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The Language of Thought
The first in a series on general and theoretical linguistics, psycholinguistics and the philosophy of language.
214 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1975
About the author
Jerry A. Fodor
28 books89 followersJerry Alan Fodor is an American philosopher and cognitive scientist. He is the State of New Jersey Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and is also the author of many works in the fields of philosophy of mind and cognitive science, in which he has laid the groundwork for the modularity of mind and the language of thought hypotheses, among other ideas. Fodor is of Jewish descent.
Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought (LOT) in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is an actually existing thing that is codified in the brain and not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adheres to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and other mental processes consist primarily of computations operating on the syntax of the representations that make up the language of thought.
For Fodor, significant parts of the mind, such as perceptual and linguistic processes, are structured in terms of modules, or "organs", which are defined by their causal and functional roles. These modules are relatively independent of each other and of the "central processing" part of the mind, which has a more global and less "domain specific" character. Fodor suggests that the character of these modules permits the possibility of causal relations with external objects. This, in turn, makes it possible for mental states to have contents that are about things in the world. The central processing part, on the other hand, takes care of the logical relations between the various contents and inputs and outputs.
Although Fodor originally rejected the idea that mental states must have a causal, externally determined aspect, he has in recent years devoted much of his writing and study to the philosophy of language because of this problem of the meaning and reference of mental contents. His contributions in this area include the so-called asymmetric causal theory of reference and his many arguments against semantic holism. Fodor strongly opposes reductive accounts of the mind. He argues that mental states are multiply realizable and that there is a hierarchy of explanatory levels in science such that the generalizations and laws of a higher-level theory of psychology or linguistics, for example, cannot be captured by the low-level explanations of the behavior of neurons and synapses.
Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought (LOT) in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is an actually existing thing that is codified in the brain and not just a useful explanatory tool. Fodor adheres to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and other mental processes consist primarily of computations operating on the syntax of the representations that make up the language of thought.
For Fodor, significant parts of the mind, such as perceptual and linguistic processes, are structured in terms of modules, or "organs", which are defined by their causal and functional roles. These modules are relatively independent of each other and of the "central processing" part of the mind, which has a more global and less "domain specific" character. Fodor suggests that the character of these modules permits the possibility of causal relations with external objects. This, in turn, makes it possible for mental states to have contents that are about things in the world. The central processing part, on the other hand, takes care of the logical relations between the various contents and inputs and outputs.
Although Fodor originally rejected the idea that mental states must have a causal, externally determined aspect, he has in recent years devoted much of his writing and study to the philosophy of language because of this problem of the meaning and reference of mental contents. His contributions in this area include the so-called asymmetric causal theory of reference and his many arguments against semantic holism. Fodor strongly opposes reductive accounts of the mind. He argues that mental states are multiply realizable and that there is a hierarchy of explanatory levels in science such that the generalizations and laws of a higher-level theory of psychology or linguistics, for example, cannot be captured by the low-level explanations of the behavior of neurons and synapses.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
May 18, 2026
Fodor begins by challenging his two biggest rivals–behaviorism and reductionism. Instead, he wants to argue for internal mental states and the special sciences.
In chapter 1, he begins by arguing that the explanation of behavior (the kind that uses standard decision theory) requires the ability of an agent to represent their behavior as a kind B to themself. Moreover, they need to represent truth, description, reference, and modality. Behaviorism cannot explain how possibilities can be live for agents. We also need computation to understand concept learning–concept learning is sensitive to how agents represent hypotheses. Additionally, similar arguments apply to perception if we think of it as a form of problem solving.
In chapter 2, he argues that one must have a private language if one is able to learn a language. He also defends it from the infinite regress argument by appealing to the relationship between compilers and languages in computers. Then, he argues that computers are at least prima facie proof against there being an in-principle objection against private languages. Then, he emphasizes that the expressive power of one’s language cannot be increased through learning. “It follows immediately that not all the languages one knows are languages one has learned, and that at least one of the languages which one knows without learning is as powerful as any language that one can ever learn.” In short, these are fundamental arguments for concept nativism.
In chapter 3, he tries to present evidence for his LOT hypothesis. He argues that linguistic theories of communication must explain the computations involved in encoding and decoding languages–”a theory of meaning serves, in effect, to pair natural language sentences with some sort of canonical representation of their truth conditions is.” For example, we must translate information from different sense modalities and compare them with each other, requiring a neutral language to arbitrate. And then he went on a long linguistics tangent that I was not equipped to parse! According to ChatGPT, his central question is Does the internal representational system use a smaller, more primitive vocabulary than ordinary language by replacing definable words with their definitions? And he is quite antireductionist suggesting that primitive vocabulary can have many terms.
