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Degrade and Destroy
“This is the ultimate insider’s view of perhaps the darkest chapter of the Forever Wars. Michael R. Gordon knows everyone, was seemingly everywhere, and brings a lifetime of brilliant reporting to telling this crucial story.” ―Retired U.S. Navy Admiral James Stavridis, Sixteenth Supreme Allied Commander of NATO and author of To Risk It Nine Conflicts and the Crucible of Decision
An essential account of the struggle against ISIS―and of how Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden have waged war.
In the summer of 2014, President Barack Obama faced an unwelcome insurgents from the Islamic State had seized the Iraqi city of Mosul and proclaimed a new caliphate, which they were ruling with an iron fist and using to launch terrorist attacks abroad. After considerable deliberation, President Obama sent American troops back to Iraq. The new mission was to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS, primarily by advising Iraqi and Syrian partners who would do the bulk of the fighting and by supporting them with airpower and artillery. More than four years later, the caliphate had been dismantled, the cities of Mosul and Raqqa lay in ruins, and several thousand U.S. troops remained to prevent ISIS from making a comeback. The “by, with, and through” strategy was hailed as a template for future campaigns. But how was the war actually fought? What were the key decisions, successes, and failures? And what was learned?
In Degrade and Destroy , the bestselling author and Wall Street Journal national security correspondent Michael R. Gordon reveals the strategy debates, diplomatic gambits, and military operations that shaped the struggle against the Islamic State. With extraordinary access to top U.S. officials and military commanders and to the forces on the battlefield, Gordon offers a riveting narrative that ferrets out some of the war’s most guarded secrets.
Degrade and Destroy takes us inside National Security Council meetings at which Obama and his top aides grapple with early setbacks and discuss whether the war can be won. It also offers the most detailed account to date of how President Donald Trump waged war―delegating greater authority to the Pentagon but jeopardizing the outcome with a rush for the exit. Drawing on his reporting in Iraq and Syria, Gordon documents the closed-door deliberations of U.S. generals with their Iraqi and Syrian counterparts and describes some of the toughest urban battles since World War II. As Americans debate the future of using force abroad, Gordon’s book offers vital insights into how our wars today are fought against militant foes, and the enduring lessons we can draw from them.
An essential account of the struggle against ISIS―and of how Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden have waged war.
In the summer of 2014, President Barack Obama faced an unwelcome insurgents from the Islamic State had seized the Iraqi city of Mosul and proclaimed a new caliphate, which they were ruling with an iron fist and using to launch terrorist attacks abroad. After considerable deliberation, President Obama sent American troops back to Iraq. The new mission was to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS, primarily by advising Iraqi and Syrian partners who would do the bulk of the fighting and by supporting them with airpower and artillery. More than four years later, the caliphate had been dismantled, the cities of Mosul and Raqqa lay in ruins, and several thousand U.S. troops remained to prevent ISIS from making a comeback. The “by, with, and through” strategy was hailed as a template for future campaigns. But how was the war actually fought? What were the key decisions, successes, and failures? And what was learned?
In Degrade and Destroy , the bestselling author and Wall Street Journal national security correspondent Michael R. Gordon reveals the strategy debates, diplomatic gambits, and military operations that shaped the struggle against the Islamic State. With extraordinary access to top U.S. officials and military commanders and to the forces on the battlefield, Gordon offers a riveting narrative that ferrets out some of the war’s most guarded secrets.
Degrade and Destroy takes us inside National Security Council meetings at which Obama and his top aides grapple with early setbacks and discuss whether the war can be won. It also offers the most detailed account to date of how President Donald Trump waged war―delegating greater authority to the Pentagon but jeopardizing the outcome with a rush for the exit. Drawing on his reporting in Iraq and Syria, Gordon documents the closed-door deliberations of U.S. generals with their Iraqi and Syrian counterparts and describes some of the toughest urban battles since World War II. As Americans debate the future of using force abroad, Gordon’s book offers vital insights into how our wars today are fought against militant foes, and the enduring lessons we can draw from them.
