El conflicto de las facultades

by Immanuel Kant, Roberto R. Aramayo (Edición, traducción, prólogo), Javier Muguerza (Epílogo)

Publicado en 1798, EL CONFLICTO DE LAS FACULTADES (1798) es el último libro que dio a la imprenta IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804). Dividida en tres partes, la obra trata del papel que deben desempeñar los filósofos en la universidad, reivindicando un espíritu crítico que hace ocupar a la filosofía el ala izquierda del parlamento universitario con el fin de preservar los intereses de la razón y de la verdad frente a los dictados dogmáticos del poder político, siempre según los objetivos programáticos de la Ilustración. Esta nueva edición castellana, traducida, prologada y anotada por Roberto R. Aramayo, presenta el ensayo kantiano ateniéndose al esquema planteado por el autor para dicho texto e incluye un epílogo a cargo de Javier Muguerza. Otras obras de Kant en esta misma colección «Crítica de la razón práctica» (H 4411), «Fundamentación para una metafísica de las costumbres» (H 4430) y «La Religión dentro de los límites de la mera Razón» (H 4427).

Genres: Philosophy, Religion, Politics

240 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1798

About the author

Immanuel Kant was an 18th-century philosopher from Königsberg, Prussia (now Kaliningrad, Russia). He's regarded as one of the most influential thinkers of modern Europe & of the late Enlightenment. His most important work is The Critique of Pure Reason, an investigation of reason itself. It encompasses an attack on traditional metaphysics & epistemology, & highlights his own contribution to these areas. Other main works of his maturity are The Critique of Practical Reason, which is about ethics, & The Critique of Judgment, about esthetics & teleology.

Pursuing metaphysics involves asking questions about the ultimate nature of reality. Kant suggested that metaphysics can be reformed thru epistemology. He suggested that by understanding the sources & limits of human knowledge we can ask fruitful metaphysical questions. He asked if an object can be known to have certain properties prior to the experience of that object. He concluded that all objects that the mind can think about must conform to its manner of thought. Therefore if the mind can think only in terms of causality–which he concluded that it does–then we can know prior to experiencing them that all objects we experience must either be a cause or an effect. However, it follows from this that it's possible that there are objects of such a nature that the mind cannot think of them, & so the principle of causality, for instance, cannot be applied outside experience: hence we cannot know, for example, whether the world always existed or if it had a cause. So the grand questions of speculative metaphysics are off limits, but the sciences are firmly grounded in laws of the mind. Kant believed himself to be creating a compromise between the empiricists & the rationalists. The empiricists believed that knowledge is acquired thru experience alone, but the rationalists maintained that such knowledge is open to Cartesian doubt and that reason alone provides us with knowledge. Kant argues, however, that using reason without applying it to experience will only lead to illusions, while experience will be purely subjective without first being subsumed under pure reason. Kant’s thought was very influential in Germany during his lifetime, moving philosophy beyond the debate between the rationalists & empiricists. The philosophers Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer saw themselves as correcting and expanding Kant's system, thus bringing about various forms of German Idealism. Kant continues to be a major influence on philosophy to this day, influencing both Analytic and Continental philosophy.

Reviews

[John · Rating 3 out of 5]

I recently addressed the question, "Does Theology Belong in the University?" in a lecture at the University of Calgary, and to prepare for it I read this edition of Kant's classic.

The edition itself is one of the most badly edited books I have encountered in scholarly publishing. Even with an entire page of errata (!), it makes other hilarious mistakes (such as the title page for the section on the theology faculty being confused for the title page for the section on the medical faculty: my German is lousy, but even I caught that one pretty quickly).

Still, the translator's introduction helpfully sets out some of the main themes and this little book is a good guide to how Kant thought about the relationship between philosophy (as he understood it) and theology (ditto).

It would be a good exercise, I think, to have a class work through this little treatise (don't bother with the stuff on the legal and medical faculties, since they are not closely associated with the heart of the work) and note how wildly Kant veers away from orthodox Christianity, let alone the particular orthodoxy of his culture (with which I am not entirely in sympathy either, to be sure!).

Kant is in many ways the father of liberal theology. Since that is a title usually given to Schleiermacher, maybe we'll call him the grandfather of liberal theology: reason and morality are everything; revelation is simply unscientific and frankly not a serious category; history--including Biblical history--cannot be studied for any lasting moral or spiritual instruction (cf. Lessing); Jesus certainly isn't divine, or he couldn't be a good example for us; and so on, and so on.

Still, I agree that the public, secular university must be a place of maximum intellectual freedom and maximum intellectual rigour, so I agree with Kant's main point: no orthodoxy should be imposed on the university. But that goes for all orthodoxies: secular humanism, sociobiology, political liberalism, or whatever.

So only one cheer for Kant on this book, but it's an important point to be justly celebrated.

[Joe · Rating 5 out of 5]

Philosophy, its Competitors, and Authority

This is a rather rarely read book by Kant. Who reads it? First, I believe it is read by those who think it a testament in the history of the struggle for intellectual freedom. Next, most people who bother to read this book today come at it from a theological background. They are interested in the contentious relationship between theology and philosophy. The last reason people might pick up this edition is that it is a bilingual edition and thus they hope they can use it as an aid in learning, or translating, the German language. The Table of Contents of this edition is as follows:

Translator's Introduction, vii;
Errata, xxxv;

Preface, 9;

First Part. The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Theology Faculty

Introduction, 23;
I. On the Relation of the Faculties
First Section. The Concept and Division of the Higher Faculties, 31;
A. The Distinctive Characteristic of the Theology Faculty, 35;
B. The Distinctive Characteristic of the Faculty of Law, 37;
C. The Distinctive Characteristic of the Faculty of Medicine, 41;
Second Section. The Concept and Division of the Lower Faculty, 43;
Third Section. On the Illegal Conflict of the Higher Faculties with the Lower Faculty, 47;
Fourth Section. On the Legal Conflict of the Higher Faculties with the Lower Faculty, 53;
Outcome, 59;

II. Appendix: The Conflict between the Theology and Philosophy Faculties, as an Example Clarifying the Conflict of the Faculties
1. The Subject Matter of the Conflict, 61;
2. Philosophical Principles of Scriptural Exegesis for Settling the Conflict, 65;
3. Objections concerning the Principles of Scriptural Exegesis, along with Replies to Them, 79;
General Remark: On Religious Sects, 85;
Conclusion of Peace and Settlement of the Conflict of the Faculties, 111;
Appendix: Historical Questions about the Bible, Concerning the Practical Use and Probable Duration of This Sacred Book, 125;
Appendix: On a Pure Mysticism in Religion, 127;

Second Part. The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Faculty of Law

An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?, 141;
Conclusion, 169;

Third Part. The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Faculty of Medicine

On the Power of the Mind to Master Its Morbid Feelings by Sheer Resolution, 175;
The Principle of the Regimen, 181;
Conclusion, 205;
Postscript, 209;

Translator's Notes, 215;

Mary J. Gregor authors the Translators Introduction and she is listed as the translator of this book. However, this is not exactly right. In the Bibliographical note we learn that the "translation of Part II of 'The Conflict of the Faculties' is by Robert E. Anchor and is reprinted from the collection "Kant: On History",edited by Lewis W. Beck (p. xxx)."

The books title, the "Conflict of the Faculties", refers to the University Faculties of Theology, Law, Medicine, and lastly, Philosophy. Philosophy is referred throughout as the "lower faculty" while the other three are the "higher faculties". What is the basis of this peculiar ranking? Kant tells us that, "a faculty is considered higher only if its teachings - both as to their content and the way they are expounded to the public - interest the government itself, while the faculty whose function is only to look after the interests of science is called lower because it may use its own judgement about what it teaches" (pp. 25-27). So, that is why those three faculties are considered 'higher': they are rightly chained by Authority! And they are 'rightly' so chained because their sayings and doings affect society. In the Preface we learned that Kant is pleased to consider this book a belated answer to an Edict sent to him (to Philosophy!, I might add) by a creature of the King. So you see, it seems that Kant's defense of philosophy basically is that philosophy is entirely irrelevant to what ordinary people believe, say and do.