His main aim in chapter 4 is to argue “It is probably a mistake to talk of the system of internal representations that the organism has available for the analysis of environmental events or behavioral options. Rather, in the general case, organisms have access to a variety of types and levels of representation.” He discusses evidence for both feed-forward and feed-back mechanisms. He discusses some points like heuristic vs careful thinking, LOT representations of LOT representations, skepticism of develop from iconic to symbolic representations, and makes an agenda for resource rationality.
In the conclusion, he makes the interesting point that cognitive psychology does the best it can for the rationality of mental processes at large and discusses what kinds of things might be available for psychological explanation.
Three stars only because of the number of digressions he goes on about representational format and linguistics instead of focusing on core argumentative topics for the LOT hypothesis.
In chapter 1, he begins by arguing that the explanation of behavior (the kind that uses standard decision theory) requires the ability of an agent to represent their behavior as a kind B to themself. Moreover, they need to represent truth, description, reference, and modality. Behaviorism cannot explain how possibilities can be live for agents. We also need computation to understand concept learning–concept learning is sensitive to how agents represent hypotheses. Additionally, similar arguments apply to perception if we think of it as a form of problem solving.
In chapter 2, he argues that one must have a private language if one is able to learn a language. He also defends it from the infinite regress argument by appealing to the relationship between compilers and languages in computers. Then, he argues that computers are at least prima facie proof against there being an in-principle objection against private languages. Then, he emphasizes that the expressive power of one’s language cannot be increased through learning. “It follows immediately that not all the languages one knows are languages one has learned, and that at least one of the languages which one knows without learning is as powerful as any language that one can ever learn.” In short, these are fundamental arguments for concept nativism.
In chapter 3, he tries to present evidence for his LOT hypothesis. He argues that linguistic theories of communication must explain the computations involved in encoding and decoding languages–”a theory of meaning serves, in effect, to pair natural language sentences with some sort of canonical representation of their truth conditions is.” For example, we must translate information from different sense modalities and compare them with each other, requiring a neutral language to arbitrate. And then he went on a long linguistics tangent that I was not equipped to parse! According to ChatGPT, his central question is Does the internal representational system use a smaller, more primitive vocabulary than ordinary language by replacing definable words with their definitions? And he is quite antireductionist suggesting that primitive vocabulary can have many terms.
His main aim in chapter 4 is to argue “It is probably a mistake to talk of the system of internal representations that the organism has available for the analysis of environmental events or behavioral options. Rather, in the general case, organisms have access to a variety of types and levels of representation.” He discusses evidence for both feed-forward and feed-back mechanisms. He discusses some points like heuristic vs careful thinking, LOT representations of LOT representations, skepticism of develop from iconic to symbolic representations, and makes an agenda for resource rationality.
In the conclusion, he makes the interesting point that cognitive psychology does the best it can for the rationality of mental processes at large and discusses what kinds of things might be available for psychological explanation.
Three stars only because of the number of digressions he goes on about representational format and linguistics instead of focusing on core argumentative topics for the LOT hypothesis.
December 24, 2025
Una serie di Saggi che consentono di mettere a fuoco il pensiero di Fodor (vero simp di Noam). Visto che non vorrei cadere in tecnicismi idioti (tipo la questione dell'assimetria casuale per giustificare il realismo intenzionale e dare una risposta sensata al problema di Brentano. Btw per quanto riguarda l'intenzionalità sto dalla parte di Dennett, Jerry è troppo artificioso).
Ah una cosa ai filosofi del linguaggio:
-USATE quel ca**o di Rasoio:
Se pensate che le "intensioni sono opere del demonio" (O.V.Quine) allora facciamo che tra senso/riferimento, intensione/estensione, contenuto stretto/largo che, sono concetti che denotano la stessa cosa (circa eh, perché ovviante non esiste sinonimia perfetta... ecc...ecc...ecc), scegliamo solo una coppia da usare. Grazie
Ah una cosa ai filosofi del linguaggio:
-USATE quel ca**o di Rasoio:
Se pensate che le "intensioni sono opere del demonio" (O.V.Quine) allora facciamo che tra senso/riferimento, intensione/estensione, contenuto stretto/largo che, sono concetti che denotano la stessa cosa (circa eh, perché ovviante non esiste sinonimia perfetta... ecc...ecc...ecc), scegliamo solo una coppia da usare. Grazie
April 1, 2018
i want to read now
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
April 12, 2026
A good view into how our minds think. There is a "mentalese" that our brains operate on. There is linguistic and psychological evidence for this.
May 1, 2026
At the same time the most abstract and yet most profound book I' ve read
December 11, 2014
He's right. About quite a bit.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews