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Biological Origin of Human Values
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January 20, 2015
In his attempt to anchor individual and social values in biology, Pugh makes a distinction between primary and secondary values. The former are innate (“emotions and biological drives”) and largely unchangeable. The latter (morals, rules, laws) derive from the former. Beyond this distinction, the reader runs into problems. The first is the mishmash of terminology making it difficult to decipher what is what and what relates to what. He variously refers to, and gives specific examples of, drives, biological drives, appetitive drives, emotions, sensations, physical sensations, innate valuative sensations, sentiments, valuative sentiments, values, a priori values, motivation drives or values, feelings, needs, urges, instincts and pain and pleasure.
Resting his argument on evolutionary goals, Pugh states that these goals are broken into physical, social and intellectual components. The first he characterizes as the “selfish” goals that focus on physical welfare. Pugh then discusses the kin selection and reciprocal altruism arguments to say that we are also social beings given to other-regarding tendencies. He argues that we do this for “the good of the species, not ourselves” ( which is not a dominant view among today’s evolutionary theorists) and he divides our social nature into three primary aspects – social dominance, acceptance and approval. The division of selfish and social goals, however, is not necessary. While they differ superficially, the individual’s welfare is integrally tied up with the group. When we seek out social groups and are sensitive to social approval, evolution does the work for us. Regarding our need for dominance, we fight for a place because it leads to more benefits for ourselves. Pugh is correct in mentioning that most of these intellectual values are byproducts of our capacity for abstraction that enabled us to solve practical problems.
Pugh argues that social values include a universal sense of fairness and justice that results in self-restraint and a negative reaction to unfairness committed on others. This neither matches up with historical reality nor with what we see every day. Rather, it could be that we have two poles of behavior and a continuum in between. At one pole, many are other-regarding and at the other, others who are more purely self-oriented and indifferent to unfairness.
In his “theory of behavior,” Pugh does not make a distinction between emotional states and action and reaction. He conflates all of these into one term, “emotions,” but pleasure and pain, happiness and sadness are end points to our interactions with the environment. It also may be that Pugh needs to re-conceptualize his view of emotions. It could be that emotions are a repository of “survival energy” that is manifested along a continuum of expression. Rather than focus exclusively on the Darwinian facial expressions or on reflexive or automatic responses, these may be components of a larger suite of motivation-driven negative states of varying intensity that result in action and reaction behavior. Our need for love, for example, does not necessarily express itself immediately or by facial expression, and yet it is difficult not to characterize that need as an emotion.
Finally, Pugh’s description of the emotions suggests humans are largely passive beings who react to stimuli. This part of Pugh is more implicit than not as he does discuss goal seeking. This is when it would be helpful if Pugh went back to his terminology to take a fresh look at what might be going on. Primary or innate values could be those needs (e.g., nurture, group protection) that prompt us to love as well as be loved and to be social as well as “selfish,” and the secondary values are the mores and rules of our culture that outline in various and non-universal ways how those needs are to be satisfied. And, if we take Darwinian variation seriously, it may be that there are poles of who we are with some emphasizing self over others and some emphasizing others as much as the self, with both poles serving the self’s survival needs.
Resting his argument on evolutionary goals, Pugh states that these goals are broken into physical, social and intellectual components. The first he characterizes as the “selfish” goals that focus on physical welfare. Pugh then discusses the kin selection and reciprocal altruism arguments to say that we are also social beings given to other-regarding tendencies. He argues that we do this for “the good of the species, not ourselves” ( which is not a dominant view among today’s evolutionary theorists) and he divides our social nature into three primary aspects – social dominance, acceptance and approval. The division of selfish and social goals, however, is not necessary. While they differ superficially, the individual’s welfare is integrally tied up with the group. When we seek out social groups and are sensitive to social approval, evolution does the work for us. Regarding our need for dominance, we fight for a place because it leads to more benefits for ourselves. Pugh is correct in mentioning that most of these intellectual values are byproducts of our capacity for abstraction that enabled us to solve practical problems.
Pugh argues that social values include a universal sense of fairness and justice that results in self-restraint and a negative reaction to unfairness committed on others. This neither matches up with historical reality nor with what we see every day. Rather, it could be that we have two poles of behavior and a continuum in between. At one pole, many are other-regarding and at the other, others who are more purely self-oriented and indifferent to unfairness.
In his “theory of behavior,” Pugh does not make a distinction between emotional states and action and reaction. He conflates all of these into one term, “emotions,” but pleasure and pain, happiness and sadness are end points to our interactions with the environment. It also may be that Pugh needs to re-conceptualize his view of emotions. It could be that emotions are a repository of “survival energy” that is manifested along a continuum of expression. Rather than focus exclusively on the Darwinian facial expressions or on reflexive or automatic responses, these may be components of a larger suite of motivation-driven negative states of varying intensity that result in action and reaction behavior. Our need for love, for example, does not necessarily express itself immediately or by facial expression, and yet it is difficult not to characterize that need as an emotion.
Finally, Pugh’s description of the emotions suggests humans are largely passive beings who react to stimuli. This part of Pugh is more implicit than not as he does discuss goal seeking. This is when it would be helpful if Pugh went back to his terminology to take a fresh look at what might be going on. Primary or innate values could be those needs (e.g., nurture, group protection) that prompt us to love as well as be loved and to be social as well as “selfish,” and the secondary values are the mores and rules of our culture that outline in various and non-universal ways how those needs are to be satisfied. And, if we take Darwinian variation seriously, it may be that there are poles of who we are with some emphasizing self over others and some emphasizing others as much as the self, with both poles serving the self’s survival needs.
May 28, 2023
This book explores theories about the human brain as a value-decision tool crafted by evolution to guide social behavior and personal choices. The book builds on the concept that the brain functions as a decision system. “Human values” are a manifestation of this system. The system operates using two value levels: primary values and secondary values. Primary (or innate) values use signals built into the system that are expressed as emotions and as drives (like pain and hunger). They are relatively fixed by genetic inheritance and are not derived or responsive to rational control. Secondary values are those developed from primary value signals and are expressed as morals, social principles, etc., and can take the form of rules of thumb, social conventions, moral and ethical principles, and habits of thought and practice.
Most classical philosophers have tended to overemphasize the role of reason and underestimate the importance of instinctive drives in human behavior. When we view the brain as a decision system, emotions can be interpreted simply as “value signals” that carry information from the motivational system to the conscious mind. Decisions of the conscious mind are ultimately evaluated in terms of an innate “value scale” that is defined by emotions. A value-driven decision system compares alternative courses of action and selects one that seems “best” in terms of this built-in system of values.
The history of human evolution suggests that most of man's primary motivating values were designed to operate in a primitive, pre-agriculture, hunting & gathering society. The innate human motivation for cooperative behavior and social approval operates effectively in the face-to-face activities of a small group but tends to break down beyond this range. Thus, humans today live in an environment different from that in which it was designed to operate. In other words, our social environment has exceeded our design parameters. The choices between actions that serve the self and those that serve cooperative social engagement in a large society are complicated and may be detrimentally compromised. One of the complexities is that an individual who is a member of a dissident outgroup can achieve social acceptance and approval within the group, and because he can satisfy his innate social needs within the group, he may not be much concerned about the approval or disapproval of the larger society. The result is a more dysfunctional modern society compared to our original small-band social existence.
This book makes a commendable effort to evaluate and understand the mechanics of the brain’s decision system, and the origins and functions of values. Where the book falls short is in its use of terminology that can be confusing and, toward the end, the author goes from a scientifically descriptive and predictive work to a proscriptive dictum that includes some unfounded value judgments and specious speculation. But the author’s description of primary values as a sort of hardware and secondary values as software are useful analogies, as is the observation that our behavior and choices are often driven by algorithms strongly influenced by our past evolutionary development. At the same time, these algorithms—for better or worse—drive complex future choices that will serve either the individual self or the social group, and consequently the survival of the species.
Most classical philosophers have tended to overemphasize the role of reason and underestimate the importance of instinctive drives in human behavior. When we view the brain as a decision system, emotions can be interpreted simply as “value signals” that carry information from the motivational system to the conscious mind. Decisions of the conscious mind are ultimately evaluated in terms of an innate “value scale” that is defined by emotions. A value-driven decision system compares alternative courses of action and selects one that seems “best” in terms of this built-in system of values.
The history of human evolution suggests that most of man's primary motivating values were designed to operate in a primitive, pre-agriculture, hunting & gathering society. The innate human motivation for cooperative behavior and social approval operates effectively in the face-to-face activities of a small group but tends to break down beyond this range. Thus, humans today live in an environment different from that in which it was designed to operate. In other words, our social environment has exceeded our design parameters. The choices between actions that serve the self and those that serve cooperative social engagement in a large society are complicated and may be detrimentally compromised. One of the complexities is that an individual who is a member of a dissident outgroup can achieve social acceptance and approval within the group, and because he can satisfy his innate social needs within the group, he may not be much concerned about the approval or disapproval of the larger society. The result is a more dysfunctional modern society compared to our original small-band social existence.
