The Eastern Front, 1914-1917

by Norman Stone

Norman Stone's important book is the first authoritative account of the Russian Front to be published in the West. Churchill called the Eastern Front 'the unknown war' and there is still no Soviet official history of the army's role during the First World War.

It was in the East, with Russia in turmoil, that many decisive engagements took place. Norman stone believes that 'the outcome of the battles was dictated by factors that do not always figure in works of military history'. Using a wide range of sources from European and American research centers, he describes the battles of the Eastern Front. Tannenberg, Austria-Hungary's entry into the war, the Russian retreat in the summer of 1915, the role of Lundendorff, the Brusilov offensive - all are carefully examined and substantially reinterpreted.

Traditional accounts of the Russian war effort describe an army crippled by shortages of shells and war materials. Norman Stone's analysis shows that German economic superiority has been greatly overestimated. The Russians suffered from a shortage of organizational and administrative ability. Their economy suffered a crisis not of decline but of growth; as a result capitalism, as Western Europe knew it, was killed off in Russia in 1915-16, not in 1917-18. In his final chapter, the author reviews the connection between war and revolution in Tsarist Russia, and suggests new approaches to our understanding of this complex problem.

Norman Stone never loses sight of his greater themes and places the conflict in a larger context. He explains the mechanics of revolutionary development and the downfall of the Tsar and thereby throws new light on our interpretation of the war in the West. The book is carefully documented and there are maps of the campaign. As the author writes: 'the book travelled a long way from the battlefields where it began; it may even have become three different books. But total war needs total history, as far as can be managed.'

Genres: History, World War I, Nonfiction, Military History, Russia, War, Russian History

348 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1975

About the author

Norman Stone was a Scottish historian and author, who was a Professor in the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University, Ankara. He is a former Professor at the University of Oxford, Lecturer at the University of Cambridge, and adviser to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

Reviews

[Peter Ellwood · Rating 2 out of 5]

An interesting book, and worth reading for the simple reason that there is still not much material out there on the war in the East. But one needs to take with a pinch of salt the blurb claims on the cover to the effect that it’s “the classic account”. It’s the only account, that’s the point.

As a technical assembly of facts, it has a lot to offer. But on the level of producing a landmark piece of writing, I think Norman Stone falls down. His style tends to be a hurried, can’t-see-the-wood-for-trees assembly of details: detail upon detail, hurled at the reader almost in shopping-list style. Page after page, detailing the number of troops in this battalion, the number of guns in that regiment.

There is a certain interest of course – the entire point of his writing is to convey that a great part of the outcome of the war was decided by economic and logistical considerations (no point in producing huge amounts of armaments if you don’t have the railway lines to transport them; fully half of Russia’s rail capacity was used up at various points transporting food for (redundant) cavalry horses: and so on).

But by and large, one breathes a sigh of relief when one hits the occasional paragraph summing up and commenting on what other people said about such and such an event. He gets quite interesting there, for example, in analysing and refuting the commonly-held Russian view that things fell apart because of shortages of shells (in fact it was more plain incompetence). But these interludes are relatively few and far between. I have no doubt about Stone’s abilities as a recorder of data: I’d have liked to see much more of his powers of analysis.

Another aspect of his writing which gets in the way is his often jeering tone. One might think this is thoroughly well deserved, and that the people in charge of WWI were indeed stupid in every way. But I was handicapped in this regard by the fact that I also read his short history of WWI as a whole not all that long before: and found the same haughty condescension applied to everyone on the Western front too. That’s just not possible.

More generally, it comes across in some ways as half a book, a project that was abandoned before its natural end.

One obvious symptom is the lack of maps to support NS's rat-a-tat delivery of detail about the movement of soldiers and ordinance. What he writes is a terrific achievement in terms of mastering that detail, no doubt about that. But without maps to pin it down it is also borders on the incomprehensible to the average reader

A more fundamental incompleteness concerns the content. The narrative simply slithers to a halt towards the end of 1916, without even really mentioning what happened thereafter (apart from Bolshevism), and not describing for example who did or said what in terms of Russia's peace deal with Germany.

Neither does the book as a whole try all that often to put the conflict into its wider perspective of a world war. It's true that it does what it says on the tin - it's called 'Eastern front' after all, and that's all it covers. But all the same, it was part of a world war and there is precious little mention of, say, the western front, and no mention at all of the Middle East. As an account of who bashed whom on the ground in the eastern campaigns, it is a valuable resource. But it's not all that readable, and the genuine full account of the war in the east is still to be written. There are more fluent historians out there.

[Charles · Rating 2 out of 5]

There is some merit in the book, but its incomplete. For example, this book has an almost exclusively Russian bias and only covers 'the land war'. After reading it, you'll likely have to read additional books to fill-in areas either uncovered, or scantily covered.

The book starts out with a very good analysis of the Russian military and its supporting civilian government arms after the Russian-Japanese War (1904-05).

Oddly, this level of analysis wasn't extended to the other combatants. The Austro-Hungarian analysis was good, but not as extensive as the Russian. There was a certain amount of compare-and-contrast with the German military, in the Russian analysis, but nothing as comprehensive as the Russian analysis. The minor combatants, Rumania, Turkey, Serbia, Bulgaria are hardly covered at all. I expected them to all be dealt with equally. However, I really liked the organizational behavior analysis that *was* written and how it effected grand strategy.

The prose in this book at times caused me to laugh-out-loud. I'm certain the author is a very erudite man. However, a general simpler choice of words would have made the reading easier, although likely less amusing.

I was a bit disappointed there was no discussion of naval operations. Taken literally, a "Front" is a part of the land war. However, the book does not exclusively discuss the various combatants armies. Something must have happened on the Baltic? Except for a mention of the Russian navy "shooting up a few German fishing boats", that's it. Likewise, the Black Sea does not receive any attention. Considering the Imperial Navy's participation in the Russian revolution, I would have expected more discussion.

In addition, the Italian Front, gets short shrift. There is some discussion of it and its affect on events further east, but in this book its an orphan.

Technology, other than railway tech is also not adequately discussed. A brief on the communications, munitions, and firearms would have been appreciated. For example, a comparison of how wired and wireless communication capabilities differed between the Germans and the Russians would have been instructive. In particular, because the outcome of several engagements was decided on it.

Logistics and geography are likewise covered unevenly. I was particularly interested in a short description about the development of Arkhangelsk, and Murmansk to bring in war materials from the Allies. However, a similar description on Siberia, which I understand at the time to be "everything east of the Urals", gets short shrift. Although there is a brief mention of the railway carrying capacity of the Trans Siberian railway.

Rather quickly, the book covers the battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes. And then, it became a dirge of body counts, railway transits, shell/food/fodder consumption rates. I could not understand why the author could never summarize comparisons between the combatants in ratios or percentages to save me from performing long division in my head?

The book also ends rather too quickly. The Russian Revolution took Russia out of the war. A lengthy economic analysis for the Revolution is provided. I thought this was rather odd for a military history.

This book is imperfect. Its title is a misnomer. It should really be "The Imperial Russian Army (mostly) on The Eastern Front 1924-1917". Its with the Imperial Russian Army that the greatest weight of discussion and perspective is devoted. That is, the narrative is not balanced. To find-out about the war on the Central Powers side, or Russia's eastern allies will require reading other books. Its also not completely a military history. It veers off for long periods on Imperial Russian economic and social issues. Strangely, it barely includes any diplomatic history into the narrative.

The book did have its good points. However, I feel that the author wanted to tell the Russian story of the war, and at that he was only partially successful.

If you have an interest in the Italian and Balkan fronts of WWI. I found this book: The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front 1915-1919 to be informative.

[Oleksandr Zholud · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is one of the early definite English-language overviews of the Eastern Front during 1914-1917. Originally published in 1975 it for years became a major source on the subject. I read it as a buddy read for February 2023 at Non Fiction Book Club group.

It is first and foremost a military history book, with a wealth of minute details on which army core was led by whom, how this commander conflicted with that over some issue, how many guns a division had, etc. As such, for an average history fan, who isn’t chiefly interested in the military part (like me) there is a lot of information that can be easily scanned over. Also, the book sometimes uses 20/20 backsight, like when it discusses the start of the campaign in 1914 simultaneously criticizing Russian I and II armies for rushing ahead and extreme caution in Ruzski’s IV army’s advance. It also tries to bust several myths about the war in this region, first of all, that shell-shortages led to the failures of Russian armies.

Where the book really shined for me is in its overviews of the Russian war economy (Ch. #9) and the final breakdown of the empire in 1917 (Ch. #13), even if in some details I don’t agree with his claims. For example, he correctly highlights that the backwardness of Russian industry is often overplayed, but ‘forgets’ serious limits to growth e.g. due to high illiteracy rates and sometimes states phrases ambiguously, e.g. five large automobile factories produced not only lorries, but in the end also tanks for the Red Army, which can be read as the Red Army right after the revolution of 1917 producing tanks, which is definitely incorrect. The first (both Russian and Soviet) tank was a copy of Renault FT-17 produced in 1920-21 just 15 copies (French produced by then 3500 copies). Moreover, 20 of FT-17 tanks were in the Intervention army already in 1918, where initially four and then more were captured and sent to Moscow (btw ‘losing’ almost all minor details during transportation by railroad to theft). There they were repaired and presented as their own production (true, later copies were produced). During this period these tanks have never been used in military operations.

There are several important issues that the book completely overlooks, e.g. multi-ethnic nature of the Russian Empire (it speaks about the issue for the Austria-Hungary) and its effect on the 1917 revolutions.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 3 out of 5]

A fine, well-researched history, although to call it a history of the Eastern Front might be misleading. Stone’s work is more focused on how Tsarist Russia waged its war, and some major operations of this theater receive only passing mention. Little attention is given to the Balkans, although I can see why Stone chose not to include it. The coverage of strategic issues is strong. Stone’s main argument is that Russia was relatively well-prepared for war, more so than many histories claim. He argues that Russia’s failures were more due to inept leadership rather than the backwardness of the nation.

There are some issues. Stone argues that Sukhomlinov was a reformer, but recent studies have cast him more as an opportunist, and an incompetent one at that. His description of the factions within the army also seems too cursory, and his grasp of tsarist Russia’s politics seems wanting. Still, Stone often makes judgments with little real evidence. Oddly, at one point Stone writes that Lenin could claim status at a patrician even though his grandfather was a serf. In another instance, he arbitrarily divides the Russian officer into factions: patrician and “praetorian.” Don’t ask me what Stone means by the latter because upon completing the book I still have no idea. He also writes that by 1918 the Red Army had formed “a partnership with the people and therefore there was a rush of volunteers to join it.” In another instance he writes that the Red Army attracted the cream of Russia’s officers, but this makes little sense.

The book is surprisingly brief, but it’s not always easy to read. The book jumps back and forth at times and his description of the campaigns has a confused, rambling tone. It also could have benefited from some better maps. Also, none of the French is translated.

[Manray9 · Rating 4 out of 5]

The definitive history of the much neglected war in the East.

[Cynda · Rating 3 out of 5]

Some of us at GR Non Fiction Book Club wanted to read a book about WW1 and did not want to read a multi-volume work. (That's me.) So we settled on this shorter older work published in 1975. Being that we are a diverse group of readers, we decided to read this book and expand upon the topic of the book with our various interests and experiences.

The book helped us to have these side, exploratory, and deeper discussions be cause the text is so dry and so to-the-point, we had plenty of room to expand into. Together we discussed Austrian Hungary as one of us loves in the Urkaine, women's roles in military as I am interested in the socio-economic improvements women gain during war times since 19th century, another couple had a stronger understanding of the basics of military and WW1. Together we have learned.

So this book can provide a good jumping word point for discussion if one has a thumbnails understanding of WW1 history.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

Forty-two years after it was written, this is still, probably, the best single volume book on this subject.

In his introduction, Stone launches a bitter attack on Edward Hallett Carr. Carr, the famous, sympathetic, historian of Soviet Russia, argued that all in pre-Revolutionary, Tsarist Russia was bad, particularly its economy. This economic weakness was a key reason for the inability of the Tsarist state to prosecute the First World War effectively and this, in turn, led to the Revolutions of 1917.

Stone, by contrast, argues that Tsarist Russia's economy was growing at a fair pace pre-1914. The Russian army's famed shortages of artillery and small arms were down to faulty doctrine rather than failures in production stemming from economic weakness. Indeed, the material in many cases did exist, Stone argues, but the chaotic of the Tsarist system was unable to exploit them. This, in microcosm, is Stone's argument about the origins of the Revolutions. They were not the product of a backward economy failing to fight the war but of a haphazard system failing to harness the might of a growing economy.

Given all this, readers looking for accounts of the fighting are likely to be disappointed. Much of the focus is on the politics and economics of the war, with a decided focus on Russia, so those coming to this subject for the first time might be better tracking down Ward Rutherford's The Russian Army In World War I.

[Brendan Hodge · Rating 3 out of 5]

Norman Stone's account of the Eastern Front during World War One remains the standard work on the subject forty years after it's publication.

In some ways, the book is showing its age. This is mostly an account of command level strategy and conflict, with less of the soldier's-eye-view material which has become standard in war histories. It also has the difficulty of tackling a vast, though under-discussed, topic in one book. I found myself wishing that each battle was covered in more detail -- though this is probably unrealistic in a one volume length. I also wished that the command and strategy of the Germans and Austrians had been covered in as much depth as that of the Russians, which I think probably is a realistic hope.

Stone makes an editorial decision to cut his work off with the end of active hostilities, but I wish very much that he'd covered more of the Russian Revolution and the effect that it had on the front, and the way in which both the German/Austrian occupation of parts of Russia affected their ability to fight in 1918 and then the collapse and emergence of nations in central Europe in the wake of the Central Powers' defeat.

All of which is to say that my main qualm with Stone's work is that I wish that he had written an even longer book which explored the edges of his defined topic more. This book is good, but will leave you wanting a good deal more. Unfortunately, this is a field in which there are still not a huge number of books available.

[Jamie Smith · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was once asked about this book, and summarized it as “The Russians were brave but hopelessly disorganized; the Germans, Ludendorff and Hindenburg in particular, were competent but by no means geniuses; and the Austrians couldn’t hold a parade without taking 10,000 casualties.”

First published in 1975, it is written in the top-down style that isn’t seen much anymore. Historians today tend to emphasize the bottom-up view of war as experienced by those directly engaged in it, filling their books with excerpts from letters and diaries. These add a sense of immediacy to the narrative, but sometimes bog down the grand sweep of strategy and tactics. For the most part, the lowest unit level this book looks at is the Division.

The main focus is on Russia, and Stone does a good job explaining the enormous complexities and inefficiencies of their military effort. While a centralized high command existed, it was ineffective and generally ignored by the Army commanders. Each branch jealously guarded its ancient privileges and officers nursed old grievances even to the detriment of the overall mission. Cavalry and artillery were separate branches and did not have to support the armies to which they were attached if they did not choose to. Transport was always a problem; Russia was deficient in railroads, and thus required many horses, which in turn meant that a great deal of the logistics system had to be devoted to providing fodder instead of carrying ammunition and supplies for the troops.

World War I was not known for brilliant generalship on either the Eastern or the Western fronts, and the battles in the East followed the same sorry refrain: inadequate intelligence, attacks over poor terrain, human wave assaults that gained little ground and even that was frequently lost to counterattacks, followed by weeks of attrition until the armies disengaged. It is not hard to see why the soldiers were completely demoralized by 1917, but this was not unique to the Russians: the Austrians were melting away and the German armies were hotbeds of Communist sympathizers.

The one bright spot for the Russians was the Brusilov Offensive in June 1916, which achieved a major breakthrough and led the Germans to pull troops out of Verdun and the Austrians to pull them from Italy to try to contain the attack. Eventually the offensive petered out, and neither Brusilov nor the Russian army commanders seemed to have learned much from it, since subsequent attacks went back to ineffective human wave assaults.

I suppose the Austrians deserve some sympathy. They had to field an army made up of soldiers of a dozen nationalities, a babel of languages. The pre-war officers in charge of these units had made some efforts to learn the languages, but these men were quickly swept away in the early fighting, and communications became a major hindrance. Added to that was the incompetence of the high command. It is hard to choose one person as the worst general in a war that had so many bad ones, but surely Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf must be one of the prime contenders for that dubious honor. He was terrible at the strategic level, and also wasted huge numbers of soldiers in non-combat operations, like sending them into the high mountains without winter clothing and without the logistical capacity to supply them. The Austro-Hungarian empire probably would not have survived World War I under any circumstances, but Conrad’s ineptitude pretty much drove the last nail into its coffin.

The book ends with Russia ceasing offensive operations in 1917, and before the Revolution. The author doesn’t address it, but I found myself thinking about one of those great what-if questions: what if Kerensky had not bowed to Allied pressure to continue the war? Would his government then have had enough support to turn back the Communists? When Lenin started his revolution there were only 7000 Bolsheviks and about 12,000 Mensheviks in Russia (which is one of the reasons he so enthusiastically endorsed terror as a force multiplier), so it is possible that history could have turned out much differently.

I have read Stone’s 1980 biography of Hitler, and his book about the Cold War, The Atlantic and its Enemies, and I liked them both. He writes clearly, and does a good job balancing the big picture with supporting details.

[Jean · Rating 4 out of 5]

Norman Stone’s book is one of the few books that look with any detail at the events that took place in the east during World War One. Winston Churchill wrote the first book that addresses the eastern front during WWI but he covered the British viewpoint. Stone’s book was written in 1975 and it suffers from lack of access to the Russian archives other than that it was well research. The book is significant because the events helped shape one of the great events of modern history, the Russian Revolution. Stone’s history is a military one, at times his detailed reconstruction of events including movement of regiments; number of guns, men and so is most tiresome. One of Stone’s themes is that the shape of the war, on a macro and micro scale was determined by wider change taking place in Russia. The Austro-Hungarian government was in chaos and their army was dragged kicking and screaming into the 20th century. Germany had planned to concentrate its forces on the western front and have Austro-Hungarian military covered a good portion of the eastern front. The book covers in detail what happen with this approach. The author’s description of the strategies involved and the failings of all sides that led to war is well research. His discussion of war economics was most interesting. I read this in audio book format. John Telfer did a good job narrating the book. This book does provide the big picture of WWI as many people forget about the battle of the eastern front. This book would be of most interest to those interested in military history. Next year 2014 is the 100th anniversary of the beginning of World War One.

[John · Rating 3 out of 5]

More or less what I was looking for to round out my self-directed learning about the Russian Revolution this year. It was hard to follow at times, and could have used more maps. But it got into tactics and more specifics of the fighting, which is what I wanted.

[Buck · Rating 5 out of 5]

Although dated info, holds up well and is well written. Sometimes self contradictory to slight extent (Russia didn't have a problem with rail capacity in 1917, but Russia had extreme difficulty keeping locomotives operational, for instance).

[Bryan Alexander · Rating 4 out of 5]

A powerful, very useful history of WWI's underappreciated eastern front.

Stone takes the story from Tannenberg up to the Bolshevik revolution, focusing on military affairs. He addresses campaigns and battles, while also spending time on supply, support, and reinforcement needs, which adds a hefty amount of logistical, administrative, and political context.

One of Stone's major arguments is that the Russian empire's warmaking capacity actually wasn't all that backward. Its material underpinnings were quite good, all things considered, and improved greatly during the war. Russia's biggest problem was poor leadership, from fatally divided command to older commanders failing to learn from reality. A persistent north-south split (35) prevented Russia from offering a coherent strategy, and weakened its ability to sanely allocate forces. Only Brusilov appears effective.

Other nations don't come off much better. Stone demolishes Austria-Hungary's leaders, and consistently takes down Ludendorff's reputation as a fine German commander. Some appear competent, like Mackensen.

Other fascinating insights:
-the eastern front was a war of maneuver, compared with the western front's notorious static lines. (92-3)
-far from collapsing, Russia actually modernized through the war.
-WWI armies' ability to field large amounts of reinforcements was unusual, and decisive in shaping static battlefields. (265-6)
-Russians called for scorched earth, but rich landowners could evade it w/bribery. Meanwhile, locals applied extra scorching to Jewish property. "'even the most extreme anti-Semites have been moved to complain of the treatment of the Jews.'" (184)
-Russia actually mobilized a relatively small proportion of its population, as compared to other nations. (216-17)
-eastern front armies relied heavily on horses for transport and as attack cavalry, but this turned out badly. Those units consumed huge amounts of supplies, and ultimately moved too slowly. (49)
-Russia sent some reinforcements to the western and Greek fronts. Some had a wild career:

Some of these troops later took a role in the unrest of the French army in 1917, and there was also trouble in Salonica. Some were repatriated; others were sent to the Sahara for penal service unless they agreed to serve with the Whites [anti-Bolshevik forces in the post-WWI Russian Civil War]. (220, note)

While some criticize Stone for being too dense (long sentences, vast paragraphs), I did not find this to be the case. His prose is well structured, especially for grappling with large, deep issues. Moreover, he has a fine, snarling wit, which leavens things:

Ludendorff's swollen reputation should be drowned in the Carpathian snows. (111)
Böhm-Ermolli... could be trusted to be more sparing with recognition of reality. (114)
The Czechs could be forgiven for concluding that, whatever Austria had achieved against the Turks, she has failed to save Western civilization from the Hungarians. (125)
[Bernard Pares] seems to have been retained [by the British Foreign Office] mainly because he had an energetic impracticality that gave him unique feeling for Russian liberals (144, footnote)
Like most autocracies, its strength was, not that it governed harshly, but that it governed less. (214)
The [Russian] army's statistical office was the Glavny Shtab, which was run, almost by definition, by incompetents, who had failed to make a career in anything other than this department, which was regarded as a water-paper basket. (215)

Maps: very good, but more are needed, especially for the Gorlice battles.

Some events should have received more extensive treatment, like the sieges of Przemyśl. We read one mention of Oskar Hutier (189), and are left to wonder to what extent his eastern front experience shaped his 1918 so-called Hutier infiltration tactics. But that's a sign of a powerful book, that we want more of it.

Sources: the book is dated, emerging in the 1970s. It was groundbreaking then, but it would be terrific to see an updated account working with whatever can be found in Russian archives, plus addressing the past generation of WWI scholarship.

Overall, a fascinating, powerful, useful book.

[Michael · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read this book for graduate school some years ago, and, judging by where I found the bookmark, really only read a small portion of it before going into the classroom to discuss it. I think I was burning out on military history at the time. It's a good book, so far as that goes, but my review should be read with the understanding that my survey of it was incomplete.

Originally written in 1975, the purpose of Norman Stone's book was to attempt to break the discussion of World War I out of the trenches and into a broader context. As important as "positional" warfare was on the Western Front, it was for a variety of reasons never a serious factor in the East, where war of "maneuver" was the rule of the day. Military historians were reasonably aware of this already, but the Eastern Front as a whole still lacked a good overall survey, accessible to students and general readers. Stone also had other axes to grind, especially in regard to Russian military “backwardness.” At the time of writing, Russian military archives were under strict Soviet control, preventing Western historians from effectively examining them, and Soviet historians had to walk a delicate tightrope between appearing inadequately “patriotic” and appearing overly enthusiastic about the pre-revolutionary Czarist regime, causing them to minimize work on the First World War. This resulted in the story being told by the victors, even more than is usual, and the harsh judgments of the Germans and Austrians of their foes becoming the dominant story. Stone sought to correct this view, and, in his introduction in 1998 after the fall of the Soviet Union, considered himself to be reasonably vindicated, while still hoping that future studies would make use of the Russian archives to give a more complete story.

The book itself is heavy on traditional military history, although not of the generally dreary and static sort we identify with battles the Western Front. The maps demonstrate the frequent large-scale movements of troops, and the complexities of battle over a wide-ranging area with far fewer units per square mile than existed in the West. There is no doubt that the Eastern Front makes more exciting reading than the West, simply because more was happening there than advances of a few meters at the expense of thousands of lives. Stone covers this action in chronological format, devoting three hundred pages to a period of just over three years, allowing for a great deal of detail and perspective. He is especially interested in questions of supply and materiel, which he sees as critical to wide-ranging operations.

Overall, I would say that this book may not be exactly my cup of tea, but it is very good at what it does, and well deserves to remain in print after so many years. For those who are excited by military history, this will offer a new and possibly important perspective on a war they thought they already knew, and for those who study Europe professionally, this will widen understanding of important events.

[R.M.F. Brown · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent introduction for the layman.

Addressing an oft-neglected period of of the Great War, Norman Stone provides us with a concise narrative of some of the war's most brutal campaigns. With an impressive array of facts and figures, he debunks the myth of Tsarist Russia being unable to wage total war, debunks the myth of Ludendorff as a military genius, and highlights how the February revolution of 1917 in Russia, was not brought about by mass conscription or severe food shortage, but rather a failure of the authorities to move food from the countryside to the city.

Stone also address another curious factor, the relatively static lines of the Eastern front. Unlike the Western front, the great expanse of the east provided ample room for manoeuvre and great break-through, but as Stone points out, the mobility wasn't there (the combustion engine was still in its infancy) and cavalry were next to useless at exploiting breakthroughs (modern firepower meant that even a squad off men could see off a cavalry troop)

The book suffers slightly from the author's inability to decide whether or not he's writing a military history of the eastern front, or a military history of the Russian army during this period, and this halfway house approach is evident in the latter chapters. Some more information about the Austro-Hungarians would have been welcome.

Despite this, this remains a classic of the genre.

[Eric · Rating 4 out of 5]

Quite a good read.

As promised, the text covers the Eastern Front of the First World War. The author provides a brisk, but engaging account of the German, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian efforts over the course of the war.

Russia gets the most attention, something the author readily admits in his introduction. Germany comes second with the Dual Monarchy a distant third. Personally, I found this a bit disappointing as I regard Austria-Hungary as the most fascinating combatant of the war and had hoped a book focused on the Eastern Front would cover the Oost-Reich in greater detail. Still, the content is solid. The development and execution of strategy and tactics on both sides receives due attention.

The author offers his own armchair general critique of individual battles and commanders (though nothing terribly controversial aside from his assessment of General Ludendorff). Additionally, there is a very thorough analysis of the Tsarist Russian military/industrial complex. I only wish a similar treatment had been extended to the Central Powers. Despite the focus on Russia 1917 receives limited coverage, as does the Treaty of Brest-Litvosk.

Politics are also largely outside the book's remit, leaving something to be desired. Still, for all my complaints "The Eastern Front" is an excellent account of an often overlooked part of the war.

[Fred Dameron · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you are into WWI or Russian history this is a great read. Here in the west we hear Tannenberg and then it's March and October 1917. What happened in between. This work fills that void.

Russian history blames shell shortages and the lack of Russian production for much of what went wrong from Jan 1915 until Jan 1917, when essentially the fighting stopped. The reality, as shown by the statistics of shell production and all other armaments, was much different. There were enough shells, rifles, aircraft, uniforms, and food stocks for the army. The problem was getting everything moved. The problem, as in the west, was the Generals did not know how to fight the mechanized war with the logistics train of the horse. This was even more true on the Eastern front where rail capacity was much less than in France and the front was two and at times three times as long as the west. Finally the last item that Stone looks at was the leadership and command structure. Two different fronts, uncoordinated, fighting for supplies and rolling stock, a commiserate that would sell army supplies for personnel profit on all fronts, STAVKA that was filled with incompetent brown nosing aristocrats, a cavalry and artillery Corp whose officers hated the infantry and would not work with them and the list of command issues goes on and on. In the West the Staffs worked to find new solutions to the trench wars. New tech was used, tanks and airplanes etc. New tactics in concealment and movement of reserves to exploit breaches, Vimy Ridge. All led to new and inventive tactics that led to strategic movement of the front. In the East the staffs were still fighting the Crimea which is a total disconbobulation of what should have happened as many of the Staff issues had been identified, but not fixed. Any thing and everything was blamed except for the inept Staff work, the logistical issues of a modern army, and the new production statistics that a modern war would require. One fascinating issue was the Russian Navy was rebuilt after the Russo - Japanese war. Really rebuild the Navy? To do what try to move against the Imperial Germ Navy in the Baltic? The whole idea of Russia post Russ/Japan war rebuilding the Navy is ludicrous. Money wasted on Battleships that should have been used for Army radios, rail millage, rolling stock, modern rifles etc. All of this can and should be laid at the foot of the Tsar and his advisors. This also leads the blame for the Civil War at the same inept Tsar. There is a lot of Russian Historians who say the Tsarina was a German spy. She was NOT a spy, but the way she ran her husband led to much of the dysfunction at STAVKA, the Army fronts, the Corps, Armies, all the way down to Companies. Nicholas was a figure head who had a bad habit of putting in his two Rubles worth in promotions, staffing, assignments etc at the worst time. Another major point Stone makes is that the best officers, most inventive and open to new ideas, mostly fought for the Red Army after the Bolshevik revolution. The White Army was commanded by the old guard of the Russian Army, traditional, unimaginative and scoffing at any new ideas. This work does not go into the Civil War, but looking at how the war went when the Whites had allied support and supplies with NCO's and some leadership supplied by the west they won. When that support went away in 1919 the White Army was done and the end was short and quick.

Many of the reasons the Russian Revolution happened started in the trench's of 1915 through Jan 1917. They started because Russia could not cope with the vast upheaval of people from rural to urban living. These issues get addressed in the last chapter. This is a essential primer on what happened from Aug 1914 until Jan 1917 and fills the void that western historians have left about Russia in that time period.

[Paul Jenkins · Rating 4 out of 5]

While I’ve read a lot of both general books about the First World War, and more specifically, specific accounts of the Western Front, my knowledge of the events of the war on the Eastern Front is much more limited. Norman Stone’s classic work (first published in 1975) The Eastern Front 1914-7 did much to fill in some of the key detail, but just as importantly to give a feel for the political, economic and social context in which this conflict was fought out.

As becomes clear in reading this account it is very difficult to study the history of the Eastern Front without being drawn to the subsequent events of the Bolshevik Revolution, the rule of Stalin and the Second World War. Some of this territory makes for the most interesting sections of the book.

While accepting that the cataclysmic stresses of war did much to accelerate the fall of the Tsar, he argues it was administrative chaos and political failures rather than economic weakness which principally undermined the Russian war effort and ultimately its regime. Indeed, there is some interesting evidence that First World War was in fact a time of unprecedented investment and expansion in the Russian economy creating structures which, in fact, the Bolsheviks were well placed to make good use of.

The First World War, of course, saw the demise of more than one empire. The Eastern Front is also a good account of the underlying weaknesses of the Austro-Hungarian army and how these were exacerbated by some classic errors of leadership.

Given a bigger space, poorer systems of transport and different concentrations of troops there were important differences in the conflict in the East compared to the stalemate of the Western Front. However, at the same time, despite some significant tactical successes neither side were able to make a decisive breakthrough in the East as much as they were in the West. Stone is a very good historical writer, and he is excellent at describing the overall dynamics of the fighting and, in particular, the challenges of reconciling the weight of force and firepower required to make a breakthrough with any element of surprise and follow up. He identifies the Russian general Brusilov as coming as close in his offensive as anyone on the Eastern Front to the development of an effective set of tactics.

I found this a very interesting introduction to the subject and, as I have said, Stone is a fluent and very readable historical writer who describes very well the big sweep of historical events. As he admits himself the book lack the stories of everyday soldiers which does so much to enliven writing about the Western Front. However, I’d recommend The Easter Front to anyone who wants to add to their knowledge of the First World War and its impact on wider events.

[Dana Johnson · Rating 2 out of 5]

What a slog.

To start, as other reviews mention, this is not a comprehensive overview of the Eastern Front in WW1 as the title would indicate. This is primarily a thesis in which the author explains why Russia performed so poorly in the war and subsequently experienced civil war.

In answering that question, this undoubtedly proves that it was characteristic mismanagement of everything from tactics and logistics to politics and money. In the examples of major battles and political machinations Stone chooses to describe, this is evident and interesting. The highlight of the book is when the Russians appear to learn from 2 years of mistakes and brilliantly execute the Brusilov offensive, only to be undermined by returning to previous methods and eventually the catastrophe of Romanian intervention. Other high points are when Stone chooses to spend decent time on the doings of Germany and in particular Austria-Hungary. These points shine in the book. I really wish more time was devoted to other players in the Eastern Front beyond mention in a few sentences or paragraphs such as the Ottomans, Bulgarians, Serbians or Greeks (curiously Romania gets half of a chapter).

Unfortunately, Stone seems to be absolutely enthralled by comparative numbers and statistics both in terms of Russian army strengths and economics. Protracted sections of tables and accounting of these topics, seriously bog down the narrative and serve to be highly confusing. They would be much better served as appendices. In addition, the editing here is terrible. Extreme long winded run on sentences dominate a lot of these passages and frequently points are repeated up to three times. Often, timelines are also out of order and chronology highly confusing. In stark contrast to Tuchman's Guns of August, Stone does not have a talent for describing battlefield geography and movements. It seems often that he wants to write a book about economics and logistics, but feels like he has to talk about war stuff in between.

The result is a fairly disjointed and hard to read book. A good editor seems to have been missed, and future editions of this would benefit from heavy revision.

It's often said that the Eastern Front is largely forgotten. From other books and the good parts here, I know that it's fascinating and deserves attention due to its differences from and importance to the Western Front, and it implications for Eastern European history. They hype quotes on the cover of this talk about it being "an unsurpassed landmark", which I can't help but wonder is a reason for people ignoring this subject, if it's landmark text is so poor.

If you have any interest in this subject, I do not recommend this book, at least not as a starting point.

[Dave Franklin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Norman Stone’s penetrating book, “The Eastern Front,” is an authoritative account of the Russian front in the First World War. Stone employs primary documents to belie the claims surrounding the war in the East, demonstrating how inefficiency and incompetence rather than material shortages led to Russia’s many failures and eventual demise.

Stone, following conventional historians, constructs a narrative that chronicles the military incomprehension regarding mass and movement, and attack and defense that gripped most armies in the early 20th century. Technological innovations: railroads, telegraph, automobiles, airplanes, repeating rifles, machine-guns, and rapid firing artillery changed almost every calculation that was thought to govern Europe after the Franco-Prussian War.

Stone points out the obsolescence of horse cavalry which was unsuited for modern warfare; and, the yet to be realized transcendence induced by motorized transport. By the later stages of the war, the internal combustion engine had improved to allow the development of a variety of vehicles, including tanks.

Russian inefficiency in the conduct of war pervades all aspects of Stone’s history. In addition to military fecklessness, the entire economy lacked the ability to use their railway system, factories, or their financial system efficiently. In a matter of days, the Germans could move an army corps; the same maneuver might consume a month for the Russian army. Likewise, Russian factories and banks were anchored in the era of Alexander II.

The Russians did enjoy some successes in World War I. The initial invasion of East Prussia took the Germans by surprise The Brusilov offensive in 1916 on the South-West Front was a major success that crippled the Austro-Hungarian army, and effectively ended Austro Hungary’s efforts in Romania, as well as its Italian campaign.

Stone concludes his study by illuminating social conditions in Russia, c.1917, that lead to chaos and social breakdown. After the March revolution, the Kerensky government continued the war, and the Bolshevik leaders Kamenev and Stalin appealed for order in the army and in the factories. It was Lenin’s return in April that propelled the Bolshevik revolution, and led to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Stone’s book is a difficult read. Along with source documents, statistics and maps- which detail unfamiliar terrain, the author assumes that the reader is conversant with much of 19th century European history. That said, this is a book that should be read by anyone who hopes to obtain an understanding of the current war in Ukraine.

[Heinz Reinhardt · Rating 2 out of 5]

The Eastern Front of the Great War is still, lamentably, the forgotten, unloved step child of military historiography. Even with the, thankfully growing, pile of books on the East Front of WWII, there is precious little on that of WWI.
Having already started Pritt Buttar's superb quadrilogy on the Eastern Front of WWI, and seeing a luminary such as he recommend this title, I gave it a shot.
Stone's work on the Eastern Front of WWI is a fairly short book, considering the immensity of the topic. At 300 pages of narrative it simply feels rushed. Part of this is because when the book was written, the 70's, there was little readily available for researchers to mine vis a vis Russian source material. However, now that Moscow has opened it's archives, one wonders why Stone's book is the only complete narrative of the East Front of the First War out there?
Stone skims and glosses over the campaign and operational narrative, focusing on the political and economic aspects of the conflict. This is both unfortunate, and at the same time the only reason this book is worth reading, really.
Current research into the Russian sources makes some of Stone's observations on the political infighting a bit invalid, and the sparse military record is now fully revived as Buttar has proven with his books. However, Stone's look into the economic strengths of the Czarist Empire are the meat of an otherwise largely bread narrative.
Stone showcases, quite convincingly, even if these passages are as dry as stale toast, that the Russian Empire was not nearly as backwards in terms of infrastructure or technology as has, and still is, claimed. Russia's problem was bureacrat inefficiency, not exactly a new revelation now or then, but the hard data Stone provides is valuable.
That said, there is little else to admire of this book which was written with little in the way of passion for the subject, almost as though Stone reserved it merely for lonely, soul deprived academics who had long since bid farewell to any hint or tremor of a joyous existence.
The books strength of showcasing Russian economic vitality, are outmatched by a lackluster military narrative, and political sections far too informed by the handicap of Cold War limits to Russian sources.
Sad to say, can't really recommend this one.

[Russ Spence · Rating 4 out of 5]

i got this after reading an interview where it was recommended, and was glad I did. This is quite a slim book on a subject largely neglected in the, but with a dramatic effect on the history of Europe in the 20th Century. This explodes a few myths; The Russian war machine by 1916 was as capable as any in Europe, the poor Russian fighting man being failed more by poor leadership than any sort of "backward" economy - that poor leadership leading directly to the Russian Revolution. The other myth exploded is the reputation of Ludendorf (much more than Hindenberg, hardly mentioned in this, although they appear to have come as a matching pair throughout the war). In the cold light of day, Hindenberg and Ludendorf's victory at Tannenberg is only seen as a major crushing defeat of the Russian force because Ludendorf told everyone it was; the Russians miss chances to win battles against their actual enemies because of petty rivalries and intrigues, but Stone points out the the Germans and Austro - Hungarians do too. At the end of this three royal houses of central Europe are destroyed. An excellent book.

[Eric · Rating 4 out of 5]

I would have rated the book five stars, but it was just too short. The approach was focused on troop movement, logistics, and battle front administration. The book had the effect of stripping the romance, so to speak of major Eastern Front engagements and proffer a reasonable explanation based more on the mind set of local commanders and the availability of supplies and transport. Assuming greater access to war time powers archives, this book would be much more fun (and informative) if expanded.

A final non sequitur is to compare this short volume, considered the current definitive work on WWI Eastern Front, with the massive amount of works on the Western Front. Given the Bolshevik collapse in 1917, leading to 70 years of Soviet tragedy in one form or another, and the almost German win in the West in March 2018, surely the Eastern Front merits more attention than given to it to date.

[Brian Miracle · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting summary of the Russian side of World War 1. The author discusses the economic and logistical concerns that adversely affected Russian performance during the war and that contributed to the Russian revolutions of 1917. The author portrays the big picture of the various offensives on the Russian front. There could have been more maps. There are only 10 in the book and the 1917 Kerensky offensive and the German Baltic offensives aren’t included. I used the World War 1 Illustrated Atlas to supplement the book’s maps. The author stops the book at the Bolshevik Revolution, so fighting after October, 1917 isn’t covered and fighting in 1917 as a whole is just summarized.

This book is good, but I’d like to see a better coverage of the Eastern Front. I will read Churchill’s volume on the Eastern Front in the future, as well as specific books on Tannenburg and the Brusilov Offensive.

3.5 stars.

[Jack Summers · Rating 2 out of 5]

I found this book difficult to absorb as it was very densely packed with facts and figures and rarely left a very high-level overview to zero in on any personalilties. I found the ending chapter particularly dissapointing as I was fascinated to learn how the revolution affected the front, but this boiled down in the book to "there was an armistice", then 20 pages on very precise railway rolling stock and grain production figures; then on the final page it half-mentions that the soldiers went home. No mention at all of the aftermath of the war, such as details of the armistice itself, and doesnt mention how the change in governments post-Tsar affected the front.

Very much a facts and figures book, and i can see it has a large audience, but woukd not recommend for anyone more interested in the human side of history.

[Steve Dyster]

Amongst the numerous reviews, I feel that I have little to add. I would have liked better quality maps - clearer and easier to interpret. Apart form that, other readers/reviewers have dealt with many different aspects of the book. It undoubtedly added to my knowledge. Short? Yes, but manageable. As ever, I want to know more about certain aspects of the Eastern Front. With such a war of movement, I would like to know more about refugees; in the multi-ethnic and nationally charged region, what about the political ramifications of the changing state of affairs. This is less a criticism of a book that was written with the clear intention of dealing with military matters, just where I'd like to go next.

[Dropbear123 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mainly the Russian perspective on the Eastern Front in WW1. The military chapters were fairly unmemorable. Very old fashioned top-down approach, focused on armies and corps moving around with little on the views of ordinary soldiers. Plus the maps in the Penguin Penguin Classics edition were not very helpful. The chapters in things like the economy or the prewar army were pretty enjoyable but pretty much only on the Russian point of view, little on Germany or Austria-Hungary. Stone’s general argument is that Russia was not as economically backward as made out and Russia’s failures in the war were mainly the fault of bad management and poor choices. Overall I enjoyed it but I’m really into WW1. Would only recommend it if you’re also interested in the war, otherwise you’d find it very dull.

[Jim · Rating 2 out of 5]

I give props to Norman Stone for researching and writing on this subject. The Eastern Front of the First World War is not a well-known area of history, particularly here in the United States.

The book, however, focuses too much on the logistics and economics of the war, and not enough on the actual battles and campaigns. Tanneberg for example, one of the preeminent battles of the war, received only a few pages of coverage.

Hopefully soon we will have a more detailed history of this front, for now, Stone's work is a decent entry.

[Porter Broyles · Rating 3 out of 5]

I don't know much about the Eastern Front and this book helped to fill some of that deficeincy.

Unfortunately, I listened to this as an audio book. Apparently there are a ton of tables in the book as a large portion of the book was the narrator reading the tables. "Tanks 1914, 128. Tanks 1917, 264. Cannons 1914, 345. Cannons 1917, 923. etc." Or "Divisions German, 20. Divisions Russian, 22. Divisions French, 23." Etc.

This made listening to the book infuriating.

[Dennis Normile · Rating 4 out of 5]

I really enjoyed this book, it was the first book dedicated to the Eastern Front of the Great War I read. While very informative of strategic matters, I found it to be very critical of the Russian Army, and portrayed every German victory as effortless and bloodless. On the whole, I definitely recommend it to any Great War enthusiast.