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The Panzers of Prokhorovka: The Myth of Hitler’s Greatest Armoured Defeat
This ground-breaking new study of the battles of Kursk and Prokhorovka will transform our understanding of one of the most famous battles of the Second World War, widely mythologized as the largest tank battle in history.
'If ever there was a time for a sober, authoritative dissection of the myths the Soviets fashioned from the Eastern Front, it is now.' - Oliver Moody, Berlin Correspondent for The Times
Today in Russia there are three official sacred Kulikovo, where the Mongols were defeated in 1380; Borodino, where Russian troops slowed Napoleon's Grande Armée before Moscow in 1812; the third is Prokhorovka. This is widely described as the most critical tank battle of the Second World War, which saw the annihilation of Hitler's elite Panzer force in the largest armoured clash in history and left Hitler with no alternative but to halt Germany's offensive against the Kursk salient. Victory, on 12 July 1943, at Prokhorovka over Hitler's vaunted SS troops has traditionally been described as a turning point in the Second World War.
The Panzers of Prokhorovka challenges this narrative. The battle was indeed an important Soviet victory, but a very different one to that described above. Based on ground-breaking archival research and supported by hitherto unpublished images of the battlefield, Ben Wheatley argues that German armoured losses were in fact negligible and a fresh approach is required to understand Prokhorovka. As we reach the 80th anniversary of the battles of Kursk and Prokhorovka in 2023, The Panzers of Prokhorovka tackles the many myths that have built up over the years, and presents a new analysis of this famous engagement.
'If ever there was a time for a sober, authoritative dissection of the myths the Soviets fashioned from the Eastern Front, it is now.' - Oliver Moody, Berlin Correspondent for The Times
Today in Russia there are three official sacred Kulikovo, where the Mongols were defeated in 1380; Borodino, where Russian troops slowed Napoleon's Grande Armée before Moscow in 1812; the third is Prokhorovka. This is widely described as the most critical tank battle of the Second World War, which saw the annihilation of Hitler's elite Panzer force in the largest armoured clash in history and left Hitler with no alternative but to halt Germany's offensive against the Kursk salient. Victory, on 12 July 1943, at Prokhorovka over Hitler's vaunted SS troops has traditionally been described as a turning point in the Second World War.
The Panzers of Prokhorovka challenges this narrative. The battle was indeed an important Soviet victory, but a very different one to that described above. Based on ground-breaking archival research and supported by hitherto unpublished images of the battlefield, Ben Wheatley argues that German armoured losses were in fact negligible and a fresh approach is required to understand Prokhorovka. As we reach the 80th anniversary of the battles of Kursk and Prokhorovka in 2023, The Panzers of Prokhorovka tackles the many myths that have built up over the years, and presents a new analysis of this famous engagement.
320 pages, Hardcover
Published June 20, 2023
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
July 14, 2025
I find it a bit amusing how the author felt the need to preface this book with an acknowledgement of the valiance and courage of the Red Army’s 5th Guards Tank Army and the II SS Panzer’s Korps complicity and/or involvement in mass murder and war crimes.
The author sets out a rather controversial argument, though one that has been raised before: that the II SS Panzer Korps at the Battle of Prokhorovka during Operation Citadel lost hardly any tanks during the battle. This runs counter to the traditional Soviet historiography that as many as 50-70% of the German tank force was destroyed during the battle. These are based on Soviet claims, but with the German tank inventory reports before and after the battle seemingly lost, there was no way to challenge these numbers.
The author was able to access a recently declassified area of the national German military records and found the divisional and Korps inventory reports of the II SS Panzer Korps around the time of the Battle or Prokhorovka. Cross-referencing this material with total-loss reports, other inventory reports as well as utilizing Luftwaffe and VKS aerial reconnaissance photographs of the battlefield, the author finds that the Germans lost no greater than 16 tanks (3% of the II SS Panzer Korps’ force) during the battle. Ironically, only one Tiger tank was lost compared to the two featured on the Prokhorovka monument in Russia.
This does not mean that the Germans won. In the end, the artillery and anti-tank defences of Prokhorovka actual were too great for the Germans to capture, and at the end of the day the Soviets could still muster more tanks than the Germans for the defence of the town. As a result, the offensive was abandoned with Hitler cancelling any further drives into enemy territory. However, this does make Prokhorovka seem like an unnecessary blunder for the Soviets. The territory the Germans captured was going to be used to mount a Soviet counteroffensive, causing the Stavka to pressure local general Rotmistrov into recapturing the territory. A hasty attack was planned, one that did not take into account an anti-tank ditch built by the Soviets themselves and caused many losses in the subsequent battle.
If the Germans really didn’t lose that many tanks, then where did the “Panzers of Prokhorovka” go? Well, as the author shows, they were slowly ground down into dust in the subsequent Soviet offensives of 1943 going into the winter of 1944. By January of 1944, less than ten of the tanks present at the battle were still in divisional tank inventories. The author partly blames Hitler for this, breaking up the II SS Panzer Korps and sending some of its divisions to defend unnecessarily, causing them to run through their spare parts and be unavailable to defend important positions like Kharkov. As he states though, no smarter tactical planning could prevent the German army from having its tank divisions crushed into pieces by the weight of the Red Army.
5/5. Not a good book in terms of being a narrative-following but absolutely valuable in showing the reader how history is made.
The author sets out a rather controversial argument, though one that has been raised before: that the II SS Panzer Korps at the Battle of Prokhorovka during Operation Citadel lost hardly any tanks during the battle. This runs counter to the traditional Soviet historiography that as many as 50-70% of the German tank force was destroyed during the battle. These are based on Soviet claims, but with the German tank inventory reports before and after the battle seemingly lost, there was no way to challenge these numbers.
The author was able to access a recently declassified area of the national German military records and found the divisional and Korps inventory reports of the II SS Panzer Korps around the time of the Battle or Prokhorovka. Cross-referencing this material with total-loss reports, other inventory reports as well as utilizing Luftwaffe and VKS aerial reconnaissance photographs of the battlefield, the author finds that the Germans lost no greater than 16 tanks (3% of the II SS Panzer Korps’ force) during the battle. Ironically, only one Tiger tank was lost compared to the two featured on the Prokhorovka monument in Russia.
This does not mean that the Germans won. In the end, the artillery and anti-tank defences of Prokhorovka actual were too great for the Germans to capture, and at the end of the day the Soviets could still muster more tanks than the Germans for the defence of the town. As a result, the offensive was abandoned with Hitler cancelling any further drives into enemy territory. However, this does make Prokhorovka seem like an unnecessary blunder for the Soviets. The territory the Germans captured was going to be used to mount a Soviet counteroffensive, causing the Stavka to pressure local general Rotmistrov into recapturing the territory. A hasty attack was planned, one that did not take into account an anti-tank ditch built by the Soviets themselves and caused many losses in the subsequent battle.
If the Germans really didn’t lose that many tanks, then where did the “Panzers of Prokhorovka” go? Well, as the author shows, they were slowly ground down into dust in the subsequent Soviet offensives of 1943 going into the winter of 1944. By January of 1944, less than ten of the tanks present at the battle were still in divisional tank inventories. The author partly blames Hitler for this, breaking up the II SS Panzer Korps and sending some of its divisions to defend unnecessarily, causing them to run through their spare parts and be unavailable to defend important positions like Kharkov. As he states though, no smarter tactical planning could prevent the German army from having its tank divisions crushed into pieces by the weight of the Red Army.
5/5. Not a good book in terms of being a narrative-following but absolutely valuable in showing the reader how history is made.
December 26, 2024
The Battle of Prokhorovka in July 1943 is considered one of the three great Russian battles. Rightly so, perhaps, and it could be considered as a turning point on the Eastern Front. The claim that this battle was also the graveyard of the Panzers has been challenged, however, at first on the fringes of historical thought, but now also by Ben Wheatley who has brought the counter-argument into the mainstream with what he argues is definitive proof.
Wheatley lays out his thesis and methodology. He argues that the widely accepted panzer graveyard is a myth, and he produces aerial photographs of the battlefield and German AFV (Armoured Fighting Vehicle) records to support his case. He sketches the context for a battle that saw mind-boggling numbers of men and machines slogging it out as part of the wider Battle of Kursk. The Soviets heralded a great victory, which was true but not in the manner they claimed. In Wheatley’s narrative, the Soviet attack on the Germans was launched too soon, causing them heavy losses, though they did stop the German advance. But far from being smashed, the Germans withdrew having lost just a few tanks, three percent to the Soviet claim of up to seventy percent, according to Wheatley. The German before and after battle records are quite clear on that, and the aerial photographs show very few carcasses of German panzers to support the Soviet interpretation. In short, Wheatley contends, there was no panzer disaster at Prokhorovka.
This book is light on narrative, and beginner students embarking on the Eastern Front should probably do some background reading on the battle and campaign before diving into Wheatley’s analysis. But if you are familiar with the battle and are able to grasp the significance of the AFV reports, then you are in for a treat as Wheatley pursues the panzers through the records often down to individual tanks. He incorporates many tables, a host of remarkable photographs, and an annotated historiography to help you along. I find it unlikely that Wheatley’s argument will be successfully challenged, which surely brings the Prokhorovka debate to a satisfying close.
Wheatley lays out his thesis and methodology. He argues that the widely accepted panzer graveyard is a myth, and he produces aerial photographs of the battlefield and German AFV (Armoured Fighting Vehicle) records to support his case. He sketches the context for a battle that saw mind-boggling numbers of men and machines slogging it out as part of the wider Battle of Kursk. The Soviets heralded a great victory, which was true but not in the manner they claimed. In Wheatley’s narrative, the Soviet attack on the Germans was launched too soon, causing them heavy losses, though they did stop the German advance. But far from being smashed, the Germans withdrew having lost just a few tanks, three percent to the Soviet claim of up to seventy percent, according to Wheatley. The German before and after battle records are quite clear on that, and the aerial photographs show very few carcasses of German panzers to support the Soviet interpretation. In short, Wheatley contends, there was no panzer disaster at Prokhorovka.
This book is light on narrative, and beginner students embarking on the Eastern Front should probably do some background reading on the battle and campaign before diving into Wheatley’s analysis. But if you are familiar with the battle and are able to grasp the significance of the AFV reports, then you are in for a treat as Wheatley pursues the panzers through the records often down to individual tanks. He incorporates many tables, a host of remarkable photographs, and an annotated historiography to help you along. I find it unlikely that Wheatley’s argument will be successfully challenged, which surely brings the Prokhorovka debate to a satisfying close.
May 30, 2024
Not for the general reader but a treasure for military history devotees. This is a revisionist history of the biggest tank battle in history in 1943. Most historians believe that the tank losses on both the German and Russian sides were enormous but the Russians won the battle. The author accepts the fact that the Russians won and that their losses were enormous but doesn't accept that the German losses were enormous. In fact, he believes that the German losses were insignificant.
He presents startling new research to back up his case. The evidence is quite convincing and very detailed. He even gets down to the chassis numbers of individual tanks destroyed on particular positions in the battlefield!
He presents startling new research to back up his case. The evidence is quite convincing and very detailed. He even gets down to the chassis numbers of individual tanks destroyed on particular positions in the battlefield!
July 15, 2023
A good well researched book. Yes its full of data like inventory sheets of the SS and Panzers armors and vehicules that mentions how much AFV(armoured fighting vehicules) where in stock at specific period before and after this battle.
The bibliography and the appencidices are almost half of the book. The first half of this book is the story of the panzers armee involved at the battle of Prokhrovka from before Operation Citadell till there destructions in Ukraine or abandonment in the Fatherland by lack of manpower and heavy equipements like heavy cranes to repairs them (greater Germany in WW2) in the winter and spring 1944.
The bibliography and the appencidices are almost half of the book. The first half of this book is the story of the panzers armee involved at the battle of Prokhrovka from before Operation Citadell till there destructions in Ukraine or abandonment in the Fatherland by lack of manpower and heavy equipements like heavy cranes to repairs them (greater Germany in WW2) in the winter and spring 1944.
October 8, 2023
Interesting but too technical for me
This is a very interesting book. It’s the record straight regarding one of the more enduring myths of World War II. However, for the general reader, and for me as well, it is perhaps somewhat too technical in its detail about the weekly reports and other data on AFVs.
This is a very interesting book. It’s the record straight regarding one of the more enduring myths of World War II. However, for the general reader, and for me as well, it is perhaps somewhat too technical in its detail about the weekly reports and other data on AFVs.
February 17, 2025
Good book with plenty of tables to consider the author's point; that the German losses at Prokorovka were inflated by the Soviets to cover their own losses. With meticulous research the unearthing of the German repair-shop statistics tend to prove that indeed the German losses were minimal even though the battle was lost. Once again a good book for the statistician
January 6, 2026
A deep dive into official reports and analysis of numbers. great for the peson interested in historical research and how to use historical records. also gives a over view of east front from 1943 through 1944 but not in detail. also battle of Prokhorovka not gone into in excessive detail.
September 14, 2023
Please see my forthcoming review in _The Journal of Military History_.
March 24, 2025
it seemed to have more status reports than text. Not an easy read. I am sorry tohave bought the book
March 27, 2025
Good book very informative… I mean VERY informative.
December 7, 2025
A very detailed look at a very narrow subject. some interesting stuff on what happened over the following year as well.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews