The Return of the Taliban: Afghanistan after the Americans Left

by Hassan Abbas

The first account of the new Taliban—showing who they are, what they want, and how they differ from their predecessors
 
Since the fall of Kabul in 2021, the Taliban have effective control of Afghanistan—a scenario few Western commentators anticipated. But after a twenty-year-long bitter war against the Republic of Afghanistan, reestablishing control is a complex procedure. What is the Taliban’s strategy now that they’ve returned to power?
 
In this groundbreaking new account, Hassan Abbas examines the resurgent Taliban as ruptures between moderates and the hardliners in power continue to widen. The group is now facing debilitating threats—from humanitarian crises to the Islamic State in Khorasan—but also engaging on the world stage, particularly with China and central Asian states. Making considered use of sources and contacts in the region, and offering profiles of major Taliban leaders, Return of the Taliban is the essential account of the movement as it develops and consolidates its grasp on Afghanistan.

Genres: Politics, History, Nonfiction, Islam, Asia, Terrorism, Middle East

320 pages, Hardcover

First published April 11, 2023

About the author

Hassan Abbas is professor and chair of the department of regional and analytical atudies at National Defense University's College of International Security Affairs in Washington, D.C.

Reviews

[Michiel Vandenberghe · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very accessibly written account on how the Taliban returned to power when NATO and US troops left Kabul in the summer of 2021. Abbas shows a detailed and nuanced picture of the current Taliban government and its workings in comparison to their previous stint in power during the 90s. At the end of the book he gives some guidance on how the international community might approach the Taliban in order to create an opportunity for a more peaceful and inclusive Afghanistan.

[Aqeel Haider · Rating 5 out of 5]

#Bookreview
#Nonfiction
𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐑𝐞𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐧 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐓𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐛𝐚𝐧 by 𝐇𝐚𝐬𝐬𝐚𝐧 𝐀𝐛𝐛𝐚𝐬.
(Afghanistan After the Americans Left)
A must read and insider account of Talibans.Abbas aptly discussed Doha Deal, internal factions , emerging threat of ISK , Ideological foundations and Taliban 3.0 which i delve into coming paragraphs.

15th August 2021 was the day When Talibans took over the Kabul. It was memorable day for Talibans and fearful to Afghans. Over the time Afghans have developed a sense of Nationalism and frequent interactions with westerns acquaint them to Western values same impact is for Talibans. Talibans 3.0 are much different then their Ideological context and conduct from Old Guns.

Talibans have different categories Doha team who are moderate in their nature due frequent touch with open minded society ( Mullah bradar Abbas Sanitkzai)
, Quetta Shura council- A senior ideologues and old Guard Ideological brain(Mullah habitaullah)
Field Commander- who shaped the battle on ground ( Sirajuddin Haqqani, Mullah Yaqoob)
Rural Peasants and villager who choose the Taliban out of tribalism or village alligence.

After Taliban taking Control of Afghanistan now it is test of their governance, most daunting challenges legitimacy, Woman education, Minorities and financial issues and ISK emerging threat.

Author discussed in detail their internal factions and tussles between Pragmatic group and Hardliners Which hindering their unity. He shed light on Pakistan, Russia, China, India, Qatar, Turkey investment into international relationships with regime.

#thanks
#Recommended

[Sumukh · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ahmed Rashid’s “Taliban” provides a thorough understanding to the history of the group and proved important as Americans gathered an understanding of their place and continued war in Afghanistan.

Now removed from this nation and observing its swift grasp into the hands of the Taliban again, Hassan Abbas’s “The Return of the Taliban” provides a broad understanding to today’s Taliban. It identifies what occurred during America’s 2 decades in the nation, the major missteps that ultimately powered the Taliban’s presence and rise, their major players, and now how the Taliban and the international community potentially will work with each other.

It is an excellent book from a scholar in the field in understanding where America and the rest of the world is now at with Afghanistan and the Taliban.

[Himadri Bose · Rating 5 out of 5]

Hassan Abbas has authored a timely, in-depth and incisive book on a topic crucial to peace and security in South Asia. The Taliban are back, and the world is struggling to come to terms with dealing with a so-called terror outfit that has morphed into the government of the day. The Taliban have won the long war and now have to make the transition to governance. The book seeks to answer the fundamental question: where is the Taliban headed ideologically and organisationally, what are their challenges, and how does the world deal with them? Abbas states, "The underlying thesis tested here is that the return of the Taliban to power warrants a rebirth of the group in a way—as they are not immune to the changing tides of time."
Abbas begins by examining the complex circumstances that led to the peace deal of 2020—the initial Trump years (2017- 2018) witnessed an aggressive posture to counter the Afghan Taliban. However, by the end 2018, the call had been taken to exit Afghanistan. The exit would save $ 27 billion a year in military spending. The draft agreement was ready by 2019; countering the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK – an offshoot of ISIS), safe passage of the U.S. soldiers and a smooth transition of power were vital imperatives. While negotiations were ongoing, there was overbearing pressure from Trump for an early conclusion of the deal. For the Taliban, the release of 5000 prisoners from Afghan prisons was a key negotiation driver, while the U.S. and the Afghan government did not realise the trap they were walking into. The release of the prisoners would eventually bolster the ranks of the Taliban. Trump was dissuaded from concluding the deal in the mainland U.S., and the peace deal was concluded in Doha in August 2020. The Taliban were ready for the ensuing churn and had no pretensions about sharing power or a smooth transition. They moved into Kabul in a show of strength in August 2021. Ghani bolted to save himself and not end up as Najibullah did after the Russians left and Taliban 3.0 was born.
Abbas documents the Taliban's transition and the ensuing power struggle. As the group established its first government, tensions surfaced between hardliners and moderates. Sirajuddin Haqqani, a known adversary of the U.S. and an ally of the Pakistani ISI, obtained the high-ranking role of interior minister, likely expecting further benefits. Mullah Barader, recognised by the U.S. as the head of the political office in Doha, appeared to be the biggest casualty in this power struggle. Despite his ambitions to become the supreme leader, the secluded Deobandi cleric Hibatullah Akhundzada was awarded the title.
Taliban 3.0 began with reconciliatory notes, seeking to repair their international image. The fledgling Taliban was hit hard by the suicide bombing attack by ISK on August 26, 2021, killing over 170 Afghans and 13 U.S. troops at Kabul airport. The bomber had been released from prison by the Taliban. The interim government of the Taliban was largely Pashtun, and 14 members of the cabinet are on the U.N. Security Council terrorism blacklist. Abbas highlights the umbilical links of the Taliban with Pakistan, such as the endorsement of Pakistani ISI, the membership of the Quetta or Peshawar Shura and alumni of Darul Uloom Haqqania seminary. It was just a matter of time before the Taliban reneged on their erstwhile promises of moderation and clamped down on women's rights and education. Adding to the mix, there is no let-up in the persecution of minorities. The Taliban is fraught with internal factional battles and is struggling to cement its legitimacy both domestically and internationally. Complicating the challenges of the Taliban is the rise of ISK, whose ideology is extremely hard-line and seeks to displace the Taliban. The ISK ideologues contend that the Taliban is soft on the minorities and is ceding space to the moderates. After the Taliban came back to power, the ISK executed 127 attacks in Afghanistan, of which 80 percent targeted the Taliban. Abbas argues that there is a struggle between the 'old and the new' Taliban. However, a moderate turn in the ways of the Taliban would mean a departure from its hard-line foundational ideology. Furthermore, the Taliban are struggling to come to terms with the economics of running a nation.
A thread consistently running through the book is the vexed relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan. The Haqqani network and the Quetta Shura were nurtured to undermine the Ghani government and create strategic depth to counter India. The ISI believed that the Haqqani-led men would be in power and secure Pakistani interests. However, these grand plans seem to have unravelled with the Haqqanis holding only a fraction of the critical posts. Pakistan is unpopular in Afghanistan, and the Taliban government are careful not to be seen to be too closely aligned. Besides, the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik i Taliban Pakistan, or TTP), which was attacking the Pakistani government and civilian targets, had the tacit support of the Afghan Taliban as payback for the refuge they provided when the Taliban were fighting the U.S.-led forces. The math appears implausible: the TTP will continue to use Afghanistan as a base of operations from which to strike and destabilise Pakistan if the Taliban move against the group, it will drive its adherents onto the ISK.
Abbas contends that countries are slowly coming to terms with the ascendancy of the Taliban. On the one hand, the Taliban have reneged on their promise of upholding women's rights and civil liberties and on the other, the Taliban need international validation to address their economic and security concerns. There is also a recognition amongst nations, notably China, Turkey and Russia, that Afghanistan is rich in resources and they seek the first-mover advantage. Abbas goes on to highlight the geopolitical imperatives for the U.S., UAE, Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, India, Qatar and Pakistan as they engage with the Taliban, either forthrightly or with veiled deniability. He posits that the competing interests of various nations, internal divides and the threat from ISK are severe challenges for the Taliban.
Abbas distinguishes between engaging and endorsing, wherein the former is to keep the dialogue going, and the latter is about supporting what the Taliban stand for. He argues that engaging with the Taliban is the only way forward for the world and that engagement is not to be construed as an endorsement. Not engaging runs the risk of playing into the hardliners, reinforcing the lament that the world does not care about Afghanistan. The Taliban will also have to reinvent themselves as 'Taliban Generation Z' comes to the fore. They have a relatively modern outlook and could lead the change within the Taliban. Abbas posits two scenarios. Firstly, "the best-case scenario remains that the Taliban properly build upon the relative peace that has come to Afghanistan—in comparison to previous years—and that the moderates among them rise to the top." The worst-case scenario is that the Taliban rule goes from bad to worse, and Afghanistan descends into another period of violence and chaos. Abbas reckons that "The Taliban today are not a product solely of some larger evil ideology - but of a people's pain, desperation and lack of options".
Overall, it is a well-researched and insightful book that raises some very sharp questions on how the world should deal with the Taliban and how they, in turn, should deal with themselves. His recommendation of overlooking the Taliban's brutal past and their repressive present for the greater good of the Afghan people may be controversial, but perhaps the only hope for the region. If the past of Afghanistan is anything to go by, even time may not have an answer to this vexed predicament.

[Tristan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Reading this book feels like you sit down in a coffee shop with Hassan Abbas and he tells you everything he knows about Afghanistan since ~2020 (plus a works cited). Very lax with his English (possibly because its a second or third language), Abbas understands the narrative of recent events in Afghanistan because he has watched, listened, and discussed, rather than read or studied the matter. The book has an unprofessional yet informative feeling.

There is a great irony in the Taliban’s success in outlasting the American occupation, and therefore inheriting the rule of Afghanistan, as it means that the group now has the incredibly unenviable task of governing Afghanistan. Abbas asserts that the new Afghan generation’s Internet access, the diverse population’s desire for education and infrastructure, mounting economic and agricultural issues, the continued presence of ISK (the Islamic State in Khorasan), and relationships with bordering countries (namely Pakistan, Iran, China) are all problems that the Taliban will have to solve if they want to continue ruling Afghanistan.

Favorite quotes:

“The US and its allies just cannot brush off their complicity in hand-picking and empowering inept and corrupt leaders in Afghanistan.”

“Engaging with the Taliban will, at the very worst, result in the inflation of their egos - and at best will restore life to a nation and people who have long deserved peace and prosperity.”

[Nassir · Rating 1 out of 5]

I read The Return of the Taliban: Afghanistan After the American Withdrawal by Hassan Abbas, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. One would have to be quite naive to expect a book, statement, or argument from a Pakistani that favors Afghanistan. Some readers, after going through the first couple of chapters, might be misled into believing that this book is against the Taliban and in favor of Afghanistan. However, by the time you finish it and analyze it deeply, you realize that Hassan Abbas skillfully and subtly conveys to his Western audience that the Taliban are a permanent reality in Afghanistan and that engaging with them is inevitable. He advises that the group should be recognized.

To create the illusion of objectivity, Abbas initially highlights some of the Taliban’s brutalities. But gradually, with great finesse, he begins whitewashing their image. He repeatedly asserts that the Taliban are evolving in a positive direction, telling English-speaking readers that there is no alternative in Afghanistan but to engage with the group. To further convince his audience, he highlights the suffering of ordinary Afghans, arguing that refusing to legitimize the Taliban would ultimately harm the Afghan people.

However, we know well that Hassan Abbas is a Pakistani. Anyone who has ever believed that Pakistan or a Pakistani would speak in Afghanistan’s favor is deeply mistaken and should reconsider their assumptions. Do not waste your time reading this book—it is not worth it.

[sohail babar · Rating 4 out of 5]

Groundbreaking account of new Taliban since fall of Kabul.
* Aimed at - To tell the story of Taliban's transition from old self styled to new tech savvy morality police. It captures the idea of religion and tribalism gone sour, mixed with patriarchy and toxic dose of nationalism and ethnic rivalry, exactly what makes them rigid and narrow minded.
* The book investigates how old Talibans maintain their relevance amid new Z generation and vying for global recognition.
* Fast paced and vivid tale of Talibans since its genesis to regain of power with analysis on its future status in global arena.

[Liam · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Besides a Pashtun background, another important qualification to land a job in the Taliban government is one's direct or indirect link with Pakistan, whether it is membership in the Quetta or Peshawar Shura or alumni status with Darul Uloom Haqqania seminary. The older generation of the Taliban had mostly gone to this seminary located about 60 kilometers from the Afghan border. It is one of Pakistan's oldest and most notorious seminaries. More Taliban leaders passed through its hall than any other seminary. ... Many of the alumni adopt the title Haqqani as a surname, as a badge of honor and that is how the 'Haqqani' network is labeled, contrary to a misperception that Haqqani is the name of some Pashtun tribe." (91-2)

"A most interesting account dates to when the Taliban's relations with Pakistan were at their best, just before 9/11. A moment marked forever in Pakistani media was when the Pakistan soccer team had traveled to Afghanistan for a game -- only to be deported almost immediately. Their crime was wearing shorts." (96)

"The challenged posed by ISK to the Taliban in ideological terms hence is significant. The test this poses is expressed best through an anecdote. A conversation between the late religious leader and head of Darul Uloom Haqqania, Sami ul Haq -- known also as the father of the Taliban -- and Yunus Khalis -- seen as one of the founders of the Mujahideen movement and someone who inspired the Taliban -- in Akora Khattak, went like this: while addressing Haq, Khalis asked him how they should deal with extremists like those who joined Daesh and/or the Pakistani Taliban. Haw responded by comparing those men to 'aag ki shalwar' -- translated as 'burning pants.' What he meant was, if you wear them, the burn you -- if you take them off, you are naked. Essentially, you are stuck." (206)

[Andrew Clement · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book does take you inside the innerworkings of the Taliban post-2021 insomuch as possible for most who are based in the West can do. The author does take a perspective insofar was what past policy mistakes there have been in the past, and also on what strategies might yield the most diplomatic fruit going forward.
However, I felt that, possibly because the author is writing to close to the present, that the book is little do much in the way of suggesting future policy directions for the Taliban and the international community, rather than to simply equivocate about what the Taliban might do in the present and future, or making the obvious point that divisions exist within their ranks, as is the case for any governing body. 'The Taliban could get more radical, or it could get more open, we just don't know...'
I also found sections of the book somewhat pedantic, wherein the author clear approaches the reader as a Westerner that needs to be 'schooled' about how they simply don't understand Afganistan, when anyone who has some passing familiarity would indeed already be acutely aware of this fact.
In the same vain, the book repeatedly berated the issue of women's rights in Afghanistan, while often failing to move beyond beating an already dead horse into the ground within its own text. It is ironic that the author then proceeds to compellingly make the case for dropping the issue in international prescriptions in order to focus on the art of the possible for the time being.

[Rob Sedgwick · Rating 3 out of 5]

The Return of the Taliban I found rather a rambling book which is good in patches, but repetitive in others. It's mainly about the Taliban leadership, there is very little about what life is like for ordinary Afghans or even low or mid-ranking Taliban. The author doesn't actually live in Afghanistan. The book mainly discusses the differences between Taliban 1.0 and the new incarnations. It's a mixture of history, geopolitics, gossip and speculation about the future. The younger generation of Taliban suggests at least some hope for the future.

[Farhad Khurami · Rating 3 out of 5]

Would have been a good book if the writer would not insist on recognizing and legitimizing a terrorist regime. The fact should not be forgotten that Afghanistan has still a chance to defeat the Taliban if the the US’s policy is slightly changed. Something never mentioned in the book is that I bet Taliban would not be able to govern for a year if the weekly cash is stopped. Mysterious $30 million per week along with other assistance keeps Taliban in power and strong.

[Deana Seif · Rating 5 out of 5]

I highly recommend this book. I think it gives a good historical overview of how the Taliban were formed and why and just how international interference and policies have heavily impacted Afghanistan and other countries. It gives an unflinching look at where we are currently and challenges us to broaden our perspectives on what we can do going forward to support the people of Afghanistan living under Taliban rule.

[Jaward · Rating 5 out of 5]

clearly well researched and a knowledgeable writer, this is a somewhat accessible book and insight into the recent histories of the Taliban and an understanding into what happened in 2021.

One of the most memorable quotes for me was : "The taliban today are not a product solely of some larger evil ideology - but of a people's pain, desperation and lack of options".

History likely to repeat itself in other countries too.

[dcmetrolover · Rating 5 out of 5]

A great breakdown on the TTP, ISK, Taliban, among other groups. Describes their backgrounds and current status after the U.S. withdrawal in 2021. Provided enough detail of leaders, various ethnic and religious groups, and key figures as well as the political landscapes of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the FATA, and some detail about the U.S. and India. Great context about South East Asia tensions and relations.

[Mads Floyd · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very nice bit of text that surmises the days since the Americans left Afghanistan. I would’ve liked a bit more detail on daily life within the country these days, but I’ll suffice with an overbearing amount of detail about the governmental system of the Taliban. The book stylistically is quite informal, which I sometimes prefer, so as not to overwork my brain when I’m simply trying to keep up with events. If I were to write a book such as this, this is how I would write it.

[Stewart Cotterill · Rating 5 out of 5]

A thoroughly interesting book. The author really shows how the ‘new’ Taliban are no longer a monolithic being. The differences within the Taliban and what this means going forward is explored fully. In his conclusion the author puts forward some uncomfortable suggestions but backs these up with carefully considered reasoning.

[Benish Zahra · Rating 5 out of 5]

Brilliantly written, incisive and highly informative. Author’s nuanced analysis and passion for the topic comes out strongly. The chapter on Deobandi school history and thinking is one of the best I have read on the topic. Highly recommended.

[Harry Stevens · Rating 5 out of 5]

Nothing really to complain about. Short, to the point, informative.

[Naveed Bokhari · Rating 5 out of 5]

A brilliant account of the dynamics shaping and impacting the Taliban since August 15, 2021.

[Malihe63 · Rating 5 out of 5]

بسیار بسیار بسیار کتاب خوبی در خصوص طالبان بود خیلی نکات جدید برای یادگیری بود و کتاب بسیار مفیدی بود

[Sudais Khan · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book provides a clear difference between Hard faction and moderate faction of the Taliban, but it is too long compared to information it provides.

[Justine K D · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great research and sourcing, especially on the title material. The middle bit felt less thought-through and well-organised, especially the bit on Deobandism and how it connects to the Taliban: ironically, the older material. I read the initial 2023 version, not the 2024 update, but to his credit, the author's analysis seems to have been largely borne out since then..