This extraordinary defense of Philosophy in the Introduction ends thusly:
"The reason why this faculty, despite its great prerogative (freedom), is called the lower faculty lies in human nature; for a man who can give commands, even though he is someone else's humble servant, is considered more distinguished than a free man who has no one under his command. (p. 29)"

This, however, is not exactly the same as the point we thought Kant had made earlier. There he basically argued that only the faculty that was irrelevant to the behavior of society was Free, while the rest were rightfully chained to Authority. In other words, one could infer from this that the inferior position of philosophy vis-à-vis the other faculties is merely an artifact of Civil Society (Nomos); that is to say, it is but fashion. Now, at the end of this Introduction, he finds the roots of this lower ranking to be in human nature itself. That, unfortunately for philosophy, is not merely fashion. I suspect that here we are meant to understand that under any Authority (I mean to say under any possible Religion, any possible Politics) philosophy would still be the powerless 'faculty' and, perhaps for some even more worrisome, that there will always be an extra-philosophical (or non-philosophical) Authority judging philosophy.

If one includes the Preface, Part One (the part specifically concerning theology) takes up more than half the book. Why is so much attention paid to Theology? Because, as Kant indicates, it was thanks to Theology, in a conflict with Philosophy over Biblical Interpretation, that the hounds of the State were released against Philosophy. One might assume that Kant intends to return the favor by warning Authority that the other faculties can, and at times have, overstepped their legitimate bounds.

"So the biblical theologian (as a member of a higher faculty) draws his teaching not from reason but from the Bible; the professor of law gets his, not from the natural law, but from the law of the land; and the professor of medicine does not draw his method of therapy as practiced on the public from the physiology of the human body but from medical regulations. As soon as one of these faculties presumes to mix with its teachings something it treats as derived from reason, it offends against the authority of the government that issues orders through it and encroaches on the territory of the philosophy faculty... (p. 35)"

The "higher faculties" are regulated by the State (or whatever Powers be), answer to it, and therefore cannot be (primarily) concerned with Reason. (As an aside we should note that Kant is merely being polite -or prudent- when he says here that the "biblical theologian" teaches from the Bible; theology was also quite 'regulated' by the State in Frederick William II's Prussia.) So again, we see that the freedom of thought that philosophy enjoys comes at a price: practical irrelevancy. But we should also note that for Kant there are only two competent Judges of the Higher Faculties: Philosophy and Authority. It seems that Kant is here proposing a détente between these two 'powers'. But don't these two very different Judges ever come into conflict? No. Kant (in the theological section of this book) seems to intend for us to believe that Philosophy is a Judge without any practical Jurisdiction. And the State has no Authority over (because it has no vital, that is to say, practical interest in) mere Reason Itself. ...How could there ever be a conflict?

Kant strives to demonstrate this throughout Part One of this text. One does wonder how successful this argument was or could ever be... And how well received his subtle contention that mere Authority (and again, here he seems to mean any political or religious Authority) is never entirely guided by Reason. Authority herself, unlike Philosophy, therefore seems to be an admixture of nature and fashion.
I leave the niceties of the argument over biblical interpretation to those more knowledgeable of biblical criticism in the Eighteenth Century.

Now I would like to continue with a consideration of the discussion of Law that makes up Part Two. It poses the question: "Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" But first, I want to note that there is a different translation of Part Two (in "Kant's Political Writing", Hans Reiss, ed., H.B. Nisbet translator, 1970) that I will also refer to. Those who bought the present book as an exercise in translation might find a comparison of this translation by Robert E. Anchor with the Nisbet translation beneficial. Overall, I found the Nisbet translation more readable and will often make use of it below.

Question: "how is a history a priori possible? Answer: if the diviner himself creates and contrives the events which he announces in advance. (pp. 141-143)" So, one does not merely predict the future, one makes it too. Or, more clearly, the 'making' is the prediction. Now, Kant sees three possibilities regarding a predictable human History: "The human race exists in continual retrogression toward wickedness, or in perpetual progression toward improvement in its moral destination, or in eternal stagnation in its present stage of moral worth among creatures (a stagnation with which eternal rotation in orbit around the same point is one and the same.) (p. 145)" Kant at this point seems, perhaps a bit more than ever so slightly, to consider the last possibility of an eternal cycle the most likely. The first possibility is dismissed because, if true, humanity likely would have long ago destroyed itself. The second is 'untenable' because of the admixture of good and evil in each individual. But the third possibility, "which may well have the majority of voices on its side..." (p. 147), is really rather dispiriting...

"[I]n the final analysis, man requires coherency according to natural laws, but with respect to his future free actions he must dispense with this guidance or direction." (p. 151)

However, whether one is in a cycle of decline or progression one cannot know that a change of direction is not around the corner (see p. 149). Prophesy may be impossible, but there is no need to ever despair. So, therefore one should perhaps not shy away from practical activity because this "would concern an event he himself could produce" (p. 151). But is this still the case even given the fact that the following statement is true of Humanity?:

"with the mixture of good and evil in his predisposition, the proportion of which he is incognizant, he himself does not know what effect he might expect from it. (p. 151)"

Now, it would seem that our ability to predict the future cannot be simply based on human nature thanks to this admixture making prediction unlikely, if not impossible. We began this second essay with an exceedingly modern gesture: one can know what one makes. Of course, this tacitly assumes that one has real knowledge of oneself, and also ones materials, others, and circumstance. But if we now concede that the human maker does not entirely know himself (remember, we do not know the proportion of the admixture of good and evil) then all his making must be suspect (that is, in a certain sense even the intended results are 'unknown' or 'unpredictable') too. What now? Well, we might still know our circumstances...

"But from a given cause an event as an effect can be predicted [only] if the circumstances prevail which contribute to it." (p. 151) Perhaps. But now, you see, the future is no longer entirely in our hands; and we are thus, but (hopefully) only partly, hostages to fate. This event "might then serve to prove the existence of a tendency within the human race as a whole, considered not as a series of individuals (for this would result in interminable enumerations and calculations) but as a body distributed over the earth in states and national groups. (This last quote is from the Nisbet translation of this essay, cited above, p.181. I found the translation by Anchor somewhat obscure at this point.)"

But what 'event' are we now speaking of? Of course, it is the French Revolution! Is Kant now going to speak of heroic individuals overthrowing merciless tyranny and thus of Man making History? "No, nothing of the sort. It is simply the mode of thinking of the spectators which reveals itself publicly in this game of great revolutions, and manifests such a universal yet disinterested sympathy for the players on one side against those on the other, even at the risk that this partiality could become very disadvantageous for them if discovered (p. 153)." One might say that the Universality of the anonymous Public here constitutes for Kant an almost Kojèvean 'third' that judges between the Revolution and Ancien Régime in a disinterested manner. This universal reaction points to our common moral character, "or at least the makings of one. (Nisbet, 182)"

Now, Kant argues that even if this Revolution ultimately fails, and in so horrifically bloody a manner that none dare attempt it again, we have still learned something: that this sympathy that borders on enthusiasm, "can have no other cause than a moral predisposition in the human race. (p. 153)" What this predisposition affirms is the right of a people to self-government, that their constitution will eschew offensive war, and that this government must be a Republic, or at least have a republican constitution. He goes on to say of this popular enthusiasm that "(although not to be wholly esteemed, since passion as such deserves censure), [...] genuine enthusiasm always moves only toward what is ideal and, indeed, toward what is purely moral..." (p. 155) Apparently, this 'genuine enthusiasm' can be known by its disinterestedness: "the external public of onlookers sympathized with their exaltation, without the slightest interest of actively participating in their affairs. (Nisbet, 183)"

The public hasn't the "slightest interest of actively participating" in Revolution. A remarkable observation! - Or perhaps it is a promise? ...Or a covert threat? In any case, the present dearth of European Monarchs does make one wonder exactly how accurate this particular observation was... Nor should we be surprised at this enthusiasm of the people. Kant indicates that it is not Revolution per se that interests this remarkably self-controlled public but rather Universalism Itself! He says, by way of clarification, "non singulorum, sed universorum'. Now, Kant goes on to argue that evolution is preferable to Revolution and that European Monarchs should rule in a manner based on Republican Principles. And he foresees that this may indeed be the course of events. Of the Revolution he says,

"[f]or that event is too important, too much interwoven with the interest of humanity, and its influence too widely propagated in all areas of the world to not be recalled on any favorable occasion by the nations which would then be roused to a repetition of new efforts of this kind; because then, in an affair so important for humanity, the intended constitution, at a certain time, must finally attain that constancy which instruction by repeated experience suffices to establish in the minds of all men. (p. 159)"

And it is this evolution, with the French Revolution as its lodestar, which henceforth guides humanity. Now, our author sets no time frame for this process. "But so far as time is concerned, it can promise this only indefinitely and as a contingent event. (p. 159)" In this manner Kant quietly, gently, and politely places the sword of Damocles over the Monarchs of the World. Republicanism is coming; but nobody knows when...

What is popular Enlightenment? "Enlightenment of the masses is the public instruction of the people in its duties and rights vis-à-vis the state to which they belong. (p. 161)" Who does this teaching? The Philosophers. Yes, this is so not what Kant had said in his essay regarding Theology! We have now reached section 8 of the second part of our book. This part is concerned with the conflict between philosophy and law. The title of this section is "Concerning the Difficulty of the Maxims Applying to World Progress with Regard to Their Publicity". What is the difficulty? Well, since philosophy is only concerned with "natural rights and rights arising out of the common human understanding", philosophy comes into conflict with the state, "precisely because this freedom is allowed to them, [the philosophers] are objectionable to the state, which always desires to rule alone" (p. 161).

It is curious, by the way, that Kant specifically extends the concerns of philosophy beyond natural rights to 'rights arising out of the common human understanding' (Nisbet renders this passage as "rights which can be derived from ordinary common sense". - p. 186.) I had underlined this when I first read it, and I still stop short when I reread it. If philosophy is to concern itself with 'common sense' than it has, at least according to Kant, seemingly also set itself up as the final arbiter of mere fashion (i.e., of Nomos). The only possible justification for this that I can see is that this 'common human understanding' must always have some Reason in it in order to achieve any degree of commonality. However, the interest of philosophy in the merely contemporary certainly cannot reassure the State of the moderation (or the good will) of the philosophers!

And again, this is really not exactly what Kant had said in the previous section regarding Theology. How does our philosopher get around this? Oh, "the people take scarcely any or no notice at all of it and their writings"! (But is it really possible for philosophy to always remain uninteresting?) So then, the writings of the philosophers, while put out in the marketplace of ideas for any to peruse, are merely "addressed respectfully to the state" (p. 161). But all this must be done publicly because "if a whole people wishes to present its grievance (gravamen), the only way in which this can be done is by publicity. A ban on publicity will therefore hinder a nation's progress, even with regard to the least of its claims, the claim for natural rights. (Nisbet, 186)." The necessity of 'publicity' seems to be that without it the State will become blind to either the necessities of human nature or changes in fashionable 'common sense'.

Of course, publicity can be used to deceive too. As an example Kant here mentions the english crown, which makes a great show of its 'limited' nature while being, at all crucial points (especially regarding war), absolute. This is likely a warning directed at the Prussian King. Contrary to the deceptive nature of warring Kingdoms, the Republican Ideal (our author calls it a 'respublica noumenon') tends towards peace. "A civil society organized in conformity with it and governed by laws of freedom is an example representing it in the world of experience (respublica phaenomenon), and it can only be achieved by a laborious process, after innumerable wars and conflicts. But its constitution, once it has been attained as a whole, is the best qualified of all to keep out war, the destroyer of everything good. (Nisbet, p. 187.)" It would be foolish to object that republics, both ancient and modern, have in fact fought many wars. Kant would answer that the best instantiation of the 'Ideal Constitution' has not yet been attained. Only if this cannot ever be attained would it be plausible to argue that the attempt to create it was but a 'fools errand'.

Review is too long, will continue with a comment.

[Drew Witte · Rating 4 out of 5]

50% the all-destroyer doing his thing and 50% offering remedies for coping with the ailments of old age via pure reason

[Tim · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dispute of the Faculties is Kant's defense of his religious writings against secular Prussian Lutheran authorities who accused him of a wide range of issues including attempting to wrestle religious power away from Biblical Theologians and corrupting the youth with unbiblical ideas. His 1793 Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason, his most theological work, cause a stir among the Prussian censorship authorities. The Prussian state still intervened in academic affairs for its own reasons, and Kant’s works gained their attention as potentially disruptive. He published only one small lecture on Anthropology after this work before he died.

Merely two years before publishing Dispute of the Faculties, in 1796, Kant wrote a preface for a book titled About the organ of the soul by a German scientist named Samuel Thomas Soemmerring, who published works on a range of scientific topics, primarily in anatomy. In it he is wrestling with these same issues, as he was already receiving significant criticism from the government, and was facing his works being censored:

Therefore a responsum is sought over which two faculties can get into arguments because of their jurisdiction [...], the medical, in their anatomical-physiological, with the philosophical, in its psychological-metaphysical subject, where, as with all attempts at a coalition, between those who want to base everything on empirical principles and those who demand a priori reasons… Anyone who, in the present case, thanks the physician as a physiologist will lose it with the philosopher as a metaphysician; and vice versa, whoever pleases him offends against the physiologist

Here and in Faculties, he argues for a pragmatic differentiation between the sciences, humanities, theological and philosophic faculties. The Theological faculties should be focused on pragmatic church issues and not conflict with the philosophers. These are practical conflicts that inevitably arise from the Mind-World and Mind-Body paradox.

But the Prussian government was not interested in his high-brow philosophy. The accusations of meddling in state and church affairs came from his 1793 Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason, which was exclusively a theological systematic on a wide range of issues. His other Apologetics works including his 1763 The Only Possible Ground of Evidence for a Demonstration of the Existence of God also drew criticism due to his dismissive arguments against the normative cosmological arguments used by the protestant churches of his day.

Hegel faced the exact same problems and entered into quarrels with the Theologians of his day, who felt that he was stepping on their toes. Hegel received a lot of flak from theologians over his work as they did towards philosophy in general, and in his Lectures on religion, he defends Philosophy writes largely from these detractors:

Even the theologians, who are still only at home when in vanity, have dared to accuse philosophy of its destructive tendency, theologians who no longer possess anything of the substance that could be destroyed... Those who resent philosophy for thinking religion do not know what they are asking... this is the outward appearance of humility, but true humility consists in sinking the mind into truth.

Hegel understands this anti-philosophic bend to be due to the fantasy of Sola Scriptura, a result of Medieval-Catholic Nominalism and Cartesian Epistemology. He was a Protestant Apologist, writing extensively against Catholicism, so his criticism of Sola Scriptura is naturally interesting. Reading it in the context of all of his lectures on Religion over the years, it seems to me to stem from his encounters with Protestant clergy- all of whom thought their interpretation of the Bible is "obvious" and immutable, unable to see that they are interpreting it through the lens of tradition just as much as any Roman Catholic does. Philosophy, then, they attacked because it threatened this illusion- this fantasy of Sola Scriptura- which is the lie their whole Weltbild (worldview) relies upon. Hegel writes

In the Protestant Church, the Bible was the essential basis of the doctrine... it was thought that exegesis, was only to take up the thoughts of the Bible. But in fact, the intellect had established its views, its thoughts, beforehand, and then it was seen how the words of Scripture could be explained according to them... Because this exegesis consults reason, it has come about that a so-called theology of reason has come into being, which is opposed to that doctrinal concept of the church, partly by itself, partly by that which it opposes… the nature of interpretive explanation implies that pre-conceived concepts assert themselves in the process of interpretation... Even in the representation of a philosophical system already developed in itself, e.g. of Plato or Aristotle, it is the case that the representations turn out differently according to the already determined mode of a conception of those who undertake them. From Scripture, therefore, the most opposite opinions have been exegetically proved by theology, and thus this so-called Holy Scripture has been turned into a disguise for heterodoxy. All heresies have invoked the Scriptures.

