Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb, KCB, CMG, DSO, OBE, MC (a.k.a. "Glubb Pasha") was a British Army officer who was for many years seconded to the Arab Legion of the Trans-Jordan (later The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan), which he ultimately commanded until dismissed by King Hussein in March 1956. He wrote many books after his retirement, primarily on the history of the Middle East and on Military History.
An interesting thesis that should be sobering to any current world empire, including the United States. Some may think his generalization not sufficient for supporting his thesis, but I would disagree in that what he does present is part of our historical record and it's exactly because of the things he mentions that a revisionist point of view of the history of empires does not do it justice. He makes a very valid point that "We do not learn from history because our studies are brief and prejudiced." And this is precisely why empires fall. Very good read!
"Men are interminably different, and intellectual arguments rarely lead to agreement. Thus public affairs drift from bad to worse, amid an unceasing cacophony of argument. But this constant dedication to discussion seems to destroy the power of action. Amid a Babel of talk, the ship drifts on to the rocks."
"Perhaps the most dangerous by-product of the Age of Intellect is the the unconscious growth of the idea that the human brain can solve the problems of the world. Even in the low level of practical affairs this is patently untrue. Any small human activity, the local bowls club or the ladies' luncheon club, requires for its survival a measure of self-sacrifice and service on the part of the members. In a wider national sphere, the survival of the nation depends basically on the loyalty and self-sacrifice of the citizens. The impression that the situation can be saved by mental cleverness, without unselfishness or human self-dedication, can only lead to collapse."
"Men can scarcely be blamed for not learning from the history they are taught. There is nothing to learn from it, because it is not true."
"If we could accept these great movements as beyond our control, there would be no excuse for our hating one another because of them."
"However varied, confusing and contradictory the religious history of the world may appear, the noblest and most spiritual of the devotees of all religions seem to reach the conclusion that love is the key to human life. Any expansion of our knowledge which may lead to a reduction in our unjustified hates is therefore surely well worth while."
"For the history of the human race to have meaning, it must be the history of the human race."
"Ten generations of human beings suffice to turn the hardy and enterprising pioneer into the captious citizen of the welfare state."
"In our present state of mental chaos on the subject, we divided ourselves into nations, parties, or communities and fight, hate, and vilify one another over developments which may perhaps be divinely ordained and which seem to us, if we take a broader view, completely inevitable."
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Finally got around to reading this essay after more than a decade, and I'm glad I did. An intriguing little gem of imperialist historiography that furnishes an interesting framework through which to analyze the rise and fall of empires (including the present ones of our time). Presenting a startling vision for the future of humanity - which promises to be rather like its past - it helped weave together many of my observations of the past decade (and beyond) from history, politics and society.
From Glubb's examples of daily life in ancient empires, once gets of sense of how intimately familiar the past can be, how alien, and yet how indistinguishable from our daily lives. His general descriptions of the political disorder in 10th century Baghdad - as political factions bickered, even as popular singers swayed the young and women and cultural minorities sought equality and visibility in public life - might as well have been taken from our news headlines today.
According to Glubb, every empire goes through a predictable set of stages in a lifespan encompassed by the passage of 10 generations of citizens (approximately 250 years of time, on average). Technology and geography merely influence the shape and size the empire takes over the course of its life, but do little to influence the way the empire evolves over time. Both the Assyrian and the British Empires lasted roughly the same duration, despite being of very different size and geographical spread, and went through similar internal processes despite being separated in time by millennia. In addition, while all empires have similar life processes, their origins and endings can be as surprising and unpredictable as their lifespans are predictable, making history not exactly deterministic, but certainly a variation on familiar themes.
The essay also skewers how the West has always been dismissive and scornful of countries with systems different from their own, how the current liberal world order basically assumes Western (and white) primacy while adopting an air of condescension in its largesse, and the naive belief of certain generations that the future always automatically gets better without acknowledging the "courage, endurance and hard work" that preceding generations put in to make it seem automatic.
A surprisingly dispassionate analysis of world political history from someone who was otherwise an embodiment of the imperial and Anglocentric values of his age, Glubb's willingness to discard received wisdom and start again from first principles strikes me as going beyond merely another attempt at rationalizing the fall of the British Empire. For a 20th century imperialist British historian, albeit an amateur one, he seems surprisingly free of colonial arrogance and Anglo-supremacism, given his life and career.
There's also something very Buddhist about it all, in the sense that nothing seems to have changed much in 4000 years of empire, even as everything seems to have changed technologically and politically. It might seem dismal to some, but if everything is temporal and passing, then there's nothing to be surprised about. This too shall pass.
Any person with thoughts on the future of society should read this essay, merely to contemplate the ideas - right or wrong - expressed within.
I've got to admit, John Glubb's observations were quite striking. I was blown away by its relevance for today. It's not PC at times, but that does not concern me.
My major criticism with this book, is the nonexistent references. There is no way that I can verify this to be an accurate book. For all I know, it could be an attempt for Glubb to cunningly push his political ideology...
"XXXIX Summary As numerous points of interest have arisen in the course of this essay, I close with a brief summary, to refresh the reader’s mind. (a) We do not learn from history because our studies are brief and prejudiced. (b) In a surprising manner, 250 years emerges as the average length of national greatness. (c) This average has not varied for 3,000 years. Does it represent ten generations? (d) The stages of the rise and fall of great nations seem to be: The Age of Pioneers (outburst) The Age of Conquests The Age of Commerce The Age of Affluence The Age of Intellect The Age of Decadence. (e) Decadence is marked by: Defensiveness Pessimism Materialism Frivolity An influx of foreigners The Welfare State A weakening of religion. (f) Decadence is due to: Too long a period of wealth and power Selfishness Love of money The loss of a sense of duty. (g) The life histories of great states are amazingly similar, and are due to internal factors. (h) Their falls are diverse, because they are largely the result of external causes. (i) History should be taught as the history of the human race, though of course with emphasis on the history of the student’s own country."
What Americans need now is a cheery book that assures us how our global power and hegemony are destined to last, if not forever, for a good deal longer. This is not that book. The Fate of Empires is an obscure work, by an obscure man. Yet it apparently still has a following today, because quite frequently, I am asked to read and discuss it, most of all the relevance of its analysis of empire to the present American moment. And to be sure, as America flails impotently in a doomed effort to maintain global preeminence, a discussion of how empires end seems particularly timely. So I figured, why not?
Sir John Bagot Glubb, born in 1897, was a man whose life spanned the height, and then the death, of British empire. His father was a career soldier; he himself fought in World War I, and was awarded the Military Cross. He thus seemed set on an honorable, though not exceptional, career. But like many Englishmen of his generation, most famously T. E. Lawrence but also others such as Wilfred Thesiger, he had a great interest in, and attraction to, the Middle East—in particular, to the Arabs. These men saw in the Arabs, if not a higher civilization, one with virtues lacking in the West, and they immersed themselves within Arab culture, often for decades.
Glubb himself did not go fully native, as by taking an Arab wife or converting to Islam. He was an Englishman to the core, something that comes through clearly, in good and bad ways, in this book. He even named his son, born in 1938, after the heroic Godfrey of Bouillon (the Godfrey part, not the Bouillon part), first ruler of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem, an aggressive statement of Western Christian confidence. But naming does not dictate destiny, at least not here—Godfrey converted to Islam as a young man, changed his name to “Faris,” and spent his life working for Muslim causes, mostly with a Communist bent. Maybe Glubb would have been fine with part of that, though, given his admiration for the Arabs and Islam. I don’t know if he ever commented publicly on his son’s choices.
After the war, Glubb was sent by the British to Iraq, sometime Mesopotamia, then under administration by the British as a League of Nations mandate. In 1926, he took service directly with the new government of Iraq. The British also administered the contiguous Emirate of Transjordan (which later, in 1946, became the country of Jordan), and in 1930 Glubb joined the Arab Legion, a small body of men formed by the British as the nucleus of an army for the Transjordan. In this capacity, he became intimately familiar with the land, its people, and its rulers, the Hashemite kings of the region, who still rule Jordan. In 1939, he took over command of the Arab Legion, which had grown greatly and became the actual army of the Transjordan, then of Jordan itself, and ultimately the largest armed force in the area. This made Glubb in effect the chief military officer (whom they called “Glubb Pasha”) of Jordan, responsible directly to the King, and he had considerable influence in government. He led the Legion against Israel in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, and left command, to return to England, in 1956.
No doubt this history, if expanded, is fascinating, and controversial, perhaps, but that is not our focus today. Glubb spent the next thirty years writing, mostly detailed works about the Arab world. But this is his only still-read work—a quite short, more general, book, written in 1976 as two essays for a British magazine. What he offers is an empirical analysis of past historical empires, or more precisely “great powers,” in which he sought for patterns explaining their rise and fall, in order to “reach conclusions which [will] assist to solve our problems today.”
Such analysis is an ancient pastime, of course. Everyone from Xenophon to Ibn Khaldun to, closer in time to Glubb, Oswald Spengler, had offered such analyses. Glubb doesn’t seem to realize this, however, or at least doesn’t advert to it. He says of his plan, “No such conception ever appears to have entered into the minds of our historians,” and he complains that all historical study is “limited to short periods.” I suppose if that means “modern British historians,” there may be some truth to his claim, but it’s obviously untrue on any wider scale. This points up my main complaint with this book—although it has some interesting things to say, it betrays a blinkered focus far too often. The British as a whole (with plenty of notable exceptions) were often accused of superciliously ignoring other cultures, other than as they intersected with England and the West, and while that tendency was probably exaggerated, for in many ways the British were far more cosmopolitan than us, Glubb’s analysis is, as they say, miles wide and inches deep. Maybe being narrow is inevitable in what is not a magnum opus, rather just two magazine articles (the second largely responding to criticism of the first), and being narrow doesn’t mean no interesting conclusions can be drawn, but it definitely undercuts the impact of the book.
The short version of The Fate of Empires, and probably the reason it has undergone a revival of late (along with that it’s a lot quicker read than, say, Arnold Toynbee’s somewhat similar twelve-volume A Study of History), is the internet meme: “Hard times create strong men, strong men create good times, good times create weak men, and weak men create hard times.” Glubb’s method of analysis is simple. He lists the empires from which he derives his conclusions, beginning with the Assyrian (859–612 B.C., in his reckoning) and ending with Britain (1700–1950). He lists eleven (with the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire being distinct great powers). Six powers are listed in the Christian era: three non-Western (all Muslim dominated), and three Western Christian (Spain until 1750; Romanov Russia; and Britain). “India, China, and Southern America were not included, because the writer knows nothing about them.” I suppose honesty is the best policy, but if you’re purporting to disseminate knowledge synthesizing the life and death of great powers, this seems like a very major gap indeed.
But let’s see what Glubb has to say. His first, and arguably most important, conclusion is that all empires, with the exception of a few whose life span was cut short, last for approximately the same time period—250 years, or ten generations, more or less. This is true regardless of their form of governance, location, or the technologies of the time, transport, war, or other. Glubb’s is a pessimistic vision. The usual human response to the inevitable failure of empire is to analyze one’s own declining polity and offer revisions to the structures in an attempt to prolong the empire, but Glubb is very clear that what does not matter at all is the nature of the political institutions or the ideology of the state. Huge variations have existed in history—the Romans had almost nothing politically in common with the Mamluks, for example—yet regardless, every empire follows the same path. The precise nature of the ultimate fall varies, however, because it depends largely on external circumstances.
After this overview, Glubb generalizes the universal life stages of empire. First, “outburst,” the “Age of Pioneers,” an “extraordinary display of energy and courage,” where “backward races” rise up. The reason for this outburst is always obscure, but most likely, Glubb thinks, due to jealousy of the goods, material and immaterial, that empires have. He adduces the Viet Cong, who “showed more enterprise and initiative than the Americans”; today he might adduce the Taliban. The observant reader will note, however, that mere successful defense against a foreign power, not followed by expansion at the expense of that power, is hardly rising up. Nonetheless, it is no doubt true that all great powers to date began in an age of expansionist pioneers.
This first age merges into expansion, the “Age of Conquests.” Conquest is accomplished by aggression, most often by subduing existing civilizations, but also by grabbing uncivilized lands, if any are available, simply by shouldering existing populations aside, such as the United States’s “conquest of barbarian peoples.” Psychologically, the nascent empire shows “unresting enterprise in every field,” combined with “readiness to improvise and experiment.” That is, conquest is not merely military; it is full spectrum aggressive achievement.
Expansion leads to the “Age of Commerce,” which features a great increase in trade and material wealth, especially when formerly fragmented lands are brought under one umbrella. (Glubb is very concerned about small states forming “an insuperable obstacle to trade and co-operation,” for which reason he is desirous of the creation of a European super-state. He expresses no hesitation at this goal, another strike against him, given what we see the European Union has devolved into. “Great power” is a term nobody would apply to it.) In the beginning of the Age of Commerce, virtues such as “courage, patriotism and devotion to duty” are still ubiquitous, but part of the Age of Commerce is that enterprise is turned toward seeking new forms of wealth, which leads to the “Age of Affluence.” The turn to a focus on money erodes virtue; it “silences the voice of duty.” Somewhere in here is the noontime of the empire. Yet the first signs of internal decay become visible, in particular a loss of initiative as organizations of the society calcify and virtue seeps away.
Outward changes then begin, most notably a change to defensiveness, to no longer expanding but rather protecting what has been gotten. Pacifism increases and the military loses prestige, but the civilization still sees itself, increasingly falsely, as exalted and strong. The “Age of Intellect” arrives, where the ruling classes turn to education as their main focus, especially of the young, and more broadly, high culture reigns supreme, and science is privileged. This creates the false idea that “the human brain can solve the problems of the world.” Intellectualism “weakens unselfishness and human dedication to sacrifice.” Worse, it leads to the widespread belief that cleverness can substitute for sacrifice. Carl Schmitt’s “endless conversation” becomes the prime mode of political discourse (not that Glubb mentions Schmitt), and decline accelerates. Internal dissension increases, both in frequency and in the gulf between factions, and national leaders promise not to work for the nation, but to harm the opponents of their supporters. (Glubb also complains that we moderns do not learn from history, and that what little history is taught in schools is merely “contemporary politics masquerading as history.” He had seen nothing yet.)
Mass immigration is permitted, even encouraged, ending the ethnic homogeneity on which a high-trust society necessarily relies, furthering the decline. The original inhabitants admit immigrants to do the tasks they no longer want to do, whether menial or military, and seeing themselves as superior, and destined to rule forever, do not consider the long-term effect. Progress is inevitable, after all, so there is no need to work hard—rather, it is time to relax, and enjoy the fruits of empire, and to spread the wealth through creating a welfare state. Immigrants assimilate somewhat, but their loyalties to the nation are weaker, and diversity is the very opposite of our strength. It is not, Glubb is at pains to note, perhaps not wanting to be cancelled as Enoch Powell had been, that immigrants are inferior—merely that excessive immigration is fatal to an empire (though he is wrong that immigrants are “just different”; they can often be inferior, both in their nature and culture, and in that since almost always they migrate for gain, they slot directly into the ongoing decline based on excessive commercial focus).
Selfishness and idleness hack at the roots of the nation. The fruit is decadence. “Decadence is a moral and spiritual disease, resulting from too long a period of wealth and power, producing cynicism, decline of religion, pessimism and frivolity. The citizens of such a nation will no longer make an effort to save themselves, because they are not convinced that anything in life is worth saving.” Total lack of initiative appears; there are no new enterprises, no risk-taking, no heroic achievement. All that remains is to squabble over the wealth remaining—which, no surprise, diminishes rapidly.
As decline begins to bite, “universal pessimism” takes hold, as everyone sees the contrast to earlier, more glorious, self-confident times. Frivolity, in the form of sportsball and other entertainment, grows greatly. “The heroes of declining nations are always the same—the athlete, the singer, or the actor.” Most of all, women, formerly entirely absent from public and political life, become openly influential in both spheres. Given that women are usually highly influential in private life, and thereby in most societies (mostly invisibly) influence politics at all stages of a civilization, and exercise even more influence through the raising of children, it is not clear whether Glubb sees this newly public role for women as cause or effect of decline, though he is very clear that feminism, supposed liberation of women, is the direct opposite of the health of the state; it appears often at the same stage as feminization of men and an increase in homosexuality, both dire signals of the approaching end. Regardless, Glubb could not even have conceived of today’s gynocracy that rules almost the entire West, in which the female virtues, and the female vices, are both exalted as the only possible basis for governance, public and private, while masculinity is demonized and prevented from fulfilling its crucial civilizational functions. Unsurprisingly, this is like throwing gasoline on the fire of collapse, something I have earlier noted as being on shining display in our response to the Wuhan Plague, but which will soon enough offer far more dramatic examples.
Glubb’s analysis all fits together neatly with basic facts every educated person knows about fallen empires. That said, few of his conclusions are buttressed with specific historical examples; this book is very short, as I say, and offers only brief synthesis and summary. The examples Glubb does offer are almost always from England or from what he calls the Arab Empire, which he dates from A.D. 634–880. Perhaps someone expert in Assyria or the Persia of Cyrus could offer confirmation or objections to the analysis. That’s not me, but I am frankly dubious, for example, if one can slot the empire of Spain, or Romanov Russia, very easily into the specifics of Glubb’s claimed pattern. Russia, for example, had many problems, but immigrants and sportsball were not in evidence, nor were women political decisionmakers. Thus, my snap judgment on Glubb’s book is that it’s interesting, but not much more, without a lot more detail being provided and supportively slotted into his overall argument.
Glubb was perfectly well aware that more study would helpful. “If the present writer were a millionaire, he would try to establish in some university or other a department dedicated solely to the study of the rhythm of the rise and fall of powerful nations throughout the world.” This is, in fact, what Peter Turchin, the originator of cliodynamics, which purports to scientifically study exactly this, has done. I don’t know if he’s come up with any suggested answers on what to do, but certainly his prediction in Ages of Discord that the 2020s would be a time of chaos in the West are looking pretty good right now.
I think we can conclude no more than that Glubb was generically somewhat correct. For example, it is no doubt true that the single greatest cause of ultimate failure of any great power is wealth. It seems evident that no society can maintain high levels of wealth for very long without rotting from the inside out, a problem for which I have not yet been able to see any solution. Glubb, for this reason, attacks modern industrial society, sometimes seeming like he is channeling the future manifesto of Theodore Kaczynski. But industrial society has a life of its own; it cannot be dialed back except, maybe, by a strictly virtuous society (both ruling class and the masses), and when industrial society offers wealth, its mere existence seems to make virtue impossible, thus capping the apogee of the civilization far below what it might otherwise have achieved. I am a techno-optimist, but I have not solved this problem, and doing so is essential for any future civilization.
Glubb, trying not to grasp the nettle of the obvious conclusion from his own reasoning, ends his first article with an open-ended question, whether any of this cycle can be avoided by an empire. He’s quite explicit it’s too late for England, whose empire was already long over in 1976. The only question for Glubb was whether Britain “will remain strong, united and free, or become a nation of underlings and mendicants.” In his second article, no doubt stung by negative reaction, he calls for “a revival of our spirit” that will “transform our situation and guarantee our future.” Good luck with that. We can answer his question now, and it’s underlings and mendicants for the British, six days a week and twice on Sunday. England is now a place where deracinated Eloi, descendants of Alfred and Edward the Confessor who mock their great ancestors, if they are even aware of them, prostrate themselves to Islam, vomit in the streets after binge eating and drinking, and hide quivering in their pods when a very modestly-dangerous respiratory virus sweeps the land. There is no way back for England, and Glubb would have been the first to admit that, were he granted a vision of 2022.
Whatever the precise accuracy of Glubb’s analysis . . . [review completes as first comment]
Great book, thought provoking whilst remaining compact. The biggest flaw is the lack of any references or a bibliography. It means that there is no way to verify the claims, short of sourcing your own history books on the empires and themes discussed. I intend to do that, but would have appreciated a hand in doing so.
There are so many 'wow' moments in this short read. Well worth the effort. The copy I read didn't have any citations - I wish it had, because some of the stuff in here I've never heard before. Who would have thought 9th century Bagdad looked a whole lot like 21st century United States. Sounds like we're in for a wild ride!
"For history to have meaning, it must be the history of the human race."
"Ten generations of human beings suffice to transform the hardy and enterprising pioneer into the captious citizen of the welfare state."
"In our present state of mental chaos on the subject, we divided ourselves into nations, parties, or communities and fight, hate, and vilify one another over developments which may perhaps be divinely ordained and which seem to us, if we take broader view, completely inevitable."
Like so much 20th century scholarship in the humanities, it is full of cherrypicked facts twisted into pretzels for the sake of supporting a grand "theory of everything," in this case regarding the universal pattern of empires. And a dollop of awkward race realism casually injected at random times, can't forget that ingredient.
His central claim is that the maximum lifespan of an empire is about 250 years. That 'about' is doing a monumental amount of lifting. What of the Holy Roman Empire (~1000 years), the Khmers (629 years), or even the Portuguese colonial empire (1415-1999CE)? They aren't in the arbitrary list of 11 empires he chose to talk about, the longest-lasting of which is the Mamluk Empire at 267 years. But more interesting than the ommissions are the inclusions - to make an example of just one, he lists the Ottoman Empire as lasting 250 years from 1320-1570. To those familiar with history this might seem odd, considering the Ottomans fought in World War I. The trick being pulled here is that his dates are not actually the founding and dissolution of empires, but rather the "rise and fall," letting him start and end the timer at whatever dates he identifies as the beginning of the empires' rise or declines. I hope I don't need to elaborate too much on why this is arbitrary and subjective in the extreme. In fact, Glubb himself admits that it is arbitrary and useless for predicting anything with mathematical accuracy (p. 3-4). But I'm unconvinced, as the argument that this is all reliably predictive is the only discernable point being made by this paper, and certainly the main takeaway by anyone who reads this uncritically.
Glubb does outline what he considers to represent or signal an empire's rise and fall: He marks the rise by "the outburst," the "extraordinary display of energy and courage" which allows for the rapid expansion of territory which forms the empire in the first place. Following this, the first stage of the empire's life cycle is characterized by "amazing initiative, and almost incredible enterprise, courage and hardihood." Is this when empires develop the cultural achievements they are all most remembered for? No of course not, as we will see those are the markers of decline, not achievement. This is when the borders continue expanding with a stable interior, military advancements are made in terms of tactics and technology, and the economic strength of the nation grows. It is seemingly owed to the wealth caused by these economic booms that only then do empires turn to luxuries like the arts, infrastructure, and cities are built - because the wealthy of society simply have nothing better to do with their new riches (his words not mine: p. 8). This affluence then takes a turn for the worse, which marks the beginning of the decline in typically vague terms. "Money replaces honour and adventure" and "men do not normally seek to make money for their country or their community, but for themselves." The sense of duty is eroded, and instead of further expansion, the empire turns to defending itself (apparently a bad thing?). An age of intellect occurs which advances the sciences, but with it "the idea that the human brain can solve the problems of the world." Internal civil dissent ensues (not sure how this connects with the age of intellect or the halt of expansionism), and worst of all - and probably why this essay resonates with a certain crowd in the current day - there is an influx of foreigners, undermining the social homogeneity. How Glubb thinks any empire was culturally or ethnically homogenous is beyond me, even when his examples are cherrypicked this hard. The age of expansion he praised involves, in no uncertain terms, the incorporation of new peoples and cultures into the empire to a greater degree than any waves of immigration possibly could. The next sign of decline is the welfare state, and yes Glubb does use that exact term, this isn't an alt media article written within the past few years. The state begins engaging in philanthropy, caring for its citizens like the young, the poor, the students, and public hospitals are opened. All bad things, apparently. He has a section about religion which I'm honestly not sure says anything particular about religion at all, just more vague gesturing to the "good morals" he's brought up before, mainly the values of glory and conquest. He directly praises Genghis Khan for claiming that God sent him to purge the world of decadence. Keep in mind this was the justification given for his slaughter of roughly 40 million people, completely indiscriminate along lines of faith or morality in the victims. This is apparently the style of religiosity Glubb finds admirable in a society. The decadence of individuals soon starts to take a toll on the systems of society. Glubb says the cure for this is to emigrate to new surroundings, as this inexplicably breaks people out of their decadence as they adapt to their new countries and their children become pre-eminent leaders of these new communities. Not only do I not even remotely follow the logic being applied here, it also seems to entirely undermine his earlier complaints about immigration. The only sense I can make of it is that it is a half-baked rationalization of the moral value of Britain's oversea colonies.
Despite earlier admitting that his observations cannot be relied upon, it is at this point in the paper that Glubb confidently concludes "many" empires covering the past 3000 years have followed "similar" stages of development and decline, and lived lives of "very similar" length. He says that "it is tempting" to think that measures could be taken to prevent such disastrous declines in the future, and leaves the implication on the table. The essay is also bookended by Glubb waxing about the biggest mistake humans make being that we do not learn from history. So it really seems like the only valid takeaway is that he wants to impress upon the reader that these signs of decline can and should be prevented in the future. So let's reiterate what preventing imperial decline means: 1) if a state begins warring and conquering, its citizens should strive to make sure this bloody momentum never stops; 2) as the state amasses wealth, this must not be allowed to coalesce in the upper classes, who will waste it - implicitly though maybe not intentionally this means that the state should keep the wealth and only spend on military ventures; 3) do not allow the intellectuals of society think that everything can be approach with intelligence and rationalism; 4) do not allow immigrants, presumably this means the state must firmly control all movement through borders, but I suppose if objective 1 is fulfilled all 'immigration' will occur through the process of conquest and subjugation anyways; 5) do not let the state spend money supporting its needy and vulnerable citizens, or otherwise invest in social welfare projects like hospitals; 6) preserve and teach “good” pseudo-religious morals, particularly a zealotrous thirst for glory, bravery, and adventure; and 7) make sure the state has enough territory that its citizens can move around within its borders enough so as to not become lazy. I hope that when framed like this, Glubb would realise it is not a desirable society, even if the resulting empire would surely dominate future history books. But I'm not completely sure he would.
Another reviewer wrote "'old man yells at clouds' in book form," and I really couldn't agree more. When you strip away this essay's high profile in popular memory (though thankfully not in academia), it really is just a long rant by an old man who sees the world changing around him and doesn't like it. Glubb served as a general in the British military, which at least partly explains his fetishization of brutal conquest for its own sake, but more importantly he lived through the entire 20th century decline and dissolution of the British Empire. And rather than being happy that previously-colonial subjects around the world are now in possession of their political self-determination, I think he, as a Brit, just feels like a loser. And his way of coping with this was to invent a grand historical narrative so he can say "look, we're not losers, our decline was just inevitable!" But nobody thinks the British are losers for "declining;” in fact most are happy for it. Glubb's grumpy anger and frustration now gets to outlive him and be channelled by disaffected people decades later who also feel like "things used to be better." There are many popular and equally nonsensical idioms floating around nowadays which express the same idea, such as "tough times make hard men, hard men make good times, good times make soft men, soft men make hard times." Similarly, Glubb has quoted several writers from across history expressing the same sentiments that society is declining. But rather than strengthening his argument, it just proves to me that this 'old man yells at clouds' bit is old and overdone, and it would be better to accept that things change and people being happier and suffering less isn't necessarily signalling a decadent slip towards annihilation.
Mr glubb's offensive anti-intellectualism and disdain for freedom is repugnant to me. If i want to spend all day eating cheese-its and masturbating to children's pony cartoons why shouldn't i? it's my right to do so and you can't stop me. society is better now than it has ever been. thank you obummer.
Absolute trash. A raging rubbish fire. Among innumerable problems, Rome did not fall because of a 'welfare state', nor did the British Empire. You are not just the clown, you are the entire circus, you buffoon.
"يمكننا استنتاج أن تتابع قيام وسقوط الأمم العظمى أمر حتمي، بل مقدر إلهياً…" "التاريخ يشير إلى أن الأمم الكبرى لا تضع أسلحتها بدافع الضمير، لكن بسبب ضعف الإحساس بالواجب عند المواطنين، وزيادة الأنانية والرغبة في الترف والدعة."
مقالة تاريخية فاحصة بعيدة النظر للسير جون باغوت غلوب، أحد رجالات الإمبراطورية البريطانية في بلاد العرب لعقود طويلة، والذي كان قائد الجيش العربي الأردني عشرين عاماً وقاده في حرب النكبة عام 1948.
يرى غلوب أن تناولنا للتاريخ بتحقيبه زمنياً أو تخصيصه قومياً خطأ جسيم ليس من العلم المحقق في شيء، وأن الطرق المألوفة في دراسة تاريخ حقبة أو شعب تخطئ دائماً في تبيّن السنن التاريخية الثابتة لأنها تقصد إلى تمجيد الأسلاف وذكر الأمجاد، ولأنها بهذا التخصيص تهمل تواريخ أخرى لا غنى عنها جميعاً لفهم تاريخ أي أمة. إنه يرى أن الطريقة المثلى هي درس تاريخ الجنس البشري باعتباره مجموعاً إنسانياً تأثرت وأثرت فيه الإمبراطوريات والحضارات في بعضها البعض إبّان قيامها وسقوطها.
رغم قدم الإمبراطورية الآشورية واستعمالها للوسائل القديمة في النهوض(السيف، العربة، الحيوان) وحداثة الإمبراطورية البريطانية واستعمالها للوسائل الحديثة في النهوض(البندقية، القطار، البواخر) إلا أن كلتيهما عاشتا نفس المدة تقريباً، فلماذا؟ هذا ما تجيب عليه نظرية غلوب.
مدار المقالة على نظرية رائعة(وليس غلوب مبتكرها) تقول أن قيام الإمبراطورية يبدأ ببزوغ نجم عرق مغمور ينطلق بقوة في الغزو والتوسع والسيطرة ويتسم قادة هذا العرق بالشجاعة والارتجال وحب الاستكشاف(عصر الانطلاقة)، ثم بعد سيطرته وحصوله على الثروة واستقراره على رقعة جغرافية هائلة، ينبسط الأمان فتزدهر التجارة تلقائياً(عصر التجارة)، ومع طول بقاء الثروة والسلطة في يد هذا العرق الإمبراطوري يدبّ الفساد شيئاً فشيئاً(طول بقاء الثروة والسلطة=تدهور)، ويعتاد على الرخاء ويبدأ النظر في قضايا وشؤون لم تكن قطّ من شواغل أسلافه الفاتحين الرواد، فيزدهر الفن والعمارة والأدب والفكر(عصر الرخاء وعصر الفكر)، وبعدما ذاق هذا العرق متع الحياة تموت في نفسه دوافع الانطلاق، ويتسم بعقلية دفاعية ليحافظ على مكتسباته، وربما يولّي غيره من الأعراق الأجنبية الشؤون التي كره مزاولتها وعلى رأسها الحرب. ينخر الفساد ويضعف التدين وينعدم الإحساس بالواجب، ويساور هذا العرق شعور باليأس من النهوض مجدداً، ولكن بدلاً من محاولة إنقاذ نفسه يغرق في مسائل لا تفيده في شيء(عند سقوط بيزنطة كانوا يتجادولون في اللاهوت)، ويكتمل التدهور بالسقوط، الذي تتنوع مصائر الأمم في كيفية حصوله، فربما تسقط الأمة العظمى بعدو خارجي مُبير(سقوط المماليك على يد العثمانيين) وربما تسقط الأمة العظمى بالتفكك المتسارع(تفكك الإمبراطورية الإسبانية والإمبراطورية البريطانية). عمر الأمة العظمى خمسة وعشرون جيلاً=250 سنة تزيد أو تنقص قليلاً.
تلك هي خلاصة النظرية التاريخية التي تطرحها هذه المقالة، وهي لن تعدم ناقداً يرى فيها بعض الثغرات هنا وهناك، لكنها برغم كل شيء نظرية مفيدة دقيقة صحيحة في المجمل على الأقل، وهي من عبر الأيام وسنن التاريخ الثابتة التي تدور مع دوران الزمان كما شاء الله عز وجلّ خالق الكون والخلق.
Very interesting book about the overall assessment of empires and what led to their decadence. The author argues that wealth is one of the factors that lead to that. Wealth is an individualistic gain that turn the focus of people from common good and social caring into personal benefit. Other than wealth, the author seems to present the conservative values as the ones protecting empires from decay. Weakening of religiosity, high immigration rate and unbalanced diversity, the welfare state in addition to other factors all contribute to the decadence of empires. His argument is that empires live an average of 250 years and then start having the mentioned issues that leads to its decay. Many examples are given from Roman, Arabs, mamluks, Turks, British,etc... that illustrates his point of view. The book is very short and easy to read.
An excellent reading of how empires and civilizations collapse and their general timeframe. Those interested in civilizational collapse or apocalypse literature may find this a short interesting read. Essentially the book is made up of two long essays.
Caveat, multiculturalists, feminists, cultural materialists/marxists, post-structuralists/critical theorists, and globalists may be put off by this book...just saying...
Also, the book was published back in 1977/8 so the data is old and the cultural attitudes may be considered problematic.
Funny, how the average life of an empire is around 215 years, and it starts as hard working, filled with energy, and then selfishness, material greed, lack of morals and religion, decadence and reliance on welfare state same as influx of immigrants kill it. The patterns throughout history are all the same. I wonder, why can't we limit our desire for luxuries and return to more puritan quaker type of thinking. Intelligence, self reliance, meaningful work, physical exercise, lots of books and learning - thats all we need. We don't need all the useless junk.
There are a couple of reasons I was interested in reading this essay. I first learned about it while watching a YouTube video on the Forward Observer channel where mention of some of its content resonated with my ever-increasing concerns about the decline of Western Civilization. This combined with the fact that America is a few years away from being 250-years old and, according to Sir John Glubb, great empires (or superpowers) tend to rise and fall within a 250-year period, had me curious.
WHAT DID YOU LIKE ABOUT IT?
I like the nuggets of pith that Glubb imparts throughout the text. For instance, he opens with the claim that what we learn from history is that we don’t learn from history.
Furthermore, I appreciate Glubb’s simple thesis that great empires rise and fall with “remarkable regularity” in following these stages: an age of pioneers, an age of conquests, an age of commerce, an age of affluence, an age of intellect, and finally an age of decadence. He posits that there is a correlation between the human generation and the sequence of the aforementioned stages.
Here are some characteristics from each age:
An Age of Pioneers
“Untrammelled by traditions, they [the generation of pioneers] will turn anything available to their purpose [ . . . ] Uninhibited by textbooks or book learning, action is their solution to every problem.”
An Age of Conquests
“During the military period, glory and honour [are] the principal objects of ambition.”
An Age of Commerce
“The Age of Commerce is [ . . . ] marked by great enterprise in the exploration for new forms of wealth.”
An Age of Affluence
“The first direction in which wealth injures the nation is a moral one. Money replaces honour and adventure as the objective of the best young men.”
An Age of Intellect
“The spread of knowledge seems to be the most beneficial of human activities, and yet every period of decline is characterised by this expansion of intellectual activity.”
Naturally, I can’t help but to think about what is being taught in many of our universities today—deconstructionism. It’s not being taught as just a way to critique literature. It’s being taught as the foundation of the new philosophy, one that utterly rejects the goals and values of the Enlightenment. Students today are learning that everything can be reduced to power dynamics in which Western Civilization has dominated and is hegemonic and therefore must go. It’s been chanted on campuses, “Hey hey, ho ho, Western Civ has got to go.” This disturbs me to no end, so I especially appreciate Glubb’s essay in this respect where I can place this malign sentiment within a stage of national decline.
The Age of Decadence
Glubb mentions that there’s an “intensification of internal political hatreds,” during the Age of Decadence. I don’t even need to say anything about our politics at the moment, which clearly places us in the Age of Decadence.
WHAT DID YOU NOT LIKE ABOUT IT?
At the end of the essay, Glubb reveals the lens through which he has determined his thesis, and that lens is the Judeo-Christian one. He writes, “[W]e may reach the conclusion that the successive rise and fall of great nations is inevitable and, indeed, a system divinely ordained.” While I think most Judeo-Christian values are good (and I live my own life by them), I squirm at the thought that Glubb’s thesis is just fodder for the deconstructionists.
Nevertheless, I wouldn’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. I believe there is benefit to being aware of our past and validity in the patterns Glubb has outlined. And Glubb’s final two sentences are worthy of embracing: “love is the key to human life. Any expansion of our knowledge which may lead to a reduction in our unjustified hates is therefore surely well worth while.”
DO YOU RECOMMEND IT TO OTHERS?
I recommend everybody read everything. However, note that since this essay was published in the mid 1970s, it’s very un-PC, so people today will become triggered when they read passages such as these:
An “oft-repeated phenomena of great empires,” Glubb writes, “is the influx of foreigners [ . . . ] where they tend “to form communities of their own, protecting primarily their own interests, and only in the second degree that of the nation as a whole.”
“An increase in the influence of women in public life has often been associated with national decline.”
“The Fate of Empires" by John Bagot Glubb, first published in 1978, presents a comprehensive examination of the rise and fall of empires throughout history. Glubb, a British military officer and historian, offers a thought-provoking analysis of the patterns and commonalities observed in the lifecycles of empires, shedding light on the factors that contribute to their ultimate decline. In this academic review, we delve into the key themes, strengths, limitations, and scholarly significance of Glubb's work, highlighting its contributions to the understanding of historical empires and the challenges they face.
"The Fate of Empires" explores the cyclical nature of empires, drawing from historical examples spanning centuries and continents. Glubb identifies distinct phases in the lifespan of empires, from their early foundation marked by conquest and expansion to their eventual decline characterized by complacency, moral decay, and overextension. He emphasizes the role of societal factors such as the erosion of traditional values, excessive materialism, and the loss of a shared sense of purpose in contributing to the decline and eventual fall of empires.
One of the strengths of Glubb's analysis lies in his ability to synthesize a vast array of historical examples into a coherent framework. By identifying recurring patterns and highlighting the factors that contribute to the decline of empires, Glubb provides valuable insights into the challenges faced by imperial powers throughout history. His examination of both internal and external factors sheds light on the complex interplay between societal dynamics, external threats, and the lifespan of empires.
Moreover, Glubb's work prompts readers to reflect on the role of leadership, military prowess, and the aspirations of a nation in the rise and fall of empires. He challenges the notion of invincibility and highlights the importance of moral and intellectual virtues in sustaining the vitality and longevity of empires. Glubb's analysis offers valuable lessons for contemporary societies and policymakers, urging them to consider the perils of hubris, complacency, and societal disintegration.
However, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of Glubb's work. Some critics argue that his analysis may oversimplify the complex factors contributing to the decline of empires, as historical events are often multifaceted and contingent upon various circumstances. Additionally, the applicability of Glubb's model to different cultural and historical contexts may warrant further exploration and examination.
"The Fate of Empires" by John Bagot Glubb presents a compelling and insightful analysis of the lifecycles of empires, shedding light on the common patterns and challenges they face. Glubb's work serves as a valuable contribution to the understanding of historical empires, offering a framework that invites readers to critically engage with the rise and fall of imperial powers.
The book's strengths lie in its ability to distill complex historical events into a coherent narrative, providing readers with a deeper understanding of the societal, cultural, and moral forces at play in the decline of empires. Glubb's work is of particular scholarly significance as it encourages readers to critically reflect on the challenges faced by contemporary societies, drawing lessons from the past to inform present and future decision-making.
"The Fate of Empires" by John Bagot Glubb stands as a significant work that offers a comprehensive examination of the lifespan of empires throughout history. While recognizing its limitations, this academic review acknowledges the scholarly significance and thought-provoking nature of Glubb's analysis. By highlighting the common patterns and challenges faced by empires, the book invites readers to critically engage with the rise and fall of imperial powers and draws valuable lessons.
A British General who spent >1/4 century in the middle east from late 1920's became a prolific writer on the Arab culture: Bedouins with whom he had first hand experience, the empire's history, religion, military etc.
Author's bio from historynet.com: "After WW1, Glubb became an Arabist. Resigning his British army commission in 1926 to become an administrator for the Iraqi government, he lived among the Bedouins, spoke their language, understood their customs ..."
"old man yells at cloud" in book form. Author seemingly has no idea of the difference between correlation and causation.
He presents an interesting theory of common observances of the rise and decline of empires, but doesn't employ any counterfactuals or try to find exceptions to his rule.
He is instead happy to point to those examples that suit his evident discomfort with increasing women's and non-native rights in his own country, but with no questioning of: 1. Material conditions 2. Logical beginning/end points of cultures (Britain is considered homogeneous which, if you were to ask a Scottish, Northern Irish, or Welsh person, would be laughable) 3. The validity of empire for anything other than its own sake. He mentions that the high points of empire are when it makes huge gains in conquest or commerce, and attaches a disappointment to when its citizens turn away from these goals.
Pretty low-effort pub nostalgia, well-informed with interesting historical examples but zero insightful critique
Wow. This book speaks on the great empires of our ancestors and their steady decline and fall. Its damning that history has (once again) shown us that nothing is new under the sun. The unfortunate thing is that many of the ideologies and things done during the decline of an empire is taking place presently in the West.
Interesujący esej wyjaśniający jak imperia dochodzą do świetności, a następnie upadają. Daje dużo do myślenia w kontekście obecnej sytuacji politycznej na świecie.
As soon as I finished this book, I rushed to check the year of publication.
Originally published as an article, 'The Fate of Empires' serves as a concise overview of numerous Empires throughout the ages in an attempt to give structure to their stories. The fact that it was published in 1978 serves as more proof for its truthfulness for every year that passes since.
Glubb begins his thesis by explaining that to truly benefit from history, we should learn from the entire history of the human race, not limit ourselves to the history of a select few nations, even within which the stories are carefully selected to omit anything unseemly. This made immediate sense to me. As Glubb himself alludes to, if China were to make a world-first discovery in any field of science, mathematics or technology, the rest of the world would rush to research and adopt it for their own benefit. Why then is the opposite approach taken for history? Why do we champion our own origins but ignore - or worse - vilify the histories of anyone else? The only true way to learn and benefit from the lessons of history is to study the history of mankind as a whole, not to cherry pick certain events from our own nation's past and serve it as the main dish, else what more could it be but thinly veiled propaganda?
By studying history - everyone's history - we get to see the patterns of human behaviour, we get to see how the system of ascension, prosperity, decline and collapse appear in a wide range of diverse environments with differently types of rulership and technologies. We will have a better understanding of what systems are effective and which aren't. This is precisely what this book is about.
Glubb presents a structure he has drawn from various empires that all empires generally follow, through the age of the pioneers to one where the citizens of the civilisation are stuck in a cycle of despair, waiting for their inevitable end.
There is a single issue I have with this thesis. Glubb's theory has its foundational underpinnings in one claim, that amongst the Empires he has studied, they lasted for roughly 250 years. He cites the British, Umayyad, Persian and Roman Empires (amongst a few others) as proofs for everything else that comes after.
I'm no expert on any these empires, but this claim seems to make use of a generous helping of 'artistic liberty' with their figures. To his credit, claiming such a thing in the first place is not an easy task. No matter what figure he would posit for the lifetimes of the mentioned empires, someone would be unhappy and accuse him of being wrong. If the mentioned empires did in fact last for wildly different periods in comparison to what the author claims however, then the stages of rise and fall do not seamlessly fit together as Glubb professes.
It is impossible to please everyone, but I can give him the benefit of the doubt in this matter until I learn enough myself to confirm or deny his claims.
Aside from this, it is hard to deny the logic and flow of the ideas put forth in this work, they seem evidently true. If a man's life has period of rise, affluence, stagnation and decline, why not an empire made up of many men? The patterns of life seem to repeat everywhere and only the astute are able to spot them. I think Glubb has done a wonderful job collecting the signs and symptoms and weaving them together into a single theory.
Additionally, some of the ideas espoused within 'The Fate of Empires' resound even harder today. We have tech founders and CEOs openly promising that their advances in AI and robotics will fundamentally save the world in countless aspects, even worse, millions believe them. They place their hopes (and money) in these companies hoping for an escape from the sense of civilisational despair they feel. Unfortunately, such a sign is in fact a symptom of decline in of itself. Glubb writes that one of the stages of a civilisation contains within it the rise of intellectualism. People are inclined to believe that an extraordinary new technology can save them, when in fact the truisms of human nature triumph in every era. It is only via self-sacrifice and uncompromising loyalty to the nation by its citizens does a nation pick itself up and stand on its own two feet once more. In our age of ever-accelerating technology, how many countless millions believe the false promises of something which is fundamentally unable to meet the hype?
Another interesting idea that Glubb puts forth is that each civilisation, each people has its turn at some point or another at leading the world. The individual characteristics of these people and that of their resulting civilisation provides a unique trait that they display as they lead the world with their affluence and authority. The entire world is then able to take the positives from their traits and mankind is forever changed in this regard. When another civilisation takes the helm they will imprint their own traits and the cycle will inevitably repeat once more. Seeing as even the worst empires have something positive about them, this system serves as a way for mankind to collectively take steps forward upon the path to true progress. Each nation is able to leave their own contribution on this path, writing their page in history before another closes the chapter. This is a wonderful idea and one that immediately struck a chord with me. Glubb describes it as a possible manifestation of Divine Wisdom in action before our very eyes. I tend to agree wholeheartedly.
'Search for Survival' is a Q&A response to the overwhelming replies Glubb himself received as a result of the publishing of 'The Fate of Empires'. while it isn't structured as an essay in of itself, it serves as a refreshing and concise answer to many popular queries one may have had at his initial essay. The clarifications and explanations from 'Search for Survival' flesh out a few of the initial ideas from the original work and help to solidify his message.
One qualm I have however, is that Glubb states that he is not preaching about 'the end being nigh', for he is instead trying to raise the alarm that the decline of the nations he is referring to is one made by our own hands. Just as much as it is happening to us, we alone have the power to decide to reverse course. In theory this seems sound, but if the cycles of empire seem consistent with previous example beforehand, then with Glubb's own theory it almost sounds inevitable. It feels like he tried to backtrack in 'Search for Survival' slightly due to the overwhelming attention he received for 'The Fate of Empires' in an attempt to assuage those who accused him of what we would today call 'doomerism'. Aside from that however, I find his explanations enlightening.
Overall, 'The Fate of Empires' is a sobering read, aside from the small points of dispute mentioned, it is hard to fault Glubb's rationale. We can see many of the aspects he speaks of in our world today, but the overall idea of each civilisation having a lifestyle (as Ibn Khaldun also mentioned centuries ago) is one worth internalising. We can be biased in thinking that things will never change, and for a lot of people's lifetimes they haven't. But just like nature has its seasons, so do men and the nations they build. It would be prudent for us to always be aware that the only thing constant in life is change, and 'The Fate of Empires' is a fantastic way to introduce oneself to the idea.
This is a 5 star book. It is great in such a way that it makes me think I have been too generous with other books I have also rated so highly, this cuts above the rest in a way that deserves its own distinction.
If you have any interest in history and learning from the patterns of the past, I highly recommend reading this work. If you have no interest in that sort of thing, I recommend this book for you even more, you may need it more than the rest of us.
There's much to be said about Glubb Pasha's influence in the Middle East in the first half of the 20th Century, an influence ignored and superseded by the fame of TE Lawrence. The fact of the matter is that Glubb had been much more influential in determining the course of Arab history pre- and post-WWII than any other figure. Opinion on him is divided: was he the man who facilitated the creation of Israel for the Western superpowers, or was he the person who glorified and empowered Arabs beyond their capabilities at the time? Opinion is divided and, as with most modern opinions, the last two Jordanian generations look upon him with absolute abhorrence.
And yet his love for the dignity and chivalry of Bedouin Arabs and the enlightenment he gave the west of their true personae, as clearly seen in his lecture "My Years with The Arabs" places his intentions at an even stranger paradox. If he loved several characteristics of original post-Mohammedan Arab civilization with which he lived for nearly 40 years, why was his loyalty to his monarch and country unwavering?
It seems that Glubb understood humanity and human nature very well. In "The Fate of Empires" he analyses past civilizations and cultures and notes the phases at which they reached their rise, apex and nadir, respectively, before collapsing as a result of their own faults. 'The Fate of Empires,' in its course of documenting the past, comes out as highly prophetic in the present for anyone who has observed the United States over the past 50 years and the imminent implosion of Great Britain, which one could say commenced in the mid-nineties.
In these fragile times; whenever someone begins to engage in aggressively biased debate about the political status quo, I always refer them to this essay, and read it at least once a year myself. Many comment that Glubb's worldview is highly conservative and out-dated, to which I say human nature surpasses any philosophy or ideology of past, present, or future. In this essay Glubb explains this not only with logic and facts, but also with passion. Does he offer a solution? Hardly, but then again the main issue is to expose and confront humanity's greatest nemesis: itself.
Dare I say that 'The Fate of Empires' is a seminal work, and I sincerely believe that it should be mandatory reading material for anybody even the tiniest bit interested in deciphering the disaster that is human nature.
Трудните времена правят хората силни. Силните хора правят времената лесни. Лесните времена правят хората слаби. Слабите хора правят времената трудни.
Всички сте чували тази сентенция и сте видели известна истина в нея. Джон Глъб е видял повече истина и според него световните империи от зората на човечеството насам се движат по неписан път, който се оказва еднакъв за всички и продължава горе-долу 250 г.
За този период един народ набира сила, покорява тези около него, империята му достига разцвет и после следва упадък. И всички тези периоди, във всички империи в цялата история имат горе-долу еднакви характеристики.
В началото народът живее трудно, но е смел и военолюбив. Порядките са консервативни и патриархални, интелектуалната дейност не е на почит. Това позволява на държавата да надделее над останалите и да се замогне териториално и финансово.
С богатството идва постепенно и по-лесния живот за коренните жители. Настъпва разцвет на науката, изкуството и философията, нравите стават по-свободни. Народът вече не е така военолюбив, все пак има какво да губи.
Постепенно жените раждат все по-малко деца и почват все повече да се занимават с други неща, а от мъжете все по-малко се очаква да свържат живота си с войната по какъвто и да е начин.
Този процес продължава до израждане по време на западането на империята, когато на коренните жители спира съвсем да им пука за каквото и да е и най-вече за идеята на империя, за традициите им и т.н. и логично тя се разпада под натиска на други народи, по-мотивирани за успех и по-склонни да действат, отколкото да се гримират и философстват.
Или поне така вижда нещата авторът, като дава избирателни примери от историята, а други пропуска, понеже не са му удобни. Все пак, книгата е добра да се замисли човек по тия въпроси.
When it comes to understanding the human condition, Glubb is well up there with the likes of Socrates, Jung, and Orwell in my opinion.
In short, Western civilisation is no different from any other empire, state, society, plant, animal, or human being for that matter in that we all suffer a cradle to grave existence.
And just as the Roman Empire ended its old age through a combination of mismanagement, apathy, guilt, and self-loathing, so will what's left of the Western empire eventually surrender to its critics. Anyone care to argue these characteristics can't be found in today's institutions? Or is the way the BBC likes to wallow in the victimhood of the needy while ridiculing those trying to address the issues designed to instil everyone with a can-do sense of togetherness and camaraderie? John Glubb put it best:
...too long a period of wealth and power, producing cynicism, decline of religion, pessimism and frivolity. The citizens of such a nation will no longer make an effort to save themselves, because they are not convinced that anything in life is worth saving.
The Fate of Empires and Search for Survival is well worth a read if you're wondering why the West seems determined to send itself to hell in a handcart.
“Hard times create strong men, strong men create good times, good times create weak men, and weak men create hard times.”
Sir John Bagot Glubb hits the nail on the head in these two short essays by pinpointing the problems of our rapidly deteriorating societies in the age of decadence. Despite the author's effort it's quite a depressing read frankly, considering the problems he mentions have only multiplied in scale since 1977.
For anyone interested, the 2nd essay "Search For Survival" can be found below, both in audio and text format.
An interesting read about the rising and falling of empires. The model of the 10 generations that it introduces seems overly simplistic but the breakdown of the different ages that represent the graducal changes of focus of the empire and its people is fascinating. He is not as radical as Rousseau for example, but it is obvious that he is critical of the over-intellectualism that characterizes our age. It will probably appeal more to people who prefer right wing ideologies but it should be an interesting read for everyone.