For those awaiting a proper, full scale biography of Metternich that does justice to both his importance and considerable achievements, this book is a huge disappointment, not because it is yet another attack upon the conservative statesman, but because is a totally partial quasi- hagiography in which the hero cannot err, has incredible foresight, and all mistakes are the product of others who lack his seemingly superhuman skills. By seeking to rescue Metternich from his detractors, and fight tedious battles with previous biographers, Wolfram Siemann, has so over-egged his pudding as to make it partly inedible, and, importantly, has done a grave disservice to Metternich himself, who does not require such partisanship, but, instead, only requires an objective examination of his life and the events of his age for his achievements to be validated, and his mistakes explained.
Metternich is somehow presented as the sole mind who made possible the 1813-14 coalition against Napoleon and the general peace of 1815-48, and who even played a part in the military victories, when he was but one, although an important one, of the statesmen and generals that made these possible, and whose actions were more tactical than strategic. Siemann's view both exaggerates Metternich's influence over politio-military affairs and at the same time undervalues his huge diplomatic success in both protecting the Austrian empire from French dominance and in managing a coalition of disparate states to the advantage of Austria and, in more general terms, Germany and Europe. Siemann constantly attempts to paint Metternich as the strategist and visionary of his subtitle, when actually he was much more of a successful tactician and practical politician who while he maintained a general overview of how Germany should develop, did so so as to further the interests of the Austrian empire. Siemann wants his hero to always appear as a great European confederalist, when in reality his prime motive was always the maintenance of Austrian influence and Habsburg hegemony over its multitude of territories and peoples, and in so doing he ascribes to this most practical and wily of foreign ministers an ideology and purpose unjustified by his actions, preferring instead to take at face value Metternich's own letters and memoirs to find in them a post facto truth not present in the actual decision making of the time.
From the time of his appointment as foreign minister in 1809 to his fall in the March 1848 revolution, Metternich had two main concerns: one, the security of the Austrian empire under Habsburg monarchical rule; and, two, how to maintain this ethnically and linguistically diverse empire within an emerging German national identity, sparked initially by the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and made manifest by the foundation in 1815 of the German Confederation, which Metternich envisioned not as a framework for the development of a German nation, but rather as a means of reconciling disparate German polities under Austrian supremacy. Metternich's problem was that his, Austrian vision increasingly conflicted with the aims not only of nationalists, but of other German states, Prussia predominantly, but also Bavaria and Württemburg, which did not include so many non-Germans within their borders. And so, Metternich was occupied in maintaining a political system against the threats of nationalism, popular sovereignty, and democracy that, while in the shorter term preserved continental peace, was not over the longer term sustainable in light of the political ideas that emerged from the French Revolution, and which was not equipped for the social and economic challenges and developments of the nineteenth century, particularly the industrialisation of Prussia and the concomitant effects that had upon the balance of power in Germany.
Siemann is right to deny that what Metternich sought after 1815 was a restoration of ancien régime Europe - he was a conservative not a reactionary - but the vision he had was still grounded upon the Austrian empire as the heir to the Holy Roman Empire, with Austria as the leading power in both a Germany and a central Europe based upon political structures of confederation and estates, and yet this increasingly became an unsuitable model in an age of liberalism, nationalism, and capitalism. Metternich was incredibly successful in his defensive strategy until 1848, when the revolution he had so long sought to prevent toppled him from power, thereby testifying to the ultimate failure of his policies, and while it is true that there was no 'Metternich system', nonetheless, Metternich maintained a conservative vision of Europe rooted upon a balance of power and aristocratic representation within monarchies that was entirely appropriate for 1813 to 1830, but could no longer be maintained in 1848. Metternich was a man of his time.
Indeed, Metternich was aware of the imitations of his policies, including the 'Congress system' he operated very successfully from 1814 to 1822, but which had to be adapted in the face of events which it could not control, beginning with Greek independence in the 1820s, and moving on to the overthrow of Charles X in 1830 and the foundation of Belgium the following year. But, Metternich was no dogmatist, and he recognised where the settlement of 1814-15 had to be modified in the face of popular demands and when the five continental powers had to recognise and accept such alterations to the political settlement post facto. The 'Congress system' served its immediate purpose, but after 1830 it was increasingly moribund, and was no longer suitable to the situation in which German national identity and demands for popular sovereignty were growing, and in which the foundation of the Zollverein in 1833 provided an alternative economic framework for German development that was predominantly intra-German not European in nature. Metternich may have deplored this de-Europeanisation of the German question and how it unbalanced the continental power system, much to the disadvantage of Austria, and excluded great power congresses from its management, but nonetheless he accepted reality and tried his best to make of the new dispensation what he could until the 1848 Revolution brought down what remained of the political edifice he had constructed with the other powers in 1814-15. If all political careers end in failure, how much is that true of Metternich in March 1848, forced to flee to England and deplored by the monarchy he had so faithfully served? The Metternich dispensation simply could not hold in spite of the skills of its originator, and rather than providing an ultimate solution to German and continental problems, it only deferred their settlement in more aggressive manners, although providing at least a temporary period of peace. If 1815-48 is a transitional period of European history, then Metternich's statesmanship must be seen as equally transitional, while the question remains, which the author in his hurried narrative of 1848 avoids, as to how far Metternich's conservative policies themselves motivated continental wide revolts. What is clear is that however cogent Metternich's vision was of Europe, his practical policies were no longer suitable for the post-1848 age of liberalism and nationalism, and were powerless against the forces of industrial capitalism, self-determination, and democratic sociability which provided the challenges to European stability in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Siemann makes an avid defence of Metternich's reaction to the murder of Kotzebue in 1819 and the resulting 1820 Carlsbad Decrees, but he singularly fails to establish that Metternich's actions were either proportionate to the threat or that there existed revolutionary conspiracies aimed at and with putative capability of overthrowing both monarchical government and the 1815 settlement, and he fails to consider how far the restrictions imposed influenced the 1848 Revolutions by instilling a feeling of political oppression amongst the politically aware, particularly in the cities and amongst students, that could only be alleviated by direct action. There are many parts of Metternich's career that are worthy of praise, but Carlsbad is not one of them, and there is something frankly distasteful in a twenty-first century academic using abstract arguments to justify press censorship, the dismissal of liberal or nationalist professors, and the interception of mail, when these measures are best understood as an overreaction by Metternich and contemporary statesmen to isolated attacks and romantic nostrums based upon their memory of and the fears engendered by French revolutionary violence and war and by Napoleonic conquest.
In the end, Metternich was a practical politician, and it was as this he was most successful, but even so his powers were limited, not only by the realities of continental diplomacy, but also the structures of the Hapsburg monarchy and Austrian empire he served. The most important constraint was that offered by emperor Francis, whose primary instincts were the preservation of the Habsburg dynasty and the protection of his patriarchy, and it was he who both determined and circumscribed how much influence Metternich exerted within the empire, and who, despite their shared political affinities, quashed his attempts at administrative reform. After Francis' death in 1835, the situation changed as a strong willed emperor was succeeded by the infirm and incapable Ferdinand, and power accrued to the archdukes and the council of which Metternich was a member, but which he did not control. It is from this time that Metternich's rivalry with Kolowrat, finance and interior minister since 1826, becomes the dominant factor in internal Imperial disputes. Siemann is ridiculously and relentlessly disobliging towards Kolowrat, the only Habsburg minister to rival his hero, and contradicts himself regarding the political system Metternich favoured. Metternich was opposed to over-centralisation, representative parliaments and democracy, and instead supported monarchy and government of the Habsburg territories by their estates, and yet Siemann criticises Francis for impeding Metternich's proposed reforms and attacks Kolowrat, a Bohemian count whose power lay in his status within the Bohemian estates, for defending the estates and preventing economic reforms that would have lowered tariffs to the detriment of Bohemian landowners. The author cannot have it both ways and cannot criticise the monarchical and estates government for thwarting Metternich, when Metternich himself supported those systems. If the fault was in the monarchy, particularly with Ferdinand from 1835 to 1848, and with the provincial estates, of whom Kolowrat was an outstanding representative, then Metternich who was himself a member of the German and Bohemian estates was equally at fault for operating in and maintaining a system from which he drew his power. If Metternich had not been the son of a count of the Holy Roman Empire, later raised to prince and rewarded with landed estates, as was his son later to be, then he would not have been elevated to the offices of foreign minister and chancellor. He was a part of the very system that Siemann, in order to gratuitously malign Kolowrat, defames.
This book, sadly, is not the biography Metternich deserves. It is too partisan, too polemical, too short-sighted, and too ideological, painting a picture of Metternich as a supreme strategist and visionary, based overwhelmingly upon memoirs, letters, and self-appraisals post facto, that is unjustified by the evidence and which severely underestimates the constraints within which Metternich operated and his own conservative, imperial, monarchical, and aristocratic opinions, which were very much a product of his times, tempered as they were by Revolution and war. Metternich was before all as a minister a servant of the Habsburgs and a representative of the German imperial nobility, and throughout his career he strove to retain as much of that monarchical-aristocratic power structure as he could until finally defeated by a revolution he had sought to prevent but in part had brought about. Metternich was a great statesman and within his time achieved much and contributed to the restoration and maintenance of peace, but this is far from a great biography and it fails to do justice to the real achievements and the limitations of its fascinating subject.