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The War in Ukraine’s Donbas
This collective work analyzes the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, providing a coherent picture of Ukraine and Eastern Europe in the period 2013–2020. Giving voice to different social groups, scholarly communities and agencies relevant to Ukraine's recent history, The War in Ukraine's Donbas goes beyond simplistic media interpretations that limit the analysis to Vladimir Putin and Russian aims to annex Ukraine. Instead, the authors identify the deeper roots linked to the autonomy and history of Donbas as a region. The contributions explore local society and traditions and the alienation from Ukraine caused by the events of Euromaidan, which saw the removal of the Donetsk-based president Viktor Yanukovych. Other chapters address the refugee crisis, the Minsk Accords in 2014 and the impact of the new president Volodymyr Zelensky and his efforts to bring the war to an end by negotiations among Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany. The book concludes with four proposals for a durable peace in territorial power-sharing; the conversion of rebels into legitimate political parties; amnesty for all participants of the armed conflict; and a transitional period of several years until political institutions are fully re-established.
244 pages, Hardcover
First published January 31, 2022
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May 3, 2025
This is an edited volume about the 2014-2022 Donbas war published...on the 21st December, 2021. What was it that happened 2 months later? You guessed it, Russia invaded Ukraine. In that sense, the book's timing is very unfortunate. It took a long time to put together and much of the fieldwork was from 2016-2020. None of the authors saw a full-on invasion as a possibility at that point. To be fair, nor did the Ukrainian leadership.
Still, there is plenty of value to be gained from the book. Like all edited volumes there is quite a lot of variation in quality between the chapters, both in their timeliness today and what they contribute to one's knowledge of the Donbas conflict more broadly. I wont go over every chapter, but two examples will do nicely.
The best overall chapter for me was Kimitaka Matsuzato's 'The First Four Years of the Donetsk People's Republic'. Here, Matsuzato deals with state formation in the DPR, how its initial ruling bloc was constituted, and how this shifted through assorted means (including violent ones) away from social revolutionary and independent-minded politicians and towards more conservative ones closer to Moscow. It also elucidates in a useful and clear way how the Russian state influences the assortment of allied de facto states on its borders (previously the D/LPRs, Abkhazia, South Ossetia). It's not simply a case of 'I say, you do', and the specific institutional interaction is more subtle than that, requiring only a small number of personnel. In the case of the DPR it was done through Presidential aid, Vladislav Surkov, and a small team of 'political technologists' (polittekhnologi Surkova). This team of fewer than 5 people focused on influencing the selection of the very top-level of the DPR's elite and its engagement with the Minsk negotiations while leaving many domestic matters to local leaders. Knowledge of these 'political technologists' was very close-held, and not even all DPR parliamentarians knew of them, yet they were still powerful and, to an extent, even autonomous from the Kremlin itself. It also demonstrated-interestingly, considering what has happened since-that the Russian leadership actively dissuaded pan-Russianism at this point, undermining the idea that Putin has had a 'grand strategy' since pre-2014 to take over XYZ territories and supporting a more 'reactive', pragmatic, and tacital (over strategic) framework of action.
On the other hand, Alina Cherviatsova's chapter was unfortunately dated by the time I read it. While suggesting various legal pathways of accountability for Russia's actions in Ukraine (at that point) had utility at the time of her writing the chapter, it naturally has become rather redundant now (not that international law could ever have realistically mattered). I also frankly think the concept of 'hybrid war' is completely superfluous. I see no evidence that warfare has ever NOT been 'hybrid'. Propaganda, covert action, irregular warfare, diplomacy, and so on have always been part of war, nor does it require any great 'sophistication' to do so. Even the puniest of insurgent groups can produce propaganda, try to assassinate enemy commanders/politicians, fight in an irregular fashion, etc. It is transhistorical. Its modern usage is just a bogey word for geopolitical adversaries of the US-hence why 'hybrid warfare' is almost exclusively used to describe Russia/China/Belarus/Iran and never the US, despite the latter using the same political and conflictual 'techniques'. I don't think it's a specific ontological phenomenon separate from 'war' or 'competition' more broadly and it has become a purely emotive and instrumentalised term.
I think the contrast between these two chapters in their perspective and normative positioning also illustrates an important factor people reading English-language books on Ukraine/Belarus/Russia have to consider. All knowledge production has a social-political consequence, whether or not the author is conscious of it, and this is often particularly unsubtle when Russia is the object of investigation. Sometimes I read things and they seem pretty clearly part of a wider aim/agenda to lobby for a certain outcome among the intended audience (policymakers, western citizens, government officials, etc), e.g., *Belarus in the 21st Century: Between Dictatorship and Democracy* literally has a foreword by Sviatlana Tshikhanouskaya! Journalistic works hurriedly written after the 2022 invasion, often alongside calls for a stronger western response by the authors, are a more obvious example.
I'm not saying this makes the work useless, but you clearly have to be aware of its limitations when the book has a particular narrow political purpose, and when the collection of authors are from a narrow background and positional spectrum (e.g., western diaspora nationalists). In Marples' edited volume here I don't think this is a book-ruining issue. Though the authors lean towards the Ukrainian nationalist narrative on aggregate, it's far from extreme, and they largely retain a level of scholarly objectivity and intellectual seriousness. The full range of Donbas perspectives are illuminated through proper fieldwork in a lot of chapters, e.g., Marples's, Risch's, Matsuzato's, Mikheieva's, Melnyk's, and Sukhankin's. Even in those chapters largely focusing on Kyiv's perspective and logic-of-action and in which Russia is rhetorically 'othered' (e.g., Kudelia's, Hurska's, Gyidel's) the Ukrainian state and its elites are treated critically, and Donbas is not viewed through the often lazy prism of 'Russian puppets; Russian traitors/separatists; occupied helpless victims' often seen in western media and journalistic coverage.
While the Donbas itself is well researched, there could have been more dedication to the Russian state's inner logics and behavioural drivers. I'm not asking for a "pro-Russian" chapter-propaganda for the sake of 'balance' is not serious research-but more so to understand why Russia behaved the way it did, why its tactical approach changed over time, and how the decisionmaking structures and institutions in the country operate with regards to its Ukraine/Donbas policy. Hurksa does this to an extent, but I feel like Russia's internal dynamisms are black-boxed beyond the external expression of its strategic evolution in the Sea of Azov *from Ukrainian eyes*. It's touched on occasionally (only Matsuzato does so in any detail), but not as much as it should've been considering Russia's centrality to the whole conflict.
Still, the overall quality and continuing relevance of the chapters are strong enough that I would recommend the book, even if some things can be skimmed over without losing anything of value. It's well-written and helps a great deal to understand how Donbas evolved through the post-2022 period while also giving some loose hints as to why things eventually escalated to where they did, even if it doesn't predict or fully explain the invasion itself.
Still, there is plenty of value to be gained from the book. Like all edited volumes there is quite a lot of variation in quality between the chapters, both in their timeliness today and what they contribute to one's knowledge of the Donbas conflict more broadly. I wont go over every chapter, but two examples will do nicely.
The best overall chapter for me was Kimitaka Matsuzato's 'The First Four Years of the Donetsk People's Republic'. Here, Matsuzato deals with state formation in the DPR, how its initial ruling bloc was constituted, and how this shifted through assorted means (including violent ones) away from social revolutionary and independent-minded politicians and towards more conservative ones closer to Moscow. It also elucidates in a useful and clear way how the Russian state influences the assortment of allied de facto states on its borders (previously the D/LPRs, Abkhazia, South Ossetia). It's not simply a case of 'I say, you do', and the specific institutional interaction is more subtle than that, requiring only a small number of personnel. In the case of the DPR it was done through Presidential aid, Vladislav Surkov, and a small team of 'political technologists' (polittekhnologi Surkova). This team of fewer than 5 people focused on influencing the selection of the very top-level of the DPR's elite and its engagement with the Minsk negotiations while leaving many domestic matters to local leaders. Knowledge of these 'political technologists' was very close-held, and not even all DPR parliamentarians knew of them, yet they were still powerful and, to an extent, even autonomous from the Kremlin itself. It also demonstrated-interestingly, considering what has happened since-that the Russian leadership actively dissuaded pan-Russianism at this point, undermining the idea that Putin has had a 'grand strategy' since pre-2014 to take over XYZ territories and supporting a more 'reactive', pragmatic, and tacital (over strategic) framework of action.
On the other hand, Alina Cherviatsova's chapter was unfortunately dated by the time I read it. While suggesting various legal pathways of accountability for Russia's actions in Ukraine (at that point) had utility at the time of her writing the chapter, it naturally has become rather redundant now (not that international law could ever have realistically mattered). I also frankly think the concept of 'hybrid war' is completely superfluous. I see no evidence that warfare has ever NOT been 'hybrid'. Propaganda, covert action, irregular warfare, diplomacy, and so on have always been part of war, nor does it require any great 'sophistication' to do so. Even the puniest of insurgent groups can produce propaganda, try to assassinate enemy commanders/politicians, fight in an irregular fashion, etc. It is transhistorical. Its modern usage is just a bogey word for geopolitical adversaries of the US-hence why 'hybrid warfare' is almost exclusively used to describe Russia/China/Belarus/Iran and never the US, despite the latter using the same political and conflictual 'techniques'. I don't think it's a specific ontological phenomenon separate from 'war' or 'competition' more broadly and it has become a purely emotive and instrumentalised term.
I think the contrast between these two chapters in their perspective and normative positioning also illustrates an important factor people reading English-language books on Ukraine/Belarus/Russia have to consider. All knowledge production has a social-political consequence, whether or not the author is conscious of it, and this is often particularly unsubtle when Russia is the object of investigation. Sometimes I read things and they seem pretty clearly part of a wider aim/agenda to lobby for a certain outcome among the intended audience (policymakers, western citizens, government officials, etc), e.g., *Belarus in the 21st Century: Between Dictatorship and Democracy* literally has a foreword by Sviatlana Tshikhanouskaya! Journalistic works hurriedly written after the 2022 invasion, often alongside calls for a stronger western response by the authors, are a more obvious example.
I'm not saying this makes the work useless, but you clearly have to be aware of its limitations when the book has a particular narrow political purpose, and when the collection of authors are from a narrow background and positional spectrum (e.g., western diaspora nationalists). In Marples' edited volume here I don't think this is a book-ruining issue. Though the authors lean towards the Ukrainian nationalist narrative on aggregate, it's far from extreme, and they largely retain a level of scholarly objectivity and intellectual seriousness. The full range of Donbas perspectives are illuminated through proper fieldwork in a lot of chapters, e.g., Marples's, Risch's, Matsuzato's, Mikheieva's, Melnyk's, and Sukhankin's. Even in those chapters largely focusing on Kyiv's perspective and logic-of-action and in which Russia is rhetorically 'othered' (e.g., Kudelia's, Hurska's, Gyidel's) the Ukrainian state and its elites are treated critically, and Donbas is not viewed through the often lazy prism of 'Russian puppets; Russian traitors/separatists; occupied helpless victims' often seen in western media and journalistic coverage.
While the Donbas itself is well researched, there could have been more dedication to the Russian state's inner logics and behavioural drivers. I'm not asking for a "pro-Russian" chapter-propaganda for the sake of 'balance' is not serious research-but more so to understand why Russia behaved the way it did, why its tactical approach changed over time, and how the decisionmaking structures and institutions in the country operate with regards to its Ukraine/Donbas policy. Hurksa does this to an extent, but I feel like Russia's internal dynamisms are black-boxed beyond the external expression of its strategic evolution in the Sea of Azov *from Ukrainian eyes*. It's touched on occasionally (only Matsuzato does so in any detail), but not as much as it should've been considering Russia's centrality to the whole conflict.
Still, the overall quality and continuing relevance of the chapters are strong enough that I would recommend the book, even if some things can be skimmed over without losing anything of value. It's well-written and helps a great deal to understand how Donbas evolved through the post-2022 period while also giving some loose hints as to why things eventually escalated to where they did, even if it doesn't predict or fully explain the invasion itself.
January 5, 2025
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
И где бы взрывы не били, там снова взрываться весне
Пусть и не представляем мы даже что делать нам с ней
Книга представляет из себя сборник статей на совершенно разные темы по вопросу российско-украинского конфликта, который вспыхнул в 2014. Однако я бы хотел подчеркнуть, что сегодня, информация, представленная в этой книге, является частично устаревшей. Впрочем, некоторые темы, в частности тема особых украинских групп, которые имеют возможность пересекать границу сепаратистского Донбасса для поиска тел, продолжают сохранять актуальность. Возможно, увлекательность написанного объясняется тем, что эта глава была просто хорошо написана. Что касается остальных глав, то по большей части мне было скучно читать большую их часть. Возможно сказывается усталость от данной темы, а также усталость от повторения одного и того же раз за разом, ведь по сути, мало что изменилось за прошедшие десять лет. Последнее что хотелось бы отметить, это относительно объективную оценку всех авторов.
The opposition to the Euromaidan in Donetsk and the Donbas, and grievances with Ukrainians from other regions, did not mean that Ukraine was on the verge of a civil war. No one I spoke to or received written responses from said that Ukraine was inherently divided. That was a crisis manufactured by politicians and by outside powers.
Still, hostility towards the Euromaidan, generated by pro-Ianukovych media in the Donbas and in neighboring Russia, and unresolved social grievances in the Donbas, threatened to unleash tensions that marginal separatist groups, with help from Russia, were glad to exploit in the name of their own “revolution of dignity.” The evolution of the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv and in cities of western and central Ukraine only further alienated Don-bas residents. The violent implosion of the Ianukovych regime suggested that extremists with far-right leanings really had taken power in Kyiv and had plunged Ukraine into anarchy and chaos.
Довольно точно подмеченное искусственное разделение Украины в том смысле, что политические элиты как внутри Украины, так и за её пределами (РФ) всё это время именно что разделяли страну, а не объединяли таких разных людей, которые при этом всём идентифицируют себя именно как украинцы, включая тех, кто живёт сегодня в Луганске. В контексте этого автор далее пишет о политической элите Донбасса, но я бы отметил политическую и культурную элиту западной Украины, которая также активно эксплуатировала нарратив о российской и/или советской Украине на востоке страны.
As Pavel Gubarev himself admitted, the anti-Maidan and its titushky stood for nothing except for Ianukovych and other thieves and bandits from the Party of Regions.
Потрясающее откровение, которое впрочем, не открывает ничего нового на природу режима Януковича, которая была очевидна даже таким неоднозначным личностям.
Out of the clashes on Hrushevsky Street, the mysterious Right Sector gained a name for itself in not just Ukraine, but in Russia, and its members exploited that name for the sake of the “national revolution” that its leader, Dmytro Iarosh, aspired to achieve
Как говорится, если бы Правого Сектора не существовало, его следовало бы придумать. Что ж может быть, может быть...
The rumors ranged widely, reflecting possibly a propaganda of fear generated by social networks, local media, Russian state media, and probably “whispering” propaganda, but, like the hysteria that broke out online during the Euromaidan protests, they reflected real fears people shared. Rumors focused on nefarious plans afoot by Ukraine’s new leaders. One claimed that the new Prime Minister, Arsenii Iatseniuk said the state was going to expel from Ukraine anyone who did not speak Ukrainian.
<…>
They were already firing Russian speakers from state jobs.
<…>
One rumor repeated a trope connected directly with the Euromaidan, namely the idea that greater integration with Europe, through the Association Agreement, would end the traditional family and make homosexuality and other nontraditional lifestyles the law of the land: “Gays, pedophiles and zoophiles are seizing power and will make everyone marry everyone else.” Rumors spread that people were planning on tearing down Lenin monuments.
<…>
Another reader said members of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Mariupol claimed “that the Uniate-Schismatic-Catholics will take away their churches.”
<…>
Sashko Bilyi, the Right Sector leader who helped protesters seize power in the western Ukrainian city of Rivne, figured prominently in rumors. Videos of him threatening a city prosecutor and displaying his guns and knives in front of a Rivne Regional Council meeting became symbols of the Maidan spreading chaos, anarchy, and violence in Ukraine.
Думаю, слухи внесли свой вклад в раскачивание ситуации, но всё же одними слухами в XXI веке трудно организовать сепаратистские волнения. Слухи были скорее вторичными, а первичными были политические интриги донбасских элит вкупе с российскими элитами. Думаю, в тот момент ни одна сила не знала, к чему всё приведёт. Возможно, эти две силы ожидали, что Киев отправит дипломатов и переговорщиков, а не танки и авиацию на восток Украины. В контексте этого интерес представляет следующая глава, в которой как раз и рассказывается о том, в каком состоянии находилась украинская армия на тот момент.
Militarily, only two tactical battalions (about 5,000 troops) were combat ready to engage in warfare when the Donbas hostilities escalated.
<…>
Along with poor military readiness, the Ukrainian army lacked basic equipment. According to the Ministry of Defense, only 4 percent of the Ukrainian military had life-saving items, like helmets and bulletproof jackets, in April 2014.
<…>
Food provision was poor and insufficient. Many regiments had little access to potable water with soldiers reportedly having to drink “water from the puddles” or of very poor quality “with rust.”
<…>
In short, the situation in the army was dire. Most expenses incurred on the front were covered by relatives, friends, and acquaintances of those in the military. Special troops, such as intelligence services, snipers, and narrow specialists faced additional challenges as they needed expensive technology, equipment, and gear to engage in military operations.
<…>
Bureaucratic inadequacies were cited as another constraint on the functioning of the army.
Справится с сепаратистами такая армия, конечно, могла, но дать отпор российской армии уже сил не было. Судя по тому что заявляют разные политики, 8 лет "холодного" мира были даны именно для того чтобы отстроить украинскую армию и подготовить её к открытому противостоянию с армией РФ. Интересно всё же насколько эта задача была выполнена.
Всё вышенаписанное располагается в первой половине книги. Да, есть ещё глава про поиск тел погибших, которая так же представляет интерес, но в целом, вышенаписанное содержится в первой половине книги. Оставшаяся часть меня как-то не особо заинтересовала, да и вообще не запомнились. Всё же книга была актуальная для 2014 года, сегодня же она может быть интересна лишь политологам либо историкам.
The book is a collection of articles on a variety of topics on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that erupted in 2014. However, I would like to emphasize that today, the information presented in this book is partly outdated. However, some topics, in particular the topic of special Ukrainian groups that are able to cross the border of separatist Donbas to search for bodies, continue to be relevant. Perhaps the engaging nature of what was written is due to the fact that this chapter was just well written. As for the rest of the chapters, for the most part, I was bored reading most of them. Perhaps it's the fatigue of the subject matter, as well as the fatigue of repeating the same thing over and over again because, in essence, not much has changed in the past ten years. The last thing I would like to mention is the relatively objective assessment of all the authors.
The opposition to the Euromaidan in Donetsk and the Donbas, and grievances with Ukrainians from other regions, did not mean that Ukraine was on the verge of a civil war. No one I spoke to or received written responses from said that Ukraine was inherently divided. That was a crisis manufactured by politicians and by outside powers.
Still, hostility towards the Euromaidan, generated by pro-Ianukovych media in the Donbas and in neighbouring Russia, and unresolved social grievances in the Donbas, threatened to unleash tensions that marginal separatist groups, with help from Russia, were glad to exploit in the name of their own “revolution of dignity.” The evolution of the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv and in cities of western and central Ukraine only further alienated Don-bas residents. The violent implosion of the Ianukovych regime suggested that extremists with far-right leanings really had taken power in Kyiv and had plunged Ukraine into anarchy and chaos.
The artificial division of Ukraine is quite accurate in the sense that political elites both inside and outside of Ukraine (Russia) have been dividing the country all along, rather than uniting such diverse people who identify themselves as Ukrainians, including those living in Luhansk today. In the context of this, the author goes on to write about the political elite of Donbass, but I would note the political and cultural elite of western Ukraine, which also actively exploited the narrative of a Russian and/or Soviet Ukraine in the east of the country.
As Pavel Gubarev himself admitted, the anti-Maidan and its titushky stood for nothing except for Ianukovych and other thieves and bandits from the Party of Regions.
A stunning revelation that, however, reveals nothing new about the nature of the Yanukovych regime, which was obvious even to such controversial personalities.
Out of the clashes on Hrushevsky Street, the mysterious Right Sector gained a name for itself in not just Ukraine, but in Russia, and its members exploited that name for the sake of the “national revolution” that its leader, Dmytro Iarosh, aspired to achieve
As they say, if the Right Sector didn't exist, it would have to be invented. Well, maybe, maybe...
The rumors ranged widely, reflecting possibly a propaganda of fear generated by social networks, local media, Russian state media, and probably “whispering” propaganda, but, like the hysteria that broke out online during the Euromaidan protests, they reflected real fears people shared. Rumors focused on nefarious plans afoot by Ukraine’s new leaders. One claimed that the new Prime Minister, Arsenii Iatseniuk said the state was going to expel from Ukraine anyone who did not speak Ukrainian.
<…>
They were already firing Russian speakers from state jobs.
<…>
One rumor repeated a trope connected directly with the Euromaidan, namely the idea that greater integration with Europe, through the Association Agreement, would end the traditional family and make homosexuality and other nontraditional lifestyles the law of the land: “Gays, pedophiles and zoophiles are seizing power and will make everyone marry everyone else.” Rumors spread that people were planning on tearing down Lenin monuments.
<…>
Another reader said members of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Mariupol claimed “that the Uniate-Schismatic-Catholics will take away their churches.”
<…>
Sashko Bilyi, the Right Sector leader who helped protesters seize power in the western Ukrainian city of Rivne, figured prominently in rumors. Videos of him threatening a city prosecutor and displaying his guns and knives in front of a Rivne Regional Council meeting became symbols of the Maidan spreading chaos, anarchy, and violence in Ukraine.
I think rumors contributed to the situation, but rumors alone in the XXI century make it difficult to organize separatist unrest. Rumors were rather secondary, and the primary ones were political intrigues of Donbas elites together with Russian elites. I think, at that moment, neither force knew where things would lead. Perhaps these two forces expected Kiev to send diplomats and negotiators rather than tanks and aircraft to eastern Ukraine. In the context of this, the next chapter is interesting, and it tells us what the state of the Ukrainian army was at that time.
Militarily, only two tactical battalions (about 5,000 troops) were combat ready to engage in warfare when the Donbas hostilities escalated.
<…>
Along with poor military readiness, the Ukrainian army lacked basic equipment. According to the Ministry of Defense, only 4 percent of the Ukrainian military had life-saving items, like helmets and bulletproof jackets, in April 2014.
<…>
Food provision was poor and insufficient. Many regiments had little access to potable water with soldiers reportedly having to drink “water from the puddles” or of very poor quality “with rust.”
<…>
In short, the situation in the army was dire. Most expenses incurred on the front were covered by relatives, friends, and acquaintances of those in the military. Special troops, such as intelligence services, snipers, and narrow specialists faced additional challenges as they needed expensive technology, equipment, and gear to engage in military operations.
<…>
Bureaucratic inadequacies were cited as another constraint on the functioning of the army.
Of course, such an army could deal with the separatists, but it was no longer strong enough to fight back the Russian army. Judging by what different politicians say, 8 years of “cold” peace were given precisely to rebuild the Ukrainian army and prepare it for an open confrontation with the Russian army. I wonder how far this task was accomplished.
All of the above is contained in the first half of the book. Yes, there is a chapter about the search for the bodies of the dead, which is also of interest, but in general, the above is contained in the first half of the book. The rest of the book I was somehow not particularly interested, and, in general, not remembered. Still, the book was relevant for 2014; today it may be of interest only to political scientists or historians.
И где бы взрывы не били, там снова взрываться весне
Пусть и не представляем мы даже что делать нам с ней
Книга представляет из себя сборник статей на совершенно разные темы по вопросу российско-украинского конфликта, который вспыхнул в 2014. Однако я бы хотел подчеркнуть, что сегодня, информация, представленная в этой книге, является частично устаревшей. Впрочем, некоторые темы, в частности тема особых украинских групп, которые имеют возможность пересекать границу сепаратистского Донбасса для поиска тел, продолжают сохранять актуальность. Возможно, увлекательность написанного объясняется тем, что эта глава была просто хорошо написана. Что касается остальных глав, то по большей части мне было скучно читать большую их часть. Возможно сказывается усталость от данной темы, а также усталость от повторения одного и того же раз за разом, ведь по сути, мало что изменилось за прошедшие десять лет. Последнее что хотелось бы отметить, это относительно объективную оценку всех авторов.
The opposition to the Euromaidan in Donetsk and the Donbas, and grievances with Ukrainians from other regions, did not mean that Ukraine was on the verge of a civil war. No one I spoke to or received written responses from said that Ukraine was inherently divided. That was a crisis manufactured by politicians and by outside powers.
Still, hostility towards the Euromaidan, generated by pro-Ianukovych media in the Donbas and in neighboring Russia, and unresolved social grievances in the Donbas, threatened to unleash tensions that marginal separatist groups, with help from Russia, were glad to exploit in the name of their own “revolution of dignity.” The evolution of the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv and in cities of western and central Ukraine only further alienated Don-bas residents. The violent implosion of the Ianukovych regime suggested that extremists with far-right leanings really had taken power in Kyiv and had plunged Ukraine into anarchy and chaos.
Довольно точно подмеченное искусственное разделение Украины в том смысле, что политические элиты как внутри Украины, так и за её пределами (РФ) всё это время именно что разделяли страну, а не объединяли таких разных людей, которые при этом всём идентифицируют себя именно как украинцы, включая тех, кто живёт сегодня в Луганске. В контексте этого автор далее пишет о политической элите Донбасса, но я бы отметил политическую и культурную элиту западной Украины, которая также активно эксплуатировала нарратив о российской и/или советской Украине на востоке страны.
As Pavel Gubarev himself admitted, the anti-Maidan and its titushky stood for nothing except for Ianukovych and other thieves and bandits from the Party of Regions.
Потрясающее откровение, которое впрочем, не открывает ничего нового на природу режима Януковича, которая была очевидна даже таким неоднозначным личностям.
Out of the clashes on Hrushevsky Street, the mysterious Right Sector gained a name for itself in not just Ukraine, but in Russia, and its members exploited that name for the sake of the “national revolution” that its leader, Dmytro Iarosh, aspired to achieve
Как говорится, если бы Правого Сектора не существовало, его следовало бы придумать. Что ж может быть, может быть...
The rumors ranged widely, reflecting possibly a propaganda of fear generated by social networks, local media, Russian state media, and probably “whispering” propaganda, but, like the hysteria that broke out online during the Euromaidan protests, they reflected real fears people shared. Rumors focused on nefarious plans afoot by Ukraine’s new leaders. One claimed that the new Prime Minister, Arsenii Iatseniuk said the state was going to expel from Ukraine anyone who did not speak Ukrainian.
<…>
They were already firing Russian speakers from state jobs.
<…>
One rumor repeated a trope connected directly with the Euromaidan, namely the idea that greater integration with Europe, through the Association Agreement, would end the traditional family and make homosexuality and other nontraditional lifestyles the law of the land: “Gays, pedophiles and zoophiles are seizing power and will make everyone marry everyone else.” Rumors spread that people were planning on tearing down Lenin monuments.
<…>
Another reader said members of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Mariupol claimed “that the Uniate-Schismatic-Catholics will take away their churches.”
<…>
Sashko Bilyi, the Right Sector leader who helped protesters seize power in the western Ukrainian city of Rivne, figured prominently in rumors. Videos of him threatening a city prosecutor and displaying his guns and knives in front of a Rivne Regional Council meeting became symbols of the Maidan spreading chaos, anarchy, and violence in Ukraine.
Думаю, слухи внесли свой вклад в раскачивание ситуации, но всё же одними слухами в XXI веке трудно организовать сепаратистские волнения. Слухи были скорее вторичными, а первичными были политические интриги донбасских элит вкупе с российскими элитами. Думаю, в тот момент ни одна сила не знала, к чему всё приведёт. Возможно, эти две силы ожидали, что Киев отправит дипломатов и переговорщиков, а не танки и авиацию на восток Украины. В контексте этого интерес представляет следующая глава, в которой как раз и рассказывается о том, в каком состоянии находилась украинская армия на тот момент.
Militarily, only two tactical battalions (about 5,000 troops) were combat ready to engage in warfare when the Donbas hostilities escalated.
<…>
Along with poor military readiness, the Ukrainian army lacked basic equipment. According to the Ministry of Defense, only 4 percent of the Ukrainian military had life-saving items, like helmets and bulletproof jackets, in April 2014.
<…>
Food provision was poor and insufficient. Many regiments had little access to potable water with soldiers reportedly having to drink “water from the puddles” or of very poor quality “with rust.”
<…>
In short, the situation in the army was dire. Most expenses incurred on the front were covered by relatives, friends, and acquaintances of those in the military. Special troops, such as intelligence services, snipers, and narrow specialists faced additional challenges as they needed expensive technology, equipment, and gear to engage in military operations.
<…>
Bureaucratic inadequacies were cited as another constraint on the functioning of the army.
Справится с сепаратистами такая армия, конечно, могла, но дать отпор российской армии уже сил не было. Судя по тому что заявляют разные политики, 8 лет "холодного" мира были даны именно для того чтобы отстроить украинскую армию и подготовить её к открытому противостоянию с армией РФ. Интересно всё же насколько эта задача была выполнена.
Всё вышенаписанное располагается в первой половине книги. Да, есть ещё глава про поиск тел погибших, которая так же представляет интерес, но в целом, вышенаписанное содержится в первой половине книги. Оставшаяся часть меня как-то не особо заинтересовала, да и вообще не запомнились. Всё же книга была актуальная для 2014 года, сегодня же она может быть интересна лишь политологам либо историкам.
The book is a collection of articles on a variety of topics on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that erupted in 2014. However, I would like to emphasize that today, the information presented in this book is partly outdated. However, some topics, in particular the topic of special Ukrainian groups that are able to cross the border of separatist Donbas to search for bodies, continue to be relevant. Perhaps the engaging nature of what was written is due to the fact that this chapter was just well written. As for the rest of the chapters, for the most part, I was bored reading most of them. Perhaps it's the fatigue of the subject matter, as well as the fatigue of repeating the same thing over and over again because, in essence, not much has changed in the past ten years. The last thing I would like to mention is the relatively objective assessment of all the authors.
The opposition to the Euromaidan in Donetsk and the Donbas, and grievances with Ukrainians from other regions, did not mean that Ukraine was on the verge of a civil war. No one I spoke to or received written responses from said that Ukraine was inherently divided. That was a crisis manufactured by politicians and by outside powers.
Still, hostility towards the Euromaidan, generated by pro-Ianukovych media in the Donbas and in neighbouring Russia, and unresolved social grievances in the Donbas, threatened to unleash tensions that marginal separatist groups, with help from Russia, were glad to exploit in the name of their own “revolution of dignity.” The evolution of the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv and in cities of western and central Ukraine only further alienated Don-bas residents. The violent implosion of the Ianukovych regime suggested that extremists with far-right leanings really had taken power in Kyiv and had plunged Ukraine into anarchy and chaos.
The artificial division of Ukraine is quite accurate in the sense that political elites both inside and outside of Ukraine (Russia) have been dividing the country all along, rather than uniting such diverse people who identify themselves as Ukrainians, including those living in Luhansk today. In the context of this, the author goes on to write about the political elite of Donbass, but I would note the political and cultural elite of western Ukraine, which also actively exploited the narrative of a Russian and/or Soviet Ukraine in the east of the country.
As Pavel Gubarev himself admitted, the anti-Maidan and its titushky stood for nothing except for Ianukovych and other thieves and bandits from the Party of Regions.
A stunning revelation that, however, reveals nothing new about the nature of the Yanukovych regime, which was obvious even to such controversial personalities.
Out of the clashes on Hrushevsky Street, the mysterious Right Sector gained a name for itself in not just Ukraine, but in Russia, and its members exploited that name for the sake of the “national revolution” that its leader, Dmytro Iarosh, aspired to achieve
As they say, if the Right Sector didn't exist, it would have to be invented. Well, maybe, maybe...
The rumors ranged widely, reflecting possibly a propaganda of fear generated by social networks, local media, Russian state media, and probably “whispering” propaganda, but, like the hysteria that broke out online during the Euromaidan protests, they reflected real fears people shared. Rumors focused on nefarious plans afoot by Ukraine’s new leaders. One claimed that the new Prime Minister, Arsenii Iatseniuk said the state was going to expel from Ukraine anyone who did not speak Ukrainian.
<…>
They were already firing Russian speakers from state jobs.
<…>
One rumor repeated a trope connected directly with the Euromaidan, namely the idea that greater integration with Europe, through the Association Agreement, would end the traditional family and make homosexuality and other nontraditional lifestyles the law of the land: “Gays, pedophiles and zoophiles are seizing power and will make everyone marry everyone else.” Rumors spread that people were planning on tearing down Lenin monuments.
<…>
Another reader said members of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Mariupol claimed “that the Uniate-Schismatic-Catholics will take away their churches.”
<…>
Sashko Bilyi, the Right Sector leader who helped protesters seize power in the western Ukrainian city of Rivne, figured prominently in rumors. Videos of him threatening a city prosecutor and displaying his guns and knives in front of a Rivne Regional Council meeting became symbols of the Maidan spreading chaos, anarchy, and violence in Ukraine.
I think rumors contributed to the situation, but rumors alone in the XXI century make it difficult to organize separatist unrest. Rumors were rather secondary, and the primary ones were political intrigues of Donbas elites together with Russian elites. I think, at that moment, neither force knew where things would lead. Perhaps these two forces expected Kiev to send diplomats and negotiators rather than tanks and aircraft to eastern Ukraine. In the context of this, the next chapter is interesting, and it tells us what the state of the Ukrainian army was at that time.
Militarily, only two tactical battalions (about 5,000 troops) were combat ready to engage in warfare when the Donbas hostilities escalated.
<…>
Along with poor military readiness, the Ukrainian army lacked basic equipment. According to the Ministry of Defense, only 4 percent of the Ukrainian military had life-saving items, like helmets and bulletproof jackets, in April 2014.
<…>
Food provision was poor and insufficient. Many regiments had little access to potable water with soldiers reportedly having to drink “water from the puddles” or of very poor quality “with rust.”
<…>
In short, the situation in the army was dire. Most expenses incurred on the front were covered by relatives, friends, and acquaintances of those in the military. Special troops, such as intelligence services, snipers, and narrow specialists faced additional challenges as they needed expensive technology, equipment, and gear to engage in military operations.
<…>
Bureaucratic inadequacies were cited as another constraint on the functioning of the army.
Of course, such an army could deal with the separatists, but it was no longer strong enough to fight back the Russian army. Judging by what different politicians say, 8 years of “cold” peace were given precisely to rebuild the Ukrainian army and prepare it for an open confrontation with the Russian army. I wonder how far this task was accomplished.
All of the above is contained in the first half of the book. Yes, there is a chapter about the search for the bodies of the dead, which is also of interest, but in general, the above is contained in the first half of the book. The rest of the book I was somehow not particularly interested, and, in general, not remembered. Still, the book was relevant for 2014; today it may be of interest only to political scientists or historians.
April 9, 2022
An excellent overview of the war in Donbas that has been raging for the past 8 years, written from various scholars which focus on the many angles that make up the complexities of the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
The book is a collection of articles which deal with the conflict in Ukraine’s eastern region of Donbas, looking at the various factors that are at play ranging from the local sensibilities of regional autonomy to the involvement of Russian PMCs (Private Military Companies) in hostilities. We begin with a paper which examines the impact of the Maidan in Donbas and its reception by the locals. Next, we’re accompanied by an analysis of the Minsk Accords and how they corresponded to Ukrainian and international laws, evaluating their “hybridity”. We follow with a paper which examines the DPR’s (Donetsk People’s Republic) political situation during its first four years of existence. The next four papers all deal with social and public life in the conflict zone. A sociological survey examines combatants on both sides of the conflict and their motivations. This is followed by an analysis of civilian engagement on the frontlines as well as their efforts to secure benefits for war veterans. We then are presented with the challenges faced by IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) and the prospects for the Donbas region. Additionally, we look at “inter-communal ethics” regarding war casualties on the Russian-Ukrainian borderlands throughout the war. The final three papers focus on the war and its potential conclusion. An analysis follows of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy in the Sea of Azov, and the geopolitical implications therein. This is then supplemented with an outline of the role of Russian PMCs in the Donbas. Lastly, we are offered possible scenarios for ending the war and establishing a more stable environment in the region.
Overall, a very concise summary of the various aspects and complexities that have plagued this region for the last 8 years, which is extremely paramount for understanding the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Minus the many typos that are present within the text, this book is precisely the type of scholarly analysis that I’ve been looking for in order to better understand the unfortunate situation that has been taking place in my country.
The book is a collection of articles which deal with the conflict in Ukraine’s eastern region of Donbas, looking at the various factors that are at play ranging from the local sensibilities of regional autonomy to the involvement of Russian PMCs (Private Military Companies) in hostilities. We begin with a paper which examines the impact of the Maidan in Donbas and its reception by the locals. Next, we’re accompanied by an analysis of the Minsk Accords and how they corresponded to Ukrainian and international laws, evaluating their “hybridity”. We follow with a paper which examines the DPR’s (Donetsk People’s Republic) political situation during its first four years of existence. The next four papers all deal with social and public life in the conflict zone. A sociological survey examines combatants on both sides of the conflict and their motivations. This is followed by an analysis of civilian engagement on the frontlines as well as their efforts to secure benefits for war veterans. We then are presented with the challenges faced by IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) and the prospects for the Donbas region. Additionally, we look at “inter-communal ethics” regarding war casualties on the Russian-Ukrainian borderlands throughout the war. The final three papers focus on the war and its potential conclusion. An analysis follows of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy in the Sea of Azov, and the geopolitical implications therein. This is then supplemented with an outline of the role of Russian PMCs in the Donbas. Lastly, we are offered possible scenarios for ending the war and establishing a more stable environment in the region.
Overall, a very concise summary of the various aspects and complexities that have plagued this region for the last 8 years, which is extremely paramount for understanding the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Minus the many typos that are present within the text, this book is precisely the type of scholarly analysis that I’ve been looking for in order to better understand the unfortunate situation that has been taking place in my country.
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June 3, 2022As a collection of various essays by different authors I found this book somewhat incoherent. I thought the first essay was the most enlightening. Despite drawing conclusions simply from online blogs, it really drove home how complicated the conflict over the Donbas region is and the sheer recklessness of Western governments flooding the region with uncritical arms and financial support.
May 30, 2022
As the result of an academic meeting, this book analyzes the roots of the war in Donbas, explores its continuation and repercussions, and gives some proposals for how it can be resolved. In doing so, it presents readers with a collection of ten papers that aimed to explain why the Donbas is so distinct from the rest of Ukraine. The contributions investigate local society and customs, as well as the estrangement from Ukraine produced by the Euromaidan events, which resulted in the resignation of Donetsk-based President Viktor Yanukovych. It discusses the refugee issue, the 2014 Minsk Accords, and the influence of new President Volodymyr Zelensky and his efforts to end the conflict through discussions with Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany. Scholars of political and defense studies who examine the conflict between Russia and Ukraine may find the book to be quite informative and enlightening.
April 29, 2023
a decent overview of the Donbas situation. A collection of essays by Ukrainian authors and scholars. Somewhat a tad incoherent.
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