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Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang
How often can you peek behind the curtains of one of the most secretive governments in the world? Prisoner of the State is the first book to give readers a front row seat to the secret inner workings of China's government. It is the story of Premier Zhao Ziyang, the man who brought liberal change to that nation and who, at the height of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, tried to stop the massacre and was dethroned for his efforts.
When China's army moved in, killing hundreds of students and other demonstrators, Zhao was placed under house arrest at his home on a quiet alley in Beijing. China's most promising change agent had been disgraced, along with the policies he stood for. The premier spent the last sixteen years of his life, up until his death in 2005, in seclusion. An occasional detail about his life would slip out: reports of a golf excursion, a photo of his aging visage, a leaked letter to China's leaders. But China scholars often lamented that Zhao never had his final say.
As it turns out, Zhao did produce a memoir in complete secrecy. He methodically recorded his thoughts and recollections on what had happened behind the scenes during many of modern China's most critical moments. The tapes he produced were smuggled out of the country and form the basis for Prisoner of the State. In this audio journal, Zhao provides intimate details about the Tiananmen crackdown; he describes the ploys and double crosses China's top leaders use to gain advantage over one another; and he talks of the necessity for China to adopt democracy in order to achieve long-term stability.
The China that Zhao portrays is not some long-lost dynasty. It is today's China, where the nation's leaders accept economic freedom but continue to resist political change.
If Zhao had survived -- that is, if the hard-line hadn't prevailed during Tiananmen -- he might have been able to steer China's political system toward more openness and tolerance.
Zhao's call to begin lifting the Party's control over China's life -- to let a little freedom into the public square -- is remarkable coming from a man who had once dominated that square. Although Zhao now speaks from the grave in this moving and riveting memoir, his voice has the moral power to make China sit up and listen.
When China's army moved in, killing hundreds of students and other demonstrators, Zhao was placed under house arrest at his home on a quiet alley in Beijing. China's most promising change agent had been disgraced, along with the policies he stood for. The premier spent the last sixteen years of his life, up until his death in 2005, in seclusion. An occasional detail about his life would slip out: reports of a golf excursion, a photo of his aging visage, a leaked letter to China's leaders. But China scholars often lamented that Zhao never had his final say.
As it turns out, Zhao did produce a memoir in complete secrecy. He methodically recorded his thoughts and recollections on what had happened behind the scenes during many of modern China's most critical moments. The tapes he produced were smuggled out of the country and form the basis for Prisoner of the State. In this audio journal, Zhao provides intimate details about the Tiananmen crackdown; he describes the ploys and double crosses China's top leaders use to gain advantage over one another; and he talks of the necessity for China to adopt democracy in order to achieve long-term stability.
The China that Zhao portrays is not some long-lost dynasty. It is today's China, where the nation's leaders accept economic freedom but continue to resist political change.
If Zhao had survived -- that is, if the hard-line hadn't prevailed during Tiananmen -- he might have been able to steer China's political system toward more openness and tolerance.
Zhao's call to begin lifting the Party's control over China's life -- to let a little freedom into the public square -- is remarkable coming from a man who had once dominated that square. Although Zhao now speaks from the grave in this moving and riveting memoir, his voice has the moral power to make China sit up and listen.
336 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2009
133 people are currently reading
1468 people want to read
About the author
Zhao Ziyang
7 books7 followersZhao Ziyang (Chinese: 赵紫阳) was a Chinese politician. He was the premier of China from 1980 to 1987, vice chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 1981 to 1982, and CCP general secretary from 1987 to 1989. He was in charge of the political reforms in China from 1986, but lost power for his support of the 1989 Tian'anmen Square protests.
Zhao joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in February 1938. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, he served as the chief officer of CCP Hua County Committee, Director of the Organization Department of the CCP Yubei prefecture Party Committee, Secretary of the CCP Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Region Prefecture Party Committee and Political Commissar of the 4th Military Division of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region. During the Chinese Civil War of 1945–1949, Zhao served as the Deputy Political Commissar of Tongbai Military Region, Secretary of the CCP Nanyang Prefecture Party Committee and Political Commissar of Nanyang Military Division.
After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, Zhao became Deputy Secretary of the South China Branch of the CCP Central Committee. He also served as Secretary of the Secretariat of the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the CCP, Second Secretary and First Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the CCP. He was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution and spent time in political exile. After being rehabilitated, Zhao then was appointed Secretary of the CCP Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Committee, First Secretary of the CCP Guangdong Provincial Committee, First Secretary of the CCP Sichuan Provincial Committee and First Political Commissar of the Chengdu Military Region, Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
As a senior government official, Zhao was critical of Maoist policies and instrumental in implementing free-market reforms, first in Sichuan and subsequently nationwide. He emerged on the national scene due to support from Deng Xiaoping after the Cultural Revolution. An advocate of the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the separation of the party and the state, and general market economy reforms, he sought measures to streamline China's bureaucracy and fight corruption and issues that challenged the party's legitimacy in the 1980s. Many of these views were shared by the then General Secretary Hu Yaobang.
His economic reform policies and sympathies with student demonstrators during the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 placed him at odds with some members of the party leadership, including Central Advisory Commission Chairman Chen Yun, CPPCC Chairman Li Xiannian, and Premier Li Peng. Zhao also began to lose favor with Deng Xiaoping, who was the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. In the aftermath of the events, Zhao was purged politically and effectively placed under house arrest for the rest of his life. After his house arrest, he became much more radical in his political beliefs, supporting China's full transition to liberal democracy. He died from a stroke in Beijing in January 2005. Because of his political fall from grace, he was not given the funeral rites generally accorded to senior Chinese officials. His secret memoirs were smuggled out and published in English and in Chinese in 2009, but the details of his life remain censored in China.
Zhao joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in February 1938. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, he served as the chief officer of CCP Hua County Committee, Director of the Organization Department of the CCP Yubei prefecture Party Committee, Secretary of the CCP Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Region Prefecture Party Committee and Political Commissar of the 4th Military Division of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region. During the Chinese Civil War of 1945–1949, Zhao served as the Deputy Political Commissar of Tongbai Military Region, Secretary of the CCP Nanyang Prefecture Party Committee and Political Commissar of Nanyang Military Division.
After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, Zhao became Deputy Secretary of the South China Branch of the CCP Central Committee. He also served as Secretary of the Secretariat of the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the CCP, Second Secretary and First Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the CCP. He was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution and spent time in political exile. After being rehabilitated, Zhao then was appointed Secretary of the CCP Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Committee, First Secretary of the CCP Guangdong Provincial Committee, First Secretary of the CCP Sichuan Provincial Committee and First Political Commissar of the Chengdu Military Region, Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
As a senior government official, Zhao was critical of Maoist policies and instrumental in implementing free-market reforms, first in Sichuan and subsequently nationwide. He emerged on the national scene due to support from Deng Xiaoping after the Cultural Revolution. An advocate of the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the separation of the party and the state, and general market economy reforms, he sought measures to streamline China's bureaucracy and fight corruption and issues that challenged the party's legitimacy in the 1980s. Many of these views were shared by the then General Secretary Hu Yaobang.
His economic reform policies and sympathies with student demonstrators during the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 placed him at odds with some members of the party leadership, including Central Advisory Commission Chairman Chen Yun, CPPCC Chairman Li Xiannian, and Premier Li Peng. Zhao also began to lose favor with Deng Xiaoping, who was the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. In the aftermath of the events, Zhao was purged politically and effectively placed under house arrest for the rest of his life. After his house arrest, he became much more radical in his political beliefs, supporting China's full transition to liberal democracy. He died from a stroke in Beijing in January 2005. Because of his political fall from grace, he was not given the funeral rites generally accorded to senior Chinese officials. His secret memoirs were smuggled out and published in English and in Chinese in 2009, but the details of his life remain censored in China.
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July 29, 2013
I’m not exactly up on the Chinese history; it’s not a subject that we covered much in school. Most of what I know comes by way of hazy pop culture references and exposure via the slightly counterfactual nature of science fiction and historical fiction. Moreover, having been born and raised subsequent to the Cold War and the height of anti-communist sentiment in the West, not to mention just after the Tienanmen Square incident, the history that features in Prisoner of the State belongs to that middle part of the twentieth century I fondly call the "lost years". If it happened after World War II, we didn’t really talk much about it in school. So I try to remedy that oversight by reading about it on my own time. I can’t quite recall what put Prisoner of State on my radar. It’s been on my to-read list for a few years now. My public library in Thunder Bay didn’t have a copy, so I had relegated it to the "to buy, eventually" shelf. Fortunately, I managed to find a copy in the Suffolk library system, so I jumped at the chance to read it now. And … it isn’t quite what I was expecting.
What strikes me the most about Zhao Ziyang is his unwavering focus on economic reform. From the title, not to mention the fact that he composed these thoughts while under house arrest, set me up to expect a more politically-focused tract. Knowing precisely nothing about Zhao, or indeed the structure of the Chinese leadership, prior to this point, I wasn’t prepared for Zhao’s intense, detailled discussions of how China’s economy changed in the latter part of the twentieth century. At times the minutiae become tedious, the trees threatening to rise up and swallow the forest. For the most part, though, Zhao’s account is enlightening.
Zhao’s discussion of the different paths that China could take in the 1980s provides an important context to the China that exists today. I now better understand the paradox of the People’s Republic of China: a country ruled by One Party where personal freedoms are constrained, but economic freedom has expanded markedly. Much of this is thanks to Zhao and his supporters, for they believed that the strict, centralized planned economy inherited via Stalin and Mao was doomed to failure, at least for a country the size of China. Zhao repeatedly explains that he could not abide the waste and inefficiency that resulted from a top-down, planned economy, and he saw more free-market solutions as the only way to drag China towards a twenty-first century where it could compete and interact at an international level.
That Zhao was not more interested in the political side of things might seem surprising to an outsider like me, but he also offers some insights into why this might be so. He admits that he was, at least until they came for him, fairly conservative regarding the possibility of the Party abusing its power. Like something out of Nineteen Eighty-Four, he is complacent about the system until it turns against him. This is most evident when he contrasts himself and his associate Hu Yaobang, who shared Zhao’s zeal for economic reform but was also much more interested in bringing a more open democracy to the country. Zhao’s caution allowed him to remain even when Yaobang was removed by more conservative opponents—though, of course, that same caution and lack of political deftness contributed to Zhao’s own eventual downfall.
It’d be inaccurate for me to represent Zhao as completely devoid of political leanings. Importantly, Prisoner of the State shows his growth in this area. Even before his house arrest, Zhao begins to understand that economic reform is difficult without political reform. The "beloved" Party elders are slow to retire—they like to hang on to power, unsurprisingly, and the cult-of-personality-style political system has encouraged reverence from their followers to the point of deference. The most conservative elders are very opposed to Zhao’s reforms, but there are no checks and balances to remove their influence. Similarly, once they begin to turn against Zhao and investigate him, he experiences firsthand the way an authoritarian government can trammel upon the rights of an individual, Party constitution or no.
The Zhao who speaks in this journal is a different Zhao, a Zhao who understands that China’s future is as much about political reform as it is economic reform. Just as he recognized the terrible inefficiencies that plagued a centralized, planned economy, Zhao began to understand the inefficiency inherent in political power concentrated within an oligarchy. His personal journey towards these revelations, recounted with a small dose of hindsight, provides intimate insight into China’s political climate in the late twentieth century. I definitely emerged from this book with a better understanding of how the people in power thought and the way communism was operating in China during those years.
I wouldn’t necessarily recommend this book to a general audience. It’s somewhat technical at times—economics isn’t my best subject, whereas Zhao clearly lives and breathes such theory—and packed with historical, geographical, and ethnographical detail that can overwhelm at times. For students of Chinese history or political science in general, though, this would be a fascinating firsthand account. Prisoner of the State is less about Zhao’s own personal gripes with house arrest—he gets past that after the first chapter or so—and more a meditation on what he dreamed China could be versus what it has turned into. It is at times cynical and at times hopeful, for even though he spent the last years of his life in a gilded cage, Zhao still dreamed of a China that could change.
What strikes me the most about Zhao Ziyang is his unwavering focus on economic reform. From the title, not to mention the fact that he composed these thoughts while under house arrest, set me up to expect a more politically-focused tract. Knowing precisely nothing about Zhao, or indeed the structure of the Chinese leadership, prior to this point, I wasn’t prepared for Zhao’s intense, detailled discussions of how China’s economy changed in the latter part of the twentieth century. At times the minutiae become tedious, the trees threatening to rise up and swallow the forest. For the most part, though, Zhao’s account is enlightening.
Zhao’s discussion of the different paths that China could take in the 1980s provides an important context to the China that exists today. I now better understand the paradox of the People’s Republic of China: a country ruled by One Party where personal freedoms are constrained, but economic freedom has expanded markedly. Much of this is thanks to Zhao and his supporters, for they believed that the strict, centralized planned economy inherited via Stalin and Mao was doomed to failure, at least for a country the size of China. Zhao repeatedly explains that he could not abide the waste and inefficiency that resulted from a top-down, planned economy, and he saw more free-market solutions as the only way to drag China towards a twenty-first century where it could compete and interact at an international level.
That Zhao was not more interested in the political side of things might seem surprising to an outsider like me, but he also offers some insights into why this might be so. He admits that he was, at least until they came for him, fairly conservative regarding the possibility of the Party abusing its power. Like something out of Nineteen Eighty-Four, he is complacent about the system until it turns against him. This is most evident when he contrasts himself and his associate Hu Yaobang, who shared Zhao’s zeal for economic reform but was also much more interested in bringing a more open democracy to the country. Zhao’s caution allowed him to remain even when Yaobang was removed by more conservative opponents—though, of course, that same caution and lack of political deftness contributed to Zhao’s own eventual downfall.
It’d be inaccurate for me to represent Zhao as completely devoid of political leanings. Importantly, Prisoner of the State shows his growth in this area. Even before his house arrest, Zhao begins to understand that economic reform is difficult without political reform. The "beloved" Party elders are slow to retire—they like to hang on to power, unsurprisingly, and the cult-of-personality-style political system has encouraged reverence from their followers to the point of deference. The most conservative elders are very opposed to Zhao’s reforms, but there are no checks and balances to remove their influence. Similarly, once they begin to turn against Zhao and investigate him, he experiences firsthand the way an authoritarian government can trammel upon the rights of an individual, Party constitution or no.
The Zhao who speaks in this journal is a different Zhao, a Zhao who understands that China’s future is as much about political reform as it is economic reform. Just as he recognized the terrible inefficiencies that plagued a centralized, planned economy, Zhao began to understand the inefficiency inherent in political power concentrated within an oligarchy. His personal journey towards these revelations, recounted with a small dose of hindsight, provides intimate insight into China’s political climate in the late twentieth century. I definitely emerged from this book with a better understanding of how the people in power thought and the way communism was operating in China during those years.
I wouldn’t necessarily recommend this book to a general audience. It’s somewhat technical at times—economics isn’t my best subject, whereas Zhao clearly lives and breathes such theory—and packed with historical, geographical, and ethnographical detail that can overwhelm at times. For students of Chinese history or political science in general, though, this would be a fascinating firsthand account. Prisoner of the State is less about Zhao’s own personal gripes with house arrest—he gets past that after the first chapter or so—and more a meditation on what he dreamed China could be versus what it has turned into. It is at times cynical and at times hopeful, for even though he spent the last years of his life in a gilded cage, Zhao still dreamed of a China that could change.
August 15, 2014
Zhao Ziyang, former Chairman of the Communist Party in China, was politically sidelined in May 1989 and went into house arrest as a result of his opposition to the government response to students occupying Tiananmen Square in Beijing. This fascinating personal and secret memoir recorded in the years after his arrest was published only after Zhao’s death in 2005. Bao Pu, son of Zhao’s trusted advisor, secretary, and speech writer, Bao Tong, transcribed, translated, and published the documents in his publishing house in Hong Kong in 2009. Simon & Schuster published an edition with a Foreword by Roderick MacFarquhar, noted China scholar.
In that Foreword, MacFarquhar notes that Zhao was an economic reformer but a political conservative in the 1980’s, but during his house arrest he became increasingly convinced that political change was both necessary and advantageous, i.e., economic development must be accompanied by development of an independent judiciary and the rule of law. MacFarquhar asks readers to consider that it took some years of house arrest for Zhao to come to these conclusions and wonders how much more difficult it would be for those involved in the day-to-day management of state and skirmishes within the Politburo to come to similar conclusions.
Though Zhao Ziyang has been erased from public discourse in China today, he did have some notion that the demands of the students in Tiananmen were not essentially undermining the state, but all about modifying the state to better represent the will of the people. Reading the full narrative makes clear that Zhao’s position as Party Chairman in the spring of 1989 was already tenuous. He still had Deng’s support, but that was all. After his refusal to carry out Deng’s wishes in handling the student demonstration, his political career was finished.
Hu Yaobang, in the chapter about his ouster, sounds politically tone deaf. When faced with conflict Hu ignored it or went out of the country. Hu was Party Chairman when Zhao was Premier. Hu was forced to resign in January 1987, and Zhao was asked to take his place, though he’d made clear that he did not want the role of Communist Party Chairman. He would have preferred to stay focused on economic issues as Premier.
Zhao speculates that Hu was forced out because he suggested in interviews and by “loose talk” that Deng Xiaoping would (should) retire from making decisions. Zhao did the exact opposite with Gorbachev in 1989, suggesting that Deng was really in control of everything, and that Gorbachev, if he wanted the “final word” on anything, should meet with Deng. A little later we understand the reasons for this more fully.
Corporate types who have lived/worked with a group of people who disagree but who never openly voice their disagreements and instead jockey for position by leaks or by willfully excluding someone from discussions will recognize immediately the stomach-churning turmoil of the 1980’s government of the most populous country on earth. Each individual was a planetary power shifting his weight yet no one was precisely sure what the actual sticking points were since no one voiced their opposition openly.
It appears that the shift of Zhao to position of General Secretary of the Party from Premier in 1987 was the beginning of his downfall. Though Deng Xiaoping created a Central Economic and Financial Leading Group with the intention that Zhao would keep his hold over the management of the economy while at the same time handling Party affairs, Zhao was sidelined and attacked by more conservative ideologues Li Xiannian, Wang Zhen, Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun.
The real writing on Zhao’s headstone was Zhao’s failure to push through price reforms in the fall of 1988. He’d made preparation, proposed and supported the idea but when it came to implementation, he choked. Zhao’s chapter on official corruption gives a clear explanation of how vast sums can be channeled and manipulated through government enterprises unless there is price reform. Deng Xiaoping had made clear that he wanted this work done because all the economic reform efforts in the world couldn’t work properly without price reform. Deng said repeatedly that Zhao should be strong and if it all went sideways, that Deng would take the blame. But Zhao couldn’t pull the trigger, and the conservatives then had the ammunition they needed to refuse his suggestions as bank runs, inflation, and lack of available money slowed the economy. Reforms were retrenched.
Zhao later said that this was the thing he most regretted. Indeed, we learn something about the nature of leadership with his failure in this instance: a leader doesn’t necessarily have to be fearless, but he must be bold. A leader may be afraid, but he sometimes must make a bold move despite that fear (think Shackleton). I think Deng understood this. Deng himself was vulnerable to ultraconservatives who sought to sideline his influence, and he tried to preempt their attempts by resigning from all posts and suggesting other elderly statesmen do the same.
What happens next is just the burying of the body. By 1989 Zhao must have known his position was extremely tenuous, and therefore convinced Deng not to resign his posts, knowing he would lose his powerful mentor and his one friend in the upper reaches of power. Zhao finally split with Deng over the student demonstrations, which Deng felt should be dealt with harshly, by forcing the students from the Square. If Western observers thought the political center in China was in turmoil during Tiananmen, they had missed the fact that power was being consolidated, in fact. Deng stepped down from his position as Chairman of Central Military Commission in 1989, despite promising Zhao that he would wait a year. Deng was still consulted on official matters until 1992.
Zhao never was released from house arrest, and very rarely left his home. He died in 2005. His memoir of his final years was discovered at his home in plain sight, recorded over his grandchildren’s music tapes and tapes of Chinese opera.
This memoir was both heartbreaking and heart stirring. It has the feel of truth—Zhao Ziyang’s truth—which is all we ask of a memoirist. Bao Pu did a great job condensing the material, providing explanatory text, and making a worthwhile testament to Zhao Ziyang’s life.
In that Foreword, MacFarquhar notes that Zhao was an economic reformer but a political conservative in the 1980’s, but during his house arrest he became increasingly convinced that political change was both necessary and advantageous, i.e., economic development must be accompanied by development of an independent judiciary and the rule of law. MacFarquhar asks readers to consider that it took some years of house arrest for Zhao to come to these conclusions and wonders how much more difficult it would be for those involved in the day-to-day management of state and skirmishes within the Politburo to come to similar conclusions.
Though Zhao Ziyang has been erased from public discourse in China today, he did have some notion that the demands of the students in Tiananmen were not essentially undermining the state, but all about modifying the state to better represent the will of the people. Reading the full narrative makes clear that Zhao’s position as Party Chairman in the spring of 1989 was already tenuous. He still had Deng’s support, but that was all. After his refusal to carry out Deng’s wishes in handling the student demonstration, his political career was finished.
Hu Yaobang, in the chapter about his ouster, sounds politically tone deaf. When faced with conflict Hu ignored it or went out of the country. Hu was Party Chairman when Zhao was Premier. Hu was forced to resign in January 1987, and Zhao was asked to take his place, though he’d made clear that he did not want the role of Communist Party Chairman. He would have preferred to stay focused on economic issues as Premier.
Zhao speculates that Hu was forced out because he suggested in interviews and by “loose talk” that Deng Xiaoping would (should) retire from making decisions. Zhao did the exact opposite with Gorbachev in 1989, suggesting that Deng was really in control of everything, and that Gorbachev, if he wanted the “final word” on anything, should meet with Deng. A little later we understand the reasons for this more fully.
Corporate types who have lived/worked with a group of people who disagree but who never openly voice their disagreements and instead jockey for position by leaks or by willfully excluding someone from discussions will recognize immediately the stomach-churning turmoil of the 1980’s government of the most populous country on earth. Each individual was a planetary power shifting his weight yet no one was precisely sure what the actual sticking points were since no one voiced their opposition openly.
It appears that the shift of Zhao to position of General Secretary of the Party from Premier in 1987 was the beginning of his downfall. Though Deng Xiaoping created a Central Economic and Financial Leading Group with the intention that Zhao would keep his hold over the management of the economy while at the same time handling Party affairs, Zhao was sidelined and attacked by more conservative ideologues Li Xiannian, Wang Zhen, Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun.
The real writing on Zhao’s headstone was Zhao’s failure to push through price reforms in the fall of 1988. He’d made preparation, proposed and supported the idea but when it came to implementation, he choked. Zhao’s chapter on official corruption gives a clear explanation of how vast sums can be channeled and manipulated through government enterprises unless there is price reform. Deng Xiaoping had made clear that he wanted this work done because all the economic reform efforts in the world couldn’t work properly without price reform. Deng said repeatedly that Zhao should be strong and if it all went sideways, that Deng would take the blame. But Zhao couldn’t pull the trigger, and the conservatives then had the ammunition they needed to refuse his suggestions as bank runs, inflation, and lack of available money slowed the economy. Reforms were retrenched.
Zhao later said that this was the thing he most regretted. Indeed, we learn something about the nature of leadership with his failure in this instance: a leader doesn’t necessarily have to be fearless, but he must be bold. A leader may be afraid, but he sometimes must make a bold move despite that fear (think Shackleton). I think Deng understood this. Deng himself was vulnerable to ultraconservatives who sought to sideline his influence, and he tried to preempt their attempts by resigning from all posts and suggesting other elderly statesmen do the same.
What happens next is just the burying of the body. By 1989 Zhao must have known his position was extremely tenuous, and therefore convinced Deng not to resign his posts, knowing he would lose his powerful mentor and his one friend in the upper reaches of power. Zhao finally split with Deng over the student demonstrations, which Deng felt should be dealt with harshly, by forcing the students from the Square. If Western observers thought the political center in China was in turmoil during Tiananmen, they had missed the fact that power was being consolidated, in fact. Deng stepped down from his position as Chairman of Central Military Commission in 1989, despite promising Zhao that he would wait a year. Deng was still consulted on official matters until 1992.
Zhao never was released from house arrest, and very rarely left his home. He died in 2005. His memoir of his final years was discovered at his home in plain sight, recorded over his grandchildren’s music tapes and tapes of Chinese opera.
This memoir was both heartbreaking and heart stirring. It has the feel of truth—Zhao Ziyang’s truth—which is all we ask of a memoirist. Bao Pu did a great job condensing the material, providing explanatory text, and making a worthwhile testament to Zhao Ziyang’s life.
August 1, 2017
花了三十多美元，买了从台湾寄来的中文版。可是，我只读这本书的三分之一，就坚持不下去完成它。
阅读这本书如同听一个怨妇在唠唠叨叨家中刻薄的奶奶。我没有这个耐性和时间。
我是广东出生的八十后，来了美国购买了很多关于六四事件的历史书。这是我买的第一本从共产党的角度写的历史书。买这本书目的是想了解中国共产党的最高层--政治局常委和邓小平作出武力镇压民主运动的决定的整个过层。
可是，赵没有详细讲述，因为据他所说，他是被隔绝在整个决策过程之外的。
赵是当时中共权力中第二大的人物，从89年罢黜到软禁至死，不经作何党章和法律程序。所以只要中国共产党还在，中国是不会有法治，也不会有什么民主。
一个连自己订立的党章也不遵守的政党，如何遵守民主选举的游戏规则。
将来的中国大陆也不可能像台湾一样，有一个独揽大权的蒋经国一夜之间放宽报禁，然后走上民主的道路。因为当今的中国最高统治层已经被不同利益集团瓜分。中国自上而下实行民主的机会已经错过了。
阅读这本书如同听一个怨妇在唠唠叨叨家中刻薄的奶奶。我没有这个耐性和时间。
我是广东出生的八十后，来了美国购买了很多关于六四事件的历史书。这是我买的第一本从共产党的角度写的历史书。买这本书目的是想了解中国共产党的最高层--政治局常委和邓小平作出武力镇压民主运动的决定的整个过层。
可是，赵没有详细讲述，因为据他所说，他是被隔绝在整个决策过程之外的。
赵是当时中共权力中第二大的人物，从89年罢黜到软禁至死，不经作何党章和法律程序。所以只要中国共产党还在，中国是不会有法治，也不会有什么民主。
一个连自己订立的党章也不遵守的政党，如何遵守民主选举的游戏规则。
将来的中国大陆也不可能像台湾一样，有一个独揽大权的蒋经国一夜之间放宽报禁，然后走上民主的道路。因为当今的中国最高统治层已经被不同利益集团瓜分。中国自上而下实行民主的机会已经错过了。
August 2, 2020
Re-read after 8 years. Unique insight into the inner workings of the CCP and a must-read for every scholar and student of Chinese politics.
July 26, 2021
The overall tone of the book is that either Zhao Ziyang is naïve about the intentions about the CCP or he trying to sound deliberately earnest in case his memoir is read by someone from the CCP who is a true believer.
It was really eye-opening how scummy some of the CCP folk are. It seems like an organization that self-selects for sociopaths and political people. Any honest person would stay far away because people could conspire against you.
I wish I had read the wikipedia article about him and some of the surrounding characters before reading the book. You'll get more out of the book and the other people will be better characters if you get the context instead of just seeing the names alone and trying to understand those people from Zhao's interactions.
The only thing I didn't like is that the 2nd half of the book talks about the economic transition that happened before 1989. This would be easier to read if you can read the background before the first half of the book.
It was really eye-opening how scummy some of the CCP folk are. It seems like an organization that self-selects for sociopaths and political people. Any honest person would stay far away because people could conspire against you.
I wish I had read the wikipedia article about him and some of the surrounding characters before reading the book. You'll get more out of the book and the other people will be better characters if you get the context instead of just seeing the names alone and trying to understand those people from Zhao's interactions.
The only thing I didn't like is that the 2nd half of the book talks about the economic transition that happened before 1989. This would be easier to read if you can read the background before the first half of the book.
September 8, 2013
China is a complicated place. Truth is as malleable as play dough. Whether this work is an accurate depiction of historical events or a place setter in a contrived image, might be the subject of debate. It does give a glimpse into a part of what the political culture might be. The writing is excellent and the story compelling. If nothing else it stimulates our imagination about what our present and future rival is all about.
February 28, 2010
Brutally, criminally dull. Poor guy gets put under house arrest for having an unpopular opinion, then spends 16 years writing letters to The Powers That Be who assiduously ignore them, and him, until he dies of old age and boredom. No one, but no one, does bureaucracy like the ChiComs.
dropped
June 22, 2024dropped bc my dad was being annoying about it
January 8, 2020
I'd never heard of Zhao Zhiyang and didn't know much about the events that led to the Tiananmen Square incident before I read this book. It's fascinating on a number of levels as it lays bare the inner workings of the CPC and how power is really held and distributed within the party. It was also interesting to read that the CPC even then was not a monolithic body and wasn't always able to drive down plans from the top without getting buy in at junior levels. It was also interesting to see how pragmatic they were in their experimentations around opening up the economy.
March 9, 2010
My only, rather big, problem with this book is that it is dreary and dull in writing with an official and documentary tone.
I didn't care for the first half of the book where Zhao gives an account of history of Tianamen incidents and the treatment he was dealt by the party politics and Deng Xiaopeng.
The second half that is an account of China implementing open door policies and the party politics related to that where more interesting.
I didn't care for the first half of the book where Zhao gives an account of history of Tianamen incidents and the treatment he was dealt by the party politics and Deng Xiaopeng.
The second half that is an account of China implementing open door policies and the party politics related to that where more interesting.
July 22, 2016
If it's not Zhang zi yang, this book will be so dry. I read this together with Louisa Lim's people republic of amnesia to gain the perspective of a leader. Whilst The book certainly does not lack insider's info, it is dully written. It is undoubtedly a compilation of recordings from the late zi yang, but many points were repeated again and again. How I wish that the editor could edit more carefully before publishing.
July 1, 2009
O.K., I give up. I just can't finish it!
August 30, 2021
When I started reading Zhao ZiYang’s text as a university reading I was surprised. I didn’t know that such down-to-earth, clear and rational internal account of what happened in China in 1989 existed. It is in fact difficult nowadays to understand the internal dynamics, the struggles for power and the personal thoughts of the CCP leaders, whose actions are always hidden by bureaucratic mist.
The first part is definitely the most interesting, giving a unique behind-the-scenes portrait of the Tiananmen protests: It was shocking for me to understand how China’s 1989 protests were actually very close to lead to the same progressive outcome of Eastern Europe’s 1989. And it is as shocking to see how, because of few narrow-minded and elitist bureaucrats, the progressive wave was abruptly stopped. As depicted by Zhao Ziyang, Deng XiaoPing was actually not sure on what to do, and was convinced by Li Peng’s hard-line view. At any rate, it is sad to see how the effort of thousands of young people, who were asking for freedom – something that they had never experience in their history – were wasted by the egoistic interests of few. Were these students’ life wasted? If we look at China now, I’d unfortunately say yes, as their role in history has been completely deleted, and attempts to mention the crackdown to Chinese people leads in many cases to either indifference, or identification of the protesters with “anti-party conspirators”. However, if we look at the resilience of people in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and among oversea Chinese, I have a more optimistic answer: maybe the collective memory of the heroic deeds of those students has been displaced, and can be still useful for many people who are still fighting for their freedom within and outside China.
The other most significant part is "part 6: how China must Change", as it is particularly interesting how Zhao Ziyang describes Deng Xiaoping's mentality ( " the reform he had in mind was not a modernization and democratization of politics. It was rather a kind of administrative reform ... intended to further consolidate the CCP one-party rule.") and Hu Yaobang's ideas, which was similar to Zhao's: "The democratic systems of our socialist nations are all just superfcial; they are not systems in which the people are in charge, but rather are ruled by a few or even a single person." "if a country wants to modernize, to realize a modern market economy, it must practice parliamentary democracy as its political system. Of course, it is possible that in the future a more advanced political system than parliamentary democracy will emerge. But that is a matter for the future. At present, there is no other."
I found particularly interesting and thought-provoking the idea that the Communist Party itself should promote parliamentary democracy and political competition so as to preserve its political rule on the country. "If we act with initiative, it will be benefcial to the Party, society, and
the people."
The first part is definitely the most interesting, giving a unique behind-the-scenes portrait of the Tiananmen protests: It was shocking for me to understand how China’s 1989 protests were actually very close to lead to the same progressive outcome of Eastern Europe’s 1989. And it is as shocking to see how, because of few narrow-minded and elitist bureaucrats, the progressive wave was abruptly stopped. As depicted by Zhao Ziyang, Deng XiaoPing was actually not sure on what to do, and was convinced by Li Peng’s hard-line view. At any rate, it is sad to see how the effort of thousands of young people, who were asking for freedom – something that they had never experience in their history – were wasted by the egoistic interests of few. Were these students’ life wasted? If we look at China now, I’d unfortunately say yes, as their role in history has been completely deleted, and attempts to mention the crackdown to Chinese people leads in many cases to either indifference, or identification of the protesters with “anti-party conspirators”. However, if we look at the resilience of people in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and among oversea Chinese, I have a more optimistic answer: maybe the collective memory of the heroic deeds of those students has been displaced, and can be still useful for many people who are still fighting for their freedom within and outside China.
The other most significant part is "part 6: how China must Change", as it is particularly interesting how Zhao Ziyang describes Deng Xiaoping's mentality ( " the reform he had in mind was not a modernization and democratization of politics. It was rather a kind of administrative reform ... intended to further consolidate the CCP one-party rule.") and Hu Yaobang's ideas, which was similar to Zhao's: "The democratic systems of our socialist nations are all just superfcial; they are not systems in which the people are in charge, but rather are ruled by a few or even a single person." "if a country wants to modernize, to realize a modern market economy, it must practice parliamentary democracy as its political system. Of course, it is possible that in the future a more advanced political system than parliamentary democracy will emerge. But that is a matter for the future. At present, there is no other."
I found particularly interesting and thought-provoking the idea that the Communist Party itself should promote parliamentary democracy and political competition so as to preserve its political rule on the country. "If we act with initiative, it will be benefcial to the Party, society, and
the people."
February 6, 2019
This book gives rare view into the murky doings of the single party bureaucracy and extent it holds the grip of the power in the China.
Zhao Ziyang was touted as rising star and one to succeed Deng Xiaoping. His fall from the grace is spell bounding. From being a high ranking politburo official (General Chairman of the party) to house arrest and being shunned off from public life. It is sad to read how one man's valiant effort to stand up against the party's decision to quell students demonstration against the brute force labelled him as 'liberal bourgeoisie' and 'anti-party element'. This also gives glimpse of the purges which would have happened during 'the cultural revolution' under Mao's iron fist.
This book also clarifies how difficult is to spur democracy and voice dissent in despotic China. Zhao was big economic reformer, but politically conservative. During the end part of life, he realized how political freedom is as important as the economic advances. He advocates of the change in the system. And I absolutely agree with the Zhao.
If it can happen to him it can happen to anyone. The scary part is the grip is only tightening even more in recent times.
Zhao Ziyang was touted as rising star and one to succeed Deng Xiaoping. His fall from the grace is spell bounding. From being a high ranking politburo official (General Chairman of the party) to house arrest and being shunned off from public life. It is sad to read how one man's valiant effort to stand up against the party's decision to quell students demonstration against the brute force labelled him as 'liberal bourgeoisie' and 'anti-party element'. This also gives glimpse of the purges which would have happened during 'the cultural revolution' under Mao's iron fist.
This book also clarifies how difficult is to spur democracy and voice dissent in despotic China. Zhao was big economic reformer, but politically conservative. During the end part of life, he realized how political freedom is as important as the economic advances. He advocates of the change in the system. And I absolutely agree with the Zhao.
If it can happen to him it can happen to anyone. The scary part is the grip is only tightening even more in recent times.
December 11, 2020
赵紫阳回忆录，围绕着天安门镇压前后惊心动魄的几天值得一读，也更了解“他们”自私、嗜血和冷漠的本性。
September 3, 2018
It was an interesting book. I was in the Third World over those years so I don't remember the events at all. Even the Tianamen Square massacre was a blank to me until I returned to countries with television and books.
They are a clever, subtle and devious lot in the Central Committee. Super intelligent, every one of them. That was interesting to me, from the outside it looks like a lot of them are order-following drones; serried rows all dressing the same and all with the same haircuts. Well, not so! Order-following policy wonks with responsibilities for a huge country, is a better description.
They are a clever, subtle and devious lot in the Central Committee. Super intelligent, every one of them. That was interesting to me, from the outside it looks like a lot of them are order-following drones; serried rows all dressing the same and all with the same haircuts. Well, not so! Order-following policy wonks with responsibilities for a huge country, is a better description.
June 11, 2014
This book is a diary rather than a novel and presents itself as a defense case for the late Premier Zhao Ziyang.
Zhao Ziyang was the Chinese Premier at the time of Tiananmen Square protests and the subsequent massacre. He was the only one in the then Chinese leadership who was sympathetic towards the protesting students and went at the site to urge them to call off the strike. He cried and pleaded fearing a violent and brutal backlash from the leadership but to no avail. Because of his actions, Zhao Ziyang spent his entire remaining life under house arrest. This book is based off several videotaped notes that Zhao Ziyang recorded during his house arrest. They were overlooked while cleaning his house after he died and found it's way to Hong Kong where they were summarized and published into a book.
This book gives an interesting insight into Chinese politics and the events that led to the June 3rd massacre. It also shows the intricacies of Chinese politics, how individuals long retired from politics continue to wield influence as "elders". Deng Xiaoping was the paramount leader during this period who was responsible for various reforms in Chinese economics with Zhao Ziyang enjoying his complete confidence. However, this situation changed towards the end leaving a melancholic Zhao Ziyang cut off from the world and in a state of utter sadness.
The book includes notes from the various leadership meetings held of which Zhao Ziyang was part of and the power games that were in action. It also includes letters written by late Premier Zhao to the leadership defending his actions and pleading for clemency which never came.
It's a book for anyone interested in Chinese politics academically for it makes up for a poor leisure read.
Zhao Ziyang was the Chinese Premier at the time of Tiananmen Square protests and the subsequent massacre. He was the only one in the then Chinese leadership who was sympathetic towards the protesting students and went at the site to urge them to call off the strike. He cried and pleaded fearing a violent and brutal backlash from the leadership but to no avail. Because of his actions, Zhao Ziyang spent his entire remaining life under house arrest. This book is based off several videotaped notes that Zhao Ziyang recorded during his house arrest. They were overlooked while cleaning his house after he died and found it's way to Hong Kong where they were summarized and published into a book.
This book gives an interesting insight into Chinese politics and the events that led to the June 3rd massacre. It also shows the intricacies of Chinese politics, how individuals long retired from politics continue to wield influence as "elders". Deng Xiaoping was the paramount leader during this period who was responsible for various reforms in Chinese economics with Zhao Ziyang enjoying his complete confidence. However, this situation changed towards the end leaving a melancholic Zhao Ziyang cut off from the world and in a state of utter sadness.
The book includes notes from the various leadership meetings held of which Zhao Ziyang was part of and the power games that were in action. It also includes letters written by late Premier Zhao to the leadership defending his actions and pleading for clemency which never came.
It's a book for anyone interested in Chinese politics academically for it makes up for a poor leisure read.
August 25, 2009
If the CCP knew I read this book, they'd probably revoke my visa before I got on the plane.
Or maybe not. I guess the ultimate lesson of a book like this one is that you never know what the people in power in a country like China are really thinking.
Zhao Ziyang was the Premier of China for most of the 1980s, and was the General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1987-1989. That means two things:
1) In the vague, byzantine upper echelon of the Chinese government, he was essentially the number two most powerful person in China during that decade -- or at worst he was tied in that position with a tiny handful of other men (the top man the whole time was, of course, Deng Xiaoping).
2) He was the number two most powerful person in China during the June 4th, 1989 massacre at Tiananmen Square.
On June 5th, he became the least powerful person in China, and spent the rest of his life under unofficial house arrest until his death in 2005. The reason? He directly refused Deng Xiaoping's order to send in the military to crush the demonstrators. Deng was Zhou's long-time ally, mentor, and co-crusader in favor of economic reforms, but Deng immediately forced Zhou to resign when he wouldn't bring the hammer down on the student protesters. Deng and the CCP elders never allowed Zhou his freedom again, for fear he might reveal the truth about everything that happened in 1989 and shine a bright light on an incident they all wanted to forget.
Too bad he kept a journal.
Or maybe not. I guess the ultimate lesson of a book like this one is that you never know what the people in power in a country like China are really thinking.
Zhao Ziyang was the Premier of China for most of the 1980s, and was the General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1987-1989. That means two things:
1) In the vague, byzantine upper echelon of the Chinese government, he was essentially the number two most powerful person in China during that decade -- or at worst he was tied in that position with a tiny handful of other men (the top man the whole time was, of course, Deng Xiaoping).
2) He was the number two most powerful person in China during the June 4th, 1989 massacre at Tiananmen Square.
On June 5th, he became the least powerful person in China, and spent the rest of his life under unofficial house arrest until his death in 2005. The reason? He directly refused Deng Xiaoping's order to send in the military to crush the demonstrators. Deng was Zhou's long-time ally, mentor, and co-crusader in favor of economic reforms, but Deng immediately forced Zhou to resign when he wouldn't bring the hammer down on the student protesters. Deng and the CCP elders never allowed Zhou his freedom again, for fear he might reveal the truth about everything that happened in 1989 and shine a bright light on an incident they all wanted to forget.
Too bad he kept a journal.
October 10, 2010
Assembled by family and friends of former Premier Zhao Ziyang, for me today, this book is quite valuable for its history of how the Communist Party leadership in China moved from Maoist orthodoxy to pragmatic reform, as exemplified in Zhao's life. Deng Xioaping, the man who twice survived purges, to take command of China during the 80's, turns out to have been surprisingly conservative politically. All this is strikingly relevant today. The same issue Zhao supported, that political reform should keep track with economic reform, is on the table every day for the Chinese leadership now. So far, the answer has been that there is a special "Chinese" model for economic growth. Just see the article by Evan Osnos in the October 11, 2010 New Yorker for the Chinese version of the "this time is different" argument. Zhao, who is now written out of Chinese history, may come back to haunt his oppressors one day. The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo will inspire young Chinese, like those who demonstrated in Tiananmen 21 years ago, to wonder if they can't be both prosperous and free.
February 23, 2014
How influence and authority is wielded at the top of the PRC's One Party system, consisting of active and retired members. I got to the point when Li Peng was discussed at some length, and then demoted the book into a very low priority on my "need to complete" list based on my experience with Chinese parents and sons (particularly favored and spoiled ones). FYI, Li Peng is the 1938 (at the age of 3) adopted son of Zhou Enlai; I would venture to guess that Premier Zhou did not have much quality time to spend with young Peng (as his natural father was Li Shuoxun, this is the correct use of the name).
A fascinating account on how political conflict among the more politically powerful (within the PRC One Party, but not much different than what takes place in other governing systems) can quickly devolve into tragically affecting a peaceful protest. Those participating in the protest and demonstration in Tiananmen Square can not be considered completely blameless for not recognizing the signs when Premier Zhao went to plead with them to disband before the PLA troops from other parts of China were sent to do so with deadly force.
A fascinating account on how political conflict among the more politically powerful (within the PRC One Party, but not much different than what takes place in other governing systems) can quickly devolve into tragically affecting a peaceful protest. Those participating in the protest and demonstration in Tiananmen Square can not be considered completely blameless for not recognizing the signs when Premier Zhao went to plead with them to disband before the PLA troops from other parts of China were sent to do so with deadly force.
September 12, 2011
One has to be a tad sceptical about a book published posthumously , unauthorised and supposedly translated from transcripts of audio recordings and spirited out of China by persons unknown. On top of that, the book is reputedly based on a journal of a former acting General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and a person whom I considered, and still do, to be the "Last true Chinese Communist"
So the question is: Are these the words of Zhou Ziyang? As much as I want them to be I can not bring myself to believe that they are. Notwithstanding that, they are definitely the words of someone with an intimate knowledge and understanding of both the upper echelons of the CCP and of Zhou Ziyang. If I was forced to make a guess as to who that would be I would say Bao Tong, a former secretary of Zhou, a staunch supporter and one who till suffers the same fate as Zhou, another Prisoner of the State.
I was enthralled reading this book and can highly recommend it. Each reader will have to make their own determination as to the degree of it's authenticity.
So the question is: Are these the words of Zhou Ziyang? As much as I want them to be I can not bring myself to believe that they are. Notwithstanding that, they are definitely the words of someone with an intimate knowledge and understanding of both the upper echelons of the CCP and of Zhou Ziyang. If I was forced to make a guess as to who that would be I would say Bao Tong, a former secretary of Zhou, a staunch supporter and one who till suffers the same fate as Zhou, another Prisoner of the State.
I was enthralled reading this book and can highly recommend it. Each reader will have to make their own determination as to the degree of it's authenticity.
March 5, 2012
This book was a fascinating look into the inner workings of the CCP during the 1980s, specifically during the student protests of 1989, and it is a must-read for any scholar or student of contemporary Chinese history or politics. Although I personally found it riveting, I can certainly understand how non-China Hands might be bored by large parts of it discussing the negotiations of economic policy within the upper levels of the party. The image that Zhao Ziyang's memoir reveals of rival factions jockeying for power is nearly unprecedented, and it is easy to see how easily the actions of a few individuals, and thus the contemporary history of one of the world's most important countries, could have changed or been affected so easily.
November 26, 2012
I followed the student uprisings and the Tiananmen square massacre and always wondered what happened to the one Chinese leader who was against the massacre. Well, this is his book. Not only does it contain his story which had to be secretly transcribed and smuggled out but it has sections by the editors that give background and context for his various chapters. I was impressed with his story and wonder if I would have shown the same courage that he did.. I really recommend that you read this
May 24, 2010
I really wanted to understand what the author was trying to tell me. I copied down the Chinese names, tried to keep their titles/responsibilities straight, and printed out their pictures (well I couldn’t find all the pictures). I thought this would help keep the story and the players in an order I could understand.
It just didn’t help enough for me to like the book
It just didn’t help enough for me to like the book
December 26, 2010
This is a fascinating book because it shows the inner operations of the high level Chinese government. What's interesting is that it's much like the high level operations of any major organization -- a lot of maneuvering among the players, idealism and backstabbing all part of the equation. A fantastic book for the historical record.
May 12, 2017
This book's first chapter brings a very unique and hard reaching perspective of an insider on the Tiananmen Massacre events. The story becomes very personal through Premier Zhao's record. However, the rest of the book feels a bit more of an excuse searching record thus it was more repetitive and difficult to read.
January 24, 2012
I got halfway through this before stopping. It's about Chinese politics, which isn't that interesting to me. It is interesting to learn about the maneuverings that go on in the leadership of the nation.
September 22, 2011
I so, so wish that this book had been more than a retelling of meeting minutes. I was prepared to love it. Instead, it has the dubious honor of being the first book since Billy Budd that I finally threw down in disgust without finishing.
January 17, 2011
blah blah blah...yes. It's that bad. Something must have been lost in the Chinese translation of the description of all the Communist Party inner workings.
May 26, 2015
For anyone interested in trying to understand Chinese politics, I would say that this book is a must read. However, the prose is dense and drawn out, just like Chinese politics.
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