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A History of Philosophy #7
A History of Philosophy 7: 18th and 19th Century German Philosophy
Copleston, an Oxford Jesuit and specialist in the history of philosophy, first created his history as an introduction for Catholic ecclesiastical seminaries. However, since its first publication (the last volume appearing in the mid-1970s) the series has become the classic account for all philosophy scholars and students. The 11-volume series gives an accessible account of each philosopher's work, but also explains their relationship to the work of other philosophers.
512 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1962
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August 11, 2021
If you’ve read some Hegel or Fichte or Schopenhauer, thought you’d understood it at the time, but later reflected and realised you really didn’t know why these famous men had created such bafflingly strange systems of thought, then this book is precisely the one for you.
Frederick Copleston’s colossal multi-part history of philosophy is nearing its close in this volume on 18th and 19th century German philosophy. In the previous volume the Jesuit priest had reached the mighty Kant. This next step in the series looks at what came after, which is dominated by the triumvirate of German idealists: Fichte, Schelling, all culminating in Hegel.
These thinkers are renowned for their difficulty. I have read many a book on the last of the three. While I think I grasped bits and pieces, I have never really felt like I knew what Hegel was truly getting at. This book changed that. Not only did it brilliantly contextualise such abstruse areas of thought as ‘absolute idealism’ it did so in a dynamic and engaging way that made the book a surprisingly enjoyable read (for a book on, as I said, hard as nails philosophy).
Right at the beginning the author paints a colourful picture of the thought of the time:
And what was this attempt to unify reality and why was it necessary? As the author makes clear throughout the introduction, surely one the of the best introductions to idealism ever written: “The critical philosophy [i.e. Kant’s project that had denied the possibility of metaphysics] had to be transformed into a consistent idealism; and this meant that things had to be regarded in their entirety as products of thought.”
In other words, philosophers of the time, having been raised in a Kantian climate of denial of access to objects as they are in themselves, were pushed to systems involving “interpreting the process of reality as a whole according to the pattern of human consciousness”.
As we later hear of Schelling: “[he] is convinced that all scientific inquiry presupposes the intelligibility of Nature. Every experiment, he insists, involves putting a question to Nature which Nature is forced to answer. And this procedure presupposes the belief that Nature conforms to the demands of reason, that it is intelligible and in this sense ideal.”
In these and many other clarifying statements, Copleston has helped me understand why idealism grew into the form it did in the 19th century. In all the systems of the period, a logical or intelligible structure of some kind is made fundamental to the universe, which then produces beings capable of thinking that very same structure. As Hegel memorably puts it: the absolute (everything that is) is “thought thinking itself”, a refrain Copleston makes regular use of as he helpfully hammers home this key message. It is all thoroughly teleological, something I had never quite appreciated till reading this book.
Another stand out feature of Copleston’s writing is how he simultaneously acknowledges the flaws in the many systems he examines while at the same time pushing the reader to see value in them. This is no mean feat: too many philosophical commentaries fall into the trap of hardly explaining what a philosopher might be thinking before diving down the rabbit hole of alternative opinions and academic controversy. In the end, the reader comes out with no clear idea what the author may have thought. Copleston manages the impressive feat of not blithely ignoring issues, while still getting across what he believes philosophers were trying to say.
There is a truly ingrained sympathy to the views on display which is to the author’s great credit. In describing Hegel’s dialectic, for instance, we hear how Hegel “sincerely believed that dialectical thought gives a deeper penetration of the nature of reality than understanding in the narrow sense … It is not we who do something to the concept, juggling about with it, as it were: it is the concept itself which loses its rigidity and breaks up before the mind’s attentive gaze.” Though elsewhere he probes these ideas critically, in this simple precis we really feel like we are close to Hegel’s point of view, surely a necessary starting point for a deeper critical engagement with his complex ideas.
This balance of trying to view a system from the philosopher’s perspective in a positive light while not ignoring its issues is epitomised by the author’s brilliantly concise summary of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. To give just one illustration of the balancing of these approaches in Copleston:
The heady heights of Hegel are reached at the mid-point of the book. What follows is a series of more disjointed chapters covering positivism, the emergence of existentialism with Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and so forth. Aside from Schopenhauer (and arguably Marx) there are no true system builders in this era.
The author’s quality is still on display; in describing Kierkegaard for instance he almost poetically remarks how a key point of issue for the Danish thinker was that “Hegel sought to capture all reality in the conceptual net of his dialectic, while existence slipped through the meshes.” Yet the second half of the book suffers from too many points of view. The opening chapters are cohesive looks at a single thinker with a clear thread of idealism running all the way to Hegel. In the second half, we get thematic chapters (The Neo-Kantians, The Revival of Metaphysics and so on) with the result that we do not really engage with any of them.
What redeemed this latter portion of the book is that the author is not oblivious to the proliferation of views and the tendency for philosophers to revert to old modes of thought (like Kant or even Locke). Indeed, in the closing pages, Copleston turns the failure of idealism and the muddle of post-idealism philosophy into a searingly honest critique of philosophy itself. As he asks:
Firstly, Copleston identifies a key purpose of philosophy as submitting “to critical examination the concealed implicit pre-suppositions of non-reflective philosophical attitudes”. In other words, without a philosophical stance, the issues with these grand systems, or the positivistic ones which replaced it, would never have been brought to light.
But Copleston’s view of philosophy is not simply regulative (to borrow a Kantian term). In fact, the book culminates in a surprisingly personal and philosophical last few pages in which the author offers up his own views of a more positive contribution philosophy can have beyond its merely critical role. To be clear, philosophy is, for Copleston, emphatically not a science; the scientific approach to metaphysics adopted by the philosophers covered in this volume was, accordingly, doomed to fail. From this conclusion, a positive view of philosophy’s value is built.
For Copleston - the priest - philosophy is about having a view on Being itself, but refreshingly there is no air of prescriptivism in all this. He is simply pointing to something that seems to be automatic for humankind: speculating on being, something Heidegger so firmly understood.
Philosophy seems, as a result, to be inevitably caught between the two ideas that dominate its history: the world and what lies beyond the world (two views on being), realised at various times as empiricism and rationalism, materialism and idealism and so on. Copleston thus articulates why philosophy can look like a doomed enterprise. However, he doesn’t close on a purely negative note.
Though he denies philosophical thought the grand scope of the master idealists covered in this volume, Copleston impressively manages to offer up a vision of philosophy that is palatable in the 21st century, while helping the reader appreciate why this peculiar yet enticingly ambitious period of thought was not so excessive as it might at first appear.
Frederick Copleston’s colossal multi-part history of philosophy is nearing its close in this volume on 18th and 19th century German philosophy. In the previous volume the Jesuit priest had reached the mighty Kant. This next step in the series looks at what came after, which is dominated by the triumvirate of German idealists: Fichte, Schelling, all culminating in Hegel.
These thinkers are renowned for their difficulty. I have read many a book on the last of the three. While I think I grasped bits and pieces, I have never really felt like I knew what Hegel was truly getting at. This book changed that. Not only did it brilliantly contextualise such abstruse areas of thought as ‘absolute idealism’ it did so in a dynamic and engaging way that made the book a surprisingly enjoyable read (for a book on, as I said, hard as nails philosophy).
Right at the beginning the author paints a colourful picture of the thought of the time:
Though German idealism sped through the sky like a rocket and after a comparatively short space of time disintegrated and fell to earth, its flight was extremely impressive. Whatever its shortcomings, it represented one of the most sustained attempts which the history of thought has known to achieve a unified conceptual mastery of reality and experience as a whole.
And what was this attempt to unify reality and why was it necessary? As the author makes clear throughout the introduction, surely one the of the best introductions to idealism ever written: “The critical philosophy [i.e. Kant’s project that had denied the possibility of metaphysics] had to be transformed into a consistent idealism; and this meant that things had to be regarded in their entirety as products of thought.”
In other words, philosophers of the time, having been raised in a Kantian climate of denial of access to objects as they are in themselves, were pushed to systems involving “interpreting the process of reality as a whole according to the pattern of human consciousness”.
As we later hear of Schelling: “[he] is convinced that all scientific inquiry presupposes the intelligibility of Nature. Every experiment, he insists, involves putting a question to Nature which Nature is forced to answer. And this procedure presupposes the belief that Nature conforms to the demands of reason, that it is intelligible and in this sense ideal.”
In these and many other clarifying statements, Copleston has helped me understand why idealism grew into the form it did in the 19th century. In all the systems of the period, a logical or intelligible structure of some kind is made fundamental to the universe, which then produces beings capable of thinking that very same structure. As Hegel memorably puts it: the absolute (everything that is) is “thought thinking itself”, a refrain Copleston makes regular use of as he helpfully hammers home this key message. It is all thoroughly teleological, something I had never quite appreciated till reading this book.
Another stand out feature of Copleston’s writing is how he simultaneously acknowledges the flaws in the many systems he examines while at the same time pushing the reader to see value in them. This is no mean feat: too many philosophical commentaries fall into the trap of hardly explaining what a philosopher might be thinking before diving down the rabbit hole of alternative opinions and academic controversy. In the end, the reader comes out with no clear idea what the author may have thought. Copleston manages the impressive feat of not blithely ignoring issues, while still getting across what he believes philosophers were trying to say.
There is a truly ingrained sympathy to the views on display which is to the author’s great credit. In describing Hegel’s dialectic, for instance, we hear how Hegel “sincerely believed that dialectical thought gives a deeper penetration of the nature of reality than understanding in the narrow sense … It is not we who do something to the concept, juggling about with it, as it were: it is the concept itself which loses its rigidity and breaks up before the mind’s attentive gaze.” Though elsewhere he probes these ideas critically, in this simple precis we really feel like we are close to Hegel’s point of view, surely a necessary starting point for a deeper critical engagement with his complex ideas.
This balance of trying to view a system from the philosopher’s perspective in a positive light while not ignoring its issues is epitomised by the author’s brilliantly concise summary of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. To give just one illustration of the balancing of these approaches in Copleston:
One may be suspicious of Hegel’s summaries and interpretations of the spirits of epochs and cultures, and his exaltation of philosophical knowledge may strike one as having a comical aspect; but in spite of all reservations and disagreements the reader who really tries to penetrate into Hegel’s thought can hardly come to any other conclusion than that The Phenomenology is one of the great works of speculative philosophy.
The heady heights of Hegel are reached at the mid-point of the book. What follows is a series of more disjointed chapters covering positivism, the emergence of existentialism with Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and so forth. Aside from Schopenhauer (and arguably Marx) there are no true system builders in this era.
The author’s quality is still on display; in describing Kierkegaard for instance he almost poetically remarks how a key point of issue for the Danish thinker was that “Hegel sought to capture all reality in the conceptual net of his dialectic, while existence slipped through the meshes.” Yet the second half of the book suffers from too many points of view. The opening chapters are cohesive looks at a single thinker with a clear thread of idealism running all the way to Hegel. In the second half, we get thematic chapters (The Neo-Kantians, The Revival of Metaphysics and so on) with the result that we do not really engage with any of them.
What redeemed this latter portion of the book is that the author is not oblivious to the proliferation of views and the tendency for philosophers to revert to old modes of thought (like Kant or even Locke). Indeed, in the closing pages, Copleston turns the failure of idealism and the muddle of post-idealism philosophy into a searingly honest critique of philosophy itself. As he asks:
Can philosophy be a science? If so, how? What sort of knowledge can we legitimately expect from it? Has philosophy been superseded by the growth and development of the particular sciences? Or has it still a field of its own? If so what is it? And what is the appropriate method for investigating this field?
Firstly, Copleston identifies a key purpose of philosophy as submitting “to critical examination the concealed implicit pre-suppositions of non-reflective philosophical attitudes”. In other words, without a philosophical stance, the issues with these grand systems, or the positivistic ones which replaced it, would never have been brought to light.
But Copleston’s view of philosophy is not simply regulative (to borrow a Kantian term). In fact, the book culminates in a surprisingly personal and philosophical last few pages in which the author offers up his own views of a more positive contribution philosophy can have beyond its merely critical role. To be clear, philosophy is, for Copleston, emphatically not a science; the scientific approach to metaphysics adopted by the philosophers covered in this volume was, accordingly, doomed to fail. From this conclusion, a positive view of philosophy’s value is built.
Being is unobjectifiable; it cannot be turned into an object of scientific investigation. The primary function of philosophy is to awaken man to an awareness of Being as transcending beings and grounding them. But as there can be no science of Being, no metaphysical system can possess universal validity. The different systems are so many personal decipherings of unobjectifiable Being. This does not mean, however, that they are valueless. For any great metaphysical system can serve to push open, as it were, the door which positivism would keep shut.
For Copleston - the priest - philosophy is about having a view on Being itself, but refreshingly there is no air of prescriptivism in all this. He is simply pointing to something that seems to be automatic for humankind: speculating on being, something Heidegger so firmly understood.
Philosophy seems, as a result, to be inevitably caught between the two ideas that dominate its history: the world and what lies beyond the world (two views on being), realised at various times as empiricism and rationalism, materialism and idealism and so on. Copleston thus articulates why philosophy can look like a doomed enterprise. However, he doesn’t close on a purely negative note.
The conclusion may appear to be pessimistic, namely that there is not very good reasons to suppose that we shall ever reach universal and lasting agreement even about the scope of philosophy. But if fundamental disagreements spring from the very nature of man himself, we can hardly expect anything else but a dialectical movement … this is what we have had hitherto, in spite of well-intentioned efforts to bring the process to a close. And it can hardly be called undue pessimism if one expects the continuation of the process in the future.
Though he denies philosophical thought the grand scope of the master idealists covered in this volume, Copleston impressively manages to offer up a vision of philosophy that is palatable in the 21st century, while helping the reader appreciate why this peculiar yet enticingly ambitious period of thought was not so excessive as it might at first appear.
June 25, 2015
ترجمه داریوش آشوری
انتشارات علمی فرهنگی
نخستین برخورد من با مجموعه ی ۹جلدی تاریخ فلسفه کاپلستون، مواجهه ای عاشقانه بود. علاقه ی من به این مجموعه حتی به طرح جلد و حروف چاپ شده ی داخل کتاب هم تسری پیدا کرده بود. من جلدهای یک، تا هفت رو بیش از ۵ بار خوندم! جلد یک، دو، چهار و هفت، از همه بهترن به نظر من. اما جلد هفت فوق العاده ست. این جلد به ایدءالیسم آلمانی اختصاص داره. اگرچه نقدهایی به روش پژوهش و ارایه ی مطالب از جانب کاپلستون وارد شده، دانشجوی فارسی زبان تازه کار و علاقه مند به این فلسفه، از مطالعه این کتاب ضرر نمی کنه.
اما نکته ی مهم اینه که باید به سرعت از این فاصله گرفت و سراغ متون اصلی رفت. دانشجو باید به خواندن متون اصلی عادت کند، وگرنه هرگز در هیچ حوزه ای به درجه تخصص نمی رسه،
انتشارات علمی فرهنگی
نخستین برخورد من با مجموعه ی ۹جلدی تاریخ فلسفه کاپلستون، مواجهه ای عاشقانه بود. علاقه ی من به این مجموعه حتی به طرح جلد و حروف چاپ شده ی داخل کتاب هم تسری پیدا کرده بود. من جلدهای یک، تا هفت رو بیش از ۵ بار خوندم! جلد یک، دو، چهار و هفت، از همه بهترن به نظر من. اما جلد هفت فوق العاده ست. این جلد به ایدءالیسم آلمانی اختصاص داره. اگرچه نقدهایی به روش پژوهش و ارایه ی مطالب از جانب کاپلستون وارد شده، دانشجوی فارسی زبان تازه کار و علاقه مند به این فلسفه، از مطالعه این کتاب ضرر نمی کنه.
اما نکته ی مهم اینه که باید به سرعت از این فاصله گرفت و سراغ متون اصلی رفت. دانشجو باید به خواندن متون اصلی عادت کند، وگرنه هرگز در هیچ حوزه ای به درجه تخصص نمی رسه،
July 20, 2011
I decided to read this seventh volume, as I had an interest in the intellectual period of German romanticism, or the "Aufkerlung." This is when Hegel played a decisive role. If you think he did not, you should know that Marx, his follower, changed both East and West in our world. And there is no denying that Marx was a Hegelian.
I was particularly fascinated by Copleston's writing. While he is obviously writing to illustrate the history of philosophy to theological students, who are largely expected to study philosophy rather diligently, he also can serve to "clear up" a great deal of information for the layman. I liked it so much, that I went out and bought the fourth, fifth, and sixth volumes, so now I can travel back to the time of Descartes, who remarked, "I think, therefore I am," and trace the growth of philosophy through Pascal, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Montesquieu, Volataire, Rousseau, Wolff, and the hard-to-read Kant.
After all this reading, I am so glad that I picked this book up. I bought it at a used bookstore. I was amazed that all seven volumes were unpurchased, but then I remembered that the demand for them in my area might be described as "minimal." I, however, was pleasantly surprised, and I recommend the book for others interested in the history of philosophy. For me, I love it and always have, from young adult days onward. Really enjoyable reading. Five stars!
I was particularly fascinated by Copleston's writing. While he is obviously writing to illustrate the history of philosophy to theological students, who are largely expected to study philosophy rather diligently, he also can serve to "clear up" a great deal of information for the layman. I liked it so much, that I went out and bought the fourth, fifth, and sixth volumes, so now I can travel back to the time of Descartes, who remarked, "I think, therefore I am," and trace the growth of philosophy through Pascal, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Montesquieu, Volataire, Rousseau, Wolff, and the hard-to-read Kant.
After all this reading, I am so glad that I picked this book up. I bought it at a used bookstore. I was amazed that all seven volumes were unpurchased, but then I remembered that the demand for them in my area might be described as "minimal." I, however, was pleasantly surprised, and I recommend the book for others interested in the history of philosophy. For me, I love it and always have, from young adult days onward. Really enjoyable reading. Five stars!
July 20, 2009
I've read the introduction to and most of the 3 chapters on Hegel in this volume.
The introduction is definitely interesting and worthwhile. He does a comparison/contrast with German Romanticism which I thought was helpful. He also gives a great discussion about how German Idealism as a whole can be seen as a result of Kant's work. These two historical narratives do a lot to make many of the common assumptions of the 3 main figures (Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel) clear and more comprehensible (particularly if you have studied Kant).
On the whole I found the material that is more specifically focused on Hegel to be useful as well. It is obviously and abridged account as it must be. It's a good next step from something like Singer's "very short introduction". Copleston raises more issues and is more interested in trying to give a philosophically defensible account of Hegel's philosophy even if it is meant for the student. He is clear though and his it is a thought provoking account. He is a sincere mind and takes the thinkers he writes about seriously. He clearly has a bit of a soft spot for Hegel but I'm not sure that's based on agreement.
On the other hand it's interesting to read this next to Marcuse. I feel both of them are sincere, serious scholars. That is I believe them to both have intellectual honesty and integrity. On the other hand they do have their respective points of view. So in Marcuse, the social is stressed. Part of the that obviously has to to with the subject of the book, but overall there is a definite "left Hegelian" Marxist emphasis. On the other hand, with Copleston, there is an emphasis on theological questions. Just as Marcuse wants you to see how radical Hegel was (as opposed to the right-Hegelian conservative approach) Copleston wants you to see how theologically minded Hegel was. Again, this isn't dishonesty at all in my opinion. It just exemplifies the way that interpretation works. The two serve as very useful counterpoints to eachother for exactly this reason. They both are attempting to interpret Hegel in a way that is fair to Hegel, but they both have differing interests and feelings about him.
The introduction is definitely interesting and worthwhile. He does a comparison/contrast with German Romanticism which I thought was helpful. He also gives a great discussion about how German Idealism as a whole can be seen as a result of Kant's work. These two historical narratives do a lot to make many of the common assumptions of the 3 main figures (Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel) clear and more comprehensible (particularly if you have studied Kant).
On the whole I found the material that is more specifically focused on Hegel to be useful as well. It is obviously and abridged account as it must be. It's a good next step from something like Singer's "very short introduction". Copleston raises more issues and is more interested in trying to give a philosophically defensible account of Hegel's philosophy even if it is meant for the student. He is clear though and his it is a thought provoking account. He is a sincere mind and takes the thinkers he writes about seriously. He clearly has a bit of a soft spot for Hegel but I'm not sure that's based on agreement.
On the other hand it's interesting to read this next to Marcuse. I feel both of them are sincere, serious scholars. That is I believe them to both have intellectual honesty and integrity. On the other hand they do have their respective points of view. So in Marcuse, the social is stressed. Part of the that obviously has to to with the subject of the book, but overall there is a definite "left Hegelian" Marxist emphasis. On the other hand, with Copleston, there is an emphasis on theological questions. Just as Marcuse wants you to see how radical Hegel was (as opposed to the right-Hegelian conservative approach) Copleston wants you to see how theologically minded Hegel was. Again, this isn't dishonesty at all in my opinion. It just exemplifies the way that interpretation works. The two serve as very useful counterpoints to eachother for exactly this reason. They both are attempting to interpret Hegel in a way that is fair to Hegel, but they both have differing interests and feelings about him.
August 19, 2016
This is the first volume of Copleston's History that I hadn't previously read when I was studying philosophy in college. The volume covers German philosophy of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. More than half the book is devoted to the three major post-Kantian Idealists, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and their more important disciples. Trying to understand Idealist philosophy for me is nearly impossible -- it makes my brain hurt, and I would gladly skip over this entire tendency if it weren't for the influence of Hegel on Marx and thereby on much of twentieth century philosophy. Copleston has the advantage over me here that to him as a Catholic philosopher the idea of Absolute Spirit means something, even if not what it does to Hegel. He explains these philosophies about as clearly as I think they could be explained.
The book then turns to the critics and opponents of Hegel. The neo-Kantians, and some thinkers who continued non-Kantian traditions, get one chapter; Schopenhauer gets two, there is one on the "Young Hegelians", and one on Marx (not surprisingly, this is the weakest chapter in the entire series so far; about all I can say is that he is as fair to Marx as a Catholic priest before the era of "Liberation theology" could be). Then he turns to the more existential tradition, with a chapter on Kierkegaard, one on "non-dialectical materialism" (also weak), and two on Nietzsche. The book ends up with a brief discussion of some twentieth century German philosophers who to some extent continued the traditions discussed in the book (the neo-Kantian Cassirer, the phenomenologists Husserl and Heidegger).
If I had reviewed this in the Image edition which broke it up into two parts, I would have given the first half a much higher rating than the second; Copleston understands the idealists better than he does the materialists, perhaps because that's where his sympathies lie. Not the best book in the series.
The book then turns to the critics and opponents of Hegel. The neo-Kantians, and some thinkers who continued non-Kantian traditions, get one chapter; Schopenhauer gets two, there is one on the "Young Hegelians", and one on Marx (not surprisingly, this is the weakest chapter in the entire series so far; about all I can say is that he is as fair to Marx as a Catholic priest before the era of "Liberation theology" could be). Then he turns to the more existential tradition, with a chapter on Kierkegaard, one on "non-dialectical materialism" (also weak), and two on Nietzsche. The book ends up with a brief discussion of some twentieth century German philosophers who to some extent continued the traditions discussed in the book (the neo-Kantian Cassirer, the phenomenologists Husserl and Heidegger).
If I had reviewed this in the Image edition which broke it up into two parts, I would have given the first half a much higher rating than the second; Copleston understands the idealists better than he does the materialists, perhaps because that's where his sympathies lie. Not the best book in the series.
March 4, 2024
Finished assigned chapters. I can’t think of a better place to go for a thorough introduction to any major philosopher than this series.
August 28, 2022
1831年黑格尔的死亡标志着一个时代的终结，继之而来的是唯心主义的衰落（至少在德国）和其他思潮的兴起。作者对黑格尔的评价很高。唯心主义哲学家们认为他们继承了康德（尽管康德明确表示形而上学不能提供任何理论知识）。对于形而上的唯心主义来说现实是无限思想或理性自我表达的历程。如何理解这一说法则有不同的诠释。康德的影响对Fichte大一些（比起后来的Schelling或黑格尔，但他们的思想都是在前人基础上循序渐进的）。从康德的批判哲学到唯心主义的转变第一步是消除thing-in-itself（自物体，康德哲学中不可知的世界本来面目）。康德把世界一分为二，一方面是遵从物理定律的现实世界，另一面是超越现实的精神（道德，上帝）世界，虽然他试图在第三本批判里用人作为两个世界的桥梁，但结果并不令后来的哲学家们满意。唯心主义认为如果现实是绝对理性体现自身的一个过程，那它就是可知的（假设人的意识可以被看作为绝对思想反省自身的载体，则现实就可被人的意识认知）。
唯心主义哲学家们都学过神学（跟康德对科学的重视不同），所以神学对他们的哲学体系有很大影响（有限和无限之间的关系）。尼采说他们是隐藏的神学家有一定道理但也不全对，因为他们虽然是有信仰的人但并不打算恢复宗教的核心地位。
唯心主义和浪漫主义的关系。后者更多的是对生活和宇宙（？）的态度，有别于系统的哲学反思。如果说启蒙运动着重于批判，分析和科学理解，浪漫主义则侧重于创造性的想象力，人的感情和直觉。浪漫主义还有一个特色是把自然看成一个美丽神秘的有机体（而不是笛卡尔眼里的机械世界），有点像浪漫主义化的斯宾诺莎。唯心主义和浪漫主义的共同点是对无限的感情。唯心主义里无限是通过有限体现出来的，是绝对真理。
黑格尔的名言“the owl of Minerva spreads her wings only with the falling of the dusk, and that when philosophy spreads her grey on grey, then has a shape of life grown cold.” 他清晰地意识到政治哲学倾向于规范化即将过去的社会（文化）政治形态。当一个社会（文化）趋于成熟（有时过度成熟）时，它会通过哲学反思自身，从而带来新的形态。他强调的是对历史的理解，而马克思更强调知性的革命功能。黑格尔往回看，而马克思往前看。
费希特（Fichte 1762-1814）有点传教士的感觉，视自己的哲学系统不仅为学术真理，且为救赎真理（如果适当应用可以促进社会变革）。（所以马克思某些方面后来受他的影响比受黑格尔影响更大）。柏林大学建校时（1810)他就任哲学院院长，后来担任校长。他认为哲学的使命就是解释经验（experience）。两种可能：一种是人可以把经验解释成创造思维的产物（intelligence-in-itself），另一种是解释成物自体（thing-in-itself).前者是唯心主义，后者是教条主义（dogmatism，长远看引向物质论和决定论）。康德试图找到这两者中间的一条路径，但对费希特来说只能二选一（他选了前者）。
费希特在讲解pure ego的概念时对学生说“Gentlemen, think the wall.” He then proceeded:”Gentlemen, think him who thought the wall.”还可以无限延伸下去。不论我们如何努力物化（objectify）自我（把自我变成意识的对象），永远会有一个超越物化的自我（自身是意识统一的条件）。费希特认为这个纯粹超越的自我就是哲学的第一原则。他在晚年著作中澄清了这里的ego不是指个体的自我，而是无限的活动（an infinite activity/one immediate spiritual Life）。
纯粹自我包括ego和non-ego，自发（而不是有意识的/故意的）地产生了时空。Non-ego（自然界）是已经存在的（低于自我的层面）。意识的形成要求想象力的产物更加具体，这就需要通过知性和判断来实现。再往上一层是自我意识（self- consciousness），需要通过理性实现。纯粹自我意识（自己的主体对于自身完全透明）永远不可能达到。
“No free being becomes conscious of itself without at the same time becoming conscious of other similar beings.” 承认自身作为社区/系统的一员要求感官世界作为先决条件，因为“我”的自由是通过与他人的互动来体现的，这就要求必须有一个感官世界，在此中不同的理性人能够表达自身。
费希特憧憬计划经济，国家社会主义。
谢林（Schelling，1775-1854）唯心主义中期代表人物，处于费希特和黑格尔之间。他的哲学没有一个完整的系统，不断演变。斯宾诺莎和莱布里兹都曾试图（绕过因果）阐述主观和客观的关系，谢林认为他们触及到了真理的一角即主客观其实是一体的。“Nature is ‘visible Spirit’ and Spirit ‘invisible Nature’”. 谢林比起费希特（侧重伦理观）更强调美学。
黑格尔（1770-1831）童年乏善可陈，最初发表的著作关于神学的，从后来的哲学体系回顾下来可以看出其思想的延续性，哲学和神学的主题都是绝对（the Absolute）（在宗教语言中，即为上帝），以及有限和无限的关系。晚年作为哲学家声名显赫。日常生活中他是个诚实的（资产阶级）大学教授，公仆的好儿子。
黑格尔青年时喜欢希腊文化（觉得比基督教更鲜活）。他认为哲学的根本目的是克服异义和分歧。异义和分歧会以不同方式在意识中呈现出来：灵魂和肉体，主体和客体，智识和自然。谢林的绝对类似一个黑暗的深渊或者一个空白的物体，一旦到达所有的不同都会消失；而对黑格尔来说，绝对不是一个不可穿透的现实存在（呈现背后和之上），它是呈现自身（Absolute is its self-manifestation). ‘Philosophy is concerned with the true and the true is the whole.’绝对既是主体也是客体（不同于斯宾诺莎绝对仅是客体），是精神，是自我反思的过程（reality comes to know itself），是self-thinking Thought。
《现象学》分为三部分(黑格尔特别喜欢三这个数字，很多概念都分成三部分），对应于意识的三个阶段：意识（对外在物体的感官意识），自我意识[主体审视（有限的）自我，起始于欲望，辩证地进化，主人和奴隶的关系，从斯多葛式意识演变成怀疑式意识再到不幸福式意识]和理性（有限的主体上升至统一的自我意识，综合了意识和自我意识）。
社会伦理有三个时刻：家庭（代表了统一），文明社会（代表了特性）和国家（统一和特性的结合）。从辩证发展的角度来看这三个概念（而不是时间顺序）。
黑格尔认为国家之间的关系使得战争成为必需。对他来说战争使得历史前进：阻止停滞，保存国家的伦理健康。战争是一个民族的精神得以重生或者腐朽政体被扫除让位于更有活力的精神体现的主要途径。因而黑格尔拒绝康德的永久和平理想。
世界历史是世界精神辩证呈现的过程。每个时代由一个民族占据中心地位，会不断更替。他认为东方人不知道人是自由的（只有暴君是自由的）。希腊罗马世界自由意识出现，但那时的人只知道某些人是自由的（自由人相比奴隶）。直到德意志民族（基督教影响下）才第一次意识到人是自由的。这种精神自由的意识先是出现于宗教中，经过漫长的发展才被明确为国家基础。他强调了德意志民族的重要性。同时他也强调了历史人物（世界精神借由他们为工具）所扮演的重要角色。黑格尔的形而上观点（而不是愤世嫉俗）使他认为所有发生的历史都是公正的（因为已经发生了）。他并没有憧憬一个天下大同的世界。世界历史对他来说本质上是国家精神的辩证发展。
黑格尔哲学系统的最高境界是绝对精神（绝对发展自我认知的过程），分为三个层次：艺术，宗教和哲学。作者不认为黑格尔把自己的哲学自诩为终极哲学系统，任何哲学（家）都不可能脱离时代，所以他的哲学只能说是到他的时代为止最高的境界但不代表终极真理。
叔本华（1788-1860）看不上唯心主义哲学家们尤其是黑格尔，自视为他们的对手，也看不上德国的大学教授们，崇尚康德。1848年革命（叔本华不同情）失败后人们开始关注其哲学（强调世间的恶和虚无，提倡从尘世生活转向美学思考和禁欲），生前最后十年才获得名声。作者认为虽然他不是个招人喜欢的哲学家，但无疑才华洋溢。“The world is my idea.”可看作是对康德哲学的发展，他的世界作为意志（the world as will)的理论则是他的原创。
康德告诉我们物自体是不可知的，叔本华说物自体就是意志（will）。这个意志是单一的，因为复数只存在于时空中（现象世界）。世界的内在只能是一个现实，而外在世界（现实的表象）则是由有限事物组成的经验世界。意志被描述为盲目的冲动，永无止境的追求，永恒的向往等等，形而上的意志则是求生的意志。他也承认形而上的意志不可知。
叔本华眼里的世界是充满了罪恶的，这与黑格尔关注理性在历史中的闪耀光辉而忽略罪恶的一面形成对比。所有罪恶的根源是意志的奴役。叔本华描述了两种逃脱方式：一种是暂时的，美学沉思，通过艺术逃离；另一种更持久一些，通过禁欲来达到救赎。艺术方面，叔本华觉得最高的是音乐（高于诗歌里的悲剧，绘画，雕塑，园艺，建筑）。他对歌剧作家瓦格纳和小说家托马斯曼都有影响。
费尔巴哈（1804-72）继黑格尔之后左派阵营的代表人物，也被称为反黑格尔派（由于发展了辩证唯物主义，而黑格尔是唯心主义）。他的哲学成就不高，但从哲学史的角度来说非常重要，起到了承前启后的作用。虽然马克思对他严厉批判，但却也深受其影响。
马克思和恩格斯继承了黑格尔的辩证法，但摒弃了唯心主义，取而代之唯物主义。马克思认为人的本质是社会中的生产者。生产力和社会关系的相互作用构成了人类历史。他的历史理论是唯物的因为对他而言历史的基本要素是人的经济活动（为满足自身物理需求的生产活动）。
尼采（1844-1900）五岁时父亲去世，在母亲，祖母，阿姨，妹妹陪伴下长大。年轻时跟瓦格纳成为好友，但后来分道扬镳。他的哲学没有斯宾诺莎或者黑格尔他们那么系统，但非常有特色/深度。他的价值判断充满了激情，也是他对后世影响巨大的来源。
他深受叔本华的影响，但却与叔本华的悲观主义相反，对生命充满了乐观。早期著作《悲剧的诞生》中有所体现。他认为希腊人明知生命是痛苦和危险的，却通过艺术来拥抱生命。日神采用美和形式来给生命蒙上一层面纱，反映在奥林匹克神话故事，史诗和雕塑艺术中；酒神直面丑陋和黑暗，体现在悲剧和音乐中。他的这种对古典文学的诠释当时遭到了主流学者的反对。
尼采的权力（强权）意志（will to power)是其哲学的核心。他并不认为世界是幻觉，他的权力意志也并非存在于超越界。他认为权力意志��此世无所不在，处处都能看到它的身影。生命本身就是权力意志：自我保存仅仅是其间接和最普遍的结果而已。
是生命高于知识还是知识高于生命？尼采认为当然是生命更高，所以19世纪以知识和科学为主导的文化将面临巨大的冲击（野蛮生命力的复仇）。在《Beyond Good and Evil》书中，尼采提到两种道德：主人和奴隶。在高等文明中这两者混合，同一个人可能同时具备这两种道德。主人或者贵族式道德，好的是高贵的，坏的是低贱的，适用于人而不是行动。奴隶式道德，标准在于是否对充满弱者的社会有用和有益，同情心，善良，谦虚被看作美德，而强壮独立的人被视为危险分子，因而是邪恶的。所以奴隶式道德也是羊群（herd）道德。尼采认为这种统一普世的绝对道德系统应该被摈弃，因为它是怨恨的果实，代表着低贱的生命，而贵族式道德代表上升的生命。只有足够强大的人才能自己创造独特的价值，超越自我，成为超人（人类生存的更高层次）。
尼采的超人概念很模糊（他把人比作从动物到超人之间悬在深渊上的一根绳子）Nietzsche alludes in one place to 'the Roman Caesar with Christ's soul'.Superman would be Goethe and Napoleon in one, Nietzsche hints, or the Epicurean god appearing on earth.
Zarathustra书中的一大主题是永恒的轮回（eternal recurrence），生命能达到的最高境界。尼采觉得这一理论既压抑又让人感到解脱。尼采之所以在其他著作中也强调这一理论是为了填补他的哲学中的空白：因为他的哲学中没有超越的上帝也没有泛神，通过永恒的轮回，才能体现真正强大的人坚韧不拔地/勇敢的/欢欣鼓舞的追求此生此世，而不是懦弱地逃避现世。
尼采对后世的影响广泛，不同的人对他的解读也不同。这与他的写作方式有很大关系。他的著作常常是散步时的灵感以格言警句的形式随时记录下来，有时难免前后矛盾。结合他的个人经历（后来疯了）使得解读更加困难。比起同时代那些认为进步是必然趋势的沾沾自喜的人们，尼采更能洞见本质，更具有前瞻性（预测了世界战争）。
从康德开始的德国哲学家们像一座座山峰贯穿整个19世纪。每个哲学家从不同的角度来看待世界，或者说强调不同的部分。
唯心主义哲学家们都学过神学（跟康德对科学的重视不同），所以神学对他们的哲学体系有很大影响（有限和无限之间的关系）。尼采说他们是隐藏的神学家有一定道理但也不全对，因为他们虽然是有信仰的人但并不打算恢复宗教的核心地位。
唯心主义和浪漫主义的关系。后者更多的是对生活和宇宙（？）的态度，有别于系统的哲学反思。如果说启蒙运动着重于批判，分析和科学理解，浪漫主义则侧重于创造性的想象力，人的感情和直觉。浪漫主义还有一个特色是把自然看成一个美丽神秘的有机体（而不是笛卡尔眼里的机械世界），有点像浪漫主义化的斯宾诺莎。唯心主义和浪漫主义的共同点是对无限的感情。唯心主义里无限是通过有限体现出来的，是绝对真理。
黑格尔的名言“the owl of Minerva spreads her wings only with the falling of the dusk, and that when philosophy spreads her grey on grey, then has a shape of life grown cold.” 他清晰地意识到政治哲学倾向于规范化即将过去的社会（文化）政治形态。当一个社会（文化）趋于成熟（有时过度成熟）时，它会通过哲学反思自身，从而带来新的形态。他强调的是对历史的理解，而马克思更强调知性的革命功能。黑格尔往回看，而马克思往前看。
费希特（Fichte 1762-1814）有点传教士的感觉，视自己的哲学系统不仅为学术真理，且为救赎真理（如果适当应用可以促进社会变革）。（所以马克思某些方面后来受他的影响比受黑格尔影响更大）。柏林大学建校时（1810)他就任哲学院院长，后来担任校长。他认为哲学的使命就是解释经验（experience）。两种可能：一种是人可以把经验解释成创造思维的产物（intelligence-in-itself），另一种是解释成物自体（thing-in-itself).前者是唯心主义，后者是教条主义（dogmatism，长远看引向物质论和决定论）。康德试图找到这两者中间的一条路径，但对费希特来说只能二选一（他选了前者）。
费希特在讲解pure ego的概念时对学生说“Gentlemen, think the wall.” He then proceeded:”Gentlemen, think him who thought the wall.”还可以无限延伸下去。不论我们如何努力物化（objectify）自我（把自我变成意识的对象），永远会有一个超越物化的自我（自身是意识统一的条件）。费希特认为这个纯粹超越的自我就是哲学的第一原则。他在晚年著作中澄清了这里的ego不是指个体的自我，而是无限的活动（an infinite activity/one immediate spiritual Life）。
纯粹自我包括ego和non-ego，自发（而不是有意识的/故意的）地产生了时空。Non-ego（自然界）是已经存在的（低于自我的层面）。意识的形成要求想象力的产物更加具体，这就需要通过知性和判断来实现。再往上一层是自我意识（self- consciousness），需要通过理性实现。纯粹自我意识（自己的主体对于自身完全透明）永远不可能达到。
“No free being becomes conscious of itself without at the same time becoming conscious of other similar beings.” 承认自身作为社区/系统的一员要求感官世界作为先决条件，因为“我”的自由是通过与他人的互动来体现的，这就要求必须有一个感官世界，在此中不同的理性人能够表达自身。
费希特憧憬计划经济，国家社会主义。
谢林（Schelling，1775-1854）唯心主义中期代表人物，处于费希特和黑格尔之间。他的哲学没有一个完整的系统，不断演变。斯宾诺莎和莱布里兹都曾试图（绕过因果）阐述主观和客观的关系，谢林认为他们触及到了真理的一角即主客观其实是一体的。“Nature is ‘visible Spirit’ and Spirit ‘invisible Nature’”. 谢林比起费希特（侧重伦理观）更强调美学。
黑格尔（1770-1831）童年乏善可陈，最初发表的著作关于神学的，从后来的哲学体系回顾下来可以看出其思想的延续性，哲学和神学的主题都是绝对（the Absolute）（在宗教语言中，即为上帝），以及有限和无限的关系。晚年作为哲学家声名显赫。日常生活中他是个诚实的（资产阶级）大学教授，公仆的好儿子。
黑格尔青年时喜欢希腊文化（觉得比基督教更鲜活）。他认为哲学的根本目的是克服异义和分歧。异义和分歧会以不同方式在意识中呈现出来：灵魂和肉体，主体和客体，智识和自然。谢林的绝对类似一个黑暗的深渊或者一个空白的物体，一旦到达所有的不同都会消失；而对黑格尔来说，绝对不是一个不可穿透的现实存在（呈现背后和之上），它是呈现自身（Absolute is its self-manifestation). ‘Philosophy is concerned with the true and the true is the whole.’绝对既是主体也是客体（不同于斯宾诺莎绝对仅是客体），是精神，是自我反思的过程（reality comes to know itself），是self-thinking Thought。
《现象学》分为三部分(黑格尔特别喜欢三这个数字，很多概念都分成三部分），对应于意识的三个阶段：意识（对外在物体的感官意识），自我意识[主体审视（有限的）自我，起始于欲望，辩证地进化，主人和奴隶的关系，从斯多葛式意识演变成怀疑式意识再到不幸福式意识]和理性（有限的主体上升至统一的自我意识，综合了意识和自我意识）。
社会伦理有三个时刻：家庭（代表了统一），文明社会（代表了特性）和国家（统一和特性的结合）。从辩证发展的角度来看这三个概念（而不是时间顺序）。
黑格尔认为国家之间的关系使得战争成为必需。对他来说战争使得历史前进：阻止停滞，保存国家的伦理健康。战争是一个民族的精神得以重生或者腐朽政体被扫除让位于更有活力的精神体现的主要途径。因而黑格尔拒绝康德的永久和平理想。
世界历史是世界精神辩证呈现的过程。每个时代由一个民族占据中心地位，会不断更替。他认为东方人不知道人是自由的（只有暴君是自由的）。希腊罗马世界自由意识出现，但那时的人只知道某些人是自由的（自由人相比奴隶）。直到德意志民族（基督教影响下）才第一次意识到人是自由的。这种精神自由的意识先是出现于宗教中，经过漫长的发展才被明确为国家基础。他强调了德意志民族的重要性。同时他也强调了历史人物（世界精神借由他们为工具）所扮演的重要角色。黑格尔的形而上观点（而不是愤世嫉俗）使他认为所有发生的历史都是公正的（因为已经发生了）。他并没有憧憬一个天下大同的世界。世界历史对他来说本质上是国家精神的辩证发展。
黑格尔哲学系统的最高境界是绝对精神（绝对发展自我认知的过程），分为三个层次：艺术，宗教和哲学。作者不认为黑格尔把自己的哲学自诩为终极哲学系统，任何哲学（家）都不可能脱离时代，所以他的哲学只能说是到他的时代为止最高的境界但不代表终极真理。
叔本华（1788-1860）看不上唯心主义哲学家们尤其是黑格尔，自视为他们的对手，也看不上德国的大学教授们，崇尚康德。1848年革命（叔本华不同情）失败后人们开始关注其哲学（强调世间的恶和虚无，提倡从尘世生活转向美学思考和禁欲），生前最后十年才获得名声。作者认为虽然他不是个招人喜欢的哲学家，但无疑才华洋溢。“The world is my idea.”可看作是对康德哲学的发展，他的世界作为意志（the world as will)的理论则是他的原创。
康德告诉我们物自体是不可知的，叔本华说物自体就是意志（will）。这个意志是单一的，因为复数只存在于时空中（现象世界）。世界的内在只能是一个现实，而外在世界（现实的表象）则是由有限事物组成的经验世界。意志被描述为盲目的冲动，永无止境的追求，永恒的向往等等，形而上的意志则是求生的意志。他也承认形而上的意志不可知。
叔本华眼里的世界是充满了罪恶的，这与黑格尔关注理性在历史中的闪耀光辉而忽略罪恶的一面形成对比。所有罪恶的根源是意志的奴役。叔本华描述了两种逃脱方式：一种是暂时的，美学沉思，通过艺术逃离；另一种更持久一些，通过禁欲来达到救赎。艺术方面，叔本华觉得最高的是音乐（高于诗歌里的悲剧，绘画，雕塑，园艺，建筑）。他对歌剧作家瓦格纳和小说家托马斯曼都有影响。
费尔巴哈（1804-72）继黑格尔之后左派阵营的代表人物，也被称为反黑格尔派（由于发展了辩证唯物主义，而黑格尔是唯心主义）。他的哲学成就不高，但从哲学史的角度来说非常重要，起到了承前启后的作用。虽然马克思对他严厉批判，但却也深受其影响。
马克思和恩格斯继承了黑格尔的辩证法，但摒弃了唯心主义，取而代之唯物主义。马克思认为人的本质是社会中的生产者。生产力和社会关系的相互作用构成了人类历史。他的历史理论是唯物的因为对他而言历史的基本要素是人的经济活动（为满足自身物理需求的生产活动）。
尼采（1844-1900）五岁时父亲去世，在母亲，祖母，阿姨，妹妹陪伴下长大。年轻时跟瓦格纳成为好友，但后来分道扬镳。他的哲学没有斯宾诺莎或者黑格尔他们那么系统，但非常有特色/深度。他的价值判断充满了激情，也是他对后世影响巨大的来源。
他深受叔本华的影响，但却与叔本华的悲观主义相反，对生命充满了乐观。早期著作《悲剧的诞生》中有所体现。他认为希腊人明知生命是痛苦和危险的，却通过艺术来拥抱生命。日神采用美和形式来给生命蒙上一层面纱，反映在奥林匹克神话故事，史诗和雕塑艺术中；酒神直面丑陋和黑暗，体现在悲剧和音乐中。他的这种对古典文学的诠释当时遭到了主流学者的反对。
尼采的权力（强权）意志（will to power)是其哲学的核心。他并不认为世界是幻觉，他的权力意志也并非存在于超越界。他认为权力意志��此世无所不在，处处都能看到它的身影。生命本身就是权力意志：自我保存仅仅是其间接和最普遍的结果而已。
是生命高于知识还是知识高于生命？尼采认为当然是生命更高，所以19世纪以知识和科学为主导的文化将面临巨大的冲击（野蛮生命力的复仇）。在《Beyond Good and Evil》书中，尼采提到两种道德：主人和奴隶。在高等文明中这两者混合，同一个人可能同时具备这两种道德。主人或者贵族式道德，好的是高贵的，坏的是低贱的，适用于人而不是行动。奴隶式道德，标准在于是否对充满弱者的社会有用和有益，同情心，善良，谦虚被看作美德，而强壮独立的人被视为危险分子，因而是邪恶的。所以奴隶式道德也是羊群（herd）道德。尼采认为这种统一普世的绝对道德系统应该被摈弃，因为它是怨恨的果实，代表着低贱的生命，而贵族式道德代表上升的生命。只有足够强大的人才能自己创造独特的价值，超越自我，成为超人（人类生存的更高层次）。
尼采的超人概念很模糊（他把人比作从动物到超人之间悬在深渊上的一根绳子）Nietzsche alludes in one place to 'the Roman Caesar with Christ's soul'.Superman would be Goethe and Napoleon in one, Nietzsche hints, or the Epicurean god appearing on earth.
Zarathustra书中的一大主题是永恒的轮回（eternal recurrence），生命能达到的最高境界。尼采觉得这一理论既压抑又让人感到解脱。尼采之所以在其他著作中也强调这一理论是为了填补他的哲学中的空白：因为他的哲学中没有超越的上帝也没有泛神，通过永恒的轮回，才能体现真正强大的人坚韧不拔地/勇敢的/欢欣鼓舞的追求此生此世，而不是懦弱地逃避现世。
尼采对后世的影响广泛，不同的人对他的解读也不同。这与他的写作方式有很大关系。他的著作常常是散步时的灵感以格言警句的形式随时记录下来，有时难免前后矛盾。结合他的个人经历（后来疯了）使得解读更加困难。比起同时代那些认为进步是必然趋势的沾沾自喜的人们，尼采更能洞见本质，更具有前瞻性（预测了世界战争）。
从康德开始的德国哲学家们像一座座山峰贯穿整个19世纪。每个哲学家从不同的角度来看待世界，或者说强调不同的部分。
February 14, 2022
This volume is focused on nineteenth-century German philosophy. He covers in some detail Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. He covers briefly lesser thinkers as well. I had not read any Fichte, Schelling or Schleiermacher in school or after. I did not appreciate how religious they were. Nor how Schelling and Schleiermacher were influenced by Spinoza.
April 16, 2025
Copleston is regarded as one of the best historians of philosophy of all time, and rightly so. This book is one of the best introductions to German Idealism on the market. This isn't to say he gets everything right, particularly in the sections on Hegel he makes a few errors, but I don't think these would hinder anyone who wishes to get deeper into Hegel, making its use as an introductory work very valuable. However, I feel the textual mistakes made are enough to warrant a lower rating. I still claim this is the best book on German Idealism as everything else in the English-speaking market is not great. Frederic Beiser, a different historian of philosophy, by his own admittion won't make a book on German Idealism after 1801 as he does not want to cover Hegel's philosophy, however this leaves out a lot of German Idealism which has happening at the same time as Hegel, most prominently Schelling who in the course of his life had a drastic change in his philosophy and influenced many other philosophers in his time. Copleston on the other hand covers all of this in great detail, which makes his work more valuable than anything else on the market right now.
Beyond German Idealism however this text does start to falter. The book is titled "from the Post-Kantean Idealists to Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche", however the discussions on Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and other schools of philosophy after German Idealism aren't great. The sections on post-idealist German philosophy are incredibly short. An example is that Schopenhauer gets 2 chapters dedicated to him, but the Neo-Kantians get only one. This isn't great, the Neo-Kantians had a profound influence on the rest of German philosophy, but also on politics as well, the fact that their treatment feels so insignificant is definitely a weak point.
Overall I recommend this text to anyone who wishes to get into German Idealism. This book can be both an endpoint and an introduction to many who wish to understand the arguments of the great German Idealists.
Beyond German Idealism however this text does start to falter. The book is titled "from the Post-Kantean Idealists to Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche", however the discussions on Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and other schools of philosophy after German Idealism aren't great. The sections on post-idealist German philosophy are incredibly short. An example is that Schopenhauer gets 2 chapters dedicated to him, but the Neo-Kantians get only one. This isn't great, the Neo-Kantians had a profound influence on the rest of German philosophy, but also on politics as well, the fact that their treatment feels so insignificant is definitely a weak point.
Overall I recommend this text to anyone who wishes to get into German Idealism. This book can be both an endpoint and an introduction to many who wish to understand the arguments of the great German Idealists.
May 28, 2018
I own this whole set and have profitably read parts of it from time to time. But since 19th c. German philosophy was an area I knew very little about, I decided to read this whole volume.
As usual, Copleston interestingly provides good and thorough overviews of different philosophers throughout. He makes incredibly intricate and difficult philosophical positions very understandable. And though this volume (like the rest in the set) is primarily historical in detail, Copleston also provides various helpful critiques and analyses throughout.
One think that I especially appreciated about this volume was the last chapter. Though German idealism has for the most part faded, and is something of an object of scorn and ridicule, Copleston makes the case in this last chapter for the ongoing value of studying such outlandish philosophical systems and (at least indirectly) encourages that such courageous moves within philosophy should still be attempted today. Though such systems have their faults, Copleston makes the convincing case that their ongoing value is how much they inspire us to think in adventurous and profitable ways.
Like the rest of the series, this volume was excellent and I recommend reading this whole of it for those who are interested in knowing the details of thinkers like Schelling, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. I highly recommend this book!
As usual, Copleston interestingly provides good and thorough overviews of different philosophers throughout. He makes incredibly intricate and difficult philosophical positions very understandable. And though this volume (like the rest in the set) is primarily historical in detail, Copleston also provides various helpful critiques and analyses throughout.
One think that I especially appreciated about this volume was the last chapter. Though German idealism has for the most part faded, and is something of an object of scorn and ridicule, Copleston makes the case in this last chapter for the ongoing value of studying such outlandish philosophical systems and (at least indirectly) encourages that such courageous moves within philosophy should still be attempted today. Though such systems have their faults, Copleston makes the convincing case that their ongoing value is how much they inspire us to think in adventurous and profitable ways.
Like the rest of the series, this volume was excellent and I recommend reading this whole of it for those who are interested in knowing the details of thinkers like Schelling, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. I highly recommend this book!
February 19, 2021
Might need to turn around and read this again since I’ve gone through it over the course of two or so years. Still want to have German Idealism repeatedly presented until I really know about it.
I wouldn’t recommend this volume if a person has no prior acquaintance with some of these philosophers, as was somewhat the case when I began. At least its presentation didn’t easily click for me. Idealism in this book seems like it’s not simply a different way of looking at things in the contemporary sense of glossing over recognizable ideas as if in a religion or philosophy 1 college course, but almost as if it’s in an almost incommunicable manner of thought and expression insofar as why it was so influential and convincing, when it just sounds like interesting language. It might require a well laid out bridge between Idealism and contemporary thinking and speech which this book doesn’t accomplish for beginners.
But I enjoyed this book and I hope at some point to read the other volumes. And if anyone is reading this, I don’t want to make it sound as if this book is a huge undertaking. I believe it’s 400+ pages, and it took me a couple of years due to long absences of not reading it.
I wouldn’t recommend this volume if a person has no prior acquaintance with some of these philosophers, as was somewhat the case when I began. At least its presentation didn’t easily click for me. Idealism in this book seems like it’s not simply a different way of looking at things in the contemporary sense of glossing over recognizable ideas as if in a religion or philosophy 1 college course, but almost as if it’s in an almost incommunicable manner of thought and expression insofar as why it was so influential and convincing, when it just sounds like interesting language. It might require a well laid out bridge between Idealism and contemporary thinking and speech which this book doesn’t accomplish for beginners.
But I enjoyed this book and I hope at some point to read the other volumes. And if anyone is reading this, I don’t want to make it sound as if this book is a huge undertaking. I believe it’s 400+ pages, and it took me a couple of years due to long absences of not reading it.
January 22, 2019
برای من یکی از بدترین جلدهای کاپلستون بود
مولف کاملا بی طرفی خودش را نسبت به تاریخ این دوره از دست میدهد به وضوح با شوپنهاور، مارکس و نیچه مشکل دارد و بخش عمده ای از توضیحاتش را به نقد آرا این فیلسوفان اختصاص داده است و به جای توضیح مفصل و دقیق به نقدهای سرسری و بی موقع رو آورده است. حتی بخش هایی که مولف با فیلسوفان آن خصومت شخصی ندارد مثل هگل و شلینگ هم کمی در همریخته و نامرتب است و خوبی از پس این دو ستون فلسفه قرن 19 بر نیامده است. با تمام این ایرادات نسخه ی انگلیسی آن قابل خواندن است اما ترجمه داریوش آشوری به غایت دردسر آفرین بود
تغییر بعضی کلمات که ترجمه ی مسلمی میان فارسی زبانان پیدا کرده در یک کتاب قابل قبول است اما داریوش آشوری گویی کلا زیر میز تاریخ ترجمه زده بود مثلا ترجمه abstract برآهنجیده، transcend: برین Complex همتافت archetype: سرنمون cynicism: دژآگاهی production: فرآورش و ...
متاسفانه مکررا با تعداد زیادی ازین دست کلمات در یک جمله مواجه می شوی و کنار هم چیدن مفاهیم برای ساختن مورد نظرمولف بسیار دشوار تر از خواندن نسخه اصلی آن می شود
مولف کاملا بی طرفی خودش را نسبت به تاریخ این دوره از دست میدهد به وضوح با شوپنهاور، مارکس و نیچه مشکل دارد و بخش عمده ای از توضیحاتش را به نقد آرا این فیلسوفان اختصاص داده است و به جای توضیح مفصل و دقیق به نقدهای سرسری و بی موقع رو آورده است. حتی بخش هایی که مولف با فیلسوفان آن خصومت شخصی ندارد مثل هگل و شلینگ هم کمی در همریخته و نامرتب است و خوبی از پس این دو ستون فلسفه قرن 19 بر نیامده است. با تمام این ایرادات نسخه ی انگلیسی آن قابل خواندن است اما ترجمه داریوش آشوری به غایت دردسر آفرین بود
تغییر بعضی کلمات که ترجمه ی مسلمی میان فارسی زبانان پیدا کرده در یک کتاب قابل قبول است اما داریوش آشوری گویی کلا زیر میز تاریخ ترجمه زده بود مثلا ترجمه abstract برآهنجیده، transcend: برین Complex همتافت archetype: سرنمون cynicism: دژآگاهی production: فرآورش و ...
متاسفانه مکررا با تعداد زیادی ازین دست کلمات در یک جمله مواجه می شوی و کنار هم چیدن مفاهیم برای ساختن مورد نظرمولف بسیار دشوار تر از خواندن نسخه اصلی آن می شود
October 13, 2021
مفصل ترین کتاب تاریخ فلسفه در زبان فارسی به احتمال زیاد تاریخ فلسفه نوشته فردریک کاپلستون است که مرجع درسی دانشجویان فلسفه، و هم مرجع تدریس بسیاری از اساتید آنها، از دوره لیسانس تا دکترا است. دوره نه جلدی تاریخ فلسفه، به قلم چارلز کاپلستون، که به همت عده ای از مترجمان زبده به فارسی ترجمه شده است. مجموعه ای در دسترس خوانندگان فارسی زبان قرار می دهد که تا حد زیادی می توانند آنان را از متن های دیگر بی نیاز سازد، زیرا هدف نگارنده این بوده است که سیر تحول فلسفه را از آغاز تا اواخر قرن بیستم با زبانی ساده و روان برای خواننده تحصیل کرده معمولی بیان کند.
July 5, 2023
در این جلد از تاریخ فلسفه کاپلستون به فلاسفه المان در قرن ۱۸ و ۱۹ پرداخته است .(البته در انتهای کتاب توضیح مختصری درباره فلاسفه قرن بیستم هم اشاراتی می کند ) فلاسفه ای همچون فیشته ، راشل ، هگل ، شوپنهاور ، نیچه که در المان از بزرگان فلسفه در زمان خود بوده اند .
July 3, 2019
اربعة اشهر كي أنهي هذا الكنز العظيم
July 31, 2021
Daddy Copleston can get it.
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July 30, 2011Follows up on previous assertions that Kant is the main influence in German Idealism, and how it leads to Hegel, then breaks away from German Idealism. One of the main divergence points for the array of Philosophers covered is just how much they are convinced the human mind can or cannot grasp beyond the infinite, is the finite indicative of the infinite and reconciling Metaphysics with the emerging enlightenment or keeping it separate. The Author is not expecting the reader to know more than the basic terms of Philosophy, an easy overview.
September 8, 2015
Nietzsche -- Over the years, I've probably read this entire set. This time I read the sections on Nietzsche since I was also reading Beyond Good and Evil. Copleston provides an excellent overview of Nietzsche in a style that is clear and easy to read. He does an excellent job explaining the philosopher's many contradictory elements.
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September 14, 2009History of Philosophy, Volume 7 (Modern Philosophy) by Frederick Copleston (1994)
September 26, 2014
A very compendious, but very efficient historical narrative.
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