China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power: Theory, Practice, and Implications

by Michael A. McDevitt

Xi Jinping has made his ambitions for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) perfectly clear, there is no mystery what he wants, first, that China should become a "great maritime power" and secondly, that the PLA "become a world-class armed force by 2050." He wants this latter objective to be largely completed by 2035. China as a Twenty-First-Century Naval Power focuses on China's navy and how it is being transformed to satisfy the "world class" goal. Beginning with an exploration of why China is seeking to become such a major maritime power, author Michael McDevitt first explores the strategic rationale behind Xi's two objectives. China's reliance on foreign trade and overseas interests such as China's Belt and Road strategy. In turn this has created concerns within the senior levels of China's military about the vulnerability of its overseas interests and maritime life-lines. is a major theme. McDevitt dubs this China's "sea lane anxiety" and traces how this has required the PLA Navy to evolve from a "near seas"-focused navy to one that has global reach; a "blue water navy." He details how quickly this transformation has taken place, thanks to a patient step-by-step approach and abundant funding. The more than 10 years of anti-piracy patrols in the far reaches of the Indian Ocean has acted as a learning curve accelerator to "blue water" status. McDevitt then explores the PLA Navy's role in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. He provides a detailed assessment of what the PLAN will be expected to do if Beijing chooses to attack Taiwan potentially triggering combat with America's "first responders" in East Asia, especially the U.S. Seventh Fleet and U.S. Fifth Air Force. He conducts a close exploration of how the PLA Navy fits into China's campaign plan aimed at keeping reinforcing U.S. forces at arm's length (what the Pentagon calls anti-access and area denial [A2/AD]) if war has broken out over Taiwan, or because of attacks on U.S. allies and friends that live in the shadow of China. McDevitt does not know how Xi defines "world class" but the evidence from the past 15 years of building a blue water force has already made the PLA Navy the second largest globally capable navy in the world. This book concludes with a forecast of what Xi's vision of a "world-class navy" might look like in the next fifteen years when the 2035 deadline is reached.

Genres: China, Military Fiction, Nonfiction, History, Military History, Politics, War

320 pages, Paperback

Published February 15, 2023

Reviews

[Daniel · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent overview of where the Navy of the CCP stands in terms of its progress towards becoming a world class navy second to none. This is a different navy: the allegeance of its sailors is to the Chinese Communist Party rather than to the state, the CCP being the ultimate source of power and the leader of all military and police forces in China. Ideology and mythology are to be taken into account when evaluating the nature of the culture and organization of the military forces. The author, a retired US Rear Adm. , narrates the evolution of a navy rapidly built up as a potent military organization over the last twenty years. Xi Jinping reinforced the construction efforts by giving the navy a mandate to become a tool for chinese ambitions, in particular the Belt and Road initiative which is dependent on maritime links.

The Chinese Navy has built very sound designs and capable vessels which on paper are very competitive with the best of breed in the US navy, the UK, France and Japan. The country has also progressively learned to operate as a blue water navy with its participation to the anti-piracy deterence in Somalian waters. It has built a base in that area to extend its capabilities.

One of the main focus of the navy is to provide the means to CCP leadership to extend territorial waters to areas that are not legally within its boundaries as recognized by international law. Confrontations with neighbour states occur on a continuous basis with China acting as a bully with smaller states. The objective is to be able to control resource rich areas - fishing, oil, minerals and exploit them. Building islands from rocks jutting under water is one way to add military bases for providing additional maritime and air coverage to areas which are not legally theirs.

Control of maritime links, and of the first and second line of islands to the east are paramount to the security of mainland China which has experienced during their century of shame mutiple invasions from sea powers; the lesson has not been forgotten. In the psyche of the leaders of the CCP the next century will be one of domination by China and of revenge against their former adversaries. It should not come as a big surprise that the chinese hated being the victims of colonialism but they enjoy and defend their own brand of imperialism. Their navy build up serves the purpose of blocking access to foreign navies in case of conflict and of protecting commercial shipping lines.

The question of Taiwan is to be seen in that context where the CCP story line is one of reunification with a rogue province although from an historical perspective such a statement is quite a bit of a stretch. But after all Ukraine has been invaded because Putin has decided to rewrite history like dictators are fond of doing. China is watching closely how things are going for Russia where their three day special military operation is now beyond 177 days; military adventurism can be costly. China usually is quite prudent and likes a progressive step by step approach. But this is a long term goal and the chinese are known to play the long game.

Will we see a confrontation with the US navy? Possibly when China is ready, and that might be when its navy is up to its maximum planned strenght in 2035. We can only guess at their capacity at that moment because the chinese do not publish their building plans contrary to the custom applied by all other major navies.

Impeccable sources and clear and precise explanations makes this book a joy to read. A great addition to any library dealing with the subject of Indo and Asian Pacific strategic issues.

Another great book on the subject: Red Star Over the Pacific

[Dovide · Rating 5 out of 5]

As someone who knows nothing about war tactics, strategy, or naval warfare, I was pleasantly surprised by this book. Micheal A. McDevitt (a retired Rear Admiral with 34 years in the U.S. Navy) clearly knows his stuff—he balances rigor with clarity, making naval strategy both engaging and understandable.

My favorite parts focused on the political dimensions of China’s naval ambitions. The introductory chapters and the analysis of the South China Sea tensions stood out, particularly how McDevitt unpacks the U.S.-China confrontation and Beijing’s strong-arming of smaller neighbors. The book also delivers a riveting history of the PLA Navy, including unexpected details like its training through cooperative missions (e.g., anti-piracy patrols off Somalia) and its iterative “build a little, test a little” approach to fleet development. McDevitt’s command of naval strategy is on full display here, guiding readers through China’s journey to creating a blue-water navy from scratch in a way that’s both accessible and thorough.

The breakdown of China’s “SLOC anxiety” was especially compelling. McDevitt demonstrates how the country’s political economy hinges on securing these Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) for critical imports—around 70% of its oil needs are sourced from overseas. What’s more, China has become the world’s largest food importer, spending nearly 10 times as much on food imports today as it did 15 years ago, a trend exacerbated by the country’s shrinking farmland. This critical dependence on imports, he argues, fuels Beijing’s aggressive push to build a world-class navy rivaling America’s to protect these economic interests.

What stood out most, though, was McDevitt’s impartial analysis. Despite his decades of U.S. Navy service, he avoids demonizing China, instead offering balanced insights into its strategic motivations.

In short, I found this book invaluable to better understanding how China’s economic dependencies, geopolitical ambitions, and military innovation converge in its quest for twenty-first-century naval dominance.


Rounded down from 4.25 stars.

[Ridel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Unleash the Jiaolong!

As I write this review, the USA and China are at a historic low in their bilateral relations, with nothing more than an agreement to lower the verbal temperature while disagreeing on the fundamentals of almost everything else. Taiwan just finished affirming its choice of ruling parties. Beyond its real-life applicability, as a rabid reader of fictitious nation-state politics, China as a Twenty First Century Naval Power (“Naval Power”) provides a surprising crash course in APAC politics and a case study for aspiring authors.

The best part of Naval Power is its illustration of Chinese economic power and the creation of its Naval institutions. The author is a retired USN Rear Admiral but writes accessibly, explaining the basics of maritime power and force projection. Using real-world anecdotes, the reader learns of logistical and organizational hurdles impeding the defence of one’s homeland and the projection of force. One doesn’t steal some blueprints and build aircraft carriers; discussions about interconnected operational requirements and self-reinforcing training regimens are insightful. Naval Power provides a concise, realistic example of how a modern country creates a peerless war machine.

The book’s latter half presents possible scenarios and what the Chinese need to do to achieve military aims. This inevitably devolves into war games, and as the branched predictions get broader, the author’s statements lose focus. The USN Rear Admiral has an intuitive grasp of how surveillance, missiles, aircraft and ships work together. We don’t. Target prioritization in Southeast Asia and Japan evaded my understanding, as the resulting degradation in offensive capabilities is relatively obscure.

Naval Power is a fantastic introduction to the current geopolitical situation. The source is credible and he maintains an unbiased tone despite obvious leanings. This is a masterclass of grand strategy warfare. If only it was fictional.

Recommended.

[East West Notes · Rating 5 out of 5]

At the 2012 18th Party Congress, Hu Jintao announced that China should become a hǎiyáng qiángguó (海洋强国) – “great maritime power”. Subsequently in 2017, Xi Jinping stated the PRC military should be a “world-class” force by 2050, with much of this objective completed within fifteen years. China views a powerful navy as essential for safeguarding national sovereignty, protecting their rights and interests, securing trade and participating in international maritime cooperation. Until now, few have traced the policy steps which might reveal how China’s leadership views the strategic implications and definitions of maritime power. How do the Chinese plan to utilize maritime power in commercial interests in peacetime and in war? What is the historical background to these regions and what are their implications for global peace and stability?

I’m happy today to share this very timely book which was provided by the Naval Institute Press for review. In China as a Twenty First Century Naval Power: Theory, Practice, and Implications, Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, US Navy (Ret.), senior fellow with CNA Strategic Studies, examines the maritime dimension of China’s national strategy and the maturation and growth of the PLA Navy. McDevitt’s main argument is that the CCPs “…navy (and it is a party navy) is going to become a global force to be reckoned with. At the least, only with a very large navy would it be possible to execute the sea-lane protection mission. In addition, of course, a large, globally capable fleet is also a prerequisite to the stature of a maritime leading power with a “world-class navy.”

These relatively recent statements from Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping suggests that China’s strong navy came out of nowhere, but Chinese maritime activities were well underway before these goals were specifically announced. China has long recognised the importance of the maritime domain in terms of continuing development, defence and strategic objectives (reunification with Taiwan and the reclaiming of “lost” territory), food security, protecting trade and transporting and sourcing raw materials. McDevitt explores why China is interested in being a major maritime power. China defines this power as a combination of naval power, a strong merchant marine and fishing fleet, capable shipbuilding, a well-trained coast guard and the ability to extract and protect economically important resources. As the supporting chapters on China’s maritime power ambitions reveal, many large navies operating in the region and neighbouring countries were seemingly caught unaware as China built up its navy and reclaimed territory.

The book begins with an overview of the impressive build-up of the navy, which by 2020 will be the second-most-capable navy in the world in terms of combat systems and ships. He provides clear examples of how multinational antipiracy efforts spurred operational development, particularly in improving training, communications and logistics. Participating in international endeavours against piracy boosted the PLA Navy’s confidence and professionalism. These chapters provide a useful comparative analysis of large navies operating around the world and most importantly, analyses how the PLA Navy has leapt ahead of them. While this is a careful study, McDevitt writes with wit and shares occasional personal anecdotes. He tells of how one senior active-duty American naval officer characterised the PLA Navy as a “junkyard” navy and “woefully amateurish.” McDevitt notes that even in these early stages the PLA Navy was learning from successes and failures in dealing with extended far-seas deployments, piracy and evacuating Chinese citizens from Libya and Yemen.

China’s maritime power ambitions in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean have potentially wide ranging ramifications for the rest of the world. A full section is dedicated to how and why Taiwan would be a cause for war between China and the United States. Considering that China’s economy is based along its eastern seaboard in Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Fujian and Shanghai, their fears of attack from the sea, and the potential use of the Taiwan straits to achieve this, are understandable. He reflects on the anxieties of senior levels of China’s military over these vulnerable points. It was interesting to read how the Chinese learned from World War II, such as how the Americans blocked Japan’s imports of oil and metals, to ensure it would not happen to them. In terms of Chinese history, he does briefly touch on the Hundred Years of National Humiliation (1840 – 1949), which offers unfamiliar readers a reference point for Chinese fears and ambitions. For example, in an overview of the Chigua Reef Battle (赤瓜礁海战 AKA Johnson South Reef Skirmish), Admiral Liu Huaqing, former Commander of the PLA Navy, is quoted as saying “As small a scale clash as it was, the Chigua Reef battle demonstrated the might of the Chinese Navy. I no longer had the feeling that we were being controlled and humiliated by others. The grievance that had existed in my heart for years had disappeared…”

The first half of the book acknowledges and occasionally praises the challenges the PLA Navy has overcome to make such progress. He is less warm when discussing China’s behaviour in the South China Sea. Before listing key events, he provides a brief overview of the area’s unique geography, national sovereignty, international law and various conflicting strategic interests. As is common with military analysis, he avoids pointing fingers at specific politicians or international organisations, but some of the political agreements made by South East Asian elites do seem short-sighted and the reader does wonder if these elites are in denial of, or merely resigned to, the situation. The reader might infer that he feels that many of these organisations are ineffective in dealing with fishing disputes, island building and militarization. As he says, “Now, some eighteen years later, an ASEAN-China code of conduct remains a work in progress.”

The book has two excellent contributed appendices. Those following South China Sea disputes in the newspapers might find these sections on the China Coast Guard and China’s Maritime Militia to be particularly useful. Their actions are described as “coercive,” “heavy handed” and as doing “dirty work.” These separate organisations offer politically useful protections through plausible deniability and being somewhat removed from the command of the PLA Navy. The only issue readers might have with this book is that while news organisations often refer to tensions in the South China Sea as involving “Chinese ships,” they likely are from the Coast Guard or the Maritime Militia. Therefore, a reader shouldn’t pick up this book expecting a full history of those two organisations and their well-publicised actions in the region. The book is also fairly light on the complex legal environments and the international institutions at work in these areas.

It wasn’t that long ago that books focusing on Chinese maritime power and South China Sea matters were considered a bit niche. When Bill Hayton’s The South China Sea was published in 2014, reviewers lamented having to memorise the names of tiny islands and “long-forgotten” Asian politicians in this “overlooked corner of the globe.” As mentioned in the preface of this book, “not so very long ago the idea that China would become a maritime power seemed absurd.” Now we must ask whether the PLA Navy will utilise its global expeditionary capability beyond their regular presence in the Indian Ocean. Or will their operational force remain regional, not dissimilar to imperial Japan’s in 1941? Will they maintain a substantial naval presence in the Indian Ocean, as the Soviet Union did before them? Will their navy be permanently abroad, like the Americans? In Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Conflict That Made the Modern World (2018), Andrew Lambert argued that China, with its “profoundly negative” attitude to the sea will never be a true seapower and that it has no interest in “contesting sea control beyond its own rather generously defined littoral.” Reviewing the name “PLA Navy” he announces that the sea is “…so unimportant, or so dangerous, that China does not have a navy.” While what constitutes a “seapower state” is a matter of ongoing academic debate, I think readers will agree with McDevitt that China does indeed have a navy and that it is worth paying attention to.

The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (2014) and Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (2015) have rightfully described this region as a source of potential conflict. China as a Twenty First Century Naval Power answers a need in the market for an up-to-date book on what may be one of the world’s most pressing geopolitical issues. Most significantly McDevitt explores how an obsessive pursuit of maritime power allows the CCP to protect their own power and interests. “This is what sets China apart from many of its Asian neighbors: Beijing has the capability not only to protect but also to advance its rights and interests coercively, if need be, while most of its neighbors do not.” These neighbourhood disputes include Japan over the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands, and disputes with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam over several island chains. He covers most of these major issues with concise summaries of the history, conflicts, laws, political responses and his military viewpoint. This book is written from a US Navy perspective with significant expertise and McDevitt’s reflections and observations are a valuable source of information to international China watchers and those interested in the region. Although the Nine-Dash Line is explained briefly, it would be interesting to read more about China’s rationale and justifications. I would like to see a timeline for these conflicting historical claims. The United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea often seems quite irrelevant.

China as a Twenty First Century Naval Power is far more technical than other similarly themed publications, but McDevitt provides clear explanations for terms such as SLOC, Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD), the Nine-Dash Line and dozens of other acronyms. If you’re already familiar with these terms, I don’t think it will trouble you much to skim past them. For some concepts he provides both the English and the Standard Mandarin terms and explains how they are conceptually the same or similar. He acknowledges that he is not a Sinologist and does not speak Chinese, but had a team of people who assisted in contributing papers and researching Chinese-language sources. A glance at the chapter notes and bibliography shows many Chinese language sources, such as government reports, websites and speeches. This book also includes many useful maps, charts and photos. Thankfully, the maps provide the various island names in parentheses (e.g. Penghu (Pescadores)). That’s especially useful if you read newspapers from different countries. One helpful photo of a quickly developing reef shows how the runway and deepwater harbour is roughly the size of Pearl Harbor. Even with these images, it is somewhat difficult to appreciate the size and scale of these constructions, especially if one is not trained in looking at satellite images.

McDevitt acknowledges his uncertainty over what the PLA Navy’s warship strength will be, even within a fifteen year timeline. China watchers and policy experts will appreciate his frank recognition of the potential for political change, economic slowdown or other unforeseen factors. This book does not pretend to have all the answers, but it provides readers with a useful background for understanding maritime matters in regions that may dominate the future of conflict. As Western countries experience increasing tensions with China, multinational military exercises focus on countering Chinese influence, and the matter of Taiwan regains press attention, this book is a welcome addition to previous publications seeking to broaden our understanding of the competing interests in this vital region. It is an engaging and accessible analysis of the PLA Navy and how it may evolve with China’s increasing power and influence.

[Josh · Rating 5 out of 5]

Having worked at INDOPACOM, I can tell you this book is a must read for anyone who has missed out on the past two decades. This book is relevant in modern conversations of PLAN. If you have been paying attention to the CCPs rise in military and economic power, this book is excellent way to make sure you have not missed anything.

The book is not a light read, so grab a coffee and get to reading. There are a lot of characters and events mentioned. If you need more information, make sure to pause, Google and learn, then continue to read.

All in all if you are looking for a crash course to the rise of China’s sea power and their plans to become a global sea power, this is 100% the best place to start!

[Tom Schulte · Rating 4 out of 5]

A lot of detail here on how China is growing a blue water navy with global reach and what might be its goals with such power. In December 2008, China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA(N)) embarked on a historic mission to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden. That proved to be a start, the germ of the naval power now an implicit threat to Taiwanese independence. Friction also has occurred with Vietnam, The Philippines, Malaysia, Japan, etc. as power is projected onto neighbor's continental shelves and over features not recognized territory by international law, such as the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands.

[Simon Mee · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wading through an English version of the document, I came across a statement establishing as a national objective that China should become a “great maritime power” I was immediately struck by the audacity of such an assertion, as well as with its candor and lack of equivocation.

China’s on the rise (well subject to the demographic cliff), and it has the goal of major expansions to 2035 and 2049. China as a Twenty First Century Naval Power is a bit nicer to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and its plans for maritime dominance than Crashback, but it is also more truthful – less whinging about collisions, more about whether the those H-6K Badgers will keep the Indian sealanes safe.

The Devil is in avoiding the (unnecessary) details

Simply having maritime rights and interests is not sufficient; after all, every nation that borders the sea does. For China what is essential is being able to protect them from being violated. This is what sets China apart from many of its Asian neighbors: Beijing has the capability not only to protect but also to advance its rights and interests coercively, if need be, while most of its neighbors do not.

There’s a temptation to fall into slathering descriptions of weapons systems, or flesh out potential scenarios until they become futuristic novels. McDevitt avoids this. The weapon systems are described at a relatively high level (numbers of missiles, ASW capability, what are true blue water ships), and the potential steps involving a conflict in the “First Chain” are mere sketches.

While it keeps the book relatively dry, I believe this is the right choice. By not being weighed down by detailing every potential target in Taipei, it’s easier to set out the possibilities and the constraints the PLAN faces. Anti access and area denial may rule thinking close to home, but protection of distant sealanes will stretch even burgeoning capabilities. By laying out what objectives the PLAN needs to achieve, it provides context to the large number of warships it has, and an understanding why China is building so many, while still actually having a shortfall in areas such as submarines. Perhaps a newer edition would devote some attention to drone warfare, but I suspect the strategic calculus would not change overly much.

The preference for the overview rather than individual vignettes such as in Crashback means that McDevitt can cram in alot of information. How the PLAN trained up its officers and men in anti-piracy efforts, what are Xi Jinping’s goals, how China approaches the contested South China Sea may come across as straightforward (even colourless) statements in the book, but actually convey vast amounts of information. It’s hard to describe how useful it is to know the limitations on the PLAN operating in the Philippine Sea, but I felt my conceptual framework altered by this book.

Respect without endorsement

For the PLA Navy, the problem is real. It is particularly acute in the Indian Ocean where its long SLOC presents the PLA Navy with a very difficult defensive problem. A very different SLOC situation exists in the South China Sea, where since the late 1950s the PLA Navy has played a leading part in China’s slow but steady accumulation of land features and their conversion into military bases. Today a network of island bases provides the PLA Navy the means to protect this thousand-nautical-mile SLOC.

The biggest advantage over Crashback is that this book allows you to understand the Chinese strategic position without being captured by it. Chinese vulnerabilities, including the humiliations of the 19th Century but also current sea lane protection, drive the PLAN’s expansion. A need to provide strategic depth to protect its submarine naval bases drives actions in the Spratlys (witness the strike on the Kilo class submarine at Sevastapol as evidence of such vulnerability!). However, McDevitt sets out where Chinese activities, particularly in the South China Sea, breach international law in his opinion. He’s a realist in acknowledging that parties like Vietnam and the Philippines still need to keep China on their side economically but I think it is reasonable to infer from his narrative that Chinese acts provides the United States with leverage to counterbalance the PLAN with alliances.

Similarly, while China seeks a global reach, its goals (such as protection of Chinese citizens overseas) are plausible and appear to fit its construction programme, i.e. it is hardly rushing to have a dozen aircraft carriers. It is possible to respect the reasons for the PLAN’s global expansion without feeling you are undermining the autonomy of Taiwan.

As a final mention, McDevitt sets out early that the PLAN is a Chinese Communist Party instrument, i.e. a navy for the party rather than the government. The political goals of the CCP appear to influence the navy's development, along with the associated Coast Guard and naval militia. It's more a point that I note as I am not fully cognizant of the implications of the distinction between party and state.

This new strategic environment is just around the corner, and China is leading the way.

This is a very specific technical book, but I do consider it provides an opportunity to broaden ones strategic thinking generally. It might possibly need an update in a few years if economic constraints bite, but other it is well worth a read.

[Frank · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent overview of China's efforts in building a "Blue Water, World Class" Naval force Second to None in the world by the year 2049, ie. the "China Dream". This book, was written by Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (ret.). He was the former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia. The book was published by the Naval Institute Press in Annapolis, Maryland in 2020. McDevitt concludes that China's Navy will become "a force with global expeditionary capability, mimicking the United States in certain aspects in the Indian Ocean region, but that it will also maintain an overwhelming regional force reminiscent of imperial Japan's on the eve of World War II." McDevitt stated that Taiwan could be the cause for a War between China and the U.S. if ever the Taiwan's citizens voted to become independent. Taiwan currently is neither a legally independent state nor a legal component part of the People's Republic of China. Taiwan's security is solely dependent upon the United States and is based upon the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.

If you think that such a conflict between the U.S. and China is not imminent, keep an open eye on what the People's Republic of China is currently doing in clamping down on the freedoms of the citizens of Hong Kong and basically making them slaves to the State. Taiwan citizens dare not try to claim their independence as China will not allow it Period.

It was interesting to note recently (June 16th 2021), in a Washington Times article which stated: "A U.S. Navy aircraft carrier strike group led by the USS Ronald Regan began conducting operations in the disputed South China Sea on Monday amid mounting U.S.-China tensions. The carrier and accompanying warships entered the strategic waterway where China has expanded and militarized disputed islands. China has ramped up its military presence in the South China Sea by building up artificial islands and putting air bases on the islands. The militarization, according to the Pentagon, includes deployment of advanced anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles on some of the disputed islands." If China is not planning to go to war in the near future, what is the need for a "World Class Naval Force Second To None"?

[Steve Scott · Rating 4 out of 5]

I listened to the audiobook version of this work. While it was informative and packed full of frightening information about the growth and development of the Chinese navy over the last half century, the reader would be best served by getting the actual book… Which is unfortunately expensive.

The level of detail the author provides along with his use of acronyms throughout make it a difficult work to track. It isn’t something for the casual listener. That combined with its poor technical execution, the reader often coughs and clears his throat, makes it difficult to absorb.

That aside, it is an amazing resource for anyone wanting to understand the Chinese navy. Every officer and NCO in the naval services should have this book in their library and should read it. It’s eye opening and disturbing.

[Yvonne Sallis · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good information regarding China’s efforts to not only build a world class navy and maritime force, but to exercise naval/maritime dominance. Gave it 3 ⭐️s as the spelling and grammar errors made it hard to read at times.

[Benjamin Henley · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fascinating. A lot of technical concepts were hard to grasp, but I don’t fault the book. I am not as personally versed in Naval technologies/ship classifications/etc and I don’t expect the book to reiterate continually.

[James S · Rating 5 out of 5]

Outstanding book. Almost a "how to build a world class navy from scratch" cookbook. Should be required reading for young naval officers.

[Bradford · Rating 4 out of 5]

Puts so much of current strategy and affairs into scope. Somewhat disconcerting to read while living in a primary target…

[Shawn · Rating 3 out of 5]

It wasn’t bad, I think I just got a little swept up in the jargon, but that’s bound to happen with anything military related.

[David Wagner · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fast, practical summary that does not repeat the often made mistake of underestimating Chinese capacities. Solidly based on numbers, options and strategies, can recommend.

[solo · Rating 4 out of 5]

3.5 ★ rounded up. a bit bloated, but informative. not TOO jingoistic.

[Nick · Rating 4 out of 5]

McDevitt provides a sober, well-balanced examination of how China's naval capabilities have advanced in recent years, and the implications for where they will advance to. Unlike many other books aimed at influencing public opinion regarding U.S. / China relations, McDevitt does not over-hype Chinese naval capabilities, nor minimize the real risk of military conflict regarding Taiwan or the South China Sea as China becomes proficient at introducing and using new naval capabilities. For example, China's Naval Escort Task Force operations off the coast of Africa have provided it much experience as a blue-water navy, but China is still likely years away from operating carrier task forces with the proficiency of the U.S. Level-headed policymakers should absorb McDevitt's analysis and consider how a Chinese naval task force could be used to intervene in an international crisis while looking for the milestones that China's aircraft carriers can truly operate as full task forces. Unfortunately, we are unlikely to see this type of analysis in public debate.

[Maria · Rating 3 out of 5]

McDevitt marshals his arguments and analysis of what Chinese leaders have done and said about their navy in the past 30 years to show their desire to control their international trade, harvest the resources of "claimed" islands and deal with their neighbors unilaterally.

Why I started this book: Professional Reading Title that was available as audio, perfect.

Why I finished it: This is a new book published sometime just before COVID, and unfortunately I spent most of the book questioning how COVID changes the trajectory of McDevitt's arguments. Are they merely postponed, or has COVID upended them? Realistically China's preparations for a world class navy have only paused or but it feels like so much more has changed because of the virus, lockdown and protests. Also, this book is heavy in military assumptions and jargon... making it harder to follow than some other books I have read. And weirdly the appendixes flowed better than some of the main text.

[Lance · Rating 5 out of 5]

Review of what makes China such an important naval presence both in the SCS and beyond. The author covers the technology, leadership, economics, innovation, tactics, strategy, and other tools that the CCP is using to lay the foundation for regional maritime hegemony.