Eighteen Days in October: The Yom Kippur War and How It Created the Modern Middle East

by Uri Kaufman

"Pacy and enthralling." ― Financial Times

"Tells the story brilliantly." ―Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

"Stimulating and insightful...will no doubt find a permanent place on the Arab-Israeli bookshelf." ―Michael Oren, New York Times bestselling author of Six Days of War

October 2023 marks the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, a conflict that shaped the modern Middle East. The War was a trauma for Israel, a dangerous superpower showdown, and, following the oil embargo, a pivotal reordering of the global economic order. The Jewish State came shockingly close to defeat. A panicky cabinet meeting debated the use of nuclear weapons. After the war, Prime Minister Golda Meir resigned in disgrace, and a 9/11-style commission investigated the “debacle.”

But, argues Uri Kaufman, from the perspective of a half century, the War can be seen as a pivotal victory for Israel. After nearly being routed, the Israeli Defense Force clawed its way back to threaten Cairo and Damascus. In the war’s aftermath both sides had to accept unwelcome Israel could no longer take military superiority for granted―but the Arabs could no longer hope to wipe Israel off the map. A straight line leads from the battlefields of 1973 to the Camp David Accords of 1978 and all the treaties since. Like Michael Oren’s Six Days of War , this is the definitive account of a critical moment in history.

Genres: History, Middle East, Nonfiction, Israel, War, Politics, Military Fiction

400 pages, Hardcover

Published August 29, 2023

Reviews

[Dee Miller · Rating 5 out of 5]

Audible credit 12 hours 37 min. Narrated by Jonathan Todd Ross (5)

January 1, 2025
My heart is still disturbed by the attack on October 7, 2023, by Hamas on Israel and the ongoing war. I am listening to "Eighteen Days" again after reading an article on Reuters and questioning what consequences Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu and other high-ranking Israeli military and government officials will fare when/if an investigation is made into how this happened. Fifty years ago, a similar surprise attack had disastrous consequences on the careers of Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, and General Elazar. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 was settled in just three weeks, but in that war, Israel was facing the governments of Egypt and Syria, not the terrorist organization Hamas financially supported by Iran.
The book is still a great history.

Zechariah 7:11-12 (KJV) "But they refused to hearken, and pulled away the shoulder, and stopped their ears, that they should not hear.
Yea, they made their hearts as an adamant stone, lest they should hear the law, and the words which the LORD of hosts hath sent in his spirit by the former prophets: therefore came a great wrath from the LORD of hosts." This passage is fresh on my mind as I just finished reading the Old Testament this week.
********************************
Original review September 2023
Let me just say the book was excellent, and the narrator was the best I've heard yet! It gives an unbiased account of the war and reveals the roles played by the French, American, and Russian governments. October 2023 marks the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, and this book published just this year is a great way to commemorate it.
Highly recommend this book!

Addendum
October 7, 2023
Most of the world is horrified by the brutal attack on Gaza civilians not by the armies of Egypt, Sryia, Jordan, or Iran, but by the terrorist group Hamas. Many around the world are blind to the evil of Hamas, and even today, I see videos of groups in counties like the U.S., Australia, and England rallying AGAINST Israel. Antisemitism is still evil, and mankind is blind to this perverse evil. I see flags with swastikas being raised again. The evils of the Second World War are being waged on Jewish civilians again. My heart is broken for all those who have lost loved ones and friends and for the many more lives that will be lost in Gaza and Israel. Once again, civilians of both Gaza and Israel will lose their homes and their lives because a group desires to wipe Israel off the map. As a Christian, I stand with Israel.

[Steven Conger · Rating 4 out of 5]

Uri Kaufman does an excellent job of bringing the Israeli/Egyptian War (The Yom Kippur War) to life. He moves the story from the sanitized versions that our governments want us to read and shows the reality of the conflict. He brings to life the various characters to life and we are given the opportunity to see their failures and their desires. The book is being published using recently declassified documents (particularly on the Israeli side) and interviews with many of the people who participated in the actual even. By sharing their stores one felt like they were there when the decisions were being made.

I have had the opportunity to visit many of the places that Kaufman describes and he gave me greater understanding of why those places are sacred. I would highly recommend anyone who wants a unvarnished look at the Yom Kippur War to read Kaufman's work. I found it enlightening and at times a bit depressing.

I appreciate NetGalley offering me an early copy to read and give my honest opinion.

[Jill D. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Uri Kaufman brings history to life in his book, Eighteen Days in October, a well-researched and documented story of the Yom Kippur War in October of 1973, also known as the Fourth Arab-Israeli War.

The author's heavily foot-noted book begins with a review of some of the events of the 1967 Six Day War. Both the 1967 and 1973 wars were stepping-stones to the Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979.

At the time of this war, the Soviets were backing the Arabs with military equipment. The Americans were delayed but backed the Israelis with equipment. The U.S. Vice President, Spiro Agnew, had just resigned. The Nixon tapes were soon to be released. An Arab oil embargo was being put in place against the Americans in retaliation for an announced aid package to the Israeli government. The Soviets were giving the Americans veiled threats concerning a cease fire and associated concessions related to the ending of this war. America responded by repositioning ships and aircraft, in addition to putting the military on alert. All of this was going on in the press and behind the scenes during this time period.

The author gives rich detail on these actions, along with putting the reader in a position of almost viewing the events as they occur, including the description of battles with the associated struggles, failures and successes, which were at times so sad and yet so very interesting.