512 pages, Paperback
First published June 14, 2022
About the author
Michael R. Gordon
6 books37 followersMICHAEL R. GORDON is the chief military correspondent for The New York Times, where he has worked since 1985. He is the coauthor, with Bernard E. Trainor, of The Generals' War and Cobra II.
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
June 20, 2026
Das Buch behandelt den von den USA angeführten, aber größtenteils von den kurdischen Kräften in Süd- und Westkurdistan geführten Krieg gegen die größte Terrororganisation der jüngeren Geschichte. An vielen Stellen habe ich interessante Einzelinformationen gelesen, die mir ein tieferes Verständnis für die Entwicklungen vermittelt haben, die zum Aufstieg des IS führten. Angefangen bei der sektiererischen Führung Nuri al-Malikis im Irak und dem Gefühl der Ungerechtigkeit unter den Sunniten, das viele letztlich in die Arme der al-Qaida-Terroristen trieb.
Besonders interessant war für mich, dass der Autor auch den zu schnellen Abzug der amerikanischen Truppen als einen entscheidenden Faktor für die Stärkung von al-Qaida und den daraus hervorgehenden Islamischen Staat betrachtet. Als Leser stellt man sich dabei unweigerlich die Frage, was ein erneuter amerikanischer Rückzug aus Syrien oder dem Irak bedeuten würde. Damals waren die Folgen genauso wenig vorhersehbar wie das, was in zwei oder drei Jahren in Syrien geschehen könnte. Dieses Mal möglicherweise nicht nur aus Fahrlässigkeit, sondern aus mittel- und langfristiger Kurzsichtigkeit der amerikanischen Politik.
An einer Stelle erklärt der Autor, wie die Amerikaner darüber debattierten, ob sie die Errichtung eines kurdischen Staates in Südkurdistan (das vom Irak besetzhe Teil) unterstützen würden – ähnlich wie die Unterstützung Israels im Jahr 1948. Eine Entwicklung, die vielleicht den ersten großen Baustein für die Entstehung eines Großkurdistans hätte darstellen können. Diese Idee wurde letztlich verworfen. Dennoch ist es bemerkenswert, dass eine solche Diskussion überhaupt geführt wurde. Es zeigt, dass die größten Bestrebungen und Träume einer ganzen Nation für eine Weltmacht oftmals nicht mehr als strategische Überlegungen sind. Die USA unterstützten die Kurden zwar im Kampf gegen den IS, doch diese Unterstützung war nie bedingungslos und schloss die größeren nationalen Anliegen nicht mit ein.
Der Autor schildert ebenfalls die Bedeutung des heroischen Kampfes meiner Heimatstadt Kobane. Dort wurde der Welt gezeigt, dass es eine bewaffnete Kraft und vor allem eine Bevölkerung gibt, die bereit ist, für Frieden und Freiheit zu kämpfen und notfalls auch zu sterben. Die Details der Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Kurden und den Amerikanern sind äußerst interessant. Allein zu verstehen, welcher gewaltige Apparat analysierte und bewertete, inwieweit eine Kooperation trotz des Drucks aus der Türkei möglich war, ist faszinierend. Ebenso bemerkenswert ist, dass die Obama-Regierung selbst nach Tausenden gefallenen kurdischen Kämpfern lange davor zurückschreckte, die politische Entscheidung für eine engere Zusammenarbeit mit den Kurden zu treffen, weil sie den NATO-Partner Türkei nicht verärgern wollte.
