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624 pages, Hardcover
Published April 25, 2023
"[Starting from the 18th century Russia and China] moved towards each other until they divided all the territory between them ..."
"... Several times in [the centuries that followed] ... the two powers have peered over the brink, as it were, only to draw back as if daunted by the latent potential of the other side. One former Soviet China Hand has observed that during the entire four centuries of their interaction China and Russia have never fought a major war" (p. 511).
Superficially reminiscent of the Sino-Soviet tandem of the 1950s, the new partnership differed from it in fundamental ways. It was not a revolutionary combination but a deeply traditional and conservative one. The two partners took their stand in effect on the principles of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, of unfettered national sovereignty and the right of national governments to do as they pleased in their own backyards without interference from outside, in defiance of the growing opinion in the United States and the West that governments were answerable to a global tribunal for the treatment of their populations. And this simple creed of Leave Us Alone bound them together with a more potent glue than Marxism-Leninism had ever been (p. 498).
It can be argued that no foreigner ever made a more masterful impact upon Chinese history than Joseph Stalin. He never set foot in China, and some of the Chinese who met him found his knowledge of their country at best superficial. Yet from his rise to dominance in Moscow in 1922–4 the Soviet strongman exerted a decisive influence over Chinese affairs, shaping the outcome of a series of civil and external conflicts, coaxing or threatening some of the most prominent local leaders and tugging the country’s political forces this way and that in pursuit of his crude but consistent goals ... (p. 249)
... Deng [always] fumed privately at the ‘stupidity’, the ‘idiocy’ of Gorbachev in embarking on a programme of economic reform without taking care to maintain his Party’s political grip. Some might argue that the CCP’s approach to reform was proved right by events, that it was a case, in the immortal formulation of 1066 and All That, of Gorbachev, ‘Wrong but Wromantic’ versus Deng Xiaoping, ‘Right but Repulsive’. But Gorbachev always claimed that in Soviet circumstances economic reform could never have been attempted while leaving the political lid on ... (p. 485)