The recitation of history is fascinating, describing the attack on Israel hours earlier than leaders had expected, after having just been warned of it. The frustration of top Israeli leaders with other top leaders, initial mistakes that were made, lies, withholding of intelligence, and a military that was largely a reserve force and had to be called up, all contributed to an alarming first few days of this war for the Israelis. Fortunately for Israel, the Egyptians had their own struggles and mistakes to deal with, which are described by the author.

Once the Israelis got their footing, although there are still examples of errors in judgment by leadership, there are also stories of wise decision making, courage, determination, fearlessness, expertise, and great successes in this battle for their country's continued existence.

The Agranat Commission was appointed the month following the war to investigate Israel's intelligence failure prior to the surprise attack, and the army's defense in the first few days of the war. At this time, there were large public demonstrations and pressure. The author also shows there is the question of potential bias of at least one member of the commission. Their inconsistent findings cause one to question whether this commission was indeed unbiased. Some of the commission's findings and the resulting repercussions on certain men's lives did not seem to be just treatment in light of the facts described in this book, including later information revealed over the last five decades of what actually occurred. It would seem that the public wanted a scapegoat, and the commission provided it.

Uri Kaufman's book brought back my memory of events of fifty years ago, albeit with so much more information and rich detail of the actual events. His story is of real people, who lived imperfect lives, but loved and were devoted to the existence of their country. It was a fascinating story of a pivotal period in Israel's recent history, and I expect it will remain on my mind for quite some time.

Thank-you to St. Martin's Press, Netgalley.com and Uri Kaufman for providing me with a complimentary copy of Eighteen Days in October in exchange for my unbiased review.

[Luke Ohlson · Rating 1 out of 5]

The assumptions and worldview of this author are evident in his parsing of the nuances of Israeli politics and military command and his disregard for the humanity and accompanying nuances of Egyptian, Syrian, and Palestinian politics. Much like our current news coverage Israelis are humanized while their opponents are largely nameless and faceless. We go into great detail about Ariel Sharon’s bandaging his own wound while Egyptian and Syrian combatants are consistenly referred to in the distance, tanks and transports and planes bursting into flames with no mention there are people inside.

[Dovide · Rating 3 out of 5]

In “Eighteen Days in October” Kaufman offers a well-written account of the October War, primarily told from the Israeli perspective.

There was a lot more of the minutiae of day-by-day operations to this account than I was hoping for when I picked up the book. As such, for me, the highlights were the retellings of the political and diplomatic aspects of the war.

Readers can expect a lot of characterization of the Israeli soldiers and top brass, as Kaufman focuses primarily on the palace intrigue and military operations of this side. For better or worse, feel like I know Moshe Dayan, Golda Meir, and Ariel Sharon a bit better as individuals, not just historical figures. I do find it a bit disappointing that this humanization was fairly one-sided.

Overall, Kaufman’s work is a fairly serviceable overview of the October War. There isn’t much that stands out as incredible or egregious either way. The book could be interesting for those looking for a succinct, popular military history of the Israeli experience during the war, but I wouldn’t reccomend it otherwise.

Rounded up from 2.75/5.

[Kenneth · Rating 5 out of 5]

Israel intelligence stole a radar unit from Egypt by flying in a special team with helicopters cutting it from its foundations and carrying the whole thing (Russian instruction manuals included) back to Israel.

This book is full of great anecdotes and quotes while still giving an overview of the war.

“When it is raining and you are soaked to the bone always remember that your enemy is also getting wet.”

Other quotes show brutality. Attan, an Israeli tank commander and hero of the war, was told by his parents that if they had enough money to abort him they would have. All considered him a hero of the war but also either extremely brave or crazy.

Also Golda Meir: “Peace will come when the Arabs will love their children more than they hate us.”

[Charles · Rating 3 out of 5]

The “Fog of War” and Competing Personalities in Israel’s 1973 War

In the immediate aftermath of its dramatic victory during the Six Day War of 1967, Israel and its Arab neighbors seemed poised to reach a relatively peaceful accommodation, albeit with boundaries that had been unimaginable to Palestinians before that date. Moshe Dayan declared, “The lighter the grip [on Palestinians], the firmer the hold.” It seemed possible that economic integration could result in gains for both Jews and Arabs in the region.

Arguably, the victory resulted in complacency on the Israeli side. This resulted in a false sense of security. In author Uri Kaufman’s telling, Israel’s military resources and equipment were extremely modest and the country’s developing economy was small and stretched thin. Moreover, American commitment to provide military aid, even to resupply Israel if war broke out again, was by no means guaranteed.

In the years following 1967, Israel’s defense strategy was flawed. Shades of the Maginot Line, the country built a series of forts along the canal border with Egypt when investment in tanks would have been a better decision. Israel had only 300 tanks, or three per mile on that border.

Ariel Sharon was an outspoken critic of the strategy and he would have been replaced but for fear that he would then run against the ruling Labor Party.

Israel required a week to mobilize, making Israeli intelligence critical to the country’s defense. Moreover, the economy would be crippled if Israeli reservists were called up, needlessly, for a long period. One problem, notes Kaufman: intelligence can judge an enemy’s capabilities, but it is much harder to judge its intentions.

The Americans also made assumptions that would be severely tested. Henry Kissinger feared alienating Arab nations and jeopardizing oil supply. He expected the Israelis to quickly win another conflict. Therefore the U.S. could hold off sending arms. Once Israel had won and things quieted down, the U.S. could top off Israeli military resources.

As Kaufman relates, the Egyptians surprised Israel with a canal crossing and the Syrians attacked on the Golan Heights in Israel’s northern border. Israel was stretched thin in the air and in tanks on the ground. The outcome, unlike in 1967, was very much in doubt.

What much of the book relates are the rivalries and disputes among Israeli commanders. Kaufman visited the battlefields, spoke to many participants, and reviewed thousands of pages of records of the period.

The rivalries and arguments of the key players of the time are set out in detail and they are startling. David Elazer was Chief of Staff but hardly in control of the strong personalities in the Israeli armed forces, chief among them Ariel Sharon. Shmuel Gonen, the general in charge of Israel’s southern command responsible for defending against Egyptian invasion, hated Moshe Dayan, the Defense Minister, and operated in disarray. He was replaced on the battlefield by Chaim Bar-Lev, who was a calmer presence but was not only unsure of the enemy’s movements, but also of Ariel Sharon’s movements as the latter operated independently, George Patton-style.

Abraham “Bren” Adnan was in charge of a key group of tanks defending against the Egyptians and was the first to cross the canal He then received conflicting orders, from Elazer to limit the number of tanks crossing to 80 and from Gonen to hurry up and get more across.

Meanwhile, across the north, the Israelis narrowly turned back Syrian tanks and forces. The Air Force also received conflicting instructions as their limited number of planes criss-crossed the northern and Sinai fronts, receiving orders to attack or avoid SAM missiles, attack Syrian tanks, or provide support to Israeli troops. Meanwhile they were losing planes at an unsustainable rate.

Finally, as Israel crossed into Egyptian territory and neutralized the Syrian incursion, the U.S., under Kissinger’s direction, took steps to resupply Israel.

For the reader unfamiliar with many of the Israeli personalities, Kaufman’s book is a somewhat bewildering chronicle of “Who’s on First” and it is hard to keep it straight. The book would have benefitted by a glossary with names and responsibilities.

The book jacket advertises, “How [the Yom Kippur War] created the modern Middle East,” but there is no attempt to address this claim. Kaufman fails to offer big picture analysis of the war and how it affected Israeli geopolitical views or war strategy going forward. Indeed, sadly, Israeli posture on October 7, 2023 revealed a complacency at least as profound as in 1973.

The two larger takeaways for this reader were 1) a detailed accounting of the fog of war that challenged the Israelis, and 2) a surprising lack of military discipline as key personalities fought one another and ignored orders based on their own assessment of the situation as well as their own ambitions. Clearly, Kaufman would have us believe, this made the 1973 war a tenuous situation for Israel despite the final outcome in which the country prevailed.

[Dan Walker · Rating 4 out of 5]

4 stars only because the story from the Egyptian and Syrian sides are based on memoirs and other published material, while from the Israeli side, the author references personal interviews he held with people who are still alive.

Otherwise, Mr. Kaufman has written quite a fascinating story. I knew little or nothing about the wars between Israel and the Moslem nations that surround it. This filled in some gaps. Of course, what wasn't addressed is just WHY countries like Egypt and Syria wished to go to war with Israel, other than that Israel had seized the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. Why? Well, that occurred during an earlier war. Why did that war begin? Unknown. These wars are just a given.

One thing I enjoyed about the book is that it carefully dissects the decisions made on both sides. Seems like wars are just a series of bad decisions. You only hope that the other guy's decisions are worse than yours. Other than that, at least sometimes, action is more likely to win out over inaction, and the battle will be won by the side willing to keep fighting one minute more than the other side.

One example of action winning was the decision to send Israeli commandos against Egyptian tanks. The commandos' Uzis were virtually useless against the Egyptian Kalishnikovs, but just the fact that the commandos were there masked the Israeli capture of a strategic road.

The characters presented in the book are also quite memorable. Ariel Sharon (unofficial codename: Fatso) is one example, a guy who was either a strategic genius or a glory hound who couldn't be trusted. But he could be trusted to take action, and that is one reason he kept his job when he should have been fired multiple times. One time, he simply left a couple of tactically critical hills unguarded while chasing glory. Those hills were lost to the Egyptians, and a lot of men died in a futile attempt to recapture them. On the other hand, he captured the crossing point of the Suez Canal that brought Israel's greatest victory. At one point, he ordered a single tank and an APC of commandos forward, leaving them extremely vulnerable to counterattack. His orders were to advance in the most visible manner possible (along an elevated railroad track). The resulting battle lasted several hours. Tactically, it was a terrible decision. Strategically, however, it caused Egyptian forces on the East side of the Canal to withdraw, fearing that they were about to be cut off from retreat.

For all the coverage the "great" men (and Golda) earned, it's quite surprising how many times the author references some unknown (or minor) officer or soldiers who ensured key items were ready and available just at the right time. The author definitely plays up the superiority of officers and soldiers who have the chutzpah (pronounced hootz-peh(!), to think ahead for themselves, as opposed to regimes who discouraged independent thinking (Assad had a general executed on the battlefield). As best I can tell, the entire Israeli nation can claim victory, not just the leaders who most assuredly wished to claim it for themselves.

The book also points out how public opinion on this or that person can be downright wrong. Seeking glory is a fool's errand. Those who should be celebrated were often hated and reviled after the war. The author attempts to right the wrongs of public opinion in the book. To me, the lesson was, do your duty, but don't expect the fighting to end when the war is over. You may just have to grit your teeth and live your life regardless of what people think of you.

So read the book. I listened to the audiobook, and I'm sure the footnotes would be extensive and interesting too. Of course, those aren't in the audiobook.

[Michele]

The Yom Kippur War created the conditions for major changes in relationships in the Middle East. It was unusual because the Arab nations fought so bravely and well, giving the Israelis an existential scare, upending the conventional wisdom about Arab/Israeli conflicts and exposing the fallacies upon which Israel had constructed its war plans.

The Israelis believed they would be able to immediately see the mobilization of Egyptian and Syrian forces at the borders, and have reservists there before the battle began. But, Israel and Egypt began to mobilize and demobilize repeatedly. It became unclear if they were preparing an attack or training. The A'MAN (intelligence arm of the IDF) had listening posts inside the Cairo military and government, but the man in charge of the listening disabled them, and lied to his superiors when asked if they were functioning. Thus, the intelligence was incomplete, but the men relying on the listening post warnings did not know it. The Israelis also had two super spies in the Egyptian government and military, who were to alert them when an attack was scheduled. The Israelis did not agree that they could be trusted, but relied on them anyway, to their detriment. Israelis are still divided about whether they were double or triple agents.

Because existing plans and assumptions were invalidated by events, the Israeli cabinet and military had to scrap plans and make new ones in real time, while they were literally fighting with one another, lying to one another, and these conditions led to numerous and uncharacteristic errors of judgement.

The Israelis lost massively during the first three days. They made good and bad decisions without taking time to assess conditions on the ground. They came very close to running out of tanks, planes and ammunition. Many lives were lost in consequence of the ignorance, confusion and acrimony.

The US at first refused to resupply the Israeli army, but gave in when the Soviets began an airlift to help both Egypt and Syria. When I read how the Israelis crossed the Suez Canal and beat the Egyptian army, I couldn't help but think of miracles and divine intervention, but in fact, it was the incredible hard work and courage of the troops combined with the Jewish belief that all it takes to win is that you outlast your opponent by an eyelash. That and a really consequential mistake by Anwar Sadat.

Eighteen Days was very well-written, and made me understand the great stakes and the great men and women who saved Israel once again in spite of themselves. The commission that later studied the conduct of the war was partly correct and partly looking for scapegoats, who turned out to be the chief of staff of the IDF, Moshe Dayan and Golda Meir, who were no more responsible for the debacles than the ones who were praised. I rated this one 4+ out of 5.

[LAMONT D · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is certainly a must read for those interested in the history of the nation of Israel. The research by the author is incredible. You hear a lot about 1948 and the Arab Israeli Six-Day War in 1967, but not as much about the Yom Kippur War so it was really interesting to read about the days before during and after this brief war between Isreal, Egypt and Syria. History certainly needs to be studied and understood especially in light of the horrendous killings and evil acts of the Hamas-led Palestinian militant groups in the Gaza Strip against Israel since October 7, 2023. And how the world responds to anything that happens to or in Israel repeats itself non-stop with the strong and undeniable antisemitism throughout the world. It was very fascinating to get into the minds of all the major players of this war, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, the other Arab neighbors along with the superpowers in Russia and USA. But the profiles of the top military individuals and the constant bickering and debate within the cabinet of Israel with Prime Minister Golda Meir is mindboggling. The fact that somehow, they survived and basically won despite all odds is the story worth telling and repeating to the next generations. The real stories though are the unsung heroes, everyday citizens of the nation that were called up from the reserves to fight and in many cases give their lives to the cause is a testament to the dedication of the Israeli people to their freedom and protection.

[Dan Howard · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a very interesting read. I was a high school senior in 1973 and pretty much oblivious to world affairs beyond the end of the Vietnam War. It was interesting to read about the Yom Kippur war and how the US involvement was influenced by Nixon and the Watergate affair that was unfolding at the same time.

[Alex · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a fascinating look at the Yom Kippur war especially how the outcome was truly in doubt, how both sides bungled their war effort. The author does a great job of looking at the individuals involved as their are some really colorful characters. There is even some humor in the book.

[Jordan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good context, important history

[Edward Champion · Rating 1 out of 5]

I had hoped to learn more about everything leading up to the Yom Kippur War, but Uri Kaufman -- who is apparently a real estate developer -- is not a historian in any true sense of the word. He doesn't know how to isolate the right details that not only tell a story, but reveal a narrative. So we get rambling chapters on a pontoon bridge without any real effort to create momentum, which literally every other historian does. You know, cause and effect? It's not that difficult. He shows no serious understanding of diplomacy and foreign policy. Instead we get a bunch of nonsense about Sadat being sickly and Golda Meir fucking people in her private life. Uh, Uri, I want to know how their ACTIONS led to this war. Are you writing foreign leader fan fiction? Kaufman seems most "lively" (although he writes in a stiff and aloof tone throughout) when he's describing various battles. But he writes with all the clarity of a drunkard telling you a rambling story in a bar. If you want to learn about the Yom Kippur War, Uri Kaufman ain't it. He's a superficial and tendentious moron who looks the other way when it comes to darker-skinned people losing their lives. He should stick to real estate.

[Ben Rothke · Rating 5 out of 5]

50 years ago this month was the Yom Kippur War. It was one of the darkest times in the modern state of Israel. As the Bar-Lev Line on the Suez Canal was being dismantled by the Egyptian Army like children playing with Legos, Moshe Dayan said with tears in his eyes “The Third Temple is in danger”. He was referring to the State of Israel.

Some have mocked Dayan’s comments and claim he said it in a state where he had not slept in days. But in Eighteen Days in October: The Yom Kippur War and How It Created the Modern Middle East (St. Martin's Press), author Uri Kaufman makes it eminently clear that Dayan’s fears were not unfounded, and the Temple was precariously close to falling.

In the half-century since the war, countless books and papers have been written. What Kaufman shows here, in this superb and meticulously researched book, is that the Yom Kippur War was ultimately a watershed event. What the Yom Kippur War showed, was that Israel was a force to be dealt with and is here to stay.

All of the parties in the war had their concept. In Israel, the Hebrew term conceptzia referred to the all-encompassing preconceptions and assumptions about Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Parts of the conceptzia was the axiomatic assessment that Egypt would not start a war. And a key error Israel made is that they the conceptzia conflated capabilities and intentions. Israel thought they knew the Egyptians and Syrians better than they did, with devastating consequences.

The conceptzia was like a black hole that sucked out all reason. IDF Major General Eli Zeira imprisoned himself in the intellectual trap of the Concept. Kaufman writes that he skillfully repaired it each time some new piece of evidence offered him a chance to escape. He ignored the obvious and insisted evidence to the contrary was erroneous.

It’s easy to blame the Israeli government and military establishment for their all-encompassing embrace of the concept. Yet all of us, the older we get, have our own concepts that we clinch to. Often to our own detriment.

In the six years between 1967 and 1973, while the conceptzia was being developed, Israel went on a military buying spree. While the history of Israel is filled with countless ironic and miraculous moments, Kaufman writes that President Lyndon Johnson, a Texas oilman with deep interests and loyalties to Middle East oil interests, did more to guarantee the security and survival of Israel than any American president until then.
President Johnson and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol negotiated a deal for Patton tanks based in Germany. Johnson also approved the sale of the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom, which was the most advanced fighter-bomber at the time.
The sale of the Phantom represented a significant shift in U.S. policy from maintaining a stance of neutrality to one of providing and maintaining Israel with the arms it needed to ensure a qualitative advantage over its Arab enemies.

Parenthetically, Kaufman writes that one of the main beneficiaries of the Six-Day War was the people of Gaza. Egypt never allowed Gazans to work in Egypt, nor did they give them many rights, and they in fact created the open air prison known as Gaza. If was only after 1967 that many Gazans found employment in Israel, at salaries much higher than they could ever make in Gaza. Once again, Israel is a land of irony.

The Yom Kippur War had no shortage of heroes and villains. While she had to resign in disgrace, Kaufman writes of Golda Meir in the highest of praise. Former Israeli Minister of Tourism and Minister of Internal Affairs Uzi Baram said of Golda that in terms of raw courage, she stood first among equals. And Kaufman refers to her as “a lioness in orthopedic shoes”.

She is the only prime minister in Israeli history with no military experience either in government or in uniform. And what’s surprising, is that during a war, where effective communication is critical, Kaufman writes that her command of Hebrew was in fact far from perfect. And when she had to shoot down an idea Moshe Dayan suggested, she told him to “forget about it”.

Of Golda, much of the blame, but ultimate victory of the war goes to her. She at times defied the United States and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, steamrolled the Egyptians, stared down the Soviets, and ultimately dictated the outcome of the war.

Much of the victory of 1967 was due to everything going perfectly. In 1973, Israel also was the beneficiary of countless acts of providence that tipped the war in their favor. From Syrian tanks that inexplicably stopped, when they could have had an open path into the Golan Heights, the Egyptian Army's inexplicable withdrawal from the Chinese Farm, Anwar Sadat ignoring the advice of his chief of staff Saad el-Shazly, to fighter pilots from the Moroccan Air Force that that was planned to assist; but were instead sitting in jail as a result of a failed coup against King Hassan II, and more. The Yom Kippur War was one long set of fortuitous events in Israel’s favor.

This is a fascinating, engaging book, and meticulously researched book. The drama and at times desperation of the war is evident in every chapter. Kaufman writes so enchantingly well, that when he describes the darkest times of the battles, you can feel the darkness and desperation as Israeli troops were mowed down by the dozens, with little hope for rescue, or victory.

If there’s anything critical to write about the book, it’s that I wish Kaufman would have written much more. He covers all of the key events and figures, but so much more can be written. For those who want to understand the Yom Kippur War, how it happened, how it perhaps could have been avoided, and how it was ultimately won, Eighteen Days in October is an essential read. In the corpus of military history, this book like, Golda, is first among equals.

[K.E. Shadlock · Rating 5 out of 5]

I thoroughly enjoyed the carefully researched accounts from multiple perspectives throughout the War.
I appreciated the historical context and description, balanced by anecdotes or personal remarks of figures discussed. The effect of this blend served to create a novel-like reading experience where I was consistently drawn into each chapter. Additionally, the use of maps (placed in the front of chapters) and the selected images through the book further reinforced the narrative. I am a true beginner in my studies of Middle Eastern history, but with the support of these features I was able to quickly grasp the strategic significance of maneuvers and visualize key moments. A dynamic and enlightening read, 5/5 strongly recommend!

[Ron Baumer · Rating 5 out of 5]

An informative book on the war. The use of first hand accounts and interviews added to the account. The political in-fighting that occurred as well as how close the use of nuclear weapons was intriguing. A great novel for the history enthusiast.

Thank you to #NetGalley for the ARC in exchange for my honest opinion.

[Stephanie · Rating 1 out of 5]

The author is corrupt. Don't support him

[Shawn · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent account of how the Yom Kippur War started and unfolded. It is clearly and succinctly written. Dispassionate but still captivating.

The underlying theme of the war (and the book) is captured well by this quote: “Fortunately for the Israelis, the Egyptian leadership would match their dysfunction and overtake it” (255). Israel’s overconfidence after 67 and the infamous ‘Conceptzia' led them to miss the signs of the coming war; and then early on there were many strategic and tactical errors. Nonetheless, the Israelis often got lucky in their mistakes. Though the Egyptians had the element of surprise, fought well, and had the advantage early on; they too seemed to get overconfident and made errors that ended up being more disastrous for them Israel’s errors were for Israel. And after a few days, the Israelis were able to get back the upper hand. By the end of the war, they could have destroyed the Egyptian Army and marched on Damascus. The book focuses much more on the war with Egypt rather than Syria. Kaufman does discuss the war in the north, but its significance was less. Like Egypt, Syria made surprising early gains, only to have these quickly reversed. But the fighting and consequences of the fighting along the Suez is what, as the subtitle of the book says, “created the Modern Middle East.” It is there that Egypt and Israel nearly brought the Soviets and the Americans into war but also to the eventual peace between Egypt and Israel.

The last chapter of the book discusses some of the longer term consequences. It does not go into any great detail about Camp David and the peace talks and treaty. But Kaufman does discuss the Agranat Commission that looked into the government's and army's early failures. Interestingly, Kaufman's view of the commission is that it was more scapegoat that an honest attribution of responsibility. That was new to me -- the commission is now held up as something so important and key for postwar Israel and that Israel needs as similar commission now. But if Kaufman is right, maybe not. Kaufman argues that in the years since the war and the commission, Golda, Dayan, and Elazar all end up with reputations that are unfairly tarnished. He expresses hope that in the future people can see how their contributions during the war, while far from perfect, where central in saving Israel from disaster and turning near defeat into victory.

This was not the resounding victory if 67. 73 was very nearly a total disaster. How close Israel got to actually using nuclear weapons is not clear, though Kaufman does show that there really were discussions. Israel was able to hang on and turn the tables but it really shouldn’t have been in the position it was in. In this way, Kaufman’s account mirrors so much of what happened 50 years later, almost to the day, on October 7, 2023. Israel’s overconfidence, it’s reliance on technology, its unrealistic sense of understanding the motives of its enemies, led it disaster – one in many ways worse than 73. Both were avoidable with leadership that didn't fall into the same traps.

The 73 war is another case study in the adage of armies preparing to fight the last war. Israel was prepared to fight a war like 67; but Sadat and Egypt presented them with different challenges. They had weapons, like the Saggers and SAMs, that they didn’t have or weren’t employed well in 67. And they had the element of surprise. Israel, though, quickly learned lessons on the battlefield as it fought to help it fight better and win the war. And much like the start of the war, we see something similar in Gaza today as the IDF learned how to fight this war as it fought it. The optimist in me hopes that Israel can, like in 73, achieve a victory that brings a peace to the region -- much like the victory of 73 helped to bring peace between Israel and Egypt.

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

****.5

Military history is not one of my preferred genres, but the utter failure of Israel's security forces to prevent the Oct 7 attack demonstrates that even 50 years later the lessons of the Yom Kippur War weren't truly taken to heart. This book was published just before that, to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the previous debacle, which must be revisited in order to fully understand the current situation.

The book starts in the euphoria in the wake of Israel's stunning victory in the 1967 Six Day War, which Kaufman attributes to luck as much as to sound strategy. But the good times are short lived, as the oft-ignored War of Attrition quickly began and lasted until 1970, with Israel scrambling to procure sufficient weaponry to combat the tons of materiel pouring in from the Soviet Union to Egypt.

It then introduces the major players, and traces the origins of the "conceptia", the disastrously flawed notion held by the echelons of Israel's military-political-intelligence apparatus that the Arabs wouldn't dare attack again without warning. But rather than dwell on that, the book quickly pivots to a lengthy play-by-play account of the war. Which is revealed to be a muddled mess with costly mistakes all around, and almost as much infighting as actual fighting.

A bit more interesting are the recently declassified documents that shed light on the behind-the-scenes diplomacy and politics, both internal discussions as well as secret negotiations. The actions of the Nixon administration and the response of the Soviets are particularly alarming, and show how easy it is for a local conflict to quickly escalate out of control into a much larger global problem.

The book concludes with a look at the aftermath of the war, including the results of Israel's Agranat Commission of Inquiry, which the author thinks misattributed a lot of the blame. In his view, despite the failure to fully prepare and the heavy losses the war was ultimately a major victory for Israel, and not the dismal failure as perceived by Israelis ever since. In this reckoning, prime ministers Levi Eshkol (1967) and Golda Meir (1973) come out looking good, with Meir in particular emerging as tough, calm, collected, and not at all at fault. The situations of defense minister Moshe Dayan and general Ariel Sharon are more complex, both are shown to have made some truly terrible decisions, but they also demonstrated the audacious leadership that ultimately won the war for Israel.

The book definitely changed the way I view the war, and there are some clear lessons to be learned. Not just about the war itself or even its lead-up, but the reckoning afterwards. Drawing the right conclusions and learning the right lessons are at least as important as the fighting itself, which is often haphazard and plagued by elements out of the control of the decision makers. Let's hope that Israel does a better job this time around.

Audiobook: As I'm used to by now, the narrator is unable to utter most of the Hebrew (and presumably Arabic) words and names without either mangling the pronunciation, sounding like he's being tortured, or both.

[Baris Balcioglu · Rating 4 out of 5]

I didn't know anything about this book. Hakan bought it to read something from a pro-Israeli POV. I wasn't interested but like many of my friends he eventually made me read it although he got stock in Chapter 13 or something like that. Luckily 40% of the book was endnotes and I read about the author at the end only today. He is a lawyer doing real estate business. He seems to have written it very professionally. As if he were a historian. I guess lawyers are good in the US. I appreciated that he'd spent 20 years to write this book. Well, it was nostalgic on the one hand. All these names I remember having heard when I was a kid... I remember the day Sadat was assassinated. We used to live in Iskenderun and we had lots of Arabic neighbors and I had thought that it had touched them more closely but probably I was wrong. I knew that like all the wars Israel had won this one in 1973 too but I didn't know why Golda Meir had a price to pay at the end. Since she looked like a grandma and I support women in politics and she was a leftist I had sympathy for her. But I more or less knew nothing about her. There are many gossipy details about Sharon, Golda (since everyone calls her like that), Moshe Dayan etc. I was surprised that such things can be written. I remember Dayan most likely from the pages of Meydan Larousse. From 1967 war maybe. Sharon from TV and the newspapers during the Lebanon war. I don't recall that he later became an PM. I used to have a student whom I mistook for a Muslim and his friends, in his presence, said that his last name was Dayan, and I should've understood that he was Jewish. Nonsense! In Turkey we have lots of Dayans and they are all Muslims. Who would remember Moshe Dayan in Turkey now? Anyways, I don't think that anyone in Turkey can write a comparable book. Of course, in Israil serving in the army is an integral part of their lives so they must be writing a lot about their experiences. So there is abundant info and a tradition. We also see that sources from Syria and Egypt are more limited and they are bleak. I tend to identify more with the Arabs of course so their incapability and loss were humiliating. It wasn't pleasurable to read about the war scenes. So much horror. And I couldn't follow the military stories. Maybe some excerpts from such books must be read in history classes in other, more anti-Israel countries. Then we would see that everybody makes sacrifices, everybody does stupid things, and they break down under pressure. I may continue reading with Amos Oz that has been waiting since 2013. Or maybe the peace that ended all the peace.

[Scott Martin · Rating 4 out of 5]

(Audiobook) Interesting that I would finish this book right as Hamas launched a massive attack against Israeli settlements and territory from Gaza. This work looked at how Israel was caught completely off-guard in 1973 when Egypt and Syria coordinated a series of offensives against Israel during Yom Kippur. Initially, Egypt achieved its original aims, but then mission creep from Egypt, plus increased aid from the US and Israel managing to rally its defenses turned a major defeat for Israel into a critical setback for Egypt and Syria.

This work looks at the political and military leadership of the main players in this military engagement. There was good and bad from both sides, and the fates of many from this engagement varied in the post-war era, with some whose stature aged poorly (Meir) to those whose stock went way up (Sharon). Sadat was a mixed bag, and Syria, well, the Assad regime weathered that defeat to still remain in power.

Overall, the Yom Kippur War was supposed to be the low point for Israel intelligence and strategic warning. Yet, the focus on external factors like Iran and intense internal political angst once against created blind spots that allowed Hamas to initially exploit for a headline stealing offensive. Unfortunately, only way more significant bloodshed, violence and political angst remain. While it didn’t have a completely clean/finite ending, the Yom Kippur War at least had a part where violence was reduced. Not sure we will find that here. That and another series of books will come out in the decades ahead describing how Israel botched 2023 like they did 1973.

[Alec · Rating 3 out of 5]

This year's 52 Book Club Challenge had a quartet of prompts which required me to read a book set in each season. The twist, each also needed to be from a different genre. So, for prompt 8 "Genre Three: Set in Autumn" I read Uri Kaufman's Eighteen Days in October about the Yom Kippur War and its role in the formation of the modern Middle East. When I was deciding which books I'd read, I picked this book primarily based on when the events happened so finding myself reading it on some of the same dates as the events from the book wasn't a surprise. What was a surprise, I didn't expect the conflicts & events in Israel & Palestine to still be raging (or resolving) at the same time, giving me a better understanding on some of the positions, attitudes, and history still being debated/fought over today.

While I read the book to become familiar with the conflict, I did find the book a bit challenging to follow. I don't have any context of the territory to follow along in my mind's eye and thus felt a bit lost. I'd heard of some of the main characters but hadn't realized how much knowing something about them would affect my experience. Since so many of them were unfamiliar, again I felt lost. Ultimately, I don't know how to judge this book on a 5-star system other than to say, 3-stars is average, that felt about right for this book.

[Howard H · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is one of the great stories of modern warfare. Kaufman tells it well.

A great deception by Egypt. Israelis not believing what their eyes can see. A successful surprise attack by Egypt and Syria that nearly broke the Israeli back. An almost impossible stand by Israeli tankers on the Golan Heights. Counterattack in Syria and the stunning ambush of a huge Iraqi column. An audacious crossing of the Suez Canal that doomed the Egyptians in Sinai. Superpower intrigue, influence and near collision.

All in less than three weeks. And at huge cost in lives and material. It was the last WWII style conflict.

Though Kaufman does a solid job on the history, it's not always clear why he occasionally seems to interrupt his own chronology to introduce aspects of the story out of sequence. Kaufman clearly is a critic of Dayan and a fan of Meyer. Though often critical of Sharon, he still finds reason to credit the controversial general for his results.

Where I may have appreciated Kaufman's approach most was in his ear for anecdote. These personal level tales - many of which I was reading for the for time despite my extensive research on the war - lent perspective and humor to the narrative.

Anyone who likes military history should know the Yom Kippur War. Kaufman is a good place to start.

HH

[Ksorb · Rating 4 out of 5]

There was much, much more day-by-day, blow-by-blow than I expected. I'm afraid I tended to tune out, then suddenly realize: "Wait! Who did what???" I thoroughly enjoyed the political and personality tangles, resonating with my own struggles when in leadership, and the preponderance of strong personalities (narcissists?) which tend to rise (push their way?) to those positions.

I thought about my high-school world civ class in early 1969, which the teacher divided into two halves - Palestinian Arabs and Palestinian Jews - and we had to represent "our side" to find a compromise to the struggle, acceptable to both parties. Throughout the whole semester, we failed (but got good grades for valiant effort!) It was one of the most powerful and memorable classes I ever took, even through university.

This book was inside info, of smoke-filled rooms, jealousies, and egos, struggling to find a way to achieve peace - through battle - to achieve security and self-rule -- the Middle East struggle, and I appreciated that. And, because of the thoroughness of the body of the book, the epilogue was wonderful.

[Jun-Dai Bates-Kobashigawa · Rating 3 out of 5]

Filling in critical gaps in my history of the conflict(s). This book is good if you are mostly interested in the mechanics of the war and/or want to laugh at Israeli generals. It is a complete disappointment if you are looking for any understanding of multiple sides of the conflict, or if you want to understand the human/social impact of various events or the larger conflict. In that sense, it is unfortunate that I read this so soon after Jeremy Bowen’s _Six Days_, which is an unusually effective wartime history book in exactly both of those regards (in addition to the mechanics, etc.). Between the two books, you can really feel the difference between a journalist with years spent in the region trying to understand the roots of the conflicts and an amateur historian (albeit a good one) who is most interested in understanding the conflict as a war game.

But for all that, it does fill in what was for me, an important gap in Israeli history. I still have several more to fill. It does not really fill any of my several glaring gaps in understanding the history of the Palestinian experience, so I will continue to look for books that can help with that.

[BenAbe · Rating 5 out of 5]

A meticulously researched and compellingly written account, this book masterfully captures the complexity of the Yom Kippur War across both the Sinai and Golan fronts. The author brings troop movements, brigades, and battle strategies to life with clear descriptions and well-placed maps, making the military engagements both vivid and accessible. Beyond the battlefield, the book also delves into the personalities of key generals and leaders, offering a nuanced perspective on their decisions and leadership styles. The diplomatic maneuvering is explored with depth, providing essential context on the political tensions that shaped the war’s course and its resolution.
More than just a military history, this work is essential for understanding the war’s lasting impact on the Middle East and how it broke the long-standing stalemate between Israel and its Arab neighbors and set the stage for future peace treaties. A well-balanced, deeply informative, and enriching read for anyone interested in the military history of this conflict and its consequences.
Accessible and highly entertaining.
A well-deserved 5 stars

[Mark Peacock · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's a deeply researched book that wears its research lightly; the story and its pace don't get bogged down in facts and figures. It's mostly a detailed "tick-tock" story of the Yom Kippur War, switching between the Syrian and Egyptian fronts, with a light sprinkling of analysis along the way. Kaufman's writing is strongest when describing the key battles from an Israeli perspective, and the conflicting perspectives and decisions that led first to Israeli failures and then to their eventual success.

Kaufman's insight is less sure when he widens his aperture from battlefield tactics to the broader international context. After finishing this book, I re-read the Sadat chapter in Henry Kissinger's Leadership : Six Studies in World Strategy and, not surprisingly, found that Kissinger is much more insightful on the diplomacy that surrounded the Yom Kippur war and on Sadat's rationale for starting the war.

[Cass · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well, not so much about how it (alone) created the modern Middle East, but a stunning military history. Deeply researched: pulls together the personalities, the politics, the battle experience, the geography. Very little military history succeeds in doing this well. Despite all the detail, it’s lively and easy to follow - also unusual in this genre.
To be perfect, it would need a little bit of context in the beginning: just a page of history would help, as would a requirement to avoid unexplained references. At the end, it would need to have the assumption that everything is settled “now” and that we all know what happened since the events of this book clarified - there are quick references but again, one more page would have helped.
Like all military history, it’s a pain trying to read this book on kindle, since the maps are illegible. Why this hasn’t been addressed is a mystery. My guess is that it would cost evil Amazon a dollar and that, of course, is out of the question.

[Alan · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's not a bad book, in fact it's quite good. It explains in detail the events leading up to the war, then takes you step by step through all the war events and finally analyzes all the results of the conflict that occurred in 1973 and how they continue to influence the region to this day. I think the problem for me was that, specifically the Yom Kippur War, is not one of my favorite events in Israeli history. Even though Israel won the war and this brought about the peace agreement with Egypt, it was difficult to read about all the mistakes that were made in the first days of the war. Which makes me think and compare that war with the one that is currently unfolding against Hamas and Hezbollah. You would think that after the Yom Kippur War, we would be more prepared to avoid situations like those of October 7th.