An dem Tag, an dem Mazlum Kobane erstmals mit den Amerikanern zusammentraf, führte er am selben Tag auch ein Treffen mit Qasem Soleimani, dem Kommandeur der Quds-Brigaden der iranischen Revolutionsgarden. Auch dieser bot eine Zusammenarbeit an. Das wirft die Frage auf, ob die Kurden im Nachhinein möglicherweise klüger gehandelt hätten, wenn sie sich mit dem Iran verbündet hätten. Denn wie Henry Kissinger einmal sagte: „Es ist gefährlich, Amerikas Gegner zu sein, aber tödlich, Amerikas Verbündeter zu sein.“
Besonders bemerkenswert fand ich außerdem, dass die Kurden an verschiedenen Stellen diejenigen waren, die sich um zivile Opfer oder das, was die Amerikaner als „Kollateralschäden“ bezeichnen würden, Sorgen machten, während dieser Aspekt für die Amerikaner häufig zweitrangig war. Dies erscheint umso interessanter angesichts der Vorwürfe, die heute von Teilen der amerikanischen Politik und ihren Verbündeten gegen die Kurden in Syrien erhoben werden.
Noch trauriger finde ich die Tatsache, dass alle zwanzig amerikanischen Soldaten, die im Kampf gegen den IS ums Leben kamen, in diesem Buch namentlich dokumentiert werden, während die größten Opfer dieses Krieges – die fast zehntausend gefallenen Kurden – nie dieselbe Aufmerksamkeit oder Würdigung erhalten werden. Natürlich ist jeder einzelne Tote eine Tragödie. Doch wie man so oft sagt: Wenn viele Menschen sterben, werden sie zur Statistik. Da stellt sich die Frage, was ein Menschenleben tatsächlich bedeutet und ob wirklich alle Menschenleben gleich viel wert sind. Nicht nur für die Menschen selbst, die in Regionen leben, in denen der Tod zum Alltag gehört, sondern auch in einer Weltordnung, in der der Tod einzelner Angehöriger einer Nation für die Weltgemeinschaft oftmals mehr Gewicht zu haben scheint als der Tod Tausender Angehöriger einer anderen.
Es ist ein ernüchterndes Buch. Nicht wegen seiner Enthüllungen – vieles davon war mir als jemand aus der Region bereits bekannt –, sondern weil dieses Buch wie eine Metapher zeigt, dass das prägendste Ereignis meines bisherigen Lebens für andere nichts weiter sein kann als eine interessante Lektüre. Eine historische Erzählung über Telefonate, Berichte und Geheimdienstoperationen, die längst abgeschlossen sind und heute nur noch Geschichte darstellen.
Das ist keine neue Erkenntnis. Doch es bleibt jedes Mal aufs Neue erstaunlich und ernüchternd zu erkennen, wie machtlos nicht nur ich, sondern viele Menschen sind, wenn sie nicht über die Kraft verfügen, sich in dieser von Machtpolitik und Eigeninteressen geprägten Welt durchzusetzen.
4/5
Besonders interessant war für mich, dass der Autor auch den zu schnellen Abzug der amerikanischen Truppen als einen entscheidenden Faktor für die Stärkung von al-Qaida und den daraus hervorgehenden Islamischen Staat betrachtet. Als Leser stellt man sich dabei unweigerlich die Frage, was ein erneuter amerikanischer Rückzug aus Syrien oder dem Irak bedeuten würde. Damals waren die Folgen genauso wenig vorhersehbar wie das, was in zwei oder drei Jahren in Syrien geschehen könnte. Dieses Mal möglicherweise nicht nur aus Fahrlässigkeit, sondern aus mittel- und langfristiger Kurzsichtigkeit der amerikanischen Politik.
An einer Stelle erklärt der Autor, wie die Amerikaner darüber debattierten, ob sie die Errichtung eines kurdischen Staates in Südkurdistan (das vom Irak besetzhe Teil) unterstützen würden – ähnlich wie die Unterstützung Israels im Jahr 1948. Eine Entwicklung, die vielleicht den ersten großen Baustein für die Entstehung eines Großkurdistans hätte darstellen können. Diese Idee wurde letztlich verworfen. Dennoch ist es bemerkenswert, dass eine solche Diskussion überhaupt geführt wurde. Es zeigt, dass die größten Bestrebungen und Träume einer ganzen Nation für eine Weltmacht oftmals nicht mehr als strategische Überlegungen sind. Die USA unterstützten die Kurden zwar im Kampf gegen den IS, doch diese Unterstützung war nie bedingungslos und schloss die größeren nationalen Anliegen nicht mit ein.
