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Russia's Road to War with Ukraine: Invasion amidst the ashes of empires
“We don’t yet know where the current battle is headed. But Puri’s ‘first cut’ will help us greatly in fathoming how we got here.” – Patrick Porter, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham
When Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, many in the West were left stunned at his act of brutal imperialism. To those who had been paying attention, however, the warning signs of the bloodshed and slaughter to come had been there for years.
Tracing the relationship between the two countries from the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 to Putin’s invasion in 2022, what emerges from this gripping and accessible book is a portrait of a nation caught in a geopolitical tug of war between Russia and the West. While Russia is identified as the sole aggressor, we see how Western bodies such as the EU and NATO unrealistically raised Ukraine’s expectations of membership before dashing them, leaving Ukraine without formal allies and fatally exposed to Russian aggression.
As a former international observer, Samir Puri was present for several of the major events covered in this book. He uses this experience to ask honestly: how did we get here? Why does Vladimir Putin view Ukraine as the natural property of Russia? Did the West handle its dealings with these countries prudently? Or did it inflame the tensions left amidst the ruins of the Soviet Union? Were there any missed opportunities to avert the war? And how might this conflict end?
When Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, many in the West were left stunned at his act of brutal imperialism. To those who had been paying attention, however, the warning signs of the bloodshed and slaughter to come had been there for years.
Tracing the relationship between the two countries from the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 to Putin’s invasion in 2022, what emerges from this gripping and accessible book is a portrait of a nation caught in a geopolitical tug of war between Russia and the West. While Russia is identified as the sole aggressor, we see how Western bodies such as the EU and NATO unrealistically raised Ukraine’s expectations of membership before dashing them, leaving Ukraine without formal allies and fatally exposed to Russian aggression.
As a former international observer, Samir Puri was present for several of the major events covered in this book. He uses this experience to ask honestly: how did we get here? Why does Vladimir Putin view Ukraine as the natural property of Russia? Did the West handle its dealings with these countries prudently? Or did it inflame the tensions left amidst the ruins of the Soviet Union? Were there any missed opportunities to avert the war? And how might this conflict end?
323 pages, Kindle Edition
Published August 25, 2022
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143 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
January 27, 2024
Now this is the kind of book I had wanted to read all year - although it was only written and published towards this summer "Russia’s Road to War with Ukraine: Invasion Amidst the Ashes of Empires" (2022) by Samir Puri (former international observer in Ukraine).
Firstly, the book provides much needed background to the war, including the period 2014-2022 which took place in the geopolitical shadow of the Middle East (Libya, Syria, Yemen wars etc). It filled in a lot of blanks for me, also made me appreciate the pro war/ non-negotiation perspective - I still and fundamentally disagree but I see where people are coming from.
Secondly, it then turns to issues of the underlying causes of the conflict - importantly (please read the following as my blanket disclaimer) - causes and motivation do not equal moral justification. But it remains important to look beyond 24 February and understand how we got there.
Without answering, the book raises important questions - could there have been other options to secure European security rather than full Membership/ article. Could 'we' have involved Russia more closely in the post 1989 design of European security architecture or were we driven by a flawed sense of victor's justice (and how does this link to the overall post 9/11 war on terror unipolar world order etc). Other questions (spoiler: no answers) include whether we could and should have avoided this war that now has cost hundreds of thousands of lives and destroyed an entire country etc. These are many of the questions I have struggled with for the past ten months or so and the book provided much background to better find possible answers - driven by the ultimate conviction that the twitter commentariat's war frenzy (democracy versus authoritarianism) just doesn't cut it, that we must also engage with Russia and the Russian perspective without being labeled Putin's defenders, etc.
More than anything in the book, I really appreciate the author's embracing of all that we do not know for certain (unlike the arm chair generals) as well as contradictions involved - it's so much easier to be a hawkish pundit than to tackle the moral dilemma inherent in every war, past or present <3
Firstly, the book provides much needed background to the war, including the period 2014-2022 which took place in the geopolitical shadow of the Middle East (Libya, Syria, Yemen wars etc). It filled in a lot of blanks for me, also made me appreciate the pro war/ non-negotiation perspective - I still and fundamentally disagree but I see where people are coming from.
Secondly, it then turns to issues of the underlying causes of the conflict - importantly (please read the following as my blanket disclaimer) - causes and motivation do not equal moral justification. But it remains important to look beyond 24 February and understand how we got there.
Without answering, the book raises important questions - could there have been other options to secure European security rather than full Membership/ article. Could 'we' have involved Russia more closely in the post 1989 design of European security architecture or were we driven by a flawed sense of victor's justice (and how does this link to the overall post 9/11 war on terror unipolar world order etc). Other questions (spoiler: no answers) include whether we could and should have avoided this war that now has cost hundreds of thousands of lives and destroyed an entire country etc. These are many of the questions I have struggled with for the past ten months or so and the book provided much background to better find possible answers - driven by the ultimate conviction that the twitter commentariat's war frenzy (democracy versus authoritarianism) just doesn't cut it, that we must also engage with Russia and the Russian perspective without being labeled Putin's defenders, etc.
More than anything in the book, I really appreciate the author's embracing of all that we do not know for certain (unlike the arm chair generals) as well as contradictions involved - it's so much easier to be a hawkish pundit than to tackle the moral dilemma inherent in every war, past or present <3
Want to read
November 30, 2024DK508.852 .P87 2022 Memorial Library
October 17, 2022
Decent explanation of slower brewing causes of the war. Some observations that hadn't occurred to me despite the saturation media coverage. Doesn't make big predictions which is sensible, sceptical of the preferred outcome of total Ukrainian victory but argues this sensibly.
February 20, 2024
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Но вы же сами все решили, вы вообще люди взрослые,
Только как под гипнозом не задаетесь вопросами.
Вы словили передоз, напившись соком березовым.
Нет здесь улицы роз, но ваш закат будет розовым.
Но вам все как с куста, это больше чем странно,
Иконы и лики Христа рядом с портретами Сталина.
Идут парадом войска по интернету диванные,
То ли победа близка, то ли дни окаянные.
И что после вас здесь будет в наследство оставлено?
Только груды костей меж городами и странами.
Вы пришли в чужую степь, и уйдете бесславными,
В потоке лживых новостей, в бреду могил безымянных.
Автор начинает с исторических событий эпохи царей, потом переходит к совместной советской истории сосуществования России и Украины под единством КПСС, ну а далее быстро переходит к постсоветской истории и эпохе Путина. Так как я прочитал довольно много книг о нынешнем российско-украинском конфликте, то я уже чуть ли не наизусть выучил все реперные точки, которые освещает любой автор, пишущий о (корнях) российско-украинском конфликте. Да, конфликты между Россией и Украиной были и были они, начиная со времён царей и императоров. Впрочем, это было обычное дело для того времени, и подобная картина является рядовой для многих европейских стран. Автор ничего не констатирует, а просто знакомит иностранного читателя со сложными взаимоотношениями России и Украины, которые берут начало ещё со времён Киевской Руси.
Главное что стоит подчеркнуть, это не предвзятый (объективный) подход автора. К примеру, в отличие от многих других авторов, которые никак не объясняют, почему же Россия выбрала в качестве своей жертвы именно Украину, а не какую-то другую страну постсоветского мира, автор пытается найти их и объяснить. Автор пишет, что причины не любить украинскую политическую элиту у Кремля были.
What truth to the allegation of Ukrainian arms sales to Georgia? The sale of arms to Georgia is a window into the often under-appreciated extent of Ukrainian defence industry exports, rooted in its past as a centre of Soviet arms manufacturing. Data gathered by the UN Register of Conventional Arms Sales found that ‘Ukraine was the main supplier of weapons to Georgia in 2007’, with exports significantly higher than in 2006. The weapons systems sold by Ukraine included ‘seventy-four tanks, six armoured vehicles, nine large-calibre artillery systems, 10,800 rocket systems, and 28,800 small arms’.
<…>
The Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea was now a source of disagreement between Russian officials and Ukraine. At one point during the war in Georgia, Ukraine threatened to close Sevastopol port to Russian warships involved in the war.
Добавлю к этому существенно возросшую националистическую риторику, которая зародилась во время Оранжевой революции у лидеров этой самой революции, а также желание спрятаться под зонтиком НАТО. Вот вам и причины войны. С моей точки зрения, нужно ещё добавить газовые войны, суть которых в отказе Украины платить европейские цены за газ, а также неспособность России заставить Украину платить такие цены так же как неспособность обойтись без Украины в транзите газа в ЕС. Вот на всём этом фоне Путин выглядел бы в глазах собственного населения исключительно жалким человеком. Такой человек не может быть президентом России. Итого: 6 причин, которые в сумме и привели к войне. К сожалению, автор этой книги выделил лишь часть. Я на всякий случай напомню, что всё вышесказанное не служит целью оправдать действия Путина, но объяснить.
Ещё один момент, который показывает желание автора подойти к данному вопросу максимально объективно, это когда автор совершенно правильно указывает на главную причину всех бед Украины – коррупцию.
Indeed, when the Pandora Papers scandal broke and disclosed the tax haven holdings of wealthy individuals from around the world, thirty-eight Ukrainian politicians were implicated – included the latter-day favoured son of Ukrainian politics, Volodymyr Zelensky, who had parked much of his wealth in offshore accounts. There is no getting away from it: politics in Ukraine is a sport open only to the wealthy, and regardless of whether we call these honestly earned or ill-gotten gains, the old Soviet tradition of a mix between wealth and political power has persisted in a modern form.
<…>
According to the Global Organised Crime Index, which ranks Ukraine third in its ‘criminality score’ on a list of forty-four countries in Europe, Ukraine was a hub for human trafficking, arms trafficking, drugs trafficking and wildlife trafficking. Ukraine is a point of origin for human trafficking (as ‘one of the largest countries of origin for people subject to forced labour in Europe’) and arms trafficking (thanks to the abundance of small arms littering Ukraine, from when the Red Army downed tools and disbanded in 1991).
<…>
In years gone by it was perfectly normal for someone to personally profit if they held public office or a position of administrative authority.
Собственно именно эта проблема, с моей точки зрения, и должна была стать для украинских политиков приоритетом номер один в 2004 году, а не попытки оправдать УПА, Бандеру и пр. В таком случаи бы это (т.е. борьба с коррупцией), с одной стороны, усилило бы украинскую государственность во всех сферах, включая и военную, что означало бы прогресс в военной сфере и её общую эффективность, а с другой, предотвратило бы возможность России изображать Украину как «неонацистское государство» (я знаю, что это бред, но люди верят в этот бред). Получалось бы, что страна борется с коррупцией и никаких претензий к России и к русским не имеем. В чём тут можно было бы упрекнуть Украину? Но был выбран катастрофический путь, ибо сделать из Шухевича героя намного проще, чем начать борьбу с коррупцией, т.к. в первом случаи достаточно подписать документ, а во втором можно настолько сильно увлечься борьбой с коррупцией, что в какой-то момент можно выйти в расследовании на себя самого. Тем не менее, автор очень точно показывает главные проблемы украинской государственности. Я ничего не говорю про Россию, ибо там государство давно превратилось в мафиозную структуру без возможности решить данную проблему минуя слом всей структуры. В Украине ситуация была не настолько запущенной.
Ещё один очень объективный подход обнаруживается в главе посвящённой сепаратизму на Донбассе. Как блестяще показала автор книги «The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine: Elites, Protest, and Partition», главной причиной победы сепаратистов в Донецке стали активисты и политически элиты региона (друзья Януковича). В другой книге, но тоже англоязычного автора, ставится подобный же вопрос, т.е. чего больше было в том сепаратизме на Донбассе: народного недовольства или внешнего (российского) вмешательства? Оба автора приходят к одному и тому же выводу (с которым я также согласен).
This brings up an important question: how should one characterise this phase of armed conflict? When it comes to the terminology of ‘invasion’, ‘proxy war’ and ‘civil war’, choosing one term is unwise. It was definitely an invasion; it involved proxies; but it also ignited some of Ukraine’s existing fault lines. Even as Russian soldiers and volunteers crossed the border to foment chaos, there were local people who decided to take up arms against Ukraine’s government. There were socio-economic and identity issues at stake in east Ukraine that had contributed to a local sense of alienation, and exploiting this was essential to Russia’s proxy war approach. However, it should be stressed there was no chance that Ukraine would have ever suffered a civil war without Russia’s malign hand.
Нужно отдать должное автору, ибо он умеет думать головой, а не копировать чужие мысли. Одесса и Харьков, несмотря на кровавые стычки участников Майдана и Анти-майдана, не упали в руки сепаратистов, да и всем хорошо известно, что в каждом регионе каждой страны найдётся пара сотен «горячих голов» которые смогут оказать сопротивление, любой вторгшейся иностранной группе вооружённых людей. И это я не говорю про огромное число вооружённой полиции, местного ОМОНа и местных спецслужб.
Так же автор, верно, отмечает проблему, связанную с Минскими договорённостями, имплементация которых была не выгодна, возможно, всем сторонам, но как мне кажется, украинской стороне особенно из-за сильного подъёма националистических сил, благодаря которым не только сбросили диктатуру Януковича, но и отбили у сепаратистов многие территории. Это оказалась «палкой о двух концах». Плюс, Минские договорённости привели бы к блокированию Украины членства в ЕС и НАТО, что также бы сильно ударило бы по украинским политикам, которые привыкли кормить населения обещаниями о скором вступлении в эти организации (но никаких действий к этому не предпринимали, ограничившись исключительно риторикой).
But the Minsk talks were going nowhere and were trapped in a kind of Groundhog Day. One reason was that all sides kept on fighting. Another reason was that back in Kyiv, the question of how to deal with the Russian-backed territories had become a political hot potato.
<….>
The Minsk deal was effectively unimplementable for Ukraine’s government. Poroshenko could not persuade the Rada to support the Minsk deal, because its provisions would have allowed local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk, tantamount to a surrender bill in the eyes of Ukraine’s political right, who feared that the rebel republics would become de facto Russian dependencies.
Я пишу это нейтральном тоном, но желание многих людей смотреть на мир через чёрно-белую призму именно это может подвести к необдуманному и эмоциональному суждению как в отношении Зеленского, так и в отношении других людей, которые видят мир многими оттенками. В любом случаи, книга получилась объективной и информативной. Да, в ней сказано больше об Украине нежели, о России, однако она подтвердила многие мои мысли насчёт самой Украины.
The author starts with the historical events of the Tsars' era, then moves on to the joint Soviet history of the coexistence of Russia and Ukraine under the unity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and then quickly moves on to post-Soviet history and the Putin era. Since I have read quite a few books about the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict, I have almost memorized by heart all the reference points covered by any author writing about (the roots of) the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Yes, there have been conflicts between Russia and Ukraine since the time of the tsars and emperors. However, it was a common thing at that time, and such a picture was common in many European countries. The author does not state anything but simply familiarizes the foreign reader with the complex relationship between Russia and Ukraine, which dates back to the times of Kievan Rus.
The main thing worth emphasizing is the author's non-biased (objective) approach. For example, unlike many other authors who do not explain why Russia chose Ukraine as its victim and not some other country in the post-Soviet world, the author tries to find them and explain them. The author writes that the Kremlin had reasons to dislike the Ukrainian political elite.
What truth to the allegation of Ukrainian arms sales to Georgia? The sale of arms to Georgia is a window into the often under-appreciated extent of Ukrainian defence industry exports, rooted in its past as a centre of Soviet arms manufacturing. Data gathered by the UN Register of Conventional Arms Sales found that ‘Ukraine was the main supplier of weapons to Georgia in 2007’, with exports significantly higher than in 2006. The weapons systems sold by Ukraine included ‘seventy-four tanks, six armoured vehicles, nine large-calibre artillery systems, 10,800 rocket systems, and 28,800 small arms’.
<…>
The Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea was now a source of disagreement between Russian officials and Ukraine. At one point during the war in Georgia, Ukraine threatened to close Sevastopol port to Russian warships involved in the war.
I would add to this the significantly increased nationalist rhetoric, which originated during the Orange Revolution among the leaders of this very revolution, as well as the desire to hide under the umbrella of NATO. These are the reasons for the war. From my point of view, we should also add gas wars, the essence of which is Ukraine's refusal to pay European gas prices and Russia's inability to make Ukraine pay such prices, as well as its inability to do without Ukraine in gas transit to the EU. Against all this background, Putin would look like an exceptionally pathetic man in the eyes of his own population. Such a man cannot be president of Russia. Total: 6 reasons, which in sum led to the war. Unfortunately, the author of this book highlighted only a part of them. I will remind you just in case that all of the above is not intended to justify Putin's actions, but to explain them.
Another point that shows the author's desire to approach this issue as objectively as possible is when the author quite correctly points out the main cause of all the troubles in Ukraine - corruption.
Indeed, when the Pandora Papers scandal broke and disclosed the tax haven holdings of wealthy individuals from around the world, thirty-eight Ukrainian politicians were implicated – included the latter-day favoured son of Ukrainian politics, Volodymyr Zelensky, who had parked much of his wealth in offshore accounts. There is no getting away from it: politics in Ukraine is a sport open only to the wealthy, and regardless of whether we call these honestly earned or ill-gotten gains, the old Soviet tradition of a mix between wealth and political power has persisted in a modern form.
<…>
According to the Global Organised Crime Index, which ranks Ukraine third in its ‘criminality score’ on a list of forty-four countries in Europe, Ukraine was a hub for human trafficking, arms trafficking, drugs trafficking and wildlife trafficking.15 Ukraine is a point of origin for human trafficking (as ‘one of the largest countries of origin for people subject to forced labour in Europe’) and arms trafficking (thanks to the abundance of small arms littering Ukraine, from when the Red Army downed tools and disbanded in 1991).
<…>
In years gone by it was perfectly normal for someone to personally profit if they held public office or a position of administrative authority.
Actually, from my point of view, this problem should have become the number one priority for Ukrainian politicians in 2004 rather than attempts to justify the UPA, Bandera, etc. In such a case, this (i.e., the fight against corruption) would, on the one hand, strengthen Ukrainian statehood in all spheres, including the military, which would mean progress in the military sphere and its overall effectiveness, and on the other hand, prevent Russia from portraying Ukraine as a "neo-Nazi state" (I know this is nonsense, but people believe this nonsense). It would appear that the country is fighting corruption and has no claims against Russia and Russians. What could Ukraine be blamed for? But a disastrous way was chosen because it is much easier to make a hero out of Shukhevych than to start fighting corruption, because, in the first case, it is enough to sign a document, while in the second case, it is possible to expose yourself in the investigation of corruption. Nevertheless, the author very accurately shows the main problems of Ukrainian statehood. I am not saying anything about Russia because there the state has long ago turned into a mafia structure without the possibility of solving this problem without breaking the whole structure. In Ukraine, the situation was not so bad.
Another very objective approach is found in the chapter on separatism in Donbas. As the author of the book "The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine: Elites, Protest, and Partition" has brilliantly shown, the main reason for the separatists' victory in Donetsk was the activists and political elites of the region (friends of Yanukovych). In another book, but also by an English-speaking author, the same question is posed, i.e., what was more in that separatism in Donbass: popular discontent or external (Russian) interference? Both authors come to the same conclusion (which I also agree with).
This brings up an important question: how should one characterise this phase of armed conflict? When it comes to the terminology of ‘invasion’, ‘proxy war’ and ‘civil war’, choosing one term is unwise. It was definitely an invasion; it involved proxies; but it also ignited some of Ukraine’s existing fault lines. Even as Russian soldiers and volunteers crossed the border to foment chaos, there were local people who decided to take up arms against Ukraine’s government. There were socio-economic and identity issues at stake in east Ukraine that had contributed to a local sense of alienation, and exploiting this was essential to Russia’s proxy war approach. However, it should be stressed there was no chance that Ukraine would have ever suffered a civil war without Russia’s malign hand.
We should give credit to the author because he knows how to think with his head and not copy other people's thoughts. Odessa and Kharkiv, despite the bloody clashes between Maidan and Anti-Maidan participants, did not fall into the hands of separatists, and it is well known that in every region of every country, there are a couple of hundred "hotheads" who can resist any invading foreign group of armed men. This is not to mention the huge number of armed police, local riot police, and local special services.
The author also correctly points out the problem of the Minsk agreements, the implementation of which was not favorable, perhaps, to all parties, but I think, the Ukrainian side especially, because of the strong rise of nationalist forces, thanks to which not only the Yanukovych dictatorship was thrown off, but also took back many territories from the separatists. It turned out to be a double-edged sword. Plus, the Minsk agreements would lead to blocking Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO, which would also hit hard the Ukrainian politicians, who are used to feeding the population with promises of soon joining these organizations (but have not taken any action limiting themselves only to rhetoric).
I write this in a neutral tone, but the desire of many people to look at the world through a black-and-white prism may lead to rash and emotional judgments about Zelensky and other people who see the world in many shades. In any case, the book turned out to be objective and informative. Yes, it says more about Ukraine than about Russia, but it confirmed many of my thoughts about Ukraine itself.
Но вы же сами все решили, вы вообще люди взрослые,
Только как под гипнозом не задаетесь вопросами.
Вы словили передоз, напившись соком березовым.
Нет здесь улицы роз, но ваш закат будет розовым.
Но вам все как с куста, это больше чем странно,
Иконы и лики Христа рядом с портретами Сталина.
Идут парадом войска по интернету диванные,
То ли победа близка, то ли дни окаянные.
И что после вас здесь будет в наследство оставлено?
Только груды костей меж городами и странами.
Вы пришли в чужую степь, и уйдете бесславными,
В потоке лживых новостей, в бреду могил безымянных.
Автор начинает с исторических событий эпохи царей, потом переходит к совместной советской истории сосуществования России и Украины под единством КПСС, ну а далее быстро переходит к постсоветской истории и эпохе Путина. Так как я прочитал довольно много книг о нынешнем российско-украинском конфликте, то я уже чуть ли не наизусть выучил все реперные точки, которые освещает любой автор, пишущий о (корнях) российско-украинском конфликте. Да, конфликты между Россией и Украиной были и были они, начиная со времён царей и императоров. Впрочем, это было обычное дело для того времени, и подобная картина является рядовой для многих европейских стран. Автор ничего не констатирует, а просто знакомит иностранного читателя со сложными взаимоотношениями России и Украины, которые берут начало ещё со времён Киевской Руси.
Главное что стоит подчеркнуть, это не предвзятый (объективный) подход автора. К примеру, в отличие от многих других авторов, которые никак не объясняют, почему же Россия выбрала в качестве своей жертвы именно Украину, а не какую-то другую страну постсоветского мира, автор пытается найти их и объяснить. Автор пишет, что причины не любить украинскую политическую элиту у Кремля были.
What truth to the allegation of Ukrainian arms sales to Georgia? The sale of arms to Georgia is a window into the often under-appreciated extent of Ukrainian defence industry exports, rooted in its past as a centre of Soviet arms manufacturing. Data gathered by the UN Register of Conventional Arms Sales found that ‘Ukraine was the main supplier of weapons to Georgia in 2007’, with exports significantly higher than in 2006. The weapons systems sold by Ukraine included ‘seventy-four tanks, six armoured vehicles, nine large-calibre artillery systems, 10,800 rocket systems, and 28,800 small arms’.
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The Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea was now a source of disagreement between Russian officials and Ukraine. At one point during the war in Georgia, Ukraine threatened to close Sevastopol port to Russian warships involved in the war.
Добавлю к этому существенно возросшую националистическую риторику, которая зародилась во время Оранжевой революции у лидеров этой самой революции, а также желание спрятаться под зонтиком НАТО. Вот вам и причины войны. С моей точки зрения, нужно ещё добавить газовые войны, суть которых в отказе Украины платить европейские цены за газ, а также неспособность России заставить Украину платить такие цены так же как неспособность обойтись без Украины в транзите газа в ЕС. Вот на всём этом фоне Путин выглядел бы в глазах собственного населения исключительно жалким человеком. Такой человек не может быть президентом России. Итого: 6 причин, которые в сумме и привели к войне. К сожалению, автор этой книги выделил лишь часть. Я на всякий случай напомню, что всё вышесказанное не служит целью оправдать действия Путина, но объяснить.
Ещё один момент, который показывает желание автора подойти к данному вопросу максимально объективно, это когда автор совершенно правильно указывает на главную причину всех бед Украины – коррупцию.
Indeed, when the Pandora Papers scandal broke and disclosed the tax haven holdings of wealthy individuals from around the world, thirty-eight Ukrainian politicians were implicated – included the latter-day favoured son of Ukrainian politics, Volodymyr Zelensky, who had parked much of his wealth in offshore accounts. There is no getting away from it: politics in Ukraine is a sport open only to the wealthy, and regardless of whether we call these honestly earned or ill-gotten gains, the old Soviet tradition of a mix between wealth and political power has persisted in a modern form.
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According to the Global Organised Crime Index, which ranks Ukraine third in its ‘criminality score’ on a list of forty-four countries in Europe, Ukraine was a hub for human trafficking, arms trafficking, drugs trafficking and wildlife trafficking. Ukraine is a point of origin for human trafficking (as ‘one of the largest countries of origin for people subject to forced labour in Europe’) and arms trafficking (thanks to the abundance of small arms littering Ukraine, from when the Red Army downed tools and disbanded in 1991).
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In years gone by it was perfectly normal for someone to personally profit if they held public office or a position of administrative authority.
Собственно именно эта проблема, с моей точки зрения, и должна была стать для украинских политиков приоритетом номер один в 2004 году, а не попытки оправдать УПА, Бандеру и пр. В таком случаи бы это (т.е. борьба с коррупцией), с одной стороны, усилило бы украинскую государственность во всех сферах, включая и военную, что означало бы прогресс в военной сфере и её общую эффективность, а с другой, предотвратило бы возможность России изображать Украину как «неонацистское государство» (я знаю, что это бред, но люди верят в этот бред). Получалось бы, что страна борется с коррупцией и никаких претензий к России и к русским не имеем. В чём тут можно было бы упрекнуть Украину? Но был выбран катастрофический путь, ибо сделать из Шухевича героя намного проще, чем начать борьбу с коррупцией, т.к. в первом случаи достаточно подписать документ, а во втором можно настолько сильно увлечься борьбой с коррупцией, что в какой-то момент можно выйти в расследовании на себя самого. Тем не менее, автор очень точно показывает главные проблемы украинской государственности. Я ничего не говорю про Россию, ибо там государство давно превратилось в мафиозную структуру без возможности решить данную проблему минуя слом всей структуры. В Украине ситуация была не настолько запущенной.
Ещё один очень объективный подход обнаруживается в главе посвящённой сепаратизму на Донбассе. Как блестяще показала автор книги «The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine: Elites, Protest, and Partition», главной причиной победы сепаратистов в Донецке стали активисты и политически элиты региона (друзья Януковича). В другой книге, но тоже англоязычного автора, ставится подобный же вопрос, т.е. чего больше было в том сепаратизме на Донбассе: народного недовольства или внешнего (российского) вмешательства? Оба автора приходят к одному и тому же выводу (с которым я также согласен).
This brings up an important question: how should one characterise this phase of armed conflict? When it comes to the terminology of ‘invasion’, ‘proxy war’ and ‘civil war’, choosing one term is unwise. It was definitely an invasion; it involved proxies; but it also ignited some of Ukraine’s existing fault lines. Even as Russian soldiers and volunteers crossed the border to foment chaos, there were local people who decided to take up arms against Ukraine’s government. There were socio-economic and identity issues at stake in east Ukraine that had contributed to a local sense of alienation, and exploiting this was essential to Russia’s proxy war approach. However, it should be stressed there was no chance that Ukraine would have ever suffered a civil war without Russia’s malign hand.
Нужно отдать должное автору, ибо он умеет думать головой, а не копировать чужие мысли. Одесса и Харьков, несмотря на кровавые стычки участников Майдана и Анти-майдана, не упали в руки сепаратистов, да и всем хорошо известно, что в каждом регионе каждой страны найдётся пара сотен «горячих голов» которые смогут оказать сопротивление, любой вторгшейся иностранной группе вооружённых людей. И это я не говорю про огромное число вооружённой полиции, местного ОМОНа и местных спецслужб.
Так же автор, верно, отмечает проблему, связанную с Минскими договорённостями, имплементация которых была не выгодна, возможно, всем сторонам, но как мне кажется, украинской стороне особенно из-за сильного подъёма националистических сил, благодаря которым не только сбросили диктатуру Януковича, но и отбили у сепаратистов многие территории. Это оказалась «палкой о двух концах». Плюс, Минские договорённости привели бы к блокированию Украины членства в ЕС и НАТО, что также бы сильно ударило бы по украинским политикам, которые привыкли кормить населения обещаниями о скором вступлении в эти организации (но никаких действий к этому не предпринимали, ограничившись исключительно риторикой).
But the Minsk talks were going nowhere and were trapped in a kind of Groundhog Day. One reason was that all sides kept on fighting. Another reason was that back in Kyiv, the question of how to deal with the Russian-backed territories had become a political hot potato.
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The Minsk deal was effectively unimplementable for Ukraine’s government. Poroshenko could not persuade the Rada to support the Minsk deal, because its provisions would have allowed local elections in Donetsk and Luhansk, tantamount to a surrender bill in the eyes of Ukraine’s political right, who feared that the rebel republics would become de facto Russian dependencies.
Я пишу это нейтральном тоном, но желание многих людей смотреть на мир через чёрно-белую призму именно это может подвести к необдуманному и эмоциональному суждению как в отношении Зеленского, так и в отношении других людей, которые видят мир многими оттенками. В любом случаи, книга получилась объективной и информативной. Да, в ней сказано больше об Украине нежели, о России, однако она подтвердила многие мои мысли насчёт самой Украины.
The author starts with the historical events of the Tsars' era, then moves on to the joint Soviet history of the coexistence of Russia and Ukraine under the unity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and then quickly moves on to post-Soviet history and the Putin era. Since I have read quite a few books about the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict, I have almost memorized by heart all the reference points covered by any author writing about (the roots of) the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Yes, there have been conflicts between Russia and Ukraine since the time of the tsars and emperors. However, it was a common thing at that time, and such a picture was common in many European countries. The author does not state anything but simply familiarizes the foreign reader with the complex relationship between Russia and Ukraine, which dates back to the times of Kievan Rus.
The main thing worth emphasizing is the author's non-biased (objective) approach. For example, unlike many other authors who do not explain why Russia chose Ukraine as its victim and not some other country in the post-Soviet world, the author tries to find them and explain them. The author writes that the Kremlin had reasons to dislike the Ukrainian political elite.
What truth to the allegation of Ukrainian arms sales to Georgia? The sale of arms to Georgia is a window into the often under-appreciated extent of Ukrainian defence industry exports, rooted in its past as a centre of Soviet arms manufacturing. Data gathered by the UN Register of Conventional Arms Sales found that ‘Ukraine was the main supplier of weapons to Georgia in 2007’, with exports significantly higher than in 2006. The weapons systems sold by Ukraine included ‘seventy-four tanks, six armoured vehicles, nine large-calibre artillery systems, 10,800 rocket systems, and 28,800 small arms’.
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The Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea was now a source of disagreement between Russian officials and Ukraine. At one point during the war in Georgia, Ukraine threatened to close Sevastopol port to Russian warships involved in the war.
I would add to this the significantly increased nationalist rhetoric, which originated during the Orange Revolution among the leaders of this very revolution, as well as the desire to hide under the umbrella of NATO. These are the reasons for the war. From my point of view, we should also add gas wars, the essence of which is Ukraine's refusal to pay European gas prices and Russia's inability to make Ukraine pay such prices, as well as its inability to do without Ukraine in gas transit to the EU. Against all this background, Putin would look like an exceptionally pathetic man in the eyes of his own population. Such a man cannot be president of Russia. Total: 6 reasons, which in sum led to the war. Unfortunately, the author of this book highlighted only a part of them. I will remind you just in case that all of the above is not intended to justify Putin's actions, but to explain them.
Another point that shows the author's desire to approach this issue as objectively as possible is when the author quite correctly points out the main cause of all the troubles in Ukraine - corruption.
Indeed, when the Pandora Papers scandal broke and disclosed the tax haven holdings of wealthy individuals from around the world, thirty-eight Ukrainian politicians were implicated – included the latter-day favoured son of Ukrainian politics, Volodymyr Zelensky, who had parked much of his wealth in offshore accounts. There is no getting away from it: politics in Ukraine is a sport open only to the wealthy, and regardless of whether we call these honestly earned or ill-gotten gains, the old Soviet tradition of a mix between wealth and political power has persisted in a modern form.
<…>
According to the Global Organised Crime Index, which ranks Ukraine third in its ‘criminality score’ on a list of forty-four countries in Europe, Ukraine was a hub for human trafficking, arms trafficking, drugs trafficking and wildlife trafficking.15 Ukraine is a point of origin for human trafficking (as ‘one of the largest countries of origin for people subject to forced labour in Europe’) and arms trafficking (thanks to the abundance of small arms littering Ukraine, from when the Red Army downed tools and disbanded in 1991).
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In years gone by it was perfectly normal for someone to personally profit if they held public office or a position of administrative authority.
Actually, from my point of view, this problem should have become the number one priority for Ukrainian politicians in 2004 rather than attempts to justify the UPA, Bandera, etc. In such a case, this (i.e., the fight against corruption) would, on the one hand, strengthen Ukrainian statehood in all spheres, including the military, which would mean progress in the military sphere and its overall effectiveness, and on the other hand, prevent Russia from portraying Ukraine as a "neo-Nazi state" (I know this is nonsense, but people believe this nonsense). It would appear that the country is fighting corruption and has no claims against Russia and Russians. What could Ukraine be blamed for? But a disastrous way was chosen because it is much easier to make a hero out of Shukhevych than to start fighting corruption, because, in the first case, it is enough to sign a document, while in the second case, it is possible to expose yourself in the investigation of corruption. Nevertheless, the author very accurately shows the main problems of Ukrainian statehood. I am not saying anything about Russia because there the state has long ago turned into a mafia structure without the possibility of solving this problem without breaking the whole structure. In Ukraine, the situation was not so bad.
Another very objective approach is found in the chapter on separatism in Donbas. As the author of the book "The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine: Elites, Protest, and Partition" has brilliantly shown, the main reason for the separatists' victory in Donetsk was the activists and political elites of the region (friends of Yanukovych). In another book, but also by an English-speaking author, the same question is posed, i.e., what was more in that separatism in Donbass: popular discontent or external (Russian) interference? Both authors come to the same conclusion (which I also agree with).
This brings up an important question: how should one characterise this phase of armed conflict? When it comes to the terminology of ‘invasion’, ‘proxy war’ and ‘civil war’, choosing one term is unwise. It was definitely an invasion; it involved proxies; but it also ignited some of Ukraine’s existing fault lines. Even as Russian soldiers and volunteers crossed the border to foment chaos, there were local people who decided to take up arms against Ukraine’s government. There were socio-economic and identity issues at stake in east Ukraine that had contributed to a local sense of alienation, and exploiting this was essential to Russia’s proxy war approach. However, it should be stressed there was no chance that Ukraine would have ever suffered a civil war without Russia’s malign hand.
We should give credit to the author because he knows how to think with his head and not copy other people's thoughts. Odessa and Kharkiv, despite the bloody clashes between Maidan and Anti-Maidan participants, did not fall into the hands of separatists, and it is well known that in every region of every country, there are a couple of hundred "hotheads" who can resist any invading foreign group of armed men. This is not to mention the huge number of armed police, local riot police, and local special services.
The author also correctly points out the problem of the Minsk agreements, the implementation of which was not favorable, perhaps, to all parties, but I think, the Ukrainian side especially, because of the strong rise of nationalist forces, thanks to which not only the Yanukovych dictatorship was thrown off, but also took back many territories from the separatists. It turned out to be a double-edged sword. Plus, the Minsk agreements would lead to blocking Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO, which would also hit hard the Ukrainian politicians, who are used to feeding the population with promises of soon joining these organizations (but have not taken any action limiting themselves only to rhetoric).
I write this in a neutral tone, but the desire of many people to look at the world through a black-and-white prism may lead to rash and emotional judgments about Zelensky and other people who see the world in many shades. In any case, the book turned out to be objective and informative. Yes, it says more about Ukraine than about Russia, but it confirmed many of my thoughts about Ukraine itself.
November 19, 2023
Helpful, informative, and unbiased analysis of the causes of Russian invasion of Ukraine.
June 25, 2023
In the middle of a propaganda war in which we all have to be careful about everything we see and hear, Samir Puri's "Russia's Road to War with Ukraine" is destined to be quickly overtaken by events. Nevertheless it is an excellent, intelligent read by someone who knows what he's talking about.
Samir Puri is a lecturer at King's College London. He supervised many elections in Ukraine as an OCSE observer who travelled widely across the country and talked to many people.
His book begins with Putin's famous, or infamous, historical essay that preceded Russia's "Special Military Operation" and elaborates on how states rely on different histories to justify what they do.
He is also very revealing on the problem of corruption, and how Volodymyr Zelenskyy become a very rich man along with all the other Ukrainian oligarchs (we all know about the Russian oligarchs but much less about the Ukrainian oligarchs).
I find this an excellent "plague on both your houses" book. Both sides in the current war are corrupt and blinkered and have squandered the possibilities that were open to them for a better, peaceful solution long before this war ever started. Halfway through the book I was struck by this memorable paragraph:
" Ukraine should have been developing as a place where a plurality of cultural influences and international connections mingled and merged, but this is far too idealistic a notion for the competitive world of geopolitics. Ukraine's reality was instead defined by the vanity of statesmen and their notions of zero-sum gains and losses based on different conceptions of civilisation."
Samir Puri is a lecturer at King's College London. He supervised many elections in Ukraine as an OCSE observer who travelled widely across the country and talked to many people.
His book begins with Putin's famous, or infamous, historical essay that preceded Russia's "Special Military Operation" and elaborates on how states rely on different histories to justify what they do.
He is also very revealing on the problem of corruption, and how Volodymyr Zelenskyy become a very rich man along with all the other Ukrainian oligarchs (we all know about the Russian oligarchs but much less about the Ukrainian oligarchs).
I find this an excellent "plague on both your houses" book. Both sides in the current war are corrupt and blinkered and have squandered the possibilities that were open to them for a better, peaceful solution long before this war ever started. Halfway through the book I was struck by this memorable paragraph:
" Ukraine should have been developing as a place where a plurality of cultural influences and international connections mingled and merged, but this is far too idealistic a notion for the competitive world of geopolitics. Ukraine's reality was instead defined by the vanity of statesmen and their notions of zero-sum gains and losses based on different conceptions of civilisation."
November 20, 2023
A book that takes an honest approach to the current situation in Ukraine, giving us a view of History over the centuries, the period of the Soviet Union and the effect of its end. It also brings together information on geography, economics and comparisons of oligarchies and their methods in both countries.
Finally, it analyzes the personalities and operating methods from Zelensky and Putin, and their implications for the strategies of the two countries.
Finally, it analyzes the personalities and operating methods from Zelensky and Putin, and their implications for the strategies of the two countries.
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