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A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the 21st Century
As Vice Admiral (Retired) Dewolfe Miller "Ultimately, peer threats are what drives change and inspires clarity in the way the Navy mans, trains, and equips its forces to defend freedom and deter aggression on a global scale. "A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making" is the story of the evolution of the US Navy and its preparation for high-end warfare.
This is essential because the future of combat is to bring trusted and verifiable assets to the fight. The emphasis has been on connectivity, accelerated tactical decision making, as well as common equipment, that allows integration of systems within single services, across services and into allied services in a deliberate and disciplined manner. This publication provides a timely reminder of why the transformation of today's force is so necessary."
This is essential because the future of combat is to bring trusted and verifiable assets to the fight. The emphasis has been on connectivity, accelerated tactical decision making, as well as common equipment, that allows integration of systems within single services, across services and into allied services in a deliberate and disciplined manner. This publication provides a timely reminder of why the transformation of today's force is so necessary."
355 pages, Kindle Edition
Published May 15, 2022
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September 29, 2022
For most of human history, the 'sensor' and the 'shooter' were one and the same person. A First Nation's warrior saw a target and threw his spear, a Roman soldier defended himself with his sword, a Napoleonic officer aimed his musket and fired. This is no longer necessary.
The 'Kill Web' is a radical idea working its way through western military forces. By seperating sensors (plural) and shooters (plural), there is not only far greater capacity to make the right shot, but to be far more discriminating in which target, when targeted and how targeted in order to achieve the desired political effect. This is the broader organic system underpinning military operations now being developed, whether called a 'Kill Web' or 'Integrated' or 'Networked force' as you prefer.
To put this into a real world case, imagine a ship sailing through a contested archipelago. A long-range radar system identifies that something is on the move. Special forces on reconnaissance on an island nearby make a visual identification as the ship passes by. A drone is moved into position overhead to begin providing visual, while an F-35 over the horizon and two small infantry forces with long range missiles prepare their capabilities. The commander, in this idealised picture, has the ability to decide exactly what kind of force to apply and when against the target. After the strike, quick analysis of the site will be possible to consider what went right, what went wrong and to respond as needed.
This is, to be sure, an idealised picture, free from the usual fog and friction of war. Yet though those are eternals, the idea of a kill web, like any networked capacity, offers far more resilience and alternate options. At least some of these capabilities won't be working as intended, but instead of that meaning that the shot is missed because the sensor isn't able to fire, the new approach suggests a much greater range and discretion of military choices.
The authors get this, and one element I appreciated about this book, is that even though there is a focus and touch of enthusiasm for this new approach, there is also a deliberate air of uncertainty as well. A recognition that the challenges of this way of operating require such wholesale cultural and intellectual changes to the way military services have operated for potentially centuries.
An important insight for the wider readership is that this new capability is not being embraced simply because it can be, or because its plausibly a more efficient way to fight. It is an answer to a very real world problem: If China has a far greater quantity of military assets, how can the US and allies develop sufficient quality of assets to offset that challenge? Nor is this capability simply about the kind of future force that will be built, as so much military equipment debates focus on. As Laird and Timperlake stress, we already have 80% of the force we will have in 20 years, and if there's a need to fight tonight, the key question is not 'what can we get' but 'how do we best use what we have'.
A further significance of this capability is the contribution to responding across the spectrum in a crisis. The capacity to understand and discriminate in response is essential if we are to manage so-called 'grey-zone' threats. Laird and Timperlake rightly put as much emphasis on the competition and crisis implications from this new way of operating as they do the day 1 war fighting plans.
This book is part of a broad series on the development of US and allied forces (see my review of Laird' book on Australian defence reform) . The focus here is on the US Navy, though in a thoroughly integrated fashion, recognising that the above picture only works if the air force, army, marines and allies are all contributing to the web.
Like those other books, Laird and Timperlake take a backseat as authors, concentrating on highlighting the words and ideas of the hundreds of military personnel they interview. They discuss everything from the specifics of capability, the deployment and testing of forces in exercises through to the many organisational issues of training, logistics, coordination and the like. There seems a stronger effort in this book compared to earlier ones to weave a main authorial narrative throughout and this helps to connect and explain the various insights, especially for readers who don't reach for a Janes' almanac as light reading.
Laird and Timperlake are providing a very important public service through these books. They are providing some of the clearest and in-depth analyses of how western armed forces are operating currently available in the public domain. Through reading this, I not only learned a lot about US military thought and capabilities but came to understand some of the choices and language from my own Australian Department of Defence.
Whether the Kill Web will radically change the modern armed forces remains to be seen. The war in Ukraine certainly shows that even a modest force that understands the essential principles of the new hider-finder competition of modern warfare can be very capable.
Recommended.
The 'Kill Web' is a radical idea working its way through western military forces. By seperating sensors (plural) and shooters (plural), there is not only far greater capacity to make the right shot, but to be far more discriminating in which target, when targeted and how targeted in order to achieve the desired political effect. This is the broader organic system underpinning military operations now being developed, whether called a 'Kill Web' or 'Integrated' or 'Networked force' as you prefer.
To put this into a real world case, imagine a ship sailing through a contested archipelago. A long-range radar system identifies that something is on the move. Special forces on reconnaissance on an island nearby make a visual identification as the ship passes by. A drone is moved into position overhead to begin providing visual, while an F-35 over the horizon and two small infantry forces with long range missiles prepare their capabilities. The commander, in this idealised picture, has the ability to decide exactly what kind of force to apply and when against the target. After the strike, quick analysis of the site will be possible to consider what went right, what went wrong and to respond as needed.
This is, to be sure, an idealised picture, free from the usual fog and friction of war. Yet though those are eternals, the idea of a kill web, like any networked capacity, offers far more resilience and alternate options. At least some of these capabilities won't be working as intended, but instead of that meaning that the shot is missed because the sensor isn't able to fire, the new approach suggests a much greater range and discretion of military choices.
The authors get this, and one element I appreciated about this book, is that even though there is a focus and touch of enthusiasm for this new approach, there is also a deliberate air of uncertainty as well. A recognition that the challenges of this way of operating require such wholesale cultural and intellectual changes to the way military services have operated for potentially centuries.
An important insight for the wider readership is that this new capability is not being embraced simply because it can be, or because its plausibly a more efficient way to fight. It is an answer to a very real world problem: If China has a far greater quantity of military assets, how can the US and allies develop sufficient quality of assets to offset that challenge? Nor is this capability simply about the kind of future force that will be built, as so much military equipment debates focus on. As Laird and Timperlake stress, we already have 80% of the force we will have in 20 years, and if there's a need to fight tonight, the key question is not 'what can we get' but 'how do we best use what we have'.
A further significance of this capability is the contribution to responding across the spectrum in a crisis. The capacity to understand and discriminate in response is essential if we are to manage so-called 'grey-zone' threats. Laird and Timperlake rightly put as much emphasis on the competition and crisis implications from this new way of operating as they do the day 1 war fighting plans.
This book is part of a broad series on the development of US and allied forces (see my review of Laird' book on Australian defence reform) . The focus here is on the US Navy, though in a thoroughly integrated fashion, recognising that the above picture only works if the air force, army, marines and allies are all contributing to the web.
Like those other books, Laird and Timperlake take a backseat as authors, concentrating on highlighting the words and ideas of the hundreds of military personnel they interview. They discuss everything from the specifics of capability, the deployment and testing of forces in exercises through to the many organisational issues of training, logistics, coordination and the like. There seems a stronger effort in this book compared to earlier ones to weave a main authorial narrative throughout and this helps to connect and explain the various insights, especially for readers who don't reach for a Janes' almanac as light reading.
Laird and Timperlake are providing a very important public service through these books. They are providing some of the clearest and in-depth analyses of how western armed forces are operating currently available in the public domain. Through reading this, I not only learned a lot about US military thought and capabilities but came to understand some of the choices and language from my own Australian Department of Defence.
Whether the Kill Web will radically change the modern armed forces remains to be seen. The war in Ukraine certainly shows that even a modest force that understands the essential principles of the new hider-finder competition of modern warfare can be very capable.
Recommended.
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