Der Autor schildert ebenfalls die Bedeutung des heroischen Kampfes meiner Heimatstadt Kobane. Dort wurde der Welt gezeigt, dass es eine bewaffnete Kraft und vor allem eine Bevölkerung gibt, die bereit ist, für Frieden und Freiheit zu kämpfen und notfalls auch zu sterben. Die Details der Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Kurden und den Amerikanern sind äußerst interessant. Allein zu verstehen, welcher gewaltige Apparat analysierte und bewertete, inwieweit eine Kooperation trotz des Drucks aus der Türkei möglich war, ist faszinierend. Ebenso bemerkenswert ist, dass die Obama-Regierung selbst nach Tausenden gefallenen kurdischen Kämpfern lange davor zurückschreckte, die politische Entscheidung für eine engere Zusammenarbeit mit den Kurden zu treffen, weil sie den NATO-Partner Türkei nicht verärgern wollte.
An dem Tag, an dem Mazlum Kobane erstmals mit den Amerikanern zusammentraf, führte er am selben Tag auch ein Treffen mit Qasem Soleimani, dem Kommandeur der Quds-Brigaden der iranischen Revolutionsgarden. Auch dieser bot eine Zusammenarbeit an. Das wirft die Frage auf, ob die Kurden im Nachhinein möglicherweise klüger gehandelt hätten, wenn sie sich mit dem Iran verbündet hätten. Denn wie Henry Kissinger einmal sagte: „Es ist gefährlich, Amerikas Gegner zu sein, aber tödlich, Amerikas Verbündeter zu sein.“
Besonders bemerkenswert fand ich außerdem, dass die Kurden an verschiedenen Stellen diejenigen waren, die sich um zivile Opfer oder das, was die Amerikaner als „Kollateralschäden“ bezeichnen würden, Sorgen machten, während dieser Aspekt für die Amerikaner häufig zweitrangig war. Dies erscheint umso interessanter angesichts der Vorwürfe, die heute von Teilen der amerikanischen Politik und ihren Verbündeten gegen die Kurden in Syrien erhoben werden.
Noch trauriger finde ich die Tatsache, dass alle zwanzig amerikanischen Soldaten, die im Kampf gegen den IS ums Leben kamen, in diesem Buch namentlich dokumentiert werden, während die größten Opfer dieses Krieges – die fast zehntausend gefallenen Kurden – nie dieselbe Aufmerksamkeit oder Würdigung erhalten werden. Natürlich ist jeder einzelne Tote eine Tragödie. Doch wie man so oft sagt: Wenn viele Menschen sterben, werden sie zur Statistik. Da stellt sich die Frage, was ein Menschenleben tatsächlich bedeutet und ob wirklich alle Menschenleben gleich viel wert sind. Nicht nur für die Menschen selbst, die in Regionen leben, in denen der Tod zum Alltag gehört, sondern auch in einer Weltordnung, in der der Tod einzelner Angehöriger einer Nation für die Weltgemeinschaft oftmals mehr Gewicht zu haben scheint als der Tod Tausender Angehöriger einer anderen.
Es ist ein ernüchterndes Buch. Nicht wegen seiner Enthüllungen – vieles davon war mir als jemand aus der Region bereits bekannt –, sondern weil dieses Buch wie eine Metapher zeigt, dass das prägendste Ereignis meines bisherigen Lebens für andere nichts weiter sein kann als eine interessante Lektüre. Eine historische Erzählung über Telefonate, Berichte und Geheimdienstoperationen, die längst abgeschlossen sind und heute nur noch Geschichte darstellen.
Das ist keine neue Erkenntnis. Doch es bleibt jedes Mal aufs Neue erstaunlich und ernüchternd zu erkennen, wie machtlos nicht nur ich, sondern viele Menschen sind, wenn sie nicht über die Kraft verfügen, sich in dieser von Machtpolitik und Eigeninteressen geprägten Welt durchzusetzen.