This book makes a commendable effort to evaluate and understand the mechanics of the brain’s decision system, and the origins and functions of values. Where the book falls short is in its use of terminology that can be confusing and, toward the end, the author goes from a scientifically descriptive and predictive work to a proscriptive dictum that includes some unfounded value judgments and specious speculation. But the author’s description of primary values as a sort of hardware and secondary values as software are useful analogies, as is the observation that our behavior and choices are often driven by algorithms strongly influenced by our past evolutionary development. At the same time, these algorithms—for better or worse—drive complex future choices that will serve either the individual self or the social group, and consequently the survival of the species.
May 19, 2023
This is an interesting analysis of human values taking as a starting point how one might develop a values system in a "cybernetic" system.This is basically specifying a "value function" which defines a scalar value over the space of all possible outcomes. Of course this implies ideas about outcomes and how far ahead the outcomes need to be delivered. On the basis of this "mechanical" analysis of a valuing system, Pugh, the author, examines the human decision system. He recognises that, as an evolutionary device, the human mind is imperfect and unfinished....we are aware only of the events within our "fluctuating, hazy veil of consciousness".....for example.
So he compares five functional components normally included in an artificial decision system with the human system; These five components are :
1. A data input procedure
2. A model of relationships in the environment which defines action alternatives and consequences
3. A procedure for searching through alternatives
4. A method for assigning values to alternative consequences
5. A decision mechanism for selecting alternatives.
Pugh concludes that the above model fits fairly well with human experience and talks about the role of evolution from simpler animals, like insects, with mainly hard-wired instincts and similar human drives plus higher level social values. He makes the point that not all our innate valuings are in the same units. Pain is quantitatively different from satisfaction at achieving a goal. He suggests that "it is a good rule of thumb that a value criterion is secondary rather than primary unless it is linked with a recognisable valuative sensation. Evaluative sensations include: Pain-Tactile pleasure; Discomfort-Comfort; Bad tase-Good Taste; Sorrow-Joy; Shame-Pride; Fear; Hunger; Anger; Thirst; Itch. As our sensory experience expands (with the above) the experiences are added to our innate or instinctive values....and "rational' decisions are based on this cumulative experience. So, we try to estimate, on the basis of past experience, what the values would be for each alternative.
Pugh then delves into the very murky field of classifying human values and comes up with his own list, viz:
1. Selfish values....associagted with individual welfare
2. Social values.....generally altruistic values
3. Intellectual values....generally aesthetic and intellectual values
He draws a distinction between the way he is using value terminology and traditionally ways of regarding "selfish values as "man's values" and intellectual values as "God's values". All human values have their origins in human evolutionary history. He makes the point that the interests of society have been served by encouraging behaviour conducive to the welfare of society rather than the individual.
"Each of the innate human value sensations is generated by some biological mechanism in the brain".However to make decisions the biological decision making system must place all valuation e decisions on a common "utility" scale. But not all human behaviour is under conscious control ..even habits and conditioned responses.He concludes that an adequate science of behaviour must provide a balanced treatment of both the rational and the irrational factors in the behaviour aft both animals and man.
Pugh seems fairly confident that his idealised functional view of the human decision system matches the known physiology remarkably well,
He explores each of his main classifications of human values mentioned above: selfish, social and intellectual, in some significant detail. He treats each in terms of an evolutionary process (which seems reasonable) and suggests that, via the larger frontal lobes in humans, we have the capacity for sharing and more complex social behaviour, for example, than the great apes.He has the usual digression into the role of facial expressions and emotions and the communication of emotions. (Though I've seen evidence elsewhere that humans are not that good really in reading emotions from facial expressions). Pugh claims that his "approach identifies the innate motivations with specific emotions and other evaluative sensations...and, at least in principle, the innate motivations are objectively quantifiable". He suggests that the innate value system that motivates social behaviour includes three kinds of components:
1. Emotions...providing the actual causative sensation
2. Sentiments...are a kind of predisposition too an emotion based on experience of that environment
3. Instinctive motives...stable factors which influence emotions (This seems an unnecessary complication and is very vague to my mind). He includes such things as: desire for dominance, desire for approval, desire for social acceptance etc. here. (And there seems to be some confusion about the difference between desires and values).
He suggests that most of the social values reduce to a single value scale...something like the "Joy-sorrow" continuum...and the pride vs shame continuum.....and this has been greatly enhanced as we evolved from the great apes.
And the purpose of intellectual values is to guide the individual in the development and refinement of his world model.
I'm somewhat attracted to his approach to explaining human values but such a complex model really invites criticism. It's certainly a long way from David Lewis's idea of personal values being the desires that we desire to have. Though maybe this would still fit within Pugh's intellectual values. And I guess, it can still accommodate my own MLitt thesis where I suggest that our personal values are the second order desires that we "BESIRE" to have . In other words....there has to be some component of belief AND desire.
What I really like about Pugh's approach is that he consistently relates it to evolutionary development and offers suggestions about how or why evolution drove development in this way. Though the subject is so big that it's a bit like trying to come up with a "theory of everything". But happy to give it four stars.
So he compares five functional components normally included in an artificial decision system with the human system; These five components are :
1. A data input procedure
2. A model of relationships in the environment which defines action alternatives and consequences
3. A procedure for searching through alternatives
4. A method for assigning values to alternative consequences
5. A decision mechanism for selecting alternatives.
Pugh concludes that the above model fits fairly well with human experience and talks about the role of evolution from simpler animals, like insects, with mainly hard-wired instincts and similar human drives plus higher level social values. He makes the point that not all our innate valuings are in the same units. Pain is quantitatively different from satisfaction at achieving a goal. He suggests that "it is a good rule of thumb that a value criterion is secondary rather than primary unless it is linked with a recognisable valuative sensation. Evaluative sensations include: Pain-Tactile pleasure; Discomfort-Comfort; Bad tase-Good Taste; Sorrow-Joy; Shame-Pride; Fear; Hunger; Anger; Thirst; Itch. As our sensory experience expands (with the above) the experiences are added to our innate or instinctive values....and "rational' decisions are based on this cumulative experience. So, we try to estimate, on the basis of past experience, what the values would be for each alternative.
Pugh then delves into the very murky field of classifying human values and comes up with his own list, viz:
1. Selfish values....associagted with individual welfare
2. Social values.....generally altruistic values
3. Intellectual values....generally aesthetic and intellectual values
He draws a distinction between the way he is using value terminology and traditionally ways of regarding "selfish values as "man's values" and intellectual values as "God's values". All human values have their origins in human evolutionary history. He makes the point that the interests of society have been served by encouraging behaviour conducive to the welfare of society rather than the individual.
"Each of the innate human value sensations is generated by some biological mechanism in the brain".However to make decisions the biological decision making system must place all valuation e decisions on a common "utility" scale. But not all human behaviour is under conscious control ..even habits and conditioned responses.He concludes that an adequate science of behaviour must provide a balanced treatment of both the rational and the irrational factors in the behaviour aft both animals and man.
Pugh seems fairly confident that his idealised functional view of the human decision system matches the known physiology remarkably well,
He explores each of his main classifications of human values mentioned above: selfish, social and intellectual, in some significant detail. He treats each in terms of an evolutionary process (which seems reasonable) and suggests that, via the larger frontal lobes in humans, we have the capacity for sharing and more complex social behaviour, for example, than the great apes.He has the usual digression into the role of facial expressions and emotions and the communication of emotions. (Though I've seen evidence elsewhere that humans are not that good really in reading emotions from facial expressions). Pugh claims that his "approach identifies the innate motivations with specific emotions and other evaluative sensations...and, at least in principle, the innate motivations are objectively quantifiable". He suggests that the innate value system that motivates social behaviour includes three kinds of components:
1. Emotions...providing the actual causative sensation
2. Sentiments...are a kind of predisposition too an emotion based on experience of that environment
3. Instinctive motives...stable factors which influence emotions (This seems an unnecessary complication and is very vague to my mind). He includes such things as: desire for dominance, desire for approval, desire for social acceptance etc. here. (And there seems to be some confusion about the difference between desires and values).
He suggests that most of the social values reduce to a single value scale...something like the "Joy-sorrow" continuum...and the pride vs shame continuum.....and this has been greatly enhanced as we evolved from the great apes.
And the purpose of intellectual values is to guide the individual in the development and refinement of his world model.
I'm somewhat attracted to his approach to explaining human values but such a complex model really invites criticism. It's certainly a long way from David Lewis's idea of personal values being the desires that we desire to have. Though maybe this would still fit within Pugh's intellectual values. And I guess, it can still accommodate my own MLitt thesis where I suggest that our personal values are the second order desires that we "BESIRE" to have . In other words....there has to be some component of belief AND desire.
What I really like about Pugh's approach is that he consistently relates it to evolutionary development and offers suggestions about how or why evolution drove development in this way. Though the subject is so big that it's a bit like trying to come up with a "theory of everything". But happy to give it four stars.
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March 6, 2024This book is misattributed -- it was not written by Martin Pugh, the historian. It was written by George Edgin Pugh, an American scientist.
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