual peccadilloes that make it impossible to fully respect paleocons, even when they make a positive contrast with neocons in some areas. Gottfried is offended by the idea of civil rights, and raises the specter of hate crime laws. Beyond being wrong (and wrong-headed- “law and order” types should beg for hate crime legislation, especially if they’re also traditionalist conservatives ie people who want to legislate affect and feeling, but we know why they don’t), it’s honestly just kind of lame. What kind of pathos are we expected to take from business owners no longer being able to legally visit police and/or personal and/or mob violence on customers for being the wrong race? Why is that a “freedom” we should give a damn about, even in the most abstract way?
Well, bigotry is certainly a part of it. I don’t know how personally bigoted Gottfried was or is (I believe he is still among the living). He doesn’t go on as much about the behavior of black people, sexual minorities, immigrants etc as you might expect. Bigotry, and the enforcement of a world defined by personal and sectarian ascriptions, was part of the power displaced by the professional managerial elite that serves as Gottfried’s great bugbear. The lord of the manor, or the planter, or the ward heeler, or whoever, should be allowed to enforce his bigotries and make use of the bigotries of his underlings to enforce his rule. Take that off the table, and you get the rationalism of the H.R. manager (which most often serves to sweep subtler, but ubiquitous and powerful, bigotries under the rug). The way to break the power of these managers is to mobilize these bigotries — often channeled against the openings that liberal managerial hypocrisy leaves wide open and unguarded — which are held to be the true feelings of “the people.” People power, if you will.
And this is where the antisemitism that Gottfried doesn’t deploy, but which is endemic to the far right and which his epigone Spencer has put so many chips on, comes in. You need to have a super-group to explain why the “naturally” superior, however defined — the aryans, the aristocracy, the landowner/industrialist/capitalist elite that the likes of Gottfried and Nock seemed to prefer — ever lost power. For most of them, it can’t be the real agency of the subordinate classes, otherwise they’d have to admit that the subordinate are powerful, capable of making their own decisions, and therefore do not deserve to be subordinate. There has to be some counter-elite. Because they are, in some sense, white, and because of longstanding prejudices and myths, Jews fit that role almost uniquely. Eric Voegelin, and a small school that follows him, puts Gnosticism in that same role. Gottfried comes close to that, not exactly summoning Basilides the False but basically making contemporary liberalism a sort of semi-esoteric cult, working in secret. But that’s usually several degrees too complex for people, especially because even a madman like Voegelin couldn’t bring himself to say that progressives were literally gnostics, with a lineage going back all the way. So, Jews it is, and even if it starts out targeting someone else, the Jews invariably get dragged in.
The version of this Trump, numerous right-populists the world over, and the altright has been pursuing is generally less well thought out than Gottfried’s version. You have to figure the old fucker probably furrowed a brow to see that one of the earlier instantiations of this dynamic involved a fight about video games and how many boyfriends a lady game designer had or did not have. But for all Gottfried’s erudition and delves into the history of liberal ideology, the whole edifice was always in the service of things just as stupid and small — petty bigotry, the personal domination of small-scale tyrants, silly grudges, pedantic rules-lawyering, the martinet’s dread of liberation — as “ethics in video game journalism.” As above, so below, or something. ***’
June 29, 2019
Gottfried points out (p.103-105) that classical democracy required cultural homogeneity, whereas the managerial state vociferously seeks out pluralism, immigration, and integration to defuse racism and recondition the culture. And yet he still characterizes this managerial society as “democratic” distinguishing it from 19th century “liberalism.” Wouldn’t it make more sense to call it *aristocratic* managerialism? Koch-and-Soros sponsored immigration that upholds profit and undermines wages, placating the people with affirmative action and entitlements; a globalist aristocracy of late-capitalistic neo-feudalism with exchange-value free trade Austrian economics that utilizes outsourcing and foreign labor at the expense of the livelihoods of the bottom 90% of the country...
How can a society that is constructed on free trade, interventionist warfare, mass immigration, and a welfare state be called liberal OR democratic? I think a better title of the book would be “After Liberalism: Neo-Feudal Aristocracy in the Managerial State.” Perhaps Gottfried is blinded by this point because of his own love for 19th century liberalism and his learned (through much reading of conservative theorists who don’t actually share his worldview) disgust at the word “democracy.” But a fantastic analysis nevertheless.
How can a society that is constructed on free trade, interventionist warfare, mass immigration, and a welfare state be called liberal OR democratic? I think a better title of the book would be “After Liberalism: Neo-Feudal Aristocracy in the Managerial State.” Perhaps Gottfried is blinded by this point because of his own love for 19th century liberalism and his learned (through much reading of conservative theorists who don’t actually share his worldview) disgust at the word “democracy.” But a fantastic analysis nevertheless.
January 9, 2023
Another conservative who is terrified by the “downfall of democracy” and feels his rights are being taken away because others are gaining theirs.
February 24, 2025
Gottfried clearly explains how a Trojan horse of “live and let live” was used to smuggle in a massive bureaucratic apparatus designed for social engineering and the dissolution of autonomous social forces.
July 27, 2010
Gottfried situates liberalism and democracy as two different essences. For me, Gottfried is best when he discusses how the Frankfurt School, at least semantically, replaces power with the therapeutic. The therapeutic society is ever evolving without discussion of power, or how we got here?, or where we're going. With or without knowing it Gottfried understands politics as we've entered the post-human turn.
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