Kant dances around this exact same issue in the Dispute of the Faculties, while trying to not run afoul of the Lutheran Pietist authorises. He writes “a scriptural scholarship of Christianity is subject to many difficulties of the art of interpretation…” Kant and Hegel here are both running into the Tautology created by Luther’s Claritas Scriptura, the metaphysical Nominalist foundation of Sola Scriptura, which Luther established from his Augustinian Catholic training in several works and sermons, most notable his 1539 Über das Studium der Theologie (About the study of theology) and his 1530 Ein Sendbrief vom Dolmetschen/ A Letter on Interpretation. Kant and Hegel both dealt with the fallout of these principles in the Enlightenment even after the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries.

Nietzsche was a representation of this, and likewise notes that his Atheism, and the secular state in general, is deeply indebted to Luther's Sola Scriptura and Protestantism in General:

The most important thing that Luther has done lies in the distrust that he has awakened against the saints and the entire Christian vita contemplativa: only since then has the path to an un-Christian vita contemplativa in Europe become accessible again and a goal has been set for the contempt of secular activity and the laity... -finally he made up his mind and said to himself: "There is no real vita contemplativa! We have allowed ourselves to be deceived! The saints were of no more value than any of us."-This was, of course, a peasant way of being right,-but for Germans of that time the right and only one: how edifying it was to them to read in their Lutheran Catechism: "apart from the ten commandments there is no work that could please God,-the vaunted spiritual works of the saints are of their own devising.

Schopenhauer likewise celebrated "bible-believing" and "faith-alone" Protestantism for creating modern Atheism:

Protestantism, by eliminating asceticism and its central point, the merit of celibacy, has actually already abandoned the innermost core of Christianity and is to that extent to be regarded as an apostasy from it. This has become evident in our days in the gradual transition of Christianity into the flat rationalism, this modern Pelagianism, which in the end boils down to a doctrine of a loving father who made the world, and who, if one only submits to his will in certain respects, will also provide for an even much prettier world afterwards (the only complaint about which is that it has such a fatal entrance). This may be a good religion for comfortable, married and enlightened Protestant pastors: but it is not Christianity."

In other words, the very act of trying to "prove" the existence of God in Externality is an inherently Atheistic act. Nietzsche made this observation, calling rational Protestants "Atheists who don't realize they are Atheists yet". Cosmological proofs for the existence of God are in actuality the greatest arguments for Atheism, doing the work of the Anti-Metaphysicians for them. Nietzsche loved every new Cosmological proof (of which there are millions) because it shows that Protestants will in short order all be Atheists as they are already Aristotelians.

The Metaphysician of Konigsburg
1755 General Natural History and Theory of Heaven: https://bit.ly/3FbUrcK
1764 Observations on the feeling of the beautiful: https://bit.ly/3uf7XWJ
1766 Dreams of a Ghost-Seer: https://bit.ly/3XIPFut
1783 Prolegomena to any future metaphysics: https://bit.ly/3uewAD0
1785 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: https://bit.ly/3XGObRt
1786 Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science: https://bit.ly/3GUz4Ob
1787 Critique of Pure Reason: https://bit.ly/3gMJ0i9
1788 Critique of Practical Reason: https://bit.ly/3UdFBGZ
1790 Critique of Judgment: https://bit.ly/3FdzkGK
1793 Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason: https://bit.ly/3FdEL8E
1795 Toward Eternal Peace: https://bit.ly/3ioyLRH
1797 Metaphysics of Morals: https://bit.ly/3gNkddY
1798 The Dispute of the Faculties: https://bit.ly/3AVMVQO

[Cemresu]

Türkçe'ye Erol Özbek'in çevirisi ile kazandırılmış, Vakıfbank Yayınlarından çıkmış. Kitabın başındaki Nebil Reyhani'nin sunuşu kitabı okumayı oldukça kolaylaştırıyor. Ayrıca çeviri de harika. Emeği geçenlerin eline sağlık 🙏🏻

[Ali Jones Alkazemi · Rating 4 out of 5]

Denne teksten av Kant er helt rå, men oversettelsen er meh.

[B · Rating 4 out of 5]

Immanuel Kant’s The Conflict of the Faculties is a book about how different parts of a university work together or against each other. It looks at four main areas of study: theology, law, medicine, and philosophy. Kant says that most of these faculties serve the goals of the government or the church. Only philosophy he argues, is truly free to search for truth.


Kant divides the university into four main faculties:

Three higher faculties: Theology, Law, and Medicine

One lower faculty: Philosophy

He argues that the higher faculties often work to support the interests of the government or church, while philosophy must stay free and independent to protect truth and moral thinking in academia.
Theology Faculty
This faculty teaches religion based on holy texts, such as the Bible. It supports the moral and spiritual values that the government often wants to promote. However, Kant warns that theology can become too dogmatic,meaning it tells people what to believe without allowing questions. For him, religion should be judged by reason and morality. Philosophy must be free to interpret religious ideas in a way that helps people become more ethical and responsible.

Law Faculty
The law faculty educates lawyers and judges and supports the structure of government. It ensures that society follows rules and legal systems. While Kant agrees that law is important, he says that not all laws are necessarily just. A law can be legal but still morally wrong. That’s why philosophy is needed to ask, “Is this law fair?” Philosophy checks whether laws truly respect freedom and justice.

Medicine Faculty
The medicine faculty focuses on the human body and physical health. Kant respects medicine, but he criticizes it for sometimes treating humans like machines. He believes health is not only about the body, but also about the mind, self control, and moral discipline. Doctors must care for the patient as a whole person, not just a body. Philosophy reminds medicine to respect the patient’s dignity and inner will.

Philosophy Faculty
Though officially the "lowest" faculty, philosophy is according to Kant the most important. It is the only faculty that is truly independent from the state. Philosophy asks big questions, challenges authority, and tests the ideas of all other faculties and criticize. It protects freedom of thought and promotes the use of public reason. Kant believes philosophy is the guardian of truth and must be free to speak, argue, and criticize without fear.
Kant believes that philosophy is the soul of the university. Without it, education becomes a tool of political power and manage from government not a path to enlightenment. The higher faculties may have more influence, but they must be checked and corrected by philosophical thinking.

[Leonardo]

Kant era consciente de esta paradoja cuando des-plegó su noción de entusiasmo por la Revolución francesa en El conflicto de las facultades (1795). La auténtica significación de la Revolución no reside en lo que realmente estaba sucediendo en París (gran parte de lo cual era terrorífico e incluía explosiones de pasión asesina), sino en la respuesta entusiasta que los acontecimientos en París generaron en los observadores simpatizantes a lo largo de Europa:

"La revolución de un pueblo lleno de espíritu, de la que hemos sido testigo, puede tener éxito o fracasar. Puede acumular tantas miserias y horrores que un hombre sensato que pudiera promoverla por segunda vez con la esperanza de un resultado feliz jamás se resolvería, sin embargo, a repetir el experimento a semejante precio. Pero esa revolución encuentra en los espíritus de todos los espectadores (que no están comprometidos en el juego) una simpatía [eine Teilnehmung dem Wunsche nach] rayana en el entusiasmo, y cuya manifestación lleva aparejada un riesgo que no podía obedecer a otra causa que a una disposición moral del género humano."

Sobre la violencia Pág.69

[Lara]

If it had not been for the last part in which Kant published his letter to a doctor in which he gives rather boring advice on healthy life based on his own personal experience, I might have rated the book higher, for it begins really well by Kant describing the roles of so-called upper faculties (theological, law and medical), through which the government controls its citizens, and the faculty of arts, which is to be given complete freedom of speech, especially when critisizing the upper three, for only this way are they able to fulfill their roles as citizens' caretakers.
By such division of roles, the clashes between the upper faculties and the faculty of arts are according to Kant inevitable, which is well explained, but when is to bring the light on each of the clashes, he leaves the reader feeling rather empty handed. This may be due to the fact that the parts concerning the clashes between the faculty of arts and the faculties of law and medicine were written before this occasion and have got little in common with the rest of the document.