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Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt: Towards a Secular Theocracy
"It is a small, conservative, philosophical gem, and I love it."-Amos Perlmutter Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt extends Paul Gottfried's examination of Western managerial government's growth in the last third of the twentieth century. Linking multiculturalism to a distinctive political and religious context, the book argues that welfare-state democracy, unlike bourgeois liberalism, has rejected the once conventional distinction between government and civil society.
200 pages, Hardcover
First published October 1, 2002
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About the author
Paul Edward Gottfried
36 books139 followersPaul Edward Gottfried is an American paleoconservative political philosopher, historian, and writer. He is a former Professor of Humanities at Swarthmore College and Elizabethtown College in Pennsylvania. He is editor-in-chief of the paleoconservative magazine Chronicles. He is an associated scholar at the Mises Institute, a libertarian think tank, and the US correspondent of Nouvelle École, a Nouvelle Droite journal.
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews
January 4, 2017
I find it extremely hard to decide what to make of this book. So hard that I even don’t know what title to give to my short review here. On the one hand, I would not want to think of myself as a conservative but rather as a liberal – however as one who values personal liberties and traditional identities such as family, region, and even nation, as higher than the State’s mandate to create “equality”, whatever that may mean, beyond the principle of equality before the law. As such, I cannot share Gottfried’s distrust of feminism and gay rights as a threat to the mainstream population of western societies. On the other hand, I cannot help thinking that basically, the author’s view on the development of the therapeutic state is quite lucid, threateningly lucid.
Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt was published in 2002, and it is quite appalling to what extent what, at first sight, might have been put down to excessive pessimism on Gottfried’s part now seems to have become true. Just consider the Fake News and Hate Speech debates in Germany, which might be read as an attempt of those in power to silence undesirable criticism by discrediting its proponents morally and by ousting them from the arena of political discussion, all the more so since politicians and the affiliated media apply double standards as to who is allowed to voice what kind of criticism and since facts seem to be acceptable only when they support the right kind of conclusion. We have grown used to looking to State regulations and administrative actions as the panaceas to our daily grievances, and this has given the State the chance to pervade our daily lives to the point of educating its citizens. While state regulations may have been necessary in some areas – e.g. with respect to legal discrimination of minorities –, the danger lying along this way is obvious: Instead of regarding themselves as the employees of the people constituting a nation, politicians nowadays regard themselves as educators whose primary mission resides in improving human nature towards a social utopia, and the side effect is the increase of their power in that more and more areas of daily life that used to be private are now becoming “political”. The most fateful development is the tendency to moralize in the political sphere along the lines of simplistic black-and-white divisions, and Gottfried points out that at the root of this evil there is a “deformed Protestantism”, which successfully tapped into feelings of guilt linked with the European past, making it easy to manipulate and intimidate the majority of modern citizens.
While reading this book, I constantly vacillated between the rejection of some of Gottfried’s unspoken values and the necessity of agreeing with the author on his criticism of modern political culture and the way into a subtly totalitarian nanny state. In any case, this book is worth reading.
Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt was published in 2002, and it is quite appalling to what extent what, at first sight, might have been put down to excessive pessimism on Gottfried’s part now seems to have become true. Just consider the Fake News and Hate Speech debates in Germany, which might be read as an attempt of those in power to silence undesirable criticism by discrediting its proponents morally and by ousting them from the arena of political discussion, all the more so since politicians and the affiliated media apply double standards as to who is allowed to voice what kind of criticism and since facts seem to be acceptable only when they support the right kind of conclusion. We have grown used to looking to State regulations and administrative actions as the panaceas to our daily grievances, and this has given the State the chance to pervade our daily lives to the point of educating its citizens. While state regulations may have been necessary in some areas – e.g. with respect to legal discrimination of minorities –, the danger lying along this way is obvious: Instead of regarding themselves as the employees of the people constituting a nation, politicians nowadays regard themselves as educators whose primary mission resides in improving human nature towards a social utopia, and the side effect is the increase of their power in that more and more areas of daily life that used to be private are now becoming “political”. The most fateful development is the tendency to moralize in the political sphere along the lines of simplistic black-and-white divisions, and Gottfried points out that at the root of this evil there is a “deformed Protestantism”, which successfully tapped into feelings of guilt linked with the European past, making it easy to manipulate and intimidate the majority of modern citizens.
While reading this book, I constantly vacillated between the rejection of some of Gottfried’s unspoken values and the necessity of agreeing with the author on his criticism of modern political culture and the way into a subtly totalitarian nanny state. In any case, this book is worth reading.
June 6, 2019
Paul Gottfried has an original view of things and is quite clear in his critique on the failures of modern liberalism. I always find his works to be a bit too heavy to read due to his vast erudition and attention to detail. I would recommend this book however to anyone interested in multiculturalism and getting a new perspective on it.
April 1, 2018
The title of this book accurately describes what it is about. Author explains in a great detail how and why multiculturalism got so widespread and what threats it brings.
But be warned. This book is NOT an easy read. Text is written in a very academic style and complex words are abundant. Sentences often exceed 25 or even more words in length. Ideas are presented and change rapidly. Since my first language is not English I found this book quite hard to follow and it took some time to finish, because I had to process each chapter slowly to truly understand all the points author is making.
P.S. It is amazing to see that multiculturalism with all of its challenges was so widespread in the US and Western Europe for so long and only came to the Eastern Europe in a recent years.
But be warned. This book is NOT an easy read. Text is written in a very academic style and complex words are abundant. Sentences often exceed 25 or even more words in length. Ideas are presented and change rapidly. Since my first language is not English I found this book quite hard to follow and it took some time to finish, because I had to process each chapter slowly to truly understand all the points author is making.
P.S. It is amazing to see that multiculturalism with all of its challenges was so widespread in the US and Western Europe for so long and only came to the Eastern Europe in a recent years.
March 12, 2026
Published in 2002, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt: Toward a Secular Theocracy is a concise but provocative work of political theory in which Paul Edward Gottfried examines the ideological foundations of contemporary multiculturalism in the West. Building upon themes developed in his earlier work After Liberalism, Gottfried advances the thesis that modern multiculturalism functions not merely as a cultural policy but as an ideological instrument of what he calls the “managerial–therapeutic state.” Through a synthesis of political philosophy, cultural critique, and historical analysis, the book presents a controversial interpretation of the relationship between liberal democracy, guilt, and social engineering in late modern Western societies. 
Gottfried situates multiculturalism within the broader transformation of Western political systems during the late twentieth century. In his view, classical bourgeois liberalism once maintained a clear distinction between civil society and the state. Contemporary welfare democracies, however, increasingly blur this boundary, extending administrative authority into cultural and moral domains. Multicultural ideology, he argues, serves as the legitimating doctrine for this expanded political authority. 
The central concept of the book is the “politics of guilt.” According to Gottfried, Western societies—particularly the United States—have developed a moral framework in which historical injustices such as racism, sexism, and colonialism generate a pervasive sense of collective guilt among the majority population. Political institutions and cultural elites mobilize this guilt to justify policies that privilege certain minority identities while delegitimizing dissenting viewpoints. In this framework, social groups are categorized into “victims” and “victimizers,” and the state presents itself as the arbiter responsible for redressing historical wrongs. 
A significant contribution of the book lies in Gottfried’s elaboration of the “therapeutic state.” Drawing inspiration from thinkers such as James Burnham and Carl Schmitt, Gottfried argues that contemporary governments increasingly frame political problems in psychological and moral terms rather than purely legal or economic ones. Instead of focusing primarily on material redistribution, modern states seek to reshape attitudes, language, and cultural norms through educational institutions, media influence, and administrative regulation.
In this context, multiculturalism becomes an instrument for regulating public discourse and behavior. Governments and cultural institutions encourage sensitivity toward designated minority groups while discouraging expressions that could be construed as insensitive or exclusionary. Gottfried contends that this process results in an ideological orthodoxy that resembles a form of secular religion, complete with moral taboos, ritualized expressions of repentance, and sanctioned narratives of victimhood. 
One of the book’s most distinctive arguments concerns the religious roots of the politics of guilt. Gottfried suggests that elements of liberal Protestant theology helped shape the moral sensibilities underlying contemporary multiculturalism. According to his interpretation, the Christian emphasis on repentance and identification with the suffering of others has been secularized and redirected toward political causes. In this transformed context, the traditional religious notion of sin becomes collective guilt for historical injustices, while the redemption of society is pursued through policies designed to elevate marginalized groups. 
This argument is central to Gottfried’s broader claim that modern multiculturalism functions as a “secular theocracy.” Although the ideology presents itself as progressive and rational, he contends that it reproduces many structural features of religious belief systems, including moral absolutism and the stigmatization of heresy.
Methodologically, Gottfried combines intellectual history with political theory. His analysis engages with a wide range of thinkers, including Max Weber, René Girard, and Eric Voegelin, whose work on secularized religious symbolism informs his interpretation of modern political ideologies. The book’s style is dense and argumentative rather than empirical; it relies primarily on conceptual analysis and interpretive commentary rather than statistical or sociological evidence.
The work’s brevity—approximately 160 pages—gives it a polemical clarity, but also limits the scope of its empirical support. Critics have noted that some of Gottfried’s claims about the motivations and coherence of multicultural elites are asserted rather than systematically demonstrated. Nevertheless, the book’s theoretical framework is articulated with considerable intellectual rigor.
Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt is best understood as a work of dissident political theory rather than mainstream social science. Its strengths lie in its conceptual boldness and its willingness to challenge dominant assumptions about multiculturalism and liberal democracy. Gottfried’s analysis of moral rhetoric in contemporary politics, particularly the strategic use of guilt and victimhood, anticipates later debates about “political correctness” and cultural polarization in Western societies.
At the same time, the book’s interpretive framework may strike some readers as overly deterministic. By attributing the rise of multiculturalism primarily to the interests of a managerial elite and the cultural legacy of liberal Protestantism, Gottfried arguably underestimates the diversity of motivations and historical factors that have shaped multicultural policies. Additionally, his normative stance—sympathetic to traditional Western cultural continuity—inevitably places the book within broader ideological debates about nationalism, liberalism, and cultural pluralism.
Despite its controversial perspective, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt remains an influential contribution to contemporary conservative political thought. Gottfried’s critique of the managerial–therapeutic state and his interpretation of multiculturalism as a secularized moral order offer a distinctive lens through which to examine cultural politics in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Whether one accepts or rejects his conclusions, the book provides a stimulating and intellectually provocative analysis of the ideological tensions shaping modern Western democracies.
GPT
Gottfried situates multiculturalism within the broader transformation of Western political systems during the late twentieth century. In his view, classical bourgeois liberalism once maintained a clear distinction between civil society and the state. Contemporary welfare democracies, however, increasingly blur this boundary, extending administrative authority into cultural and moral domains. Multicultural ideology, he argues, serves as the legitimating doctrine for this expanded political authority. 
The central concept of the book is the “politics of guilt.” According to Gottfried, Western societies—particularly the United States—have developed a moral framework in which historical injustices such as racism, sexism, and colonialism generate a pervasive sense of collective guilt among the majority population. Political institutions and cultural elites mobilize this guilt to justify policies that privilege certain minority identities while delegitimizing dissenting viewpoints. In this framework, social groups are categorized into “victims” and “victimizers,” and the state presents itself as the arbiter responsible for redressing historical wrongs. 
A significant contribution of the book lies in Gottfried’s elaboration of the “therapeutic state.” Drawing inspiration from thinkers such as James Burnham and Carl Schmitt, Gottfried argues that contemporary governments increasingly frame political problems in psychological and moral terms rather than purely legal or economic ones. Instead of focusing primarily on material redistribution, modern states seek to reshape attitudes, language, and cultural norms through educational institutions, media influence, and administrative regulation.
In this context, multiculturalism becomes an instrument for regulating public discourse and behavior. Governments and cultural institutions encourage sensitivity toward designated minority groups while discouraging expressions that could be construed as insensitive or exclusionary. Gottfried contends that this process results in an ideological orthodoxy that resembles a form of secular religion, complete with moral taboos, ritualized expressions of repentance, and sanctioned narratives of victimhood. 
One of the book’s most distinctive arguments concerns the religious roots of the politics of guilt. Gottfried suggests that elements of liberal Protestant theology helped shape the moral sensibilities underlying contemporary multiculturalism. According to his interpretation, the Christian emphasis on repentance and identification with the suffering of others has been secularized and redirected toward political causes. In this transformed context, the traditional religious notion of sin becomes collective guilt for historical injustices, while the redemption of society is pursued through policies designed to elevate marginalized groups. 
This argument is central to Gottfried’s broader claim that modern multiculturalism functions as a “secular theocracy.” Although the ideology presents itself as progressive and rational, he contends that it reproduces many structural features of religious belief systems, including moral absolutism and the stigmatization of heresy.
Methodologically, Gottfried combines intellectual history with political theory. His analysis engages with a wide range of thinkers, including Max Weber, René Girard, and Eric Voegelin, whose work on secularized religious symbolism informs his interpretation of modern political ideologies. The book’s style is dense and argumentative rather than empirical; it relies primarily on conceptual analysis and interpretive commentary rather than statistical or sociological evidence.
The work’s brevity—approximately 160 pages—gives it a polemical clarity, but also limits the scope of its empirical support. Critics have noted that some of Gottfried’s claims about the motivations and coherence of multicultural elites are asserted rather than systematically demonstrated. Nevertheless, the book’s theoretical framework is articulated with considerable intellectual rigor.
Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt is best understood as a work of dissident political theory rather than mainstream social science. Its strengths lie in its conceptual boldness and its willingness to challenge dominant assumptions about multiculturalism and liberal democracy. Gottfried’s analysis of moral rhetoric in contemporary politics, particularly the strategic use of guilt and victimhood, anticipates later debates about “political correctness” and cultural polarization in Western societies.
At the same time, the book’s interpretive framework may strike some readers as overly deterministic. By attributing the rise of multiculturalism primarily to the interests of a managerial elite and the cultural legacy of liberal Protestantism, Gottfried arguably underestimates the diversity of motivations and historical factors that have shaped multicultural policies. Additionally, his normative stance—sympathetic to traditional Western cultural continuity—inevitably places the book within broader ideological debates about nationalism, liberalism, and cultural pluralism.
Despite its controversial perspective, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt remains an influential contribution to contemporary conservative political thought. Gottfried’s critique of the managerial–therapeutic state and his interpretation of multiculturalism as a secularized moral order offer a distinctive lens through which to examine cultural politics in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Whether one accepts or rejects his conclusions, the book provides a stimulating and intellectually provocative analysis of the ideological tensions shaping modern Western democracies.
GPT
March 18, 2019
When the Left says we have no power, they mean political power. In terms of culture, they have dominated in the post Cold War era and Gottfried’s book lays out the contours of this power, portraying its march as inexorable. What he is discussing is how neo-liberals are left on social issues, in part so they can be conservative (but not libertarian) on economic ones.
The book traces the creation and implications of the multicultural world view and its attendant obsession with group guilt. According to Gottfried, it is a creation of the Left having achieved its overall economic aims of creating a welfare state and switching over to a war against western civilization in order to create a cultural paradise, as epitomized by John Lennon’s “Imagine.” It is fostered by an intrusive bureaucratic state, and in the book's most original observation, the Calvinist strain of Protestant thought, where salvation is unknown and therefore there is no true redemption. You can show you are saved by acts of penance, but with no certainty of redemption, the slightest miscue results in demonization. Hence the ghosts of the past are brought up, creating a “Hitler of the month club.”
What is chilling is that the book is prescient. Written in 2002, Gottfried predicted that political correctness was not a passing fad, that it would enter the mainstream of culture. Recounting what he was right about creates a run-on sentence: the memory of communist crimes would fade over time in the west, the Left would become more censorious, that there would be moral panics over “fascism” if one does not agree with the ruling paradigm, that the decline of the influence of Christian churches in society was terminal, that America would embark on ruinous wars tinged with moralist goals, that Europe would allow a flood of immigrants that would destabilize the region, that the rise of soft cultural imperialism that would create a backlash, that the failure of the belief system would not move the leaders, and that the Left would marginalize economic rhetoric to secure support from bankers. That is quite a laundry list, and it has given this obscure book some of its underground appeal. If Gottfried failed it was in supposing that economic pressures would not weaken the multicultural consensus, and that the views of the Old Right had no traction. Also, he does not consider that Eastern Europe would be resistant to the politics of guilt, given their religious background and history of occupation, whether it be Muslim, Nazi, or communist. You can tell this a book from 2002. There is no discussion of global warming, the Internet creating alternative news sources, or massive market failures, all of which threaten the neo-liberal order. Yet, the fact that he gets so much right makes this a devastating critique, that reads as if it was written in 2015.
Now comes my biggest problem with the book. Gottfried downplays the fascist potential of reactionaries. As events have sown in Russia and China, a rejection of multiculturalism is far worse. To be fair, he openly discusses how reactionaries have roots in the wreckage of fascist politics. His larger point though is the multicultural Left has roots in communism, which murdered far more people. This does not mean he thinks the reactionaries are less “evil” only that in 2002 they were ineffectual when compared to the neo-liberal order that seeks to change the world into a multicultural paradise instead of a worker’s paradise. If there is one sad conclusion to the book, it is that real democracy has been abandoned by each side, the Left preferring technocratic managers and the Right charismatic strongmen that can only win via a surge in popular support.
Lastly, the book is smart, but well written. The prose is crisp and Gottfried does not rely on jargon, although he presupposes a deep historical knowledge that is increasingly lacking. The overheated reaction to Jorg Haider’s minor cabinet post in Austria is crucial to the argument, but I barely recall Haider, and Gottfried supposes that you know the case well enough to discuss its implications.
I agree with the overall thrust of this book. Yet, just as a leftist cannot understand why someone is conservative without pathologizing and calling them corporate puppets, Gottfried is incapable of explain the rise of multiculturalism without resorting to labeling it as a kind of mental aberration fostered by an elite class. I cannot then give this book five stars. It is less about the origins of multiculturalism, than its implications, but by not discussing the origins, the positive aspects of multiculturalism, or even the potential for multiculturalism without guilt, the book is diminished.
I consider this a crucial paragraph:
“Furthermore, the unconquered fascist past has a remarkably fluid content. It keeps taking the shape of whatever is deemed politically incorrect, be it restrictions on immigration, enforcement of customary gender distinctions, or paying tribute to a recognizably European national heritage. While reasonable people may disagree about any or all of these positions, it is a bit of a stretch from there to generic fascism or to its gruesome Hitlerian subtype. But that stretch is negotiable as soon as one appeals to a hypothetical regression, that is, to the idea that one slippery slope leads to an even more perilous one. If one accepts what seem to be indelicate social premises, one opens oneself and others to a desensitization process that might culminate in Haiderism or even worse. After all, Haiderism, like Hitlerism, is about excluding the other and appealing to national solidarity, and as soon as one allows such distinctions into public discussion, all hell might break loose, particularly since the prejudice in question is said to suffuse the Western subconscious.”
This one is particularly cutting:
“One should not exaggerate the meaning of occasional demonstrations, even violent ones, by the European radical Left, against American corporations and American militarism. It is an Oedipal reflex directed against a political culture from which the European Left draws all of its ideas.”
Also:
“It is hard to imagine that Jews, Japanese, blacks, or other ethnic or racial groups with a strong sense of collective identity would quietly accept these forms of individual and group humiliation. Only those who hold their ancestral group in low regard, or believe there is value in creating this impression, would allow such injury to be directed against themselves and their children. And such a population has proved malleable to the behavioral reconstruction that has come from the managerial state. The social guilt and collective sense of shame that liberal Christianity has aroused have served the interest of, among others, political elites.”
Lastly, he explains why the Right loses the culture war, and therefore why conservatives believe their politicians are feckless.
“Yet equally relevant is that only one side in this “primal conflict” claims convincingly to hold the moral high ground, while its critics have been reduced to evasion and procedural quibbles…The fact is, multicultural and designated-victim considerations have become inseparable from American public virtue, and center-right politicians now shiver at the thought of violating these new moral standards.”
The book traces the creation and implications of the multicultural world view and its attendant obsession with group guilt. According to Gottfried, it is a creation of the Left having achieved its overall economic aims of creating a welfare state and switching over to a war against western civilization in order to create a cultural paradise, as epitomized by John Lennon’s “Imagine.” It is fostered by an intrusive bureaucratic state, and in the book's most original observation, the Calvinist strain of Protestant thought, where salvation is unknown and therefore there is no true redemption. You can show you are saved by acts of penance, but with no certainty of redemption, the slightest miscue results in demonization. Hence the ghosts of the past are brought up, creating a “Hitler of the month club.”
What is chilling is that the book is prescient. Written in 2002, Gottfried predicted that political correctness was not a passing fad, that it would enter the mainstream of culture. Recounting what he was right about creates a run-on sentence: the memory of communist crimes would fade over time in the west, the Left would become more censorious, that there would be moral panics over “fascism” if one does not agree with the ruling paradigm, that the decline of the influence of Christian churches in society was terminal, that America would embark on ruinous wars tinged with moralist goals, that Europe would allow a flood of immigrants that would destabilize the region, that the rise of soft cultural imperialism that would create a backlash, that the failure of the belief system would not move the leaders, and that the Left would marginalize economic rhetoric to secure support from bankers. That is quite a laundry list, and it has given this obscure book some of its underground appeal. If Gottfried failed it was in supposing that economic pressures would not weaken the multicultural consensus, and that the views of the Old Right had no traction. Also, he does not consider that Eastern Europe would be resistant to the politics of guilt, given their religious background and history of occupation, whether it be Muslim, Nazi, or communist. You can tell this a book from 2002. There is no discussion of global warming, the Internet creating alternative news sources, or massive market failures, all of which threaten the neo-liberal order. Yet, the fact that he gets so much right makes this a devastating critique, that reads as if it was written in 2015.
Now comes my biggest problem with the book. Gottfried downplays the fascist potential of reactionaries. As events have sown in Russia and China, a rejection of multiculturalism is far worse. To be fair, he openly discusses how reactionaries have roots in the wreckage of fascist politics. His larger point though is the multicultural Left has roots in communism, which murdered far more people. This does not mean he thinks the reactionaries are less “evil” only that in 2002 they were ineffectual when compared to the neo-liberal order that seeks to change the world into a multicultural paradise instead of a worker’s paradise. If there is one sad conclusion to the book, it is that real democracy has been abandoned by each side, the Left preferring technocratic managers and the Right charismatic strongmen that can only win via a surge in popular support.
Lastly, the book is smart, but well written. The prose is crisp and Gottfried does not rely on jargon, although he presupposes a deep historical knowledge that is increasingly lacking. The overheated reaction to Jorg Haider’s minor cabinet post in Austria is crucial to the argument, but I barely recall Haider, and Gottfried supposes that you know the case well enough to discuss its implications.
I agree with the overall thrust of this book. Yet, just as a leftist cannot understand why someone is conservative without pathologizing and calling them corporate puppets, Gottfried is incapable of explain the rise of multiculturalism without resorting to labeling it as a kind of mental aberration fostered by an elite class. I cannot then give this book five stars. It is less about the origins of multiculturalism, than its implications, but by not discussing the origins, the positive aspects of multiculturalism, or even the potential for multiculturalism without guilt, the book is diminished.
I consider this a crucial paragraph:
“Furthermore, the unconquered fascist past has a remarkably fluid content. It keeps taking the shape of whatever is deemed politically incorrect, be it restrictions on immigration, enforcement of customary gender distinctions, or paying tribute to a recognizably European national heritage. While reasonable people may disagree about any or all of these positions, it is a bit of a stretch from there to generic fascism or to its gruesome Hitlerian subtype. But that stretch is negotiable as soon as one appeals to a hypothetical regression, that is, to the idea that one slippery slope leads to an even more perilous one. If one accepts what seem to be indelicate social premises, one opens oneself and others to a desensitization process that might culminate in Haiderism or even worse. After all, Haiderism, like Hitlerism, is about excluding the other and appealing to national solidarity, and as soon as one allows such distinctions into public discussion, all hell might break loose, particularly since the prejudice in question is said to suffuse the Western subconscious.”
This one is particularly cutting:
“One should not exaggerate the meaning of occasional demonstrations, even violent ones, by the European radical Left, against American corporations and American militarism. It is an Oedipal reflex directed against a political culture from which the European Left draws all of its ideas.”
Also:
“It is hard to imagine that Jews, Japanese, blacks, or other ethnic or racial groups with a strong sense of collective identity would quietly accept these forms of individual and group humiliation. Only those who hold their ancestral group in low regard, or believe there is value in creating this impression, would allow such injury to be directed against themselves and their children. And such a population has proved malleable to the behavioral reconstruction that has come from the managerial state. The social guilt and collective sense of shame that liberal Christianity has aroused have served the interest of, among others, political elites.”
Lastly, he explains why the Right loses the culture war, and therefore why conservatives believe their politicians are feckless.
“Yet equally relevant is that only one side in this “primal conflict” claims convincingly to hold the moral high ground, while its critics have been reduced to evasion and procedural quibbles…The fact is, multicultural and designated-victim considerations have become inseparable from American public virtue, and center-right politicians now shiver at the thought of violating these new moral standards.”
June 19, 2015
Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt: Toward a Secular Theocracy discusses the problem of the West, particularly the protestant countries' appeal to distinctiveness of cultures rather than truth as an legacy of the individualist nature of the secular social democracy.
While not being a conservative per se, Gottfried did open my eyes to see what Paleoconservatism is about, surprisingly it was quite an interest read its attack on libertarianism for being too accepting of bad values without any considerations of their nature. However, I did find his economic analysis almost completely bonkers, but he was a good writer and a friend of Rothbard so I think economics is just not his strongest suit.
I love how he could use philosophical arguments as well as factual evidence to refute the "points" made by the left by engaging in buzzwords too, though it may be quite tiresome to read through all the made up words.
While not being a conservative per se, Gottfried did open my eyes to see what Paleoconservatism is about, surprisingly it was quite an interest read its attack on libertarianism for being too accepting of bad values without any considerations of their nature. However, I did find his economic analysis almost completely bonkers, but he was a good writer and a friend of Rothbard so I think economics is just not his strongest suit.
I love how he could use philosophical arguments as well as factual evidence to refute the "points" made by the left by engaging in buzzwords too, though it may be quite tiresome to read through all the made up words.
November 18, 2016
Paul Gottfried thinks the seemingly inexorable growth of the modern managerial state and the collapse of traditional Marxist hopes with the fall of the Soviet Union have greatly eroded once meaningful political distinctions in the modern West. All political rhetoric and wishful thinking aside, managerial welfare state capitalism is universally accepted both by the conventional right and left. And the ever expanding managerial state has become even more powerful and intrusive as it has developed and continues to develop “therapeutic” dimensions in an attempt to “socialize” the populace. This American led therapeutic trend is largely the product of the post-marxist left’s attempt to conquer a discriminatory and unsubdued past, and encounters hardly any real resistance. All western countries are becoming alike, and this new western “way of life” committed to globalization and lifestyle liberation is being imposed/exported abroad to the non-Western world.
Gottfried’s book, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt, published in 2002, focuses attention on the therapeutic regime that has arisen from the managerial welfare state. (He focused on the managerial state generally in an earlier book, entitled After Liberalism.) He identifies three defining characteristics of the therapeutic regime: “the attempt to present as mere psychological and educational matters what are increasingly intrusive uses of government power to alter social behavior; dividing society into victims and non-victims (or victimizers); and a politics of disposition, in which ‘sensitivity’ becomes the decisive issue for drawing friend-enemy distinctions.” As to the first characteristic, Gottfried notes that defenders of the therapeutic regime have proved very adept at pathologizing dissent. As to the second, Gottfried thinks that the State gains enormous power and the halo of sanctity when it manages to credibly define itself as speaking on behalf of “victims” in an attempt to redress historic wrongs at the expense of “victimizers.” Concerning the final characteristic, Gottfried points out that when sensitivity becomes the decisive issue for drawing friend-enemy relations, no one outside the therapeutic consensus is safe, even if they mind their own business and merely wish to be left alone. (Gottfried was very prescient regarding this point, as can be easily discerned by looking at the post-Obergefell landscape.)
Since the therapeutic regime is intrusive enough as to elicit the “soft totalitarianism” label from many commentators, Gottfried asks why opposition to it has been so weak. He thinks there are many reasons that likely serve as contributing factors, but focuses special attention on the cultural influence of liberal Protestantism. Gottfried points to the powerful mainline commitment to atone for the collective guilt of our historical past. Social sins must be acknowledged and combated in an attempt to make the sinner feel righteous, signal his virtue, and eventually usher in the secular utopia. This so-called “Protestant Deformation,” says Gottfried, has made the populations it influences very pliable as the therapeutic regime offers up racism, sexism, homophobia, and xenophobia as political challenges that feed a seemingly bottomless reservoir of liberal Protestant guilt. And liberal Protestantism is not merely being manipulated by others. It even serves as an emotional resource for some of the generals in the Therapeutic Regime’s army. Further, Gottfried thinks the cultural power of liberal Protestantism obviously influences the political attitudes of many who consider themselves non-religious. He even thinks it manages to influence religious groups-Catholics and Protestant evangelicals, for instance-that are in most respects more culturally traditional.
Gottfried obviously decries the developments he analyzes, though there is no obvious course of action to take given the realities he describes. Consider the USA. Supporters of the therapeutic regime have all the advantages. The combination of state power and liberal Protestant cultural authority is reminiscent, says Gottfried, of the alliance of throne and altar during the ancien regime. Add to this the liberal media and educational establishments, the liberal entertainment industry, immigration flows that make winning elections easier and easier for Democrats, and a Republican “opposition” party that is an echo rather than a real alternative. The Republicans shudder at the thought of being labeled sexist, racist or homophobe by their Democratic opponents, bending over backwards to remain “respectable” by secular progressive standards. And to the extent that there still is a Republican base that opposes the therapeutic regime, the party Establishment tends to treat this base with contempt and bad faith.
The fly in the ointment which may eventually disrupt the therapeutic regime, thinks Gottfried, is the ongoing complete commitment to open borders, which has for various reasons been a short term winning tactic for our governing elites. Not all populations, he thinks will prove as pliable as those formed in a liberal Protestant culture. Current trends in Europe demonstrate Gottfried’s prescience regarding this point. And the fact that European political elites seem to have abandoned all common sense when it comes to the topic of mass immigration seems to underscore Gottfried’s argument regarding the non-rational, pseudo-religious aspects of secular progressivism. Perhaps the therapeutic regime really will end up destroying itself. Although Gottfried does not talk about it, another problem facing the therapeutic regime seems to be that its conquests will reach a point where it becomes almost impossible to remain both Christian and “politically correct” simultaneously. This point may be arriving now, as mainline Christians, especially in the aftermath of Obergefell , will have to decide whether or not to go along with the persecution of their more traditionalist Christian brethren in the name of a State sponsored ongoing LGBT agenda, or defend in the name of real pluralism the rights of their traditionalist co-religionists, even if it means breaking with PC orthodoxy. It is perhaps not naively optimistic to hope that the religious mainline will stand with the traditionalists as the therapeutic regime begins to force the issue. If so, perhaps the disruption of the therapeutic regime will not require something so drastic as being overrun by foreign populations.
Finally, one should mention that the profound level of dissatisfaction with the political status quo made so obvious in 2016 would seem to indicate that Gottfried circa 2002 somewhat underestimated the latent popular discontent with the trends he so ably analyzes. Indeed, I suspect that there was an element of deliberate provocation here, as if Gottfried was trying to goad people into some sort of reflection and creative action by overemphasizing (though not fabricating) the sheeplike docility of those who would seem to be natural opponents of the therapeutic regime.
This is a sobering and illuminating book.
Gottfried’s book, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt, published in 2002, focuses attention on the therapeutic regime that has arisen from the managerial welfare state. (He focused on the managerial state generally in an earlier book, entitled After Liberalism.) He identifies three defining characteristics of the therapeutic regime: “the attempt to present as mere psychological and educational matters what are increasingly intrusive uses of government power to alter social behavior; dividing society into victims and non-victims (or victimizers); and a politics of disposition, in which ‘sensitivity’ becomes the decisive issue for drawing friend-enemy distinctions.” As to the first characteristic, Gottfried notes that defenders of the therapeutic regime have proved very adept at pathologizing dissent. As to the second, Gottfried thinks that the State gains enormous power and the halo of sanctity when it manages to credibly define itself as speaking on behalf of “victims” in an attempt to redress historic wrongs at the expense of “victimizers.” Concerning the final characteristic, Gottfried points out that when sensitivity becomes the decisive issue for drawing friend-enemy relations, no one outside the therapeutic consensus is safe, even if they mind their own business and merely wish to be left alone. (Gottfried was very prescient regarding this point, as can be easily discerned by looking at the post-Obergefell landscape.)
Since the therapeutic regime is intrusive enough as to elicit the “soft totalitarianism” label from many commentators, Gottfried asks why opposition to it has been so weak. He thinks there are many reasons that likely serve as contributing factors, but focuses special attention on the cultural influence of liberal Protestantism. Gottfried points to the powerful mainline commitment to atone for the collective guilt of our historical past. Social sins must be acknowledged and combated in an attempt to make the sinner feel righteous, signal his virtue, and eventually usher in the secular utopia. This so-called “Protestant Deformation,” says Gottfried, has made the populations it influences very pliable as the therapeutic regime offers up racism, sexism, homophobia, and xenophobia as political challenges that feed a seemingly bottomless reservoir of liberal Protestant guilt. And liberal Protestantism is not merely being manipulated by others. It even serves as an emotional resource for some of the generals in the Therapeutic Regime’s army. Further, Gottfried thinks the cultural power of liberal Protestantism obviously influences the political attitudes of many who consider themselves non-religious. He even thinks it manages to influence religious groups-Catholics and Protestant evangelicals, for instance-that are in most respects more culturally traditional.
Gottfried obviously decries the developments he analyzes, though there is no obvious course of action to take given the realities he describes. Consider the USA. Supporters of the therapeutic regime have all the advantages. The combination of state power and liberal Protestant cultural authority is reminiscent, says Gottfried, of the alliance of throne and altar during the ancien regime. Add to this the liberal media and educational establishments, the liberal entertainment industry, immigration flows that make winning elections easier and easier for Democrats, and a Republican “opposition” party that is an echo rather than a real alternative. The Republicans shudder at the thought of being labeled sexist, racist or homophobe by their Democratic opponents, bending over backwards to remain “respectable” by secular progressive standards. And to the extent that there still is a Republican base that opposes the therapeutic regime, the party Establishment tends to treat this base with contempt and bad faith.
The fly in the ointment which may eventually disrupt the therapeutic regime, thinks Gottfried, is the ongoing complete commitment to open borders, which has for various reasons been a short term winning tactic for our governing elites. Not all populations, he thinks will prove as pliable as those formed in a liberal Protestant culture. Current trends in Europe demonstrate Gottfried’s prescience regarding this point. And the fact that European political elites seem to have abandoned all common sense when it comes to the topic of mass immigration seems to underscore Gottfried’s argument regarding the non-rational, pseudo-religious aspects of secular progressivism. Perhaps the therapeutic regime really will end up destroying itself. Although Gottfried does not talk about it, another problem facing the therapeutic regime seems to be that its conquests will reach a point where it becomes almost impossible to remain both Christian and “politically correct” simultaneously. This point may be arriving now, as mainline Christians, especially in the aftermath of Obergefell , will have to decide whether or not to go along with the persecution of their more traditionalist Christian brethren in the name of a State sponsored ongoing LGBT agenda, or defend in the name of real pluralism the rights of their traditionalist co-religionists, even if it means breaking with PC orthodoxy. It is perhaps not naively optimistic to hope that the religious mainline will stand with the traditionalists as the therapeutic regime begins to force the issue. If so, perhaps the disruption of the therapeutic regime will not require something so drastic as being overrun by foreign populations.
Finally, one should mention that the profound level of dissatisfaction with the political status quo made so obvious in 2016 would seem to indicate that Gottfried circa 2002 somewhat underestimated the latent popular discontent with the trends he so ably analyzes. Indeed, I suspect that there was an element of deliberate provocation here, as if Gottfried was trying to goad people into some sort of reflection and creative action by overemphasizing (though not fabricating) the sheeplike docility of those who would seem to be natural opponents of the therapeutic regime.
This is a sobering and illuminating book.
August 24, 2011
Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt is an extremely intellectual and philosophical analysis of the growth of the nanny state. Gottfried’s thesis is that western governments have built upon a bastardized version of protestant beliefs to incorporate them into the education and acculturation of the citizenry.
It’s not an easy book to read, but one filled with insights and things that force the reader to think.
See my complete review over at What Would The Founders Think?
It’s not an easy book to read, but one filled with insights and things that force the reader to think.
See my complete review over at What Would The Founders Think?
March 22, 2016
A brilliant analysis of the cult of Social Justice. Full review here:
http://wp.me/p6lj8t-8q
http://wp.me/p6lj8t-8q
April 7, 2016
This is an excellent book describing the development of our troubles and woes.
February 26, 2025
A dense read but very enlightening. It’s amazing that Gottfried was able to see what was coming down the pipe in Western culture. To look at what has become of Germany and the social tyranny that goes on there in 2025, it’s pretty wild to think that Gottfried saw this coming. He accurately puts the onus on liberal Christianity as they have pushed for a collective social guilt. This is true in Germany and the USA; moreover, Gottfried rightly blames America for transferring these liberal Protestant sentiments to Europe.
So much of the current sentiments, as well as an explanation for a lot of the “Woke” garbage Americans have endured over the last decade, can be found in this quote:
“To the extent this culture can root in alien soil, it depends on the possibility of transferring distinctly American values and attitudes. But even with this transfer, a popular repugnance may persist in some places toward liberal Protestant sentiments, for example, toward what Germans call Sündenstolz, pride in being a repentant social sinner, or toward creating more open borders as a precondition for a multicultural society, whence the recurrent opposition to political correctness and to social engineers that is encountered in Italy, Austria, France, and other predominantly non-Protestant parts of Europe.”
It is expressly due to the fact of social totalitarianism —through propaganda, of course— that Westerners have experienced that a group of people can be guilted into repenting of their “whiteness” during the push for “social justice” of 2018-2020. There are many other examples from the earlier 2000s that Gottfried gives throughout the book.
So much of the current sentiments, as well as an explanation for a lot of the “Woke” garbage Americans have endured over the last decade, can be found in this quote:
“To the extent this culture can root in alien soil, it depends on the possibility of transferring distinctly American values and attitudes. But even with this transfer, a popular repugnance may persist in some places toward liberal Protestant sentiments, for example, toward what Germans call Sündenstolz, pride in being a repentant social sinner, or toward creating more open borders as a precondition for a multicultural society, whence the recurrent opposition to political correctness and to social engineers that is encountered in Italy, Austria, France, and other predominantly non-Protestant parts of Europe.”
It is expressly due to the fact of social totalitarianism —through propaganda, of course— that Westerners have experienced that a group of people can be guilted into repenting of their “whiteness” during the push for “social justice” of 2018-2020. There are many other examples from the earlier 2000s that Gottfried gives throughout the book.
March 28, 2023
Prof. Gottfried did a really good job with this book. As someone who grew up in Asia and spent time roughly eight years studying in the West, I never understood why the concept of collective guilt was so widespread among Westerners. The book explains how American "liberal" Protestantism became the cause of all the woke things we're currently facing now. With the end of WW2, the proclamation of the UN human rights ideas, and the attempt to "reeducate" the Axis powers, the notion of collective guilt became much more widespread (as we can see with present-day Germany compared to Japan). Though the book came out in the early 2000s, it still holds up to its argument. It's chilling to see how Prof. Gottfried has predicted it all along. I will read Prof. Gottfried's After Liberalism next to get the full picture of the therapeutic state.
December 5, 2020
Too dry and outdated for my taste. Even though the overarching theme is still relevant, the excess of examples coming from very specific things Bill Clinton, Tony Blair and a multitude of prominent figures of yesteryear did or said detracts from the engagement value of the work.
July 2, 2020
13/20
January 6, 2025
Some important observations and insights worth chewing on in this book.
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