4/5
September 6, 2022
Michael R. Gordon wrote 2 of the best books about the 2003 US Iraq invasion and the ensuing occupation, "Cobra II" and "The End Game" so I was excited to see he had written one of the first analyses and recounting of the 2013-2021 US effort to contain and eventually destroy ISIS.
"Degrade & Destroy" does a fantastic job recounting how ISIS arose in months after the US ended its occupation of Iraq in 2011 and mixed foreign fighters and disaffected Iraqis to create an insurgent army that started with car bombs and assassinations in the Sunni provinces of Iraq but was soon taking over larger and larger Iraqi cities in a snowball of bloody chaos. The Iraqi authorities slowly and begrudgingly came to accept that they needed help from the US to counter. So just 3 years after the US left, the Obama administration started letting advisors and SOF enter Iraq to help the Iraqis, but that led to increasing US air support and after ISIS had been forced out of the major Iraqi cites like Mosul, several thousand US Marines, SOF and others would help the Iraqis chase ISIS over into Syria where the US then backed a non-Assad aligned group in destroying ISIS in Syria.
Before it was over the theater would see large interventions by the Iranians and the Russian military with the US and Russia going to extreme lengths to insure that no combat accidents between the 2 countries happened that might spiral out of control. Even then, a rather mysterious and never owned up to assault by the Russian mercenaries, the Wagner Group on a US position ended in the US unleashing an hours long barrage on the Russian column that killed hundreds of Russians. A crazy incident that was barely covered in the US and both sides seemed to pretend did not happen.
"Degrade & Destroy" does a fantastic job recounting how ISIS arose in months after the US ended its occupation of Iraq in 2011 and mixed foreign fighters and disaffected Iraqis to create an insurgent army that started with car bombs and assassinations in the Sunni provinces of Iraq but was soon taking over larger and larger Iraqi cities in a snowball of bloody chaos. The Iraqi authorities slowly and begrudgingly came to accept that they needed help from the US to counter. So just 3 years after the US left, the Obama administration started letting advisors and SOF enter Iraq to help the Iraqis, but that led to increasing US air support and after ISIS had been forced out of the major Iraqi cites like Mosul, several thousand US Marines, SOF and others would help the Iraqis chase ISIS over into Syria where the US then backed a non-Assad aligned group in destroying ISIS in Syria.
Before it was over the theater would see large interventions by the Iranians and the Russian military with the US and Russia going to extreme lengths to insure that no combat accidents between the 2 countries happened that might spiral out of control. Even then, a rather mysterious and never owned up to assault by the Russian mercenaries, the Wagner Group on a US position ended in the US unleashing an hours long barrage on the Russian column that killed hundreds of Russians. A crazy incident that was barely covered in the US and both sides seemed to pretend did not happen.
August 3, 2022
Gordon bites off a lot to chew here but I think succeeded: an entire war in all its complexities, relayed in a way that kept my attention. As someone who participated in much of this war from 2017-2020, I found his narrative thorough, balanced, and accurate.
May 25, 2023
Michael Gordon delivers yet another facts-first, thorough history of recent American military operations in the Middle East. In reviewing the role of the US in defeating ISIS, Gordon weaves together a disparate narrative of local and superpower forces converging on Iraq and Syria in order to accomplish all sorts of objectives, from the petty and menial to the grandly strategic.
The book chronicles the wobbly state of Iraq after the American armed forces' exit from the country in 2011 under Barack Obama and continuing through the end days of the Trump administration. While the popular narrative colored the operation in terms of Obama's hesitation to use force and Trump's "bomb them into the sand" mentality, the on-the-ground reality is much less neat. While the Obama administration's force caps and rules of engagement force accounting chicanery and limitations on the part of US advisers in Iraq, Obama does deserve credit for crafting and implementing the counterinsurgency strategy that ultimately leans into local forces, minimizes US casualties, and defeats the ISIS caliphate. Trump, while rhetorically bombastic, largely adheres to the Obama plan until the sudden departure from the region, leaving a vacuum filled by the likes of Russia, Assad's Syria, and Iran.
