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514 pages, Kindle Edition
Published October 4, 2022
It failed because it was another project of the North to be enacted in the South. The two sections were still divided and at cross-purposes, as they had been in the war and long before it. The people of the North and the people of the South were still strangers to each other, and they did not like each other. People who think of the Civil War as a conflict purely of good against evil seem much inclined to think that after the war the South should have recognized the justice of its defeat, repented of the sins of racism and slavery, accepted correction, and done the right thing by the free black people. This certainly is reasonable, but it is psychologically uncouth. It probably shows a deficiency of self-knowledge, for it overlooks some fundamentals of human nature: People who are at home in their own country do not like to be invaded; people do not like to be beaten, especially when their defeat involves the deaths of kin and friends; people do not like to be visited by outsiders who have come to improve their politics and correct their morals. If my neighbor became my sworn enemy because of my sinful behavior, wounded me severely, burnt my house and barns, drove off my livestock, stole my horses and my crops, and then visited me on my sickbed with his Bible to make me as good as himself, I would not wish to give him the satisfaction. This we know as cussedness, a trait deplorable but common (pp. 262-63).
The reasonable question at this point is inescapable: Why, in their shared oppression and great need, did the poor white people and the poor black people not make peace and cooperate in some sort of neighborly help to one another? The answer, as I suggested earlier, must be that people who are scrambling for coins and crumbs in order to survive, as poor farmers were doing then, as credit dependent industrial farmers are doing now, are likely to think of neighbors as competitors or enemies rather than friends. And here we must think also of the advantage to “the rich man” —to the cheapener of “labor” at any time—of any division that preserves the vulnerability of the working poor (p. 348).
Mr. Taplin will not pause to ask how much power, if any, should be allotted to people who are old, white, rural, and male. Just that quartet of adjectives (describing, among others, me!) rises before him and says “Boo.” To document his horror, he too utters the fearful name of Wyoming (p. 417).
To despise conventionally the working people of the countryside and the industrial “workforce” of the cities, at the same time replacing them with technology wherever possible, is a dead-certain way to build an immense popular fund of resentment and anger. The genius of modern conservatism has been to turn that resentment and anger not against the money-people and corporations who have controlled the economy in their own interest, but against labor unions, “welfare cheats,’ “environmentalists” and other harbingers of “socialism.”
If you can sufficiently degrade the work that working people do, and then persuade them to despise themselves for doing it—easy to do when the aim of the whole culture is to escape it—then it requires only a sort of logic to enlist them as allies of their presumptive betters, who also despise them (pp. 402-03).
When Donald Trump was elected president in 2016 with the support of some “rural states,’ all of a sudden these intellectuals, or the liberal fraction of them, discovered rural America. As some of their intellectual forebears had known as late as 1952, this land had been discovered and inhabited by humans for some time. But like Columbus of old, these successors in the twenty-first century had never been here before. It rose before them like a bad dream abruptly and inexplicably real: an unvisited distant land full of people wearing blue shirts, with dirty hands and numbed minds, all so perfectly bigoted and backward that it did one’s heart good to despise them (p. 405).