This is a wonderful book, if a bit long.The story is the history of the American Business Enterprise - the large corporation - in the 20th century. The story starts back in the 19th century and continues into the present.
Readers of business history will quickly realize that Langlois’s book is following the path of Alfred D. Chandler’s massive and hugely influential 1977 volume “The Visible Hand”. In that book, Chandler establishes the multidivisional corporate form as a key contribution to the world and a standard of business organization for large firms capitalizing on scale and scope economies and selling / distributing their good to mass markets. These are the firms like General Motors that Chandler chronicled in “Strategy and Structure” and “The Visible Hand”, along with his later works. The key to this broad story is how the “visible hand” of professional management, aided by well developed management structures and technologies, supplanted the indivisible hand of the market and were fundamental to the growth to dominance of the US in the 20th century.
This is only the roughest of summaries, of course. If you want to learn about US history there are few better books to read that those of Chandler — or Langlois.
Professor Langlois presents an argument that directly takes aim at Chandler - not to refute him but to present a more nuanced view of the history that suggests that the visible hand-invisible hand was not as sharply drawn as one might think. Politics, regulation, collusion, and technology/innovation affect firms outside of firm boundaries and seem removed from simplistic notions of the market and of competition more generally. The pressures of war and depression prove highly influential for how firms grow and compete and prosper. Government policies established in preparation for war or for depression can end up influencing industries long after their initial period of initiation has passed. Government regulation of competition, collusion, antitrust, and related activities lead to whole patterns of firm and industry development that remain influential even though the initial economic and legal rationales are no longer relevant.
So Chandler’s arguments are still relevant but they need to be supplemented by the recognition that the internal dimensions of large firms are sometimes not as stable and predictable as one might think initially think. At the same time, the external dimensions of how firms develop, compete, and innovate have complex historical roots that are not always clear to even informed observers.
Chandler’s firms continued their dominance after the two world wars of the 20th century and into the Cold War. Once the wars concluded and the USSR fell apart, the lynchpin of external support in the world changed. Then consider innovation that moved from tangible scale intensive manufacturing to digital products and services and much more intangible products. With the internet developing, the traditional bases of superiority for traditional M-form firms changed sharply and newer digital platform firms became the new industrial titans. All of the sudden, the traditional explanations for the dominance of the M-form seemed less persuasive. The details behind the current global competitive world need much more elaboration.
Both of these works are major projects and require much time to digest and comprehend. It is well worth the effort to do so.