Gordon's book certainly implies that there should be a more robust, boots-on-the-ground role for America in troubled zones like the Middle East. The problem, of course, is the short-term vicious cycle - while there is wide agreement that ISIS presented humanitarian concerns and possible threats to the West, the US lacks the clear casus belli of other conflicts that strengthens the resolve of the homeland. The American military shines in tactics and logistics; its leadership and overall strategy appears less glorious and more certain to strand US forces in quagmires beyond our ability to control.
The book chronicles the wobbly state of Iraq after the American armed forces' exit from the country in 2011 under Barack Obama and continuing through the end days of the Trump administration. While the popular narrative colored the operation in terms of Obama's hesitation to use force and Trump's "bomb them into the sand" mentality, the on-the-ground reality is much less neat. While the Obama administration's force caps and rules of engagement force accounting chicanery and limitations on the part of US advisers in Iraq, Obama does deserve credit for crafting and implementing the counterinsurgency strategy that ultimately leans into local forces, minimizes US casualties, and defeats the ISIS caliphate. Trump, while rhetorically bombastic, largely adheres to the Obama plan until the sudden departure from the region, leaving a vacuum filled by the likes of Russia, Assad's Syria, and Iran.
Gordon's book certainly implies that there should be a more robust, boots-on-the-ground role for America in troubled zones like the Middle East. The problem, of course, is the short-term vicious cycle - while there is wide agreement that ISIS presented humanitarian concerns and possible threats to the West, the US lacks the clear casus belli of other conflicts that strengthens the resolve of the homeland. The American military shines in tactics and logistics; its leadership and overall strategy appears less glorious and more certain to strand US forces in quagmires beyond our ability to control.
June 28, 2022
Released two weeks ago today, top Washington, D.C. journalist and (my words) war correspondent/historian Michael Gordon weaves together a compelling and definitive account of the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) and the history of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR).
On the heels of the last combat troops leaving Iraq in 2011–one of President Obama’s campaign pledges—another conflict arose in nearby Syria the same year. That, coupled in January of that year of the self immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi would kick off the Arab Spring across the region. The vacuum left by the US troop withdrawal would lead three years later to the very public and meteoric rise of ISIS. Their self-declared caliphate and brutal battlefield tactics, tenacity and barbarity—in concert with savvy social media—put the world on edge as they expanded their reach conquering and killing everything and everyone in their path.
Gordon’s account includes first-hand interviews of prominent US players Hillary Clinton, John Kerry and others, and reveals the complex diplomacy and a struggling by-with-and-through strategy executed through (OIR). Gordon would travel to the Middle East and talk with the experts literally involved in the execution of the operation and those calling the shots from afar such as Lloyd Austin, Mike Nagata, Stephen Townsend, Joseph Votel, and also later include players such as HR McMaster, John Bolton, Martin Dempsey and Jim Mattis.
Dealings with other countries like Russia and Turkey would further add to the complexity in defeating ISIS. A great read!
On the heels of the last combat troops leaving Iraq in 2011–one of President Obama’s campaign pledges—another conflict arose in nearby Syria the same year. That, coupled in January of that year of the self immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi would kick off the Arab Spring across the region. The vacuum left by the US troop withdrawal would lead three years later to the very public and meteoric rise of ISIS. Their self-declared caliphate and brutal battlefield tactics, tenacity and barbarity—in concert with savvy social media—put the world on edge as they expanded their reach conquering and killing everything and everyone in their path.
Gordon’s account includes first-hand interviews of prominent US players Hillary Clinton, John Kerry and others, and reveals the complex diplomacy and a struggling by-with-and-through strategy executed through (OIR). Gordon would travel to the Middle East and talk with the experts literally involved in the execution of the operation and those calling the shots from afar such as Lloyd Austin, Mike Nagata, Stephen Townsend, Joseph Votel, and also later include players such as HR McMaster, John Bolton, Martin Dempsey and Jim Mattis.
Dealings with other countries like Russia and Turkey would further add to the complexity in defeating ISIS. A great read!
July 8, 2022
This book covers events that I was very familiar with from coverage in the Wall Street Journal and cable news as they occurred. It is very helpful to have them brought together in an accessible book by an objective (as far as I can tell) reporter who was on the scene for much of the time.
I feel bad for the U.S service men who had to live through the horrible conditions. The suffering of the locals was much worse. The actions and motivation of the ISIS leaders and fighters are despicable. Gordon's writing does make you understand that their techniques were more sophisticated and effective than they have been given credit for.
The role of politicians from all parties involved were often self-serving and unfair to the military who had to carry out their orders. No surprise there.
Above all, this reminds us that there are no easy answers. The world is not about to become peaceful in our lifetime and probably never. You do not want another U.S. solder to lose their life or limbs in any overseas conflict but withdrawing from the world is also unacceptable.
I feel bad for the U.S service men who had to live through the horrible conditions. The suffering of the locals was much worse. The actions and motivation of the ISIS leaders and fighters are despicable. Gordon's writing does make you understand that their techniques were more sophisticated and effective than they have been given credit for.
The role of politicians from all parties involved were often self-serving and unfair to the military who had to carry out their orders. No surprise there.
Above all, this reminds us that there are no easy answers. The world is not about to become peaceful in our lifetime and probably never. You do not want another U.S. solder to lose their life or limbs in any overseas conflict but withdrawing from the world is also unacceptable.
December 30, 2022
Random list of stuff I found interesting:
• The Iraqis were in a sorrow state when attacked by ISIS
• Iraqi army were divided between the army, the CTS (counter terrorism) and a police force
• CTS use to be effective, but was in poor state when ISIS was declared in 2014
• Mosul was important - ISIS made the Iraqi army run away, which initiated US respond
• US and Obama was reluctant to put Americans on the ground
• Americans would not cooperate with Malaki. Became better when Abadi took over.
• Much fighting was by US airforce
• ISIS had drones with bombs, which was countered by mobile jamming system
• Americans advised Iraqi leaders, but the ladder called the shots, sometimes contrary to the advise, which the US then lobbied for.
• Americans actually fought the Wagner group in a confusing moment
• Things really became weird with many changed decisions with Trump
• Turkey was very aggressive against the US allies SDF in Syria as they were Kurds to the benefit of ISIS
• The Iraqis were in a sorrow state when attacked by ISIS
• Iraqi army were divided between the army, the CTS (counter terrorism) and a police force
• CTS use to be effective, but was in poor state when ISIS was declared in 2014
• Mosul was important - ISIS made the Iraqi army run away, which initiated US respond
• US and Obama was reluctant to put Americans on the ground
• Americans would not cooperate with Malaki. Became better when Abadi took over.
• Much fighting was by US airforce
• ISIS had drones with bombs, which was countered by mobile jamming system
• Americans advised Iraqi leaders, but the ladder called the shots, sometimes contrary to the advise, which the US then lobbied for.
• Americans actually fought the Wagner group in a confusing moment
• Things really became weird with many changed decisions with Trump
• Turkey was very aggressive against the US allies SDF in Syria as they were Kurds to the benefit of ISIS
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
June 28, 2022
Extremely comprehensive look at the Iraq war from 2011 and forward.
Want to Read
July 21, 2022[led here by TV interview with author and relation to current events]
August 23, 2022
A very well-reported story on a war that most Americans were bored of by this point.
August 24, 2022
Good book. Probably 4.5. Gordon has a tendency to editorialize
October 16, 2023
Reviewing for a journal. Will post review when finished. But a very good book for people interested in War on Terror, Iraq War, Islamic State etc from one of the best journalists in these fields.
October 10, 2024
A very good albeit US centric tackling of an important topic.
July 16, 2022
Awesome. A fine ending to his trilogy on America’s 20 year war in Iraq.
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews