This reviewer spent nearly two years in Iraq 2003-2005, moving by helicopter and Humvee to all parts of Iraq, Fallujah, Basra, Mosul, Ramadi, Sadr City in Baghdad, and many others, with both US troops and Iraqi Security Forces, meeting with Sunnis, Shia and Kurds, US Marines and soldiers of all ranks.
So I think I can measure “Contractor Combatants,” by Carter Andress.
Andress has spent four years in Iraq, 2004-2008, taught himself Iraqi Arabic, never spent a night in the Green Zone, and has gone back many times each year to oversee his approx. 1,000 Iraqi employees (his company has employed over 10,000 Iraqis since 2004).
Why did he write this book, and why should you read it?
Andress writes:
“The books that focus on the war in Iraq were, for the most part, written by people who had come to the subject with a built-in bias and had constructed an artificial war to reflect their own ideological perceptions…they found unrelieved despair where I found an abiding sense of hope. They found nothing but hostility toward Americans where I found friendship and admiration. Our experience of working with Iraqis of all sects and ethnic groups was successful because it was grounded in trust and pride of performance.”
What is a “Contractor Combatant,” and why did the US Army and Marines, and the Iraqi Forces, need them?
In answering that question, Andress’ book gives the reader an insight into the new way of America’s war-fighting and peace-keeping capability.
In World War II, the U.S. had millions of men and women in uniform, with only a small percentage “at the tip of the spear.” The vast majority were doing logistics, transport, base and port construction from Normandy to Iwo Jima, and, as Napoleon said “an Army travels on its stomach,” feeding those millions of troops three times a day, seven days a week, from 1941-45.
Who does that today? The answer is Contractor Combatants, men and women who are daily on the front lines, feeding the Combatant Marines and soldiers, bringing them ammunition, building their camps, and executing the thousand and one things the uniformed Combatants need.
If you don’t like the notion of Contractor Combatants, either get a million more Americans to enlist as uniformed Combatants, or bring back the draft and compel that million to put on the uniform of the Marines or Army and go into combat.
Gripping as Andress’ account is of the ambushes, convoys through the “Triangle of Death,” feeding of the Iraqi Army in the 2d Battle of Fallujah (and a host of other perilous actions), that he and his Iraqi partners and colleagues experienced, the epilogue is the most valuable to readers anxious to understand both what happened, and most importantly today, at the outset of 2012 with U.S. troops withdrawn, what is likely to happen.
Andress anticipated General David Petraeus’s successful Surge strategy, writing before General Petraeus and his Corps Commander (now Army Chief of Staff) General Ray Odierno arrived in Iraq to implement the Surge:
“The insurgency in Iraq would collapse if the Sunni tribes turned against nihilistic killers of Al Qaeda and the proponents of a violent return to the minority sect’s ruling status in Iraq…The Sunnis seek to leverage that threat against the popular weight of the Shia and Kurd supermajority, which constitutes 80 percent of the Iraqi population.”
The Petraeus-Odierno Surge got the Sunnis to do just that, and Andress, from his on-the-ground work as a “Contractor Combatant” saw that this was the key.
The strength of this book is that Andress worked and lived with the full spectrum of Iraqis, in all parts of Iraq, and thus you will see what that was like, and equip yourself for what will come.