Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II

by David Faber

On September 30, 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew back to London from his meeting in Munich with German Chancellor Adolf Hitler. As he disembarked from the aircraft, he held aloft a piece of paper, which contained the promise that Britain and Germany would never go to war with one another again. He had returned bringing “Peace with honour—Peace for our time.”

Drawing on a wealth of archival material, acclaimed historian David Faber delivers a sweeping reassessment of the extraordinary events of 1938, tracing the key incidents leading up to the Munich Conference and its immediate aftermath: Lord Halifax’s ill-fated meeting with Hitler; Chamberlain’s secret discussions with Mussolini; and the Berlin scandal that rocked Hitler’s regime. He takes us to Vienna, to the Sudentenland, and to Prague. In Berlin, we witness Hitler inexorably preparing for war, even in the face of opposition from his own generals; in London, we watch as Chamberlain makes one supreme effort after another to appease Hitler.

Resonating with an insider’s feel for the political infighting Faber uncovers, Munich, 1938 transports us to the war rooms and bunkers, revealing the covert negotiations and scandals upon which the world’s fate would rest. It is modern history writing at its best.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Germany, World War II, European History, War, France

520 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2006

Reviews

[Michael Lewyn · Rating 4 out of 5]

For those of you unfamiliar with the story: in 1938, Hitler threatened to invade Czechoslovia, and the UK and France threatened that if Hitler invaded there would be war. The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, tried to defuse the crisis by letting Germany have the majority-German part of the country, and hoping that Hitler would leave the rest of the country alone. Since Hitler took over all of Czechoslovokia just a few months later, the conventional wisdom is that Chamberlain's strategy of appeasement was naive, and that the UK should have gone to war in 1938 (a year earlier than it actually did).

Faber's book is a blow-by-blow account of this crisis; it feels very journalistic, in that Faber describes what British and German policymakers said, but does not try to analyze the policy issues on his own. However, he seems to dislike Chamberlain and share the conventional wisdom. But there is some ammunition in this book for revisionists. Faber quotes one British official's view that "it was difficult to see how we could effectively exercise any military pressure against Germany in time to save Czechoslovakia." (p. 159). Another official stated "No Government could possibly risk a war when our anti-aircraft defenses are in so farcical a condition." (p. 160). The French foreign minister apparently believed that "neither France nor Great Britian were ready for war...[if war came in 1938] French and British towns would be wiped out and little or no retaliation would be possible." (p. 276).

It thus seems that appeasers thought they were in a no-win situation: if they sought to guarantee Czechoslovokia's security and the Nazis responded with war, World War II would have begun in 1938, and would have ended with the destruction of England and France. By contrast, appeasement bought England extra time to rearm. I am not sure they were wrong; one extra year of war would have meant one year of war without the assistance of the Soviet Union or the United States (since neither nation got involved in WW II until Germany invaded Russia in 1940, and Japan attacked the US in late 1941). On the other hand, a 1938 war would have meant that Germany had one less year to arm itself as well, and it is possible that if the UK had promised to go to war, Hitler would have backed down in 1938. I am not sure that the appeasers were wrong- but it does seem that reasonable people could and did disagree.

[Ben · Rating 4 out of 5]

History has judged Neville Chamberlain quite harshly. Anytime a politician wants to attack his opponent for being soft on foreign policy, he'll usually invoke the coded language of Chamberlain and "appeasement". If only Churchill and the hardliners had been in charge from the start, some say, England and the Allies could have nipped Hitler in the bud long before he became a major threat.

What this book highlights, however, is that Chamberlain and his policies were well in line with public sentiment of the day. Practically nobody wanted war (except Hitler) and most truly, if naively, believed Hitler would be satisfied if whatever latest demand was met. And what one man sees as appeasement, another may simply see as diplomacy. David Faber sets the record straight about what really happened in the years leading up to WWII, and just how Hitler and Germany played the rest of the world like a fiddle.

[Kuszma · Rating 5 out of 5]

„Még soha nem volt ennyire izgalmas a diplomáciatörténet!”
(én)

Az 1938-as müncheni konferencia az egyetemes történet egyik legnagyobb baklövése azóta, hogy Szvatopluk azt hitte a fehér lóra meg a marék földre, hogy ajándék, így nyomott áron odaadta országát pár kumiszszagú gyüttmöntnek. Chamberlain, a brit miniszterelnök méltó párja az öreg szlávnak: beáldozta Csehszlovákiát a náciknak, amivel csak annyit ért el, hogy Hitler elhitte, innentől szabad a pálya. Persze nekünk, utódoknak könnyű, mi ismerjük a további eseményeket, tudjuk, az „örök béke” helyett az apokalipszis következett, nehéz is ettől az utólagos tudástól függetleníteni magunkat. Hiszen akkor és ott talán valóban nem tűnt annyira valóságtól elrugaszkodottnak a gondolat, hogy egy háborút mindenáron el kell kerülni, és még egy ilyen elvetélt festőtanonc is megjuhászítható valahogy*. Talán Fabernek sem mindig sikerül ezt szem előtt tartani, de ettől eltekintve a könyv tökéletes: a szerző olyan diplomáciatörténeti munkát tett le az asztalra, ami úgy elképesztően részletező, hogy közben meg végig izgalmas tud maradni. Megtudjuk például, hogy az egész ügy nem pusztán arról szólt, hogy Hitler megvezette a naiv, önmagát „küldeséses” típusnak tartó Chamberlaint, hanem közben Hitler is hajmeresztő húzásokkal semlegesítette saját belső ellenzékét (ami alatt elsősorban a konzervatív katonai köröket kell érteni), és az angol vezető is alig kevésbé hányingerkeltő módon blokkolta saját (előrelátóbb) külügyminiszterét, Anthony Edent, és a brit sajtót.

Ezt a könyvet külön érdekessé teszi, hogy nagyon fontos demokráciaparadoxont vizsgál: mit kell, mit szabad megtennie egy békeszerető** demokráciának, ha egy agresszív, fenyegető diktatúrával találkozik? E kérdés mindig aktuális, és bár Fabernek nem dolga, hogy választ adjon rá – ugyanakkor monográfiája elég jól összefoglalja azokat a hibákat, amiket nem szabad elkövetni.

Először is: a britek alaposan mellényúltak azzal, hogy úgy vélték, mindenki úgy gondolkodik a háborúról, mint ők: olyan dolognak tekinti, amit mindenképpen el kell kerülni. Sajátos módon ők, a győztesek emlékeztek jobban arra, milyen borzalmas dolog is a sárdagasztás a lövészárokban, és egy komplett generáció elvesztése – a németeknek (és részben az olaszoknak) ez teljesen kiment a fejéből. Úgy tűnik, a frusztráció, a kudarcérzet erősebb, mint a tapasztalattal megtámasztott józan ész – a nácikban ezért lehetett erősebb a késztetés a meccs újrajátszására, mint a véráldozatoktól való félelem. Másodszor: Chamberlain azt sem értette meg, hogy Hitler nem olyan értelemben „birodalmi politikus”, mint porosz elődei voltak. Ő nem az adott rendszeren belül akart kedvezőbb lehetőségekhez jutni – az ilyen emberrel ugyanis lehet tárgyalni –, hanem az európai status quo-t akarta megsemmisíteni. Mindenestül. És ez egy terrorista mentalitása, mert a terroristának nem érdeke a nyugalom, ezért nem is lehet békét kötni vele. A terroristának káoszra, összeomlásra, paranoiára van szüksége.

Mindezekből következik, hogy a nyugati demokráciák nem ismerték fel Hitler igazi szándékait, olyan figurának gondolták, aki „végső soron” nem a legrosszabb opció, és ha mondjuk a bolsevikokkal vetjük össze, még a barátunk is lehet. Ebből kiindulva tulajdonképpen kezére játszották Ausztriát és Csehszlovákiát, segédkezve egy jóval potensebb Németország létrehozásában***. Persze senki sem tudja, hogy ha a britek akkor határozottabbnak mutatkoznak, változott-e volna bármi is**** – mindenesetre nem egy ordenáré szégyenfolttal vágtak volna bele a második világháborúba. Eszükbe juthatott volna, hogy túszejtőkkel nem tárgyalunk.

* Mondjuk elég lett volna elolvasniuk a Mein Kampf-ot, hogy megértsék, Hitler pont leszarja a klasszikus diplomáciát, és meg akarja zabálni az egész világot. De hát én se voltam még képes elolvasni azt a beteg szörnyszülöttet, úgyhogy én ne szóljak egy szót se.
** A „békeszerető” jelzőt e helyütt nem azért használom, hogy andalítsak vele, hanem e rendszerek egy alapvető tulajdonságára szeretnék rámutatni: hogy mivel a globális szabadpiaci viszonyokból élnek, ezért nem rentábilis számukra semmilyen világméretű konfliktus.
*** Ausztria szigorú fiskális politikája miatt jelentős költségvetési tartalékkal rendelkezett – ez nagyon jól jött a gazdasági csőd szélén tántorgó náciknak. A csehek pedig kiváló fegyvergyárakkal rendelkeztek, ami szintén elősegítette a későbbi német inváziók sikerét.
**** Azért Faber tudósít arról is, hogy a német tábornokok jelezték az angol külügynek: ha a britek keményen fellépnének Hitler ellen, akkor ők is hajlandóak (és képesek) 48 órán belül puccsal leváltani őt. De hogy ezt komolyan gondolták-e, az sajnos soha nem derülhetett ki.

[Tony · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a superb, behind-the-scenes history. Very well told. Chamberlain and Hitler are drawn in classic (read: Dickensian ) detail. Hitler's manic declarations are related with accompanied fist pounding and rhythmic heel stomping. We learn well Chamberlain's 'breathtaking conceit and naivete.' Faber has a novelist's touch. Yet, he also writes with such confidence in his research and detail that it seems he was there. I especially appreciate when he lets us know who is lying and why. Chamberlain is blistered as a result.
There is no reason that impeccable history has to be boring. Even knowing how the Munich negotiations ended, I could not put this book down for the last 80 pages. There was plenty here that, it seems, I didn't know. Highly recommended.

[R.F. Gammon · Rating 4 out of 5]

WOW. This is a masterclass of stating events without analysis, letting events speak for themselves. A real historical tragedy occurred here and we all know how it ends. But it hurts reading it, knowing what atrocities were to come next.

[Al Berry · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book that delves into the events leading up to Munich, starting with Bloomberg/Fritsch. Author meticulous researched. Popular history seems to paint Lord Halifax as just a big of an appeaser as Chamberlin this books suggests that is not the case. Lot of blame falls on Chamberlin but Daladier may be even more guilty.

[Ray · Rating 4 out of 5]

I had long felt that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was considered a weak and ineffective leader whose policy of appeasement with Adolph Hitler not only sacrificed the Czech nation to a German takeover, but also emboldened Hitler's further territorial expansions into east-central Europe. So rather than preventing an outbreak of war in Europe in 1938, the Chamberlain's appeasement policy only served to further strengthen Hitler politically and militarily. Many had expressed the belief that had Chamberlain taken a tougher stand against Hitler's desire to expand into Czechoslovakia, that World War II would have either been prevented or much more limited, saving millions of lives.

However, as is usually the case, there's often much more to the story than is generally understood. David Faber's insightful book, "Munich, 1938", filled in the blanks behind Chamberlain's much discussed "appeasement" of Hitler and his takeover of Czechoslovakia. Faber points out that Hitler's military expansion and plans to invade Czechoslovakia were already in place at the time of Chamberlain's meetings with Hitler. He also explained that the French had an existing mutual defense treaty with Czechoslovakia, and how they were equally complicient in the abandonment of the Czech nation. With German troop movement ready to move into Czechoslovakia, the acceptance of the idea of self-determination for the German speaking Czech's, the previous acceptance by the Czech government to transfer of the Sudentenland to German control, the French and British recognized that the German takeover was a fait accompli. Further, they both recognized that any threats of war had no affect on Hitler's plans, and there was no way they would be able to prevent the German takeover. So with the takeover all but complete, and with no way to prevent it, Chamberlain in consultation with the French hoped that his negotiations would placate Hitler's desire for further expansion and bring, as he said, "Peace with honor-Peace for our time." In hindsight, we clearly see the folly in this hope, but Faber provides a look at the background of the time, brings an number of interesting facts to light, and at least explains why Chamberlain held out this hope.

[Armen · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excellent history of the policy of appeasement as practiced by the British and French in the years before WWII. Faber does an excellent job of taking us through the years after WWI to set up both the rise of Hitler and the coming to power of Neville Chamberlain. He goes into greater detail as his narrative gets into 1938. Perhaps one of the best features of this book is that it makes you very interested in a subject and time period that, if you have picked up this book, you probably think you know something about. In fact, Faber's mission is to present to you - by presenting contemporary accounts of either through newspaper interviews or letters or diaries - the overwhelming popularity of appeasement at that time.

Faber is a very good writer - concise and detailed, presenting the story in an imaginative way. For example, he starts the book with Chamberlain's triumphal return to England after the Munich conference. From the outset he makes clear that appeasement was what the people wanted. Those who opposed it were in a very small club - sometimes consisting of one man - Churchill.

I highly recommend this book. It will give you a new perspective on a crucial period - a period often evoked by present day politicans to justify aggressive action or even warfare. They all say they want to avoid another Munich - I doubt that many of them really know what happened there except for the 'fact' that Hitler got what he wanted because England and France backed down. This book will tell you what happened and why.

[Alexander Velasquez · Rating 1 out of 5]

I hate this book; I’m just going to state it from the beginning. I will never write a review for a book having read only half of it—in this case 230 pages. For me, I have to read the entirety of a book to write a good and comprehensive review. But I hate this book so much that I’m willing to make an exception, and I hate it for one simple reason: The title is completely misleading.

The title is Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II. Yet, Munich 1938 gets one or two chapters at the end of the book. And I get it: Faber is writing the buildup to Munich 1938 and all the diplomacy that preceded it. But Faber starts his account from November 1937. Why on earth would anyone start at November 1937? The logical place would be to start at 1933 because that is when Hitler comes to power and assumes the chancellorship in Germany.

Also, to understand Munich 1938, one would have to understand Hitler’s foreign policy ambitions and, hence, understand what lies in the pages of Mein Kampf. Yet, Faber never mentions Hitler’s famed book or even references his ultimate foreign policy objective of fighting the Soviet Union and destroying France. And because Faber starts his account so late in 1937, it’s impossible to understand why Hitler is even invading Austria and Czechoslovakia in the first place.

What about appeasement? Appeasement is never fully explained. Faber makes it clear that Chamberlain wanted to appease Hitler but not why he wanted to appease Hitler.

What about World War II? Everything in the book happens before World War II. I have no idea why World War II is even part of the title of this book.

The real title of this book should be: A detailed diplomatic history between Britain and Germany from November 1937 to October 1938; that’s all this book is. And I’m upset because I bought this book to understand appeasement, to understand why Chamberlain trusted Hitler’s promise at Munich, and to understand those who opposed appeasement. After all, appeasement is in the title of the book. You would think things like this would be explained. But no. I got none of that.

There are also so many people in this book—too many as a matter of fact. Because Faber condenses a dramatic eleven month history of diplomacy, his account is overly detailed and has so many people involved that it is easy to forget who most of them are outside of the major players in the account such as Hitler, Chamberlain, Eden, and so on. It makes for a very frustrating read having to constantly ask the question, “Wait, who is this again?”

Just about the only positive thing I have to say about this book is that Faber does know his stuff, and he gives a very detailed account of all of the diplomacy, both secret and public, that went on in both Hitler’s and Chamberlain’s cabinet from 1937-1938. Otherwise, this book was completely useless for me.

Should You Read Munich, 1938?
Please don’t; it’s a complete waste of time. If you are looking for a book that will explain appeasement—what it was and why it became Britain’s foreign policy, the conflict between Chamberlain and Churchill, and the road to World War II, read Appeasement: Chamberlain, Hitler, Churchill, and the Road to War by Tim Bouverie (a review for this is coming soon). However, if and only if you are looking for an extremely detailed diplomatic history between Britain and Germany from November 1937 to October 1938, then this is definitely your book.

[Robert P. Hoffman · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is such a good book. First, the author has done so much research and uncovered so many documents that allow him to tell a story as to how all the participants approached this crisis.

Second, he weaves in discussions of how the people in London and Berlin and Munich reacted to the crisis, demonstrating how less than enthusiastic the people of Germany were to go to war.

Third, his account of the diplomacy is outstanding. He paints vivid pictures of all the people involved and gives excellent background (he is especially good in talking about how the fall of two top German generals prior to the crisis removed the last remaining military control influence over Hitler and removed two people who might have stood up to Hitler.

Fourth, the author tells the story without giving his perspective but in telling the story it shows how foolish and naïve and delusional Neville Chamberlain was.

Fifth, it is quite clear that the policy of appeasement was a failure but the author does an excellent job of showing the reasons why some of the leaders pursued such a policy--Britain was not prepared for war, there was great fear that the minute war broke out that London and Paris would be subject to aerial attacks, that would include poison gas, and there was a belief that going to war to prevent a majority of Germans being able to gain control over their lives in Czechoslovakia was indefensible.

Sixth, the author shows how craven leaders were, embracing Hitler, ignoring the terror he was inflicting on groups in Germany and on groups in other countries. They were able to talk themselves into the belief that he wasn't that bad. (Some of the quotes from Chamberlain are beyond belief.)

Finally, the stories that the author presents show that there were a few leaders, Eden and Churchill prominent among them, who had no illusions about Hitler and were opposed to the policies of appeasement.

All in all a great book.

[Ian Hall · Rating 4 out of 5]

Enlightening! Chamberlain is hardly depicted as anything close to a person with whom one can either empathize or even like. Though Faber does acknowledge the proximity of 'the rumblings of war' in the 30s to the Armistice of 2018 and so can not be accused of ignoring that fact, he nevertheless (from my personal vantage point) fails to capture the horror that lingered and continued to possess (yes, 'possess') many the UK (and soon to be Allied countries). The 'remains' of "the War to end all wars" was still very much with them, up to and beyond 1938. As if the death of sons, fathers, uncles, fiancee, friends, family, villages was bad enough, but there was the visible and invisible ubiquity of the 'survivors': amputated limbs, dis-figured faces and bodies, 'gassed' lungs, tormenting 'ghosts' and memories barred from 'public exposure' (due to the heartless / unmerciful label of being one who 'Lacked Moral Fibre' [LMF]. Not to say that this posits justification for Chamberlain's (seemingly) cowardly appeasement policy, but it, most certainly, offers the grace of understanding (while nevertheless in principled defiance and muscular disagreement)

[William Sariego · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting book though not without flaws. It is far more a study of Chamberlain and his mindset rather than Hitler and his expansionism. That is fine, Adolf has more than a few books written about him, Old Neville deserves some love in this regard. The Devil is in the details, however. At times Faber is lost in minutia. At other times he is vague in a way that resembles more a high school term paper than a serious historical work. Phrases like; "A leading historian said....." or "According to Hitler's biographer...." are left open ended. Occasionally which authorities are referenced is quoted in a footnote, but not always. Sloppy writing, IMHO.

[Ronald Golden · Rating 5 out of 5]

As I read through this book the one word which kept coming to my mind was "delusional." As I read how Prime Minister Chamberlin and his fellow appeasers in the British Government continued to indulge and cow-tow to Adolf Hitler again and again I kept thinking to myself, "How can anyone be so blind to what is right in front of one's face?" Neville Chamberlin has to go down in history as one of the worst world leaders ever. He certainly led Britain through one of her most shameful episodes. I believe he is at least partially responsible for a war which did not necessary need to happen.

[Jim Bogue · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a very detailed account of the crisis and the Munich Conference. It is well sourced and there are often apposite quotes from players in the drama. The author is the grandson of the British statesman Harold MacMillan and brings in some personal information. The author firmly believes Neville
Chamberlain was in over his head, and argues the point.
What he does not do is look much at the motives and problems of other players. Too often people are brought in just to play their fitting role. The facts are there; analysis is somewhat stinted.

[James Smethurst · Rating 5 out of 5]

Diplomatic manouevres

If you want to read about the munich agreement and are interested in the diplomatic chicanery of 1938 then this is the book for you. At times you want to yell at Mr chamberlain's naivety when dealing with hitler at other times you feel ashamed at the way this country appeased such a monster. Well researched and straight to the point.

[Anna Carroll · Rating 5 out of 5]

The detail in this book show the reader exactly how dictatorships are allowed to grow and cause injury to others. This book echos Martin Luther King saying, "Most of the evil in the world is done by good people saying nothing."

[David Greenwood · Rating 2 out of 5]

As dry as the Saharan desert. Interesting insights into what was said by hitler and chamberlain in the conferences, but a complete lack of social context.

[Alan Saltman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good book . Provides a lot of insight into steps leading up to the Munich agreement

Worthwhile . I would give it 4.5 stars if I could.

[Emmanuel Gustin · Rating 5 out of 5]

The agreement of Munich in 1938 has remained in people memories as one of the most painful and disgraceful events in the troubled period before the war. Even today, its memory remains in use as a political weapon. It is the great merit of Faber's account to move us beyond the cartoonish caricatures, and try to explain the actions of the politicians in their historic context. He focuses on the enigmatic personality of Neville Chamberlain, the man who went to unprecedented lengths to avoid war with Germany in 1938 but declared it in 1939. The portrait that emerges cannot fully explain the aloof personality of one of Britain's best-known prime ministers, but it helps us greatly to understand what he did and why. And even if we do not approve, we learn enough to form a more nuanced opinion than the blanket condemnation that has so often befallen him.

If the book has a weakness, it is its exclusive focus on politics and diplomacy, and specifically on British politics and diplomacy. It describes only a narrow band in a complex event, and therefore is not a complete or a definitive account of the Munich crisis. But with that limitation, this is an excellent book.

[Bryan · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a fantastic look into the behind-the-scenes negotiations between British prime minister Neville Chamberlain and Adolph Hitler. Chamberlain's goal was to appease Hitler and prevent another European war. Hitler's of course, was to dominate Europe. I found myself frustrated especially by Britain's and France's policy of appeasement. Couldn't they see that every inch they gave Hitler, he consistently took a mile? Unbelievable.

GREAT historical account for anyone interested in this period in history.

[Maryellen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very well written book about a painful episode in British diplomacy. It was difficult reading about the pig-headedness of Chamberlain and the browbeating that Benes was forced to endure from Chamberlain, France and Hitler. A complicated and difficult situation that Faber does a good job of keeping straight. It left you wondering what would have happened if Chamberlain had stood up to Hitler and called his bluff. Probably really wouldn't have made any difference.

[B Kevin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Of course, we have all heard of Nevil Chamberlain and his piece of paper granting 'Peace in our time' but about the background leading up to that, the personalities involved and the issues? Well researched and detailed, this book takes you back to that time, giving you a feel for the hopes and fears of those involved. Fascinating hearing contemporary accounts of Munich, in hindsight of what was to happen.

[Jim · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an extremely thorough book; the author tells a painstakingly detailed story of the events in Germany and to a lesser extent, England and France, leading up to the Munich Conference in September, 1938. Perhaps, though, this book had the wrong title--it should have been titled Hitler and the German Army, 1937-38.

[Stephen Dearden · Rating 4 out of 5]

I think this book is great if you want to know about appeasement and how both sides felt about it. I was very impressed how Faber gave both Britain and Germany's perspectives on the negotiations. You have to be careful though because some of the quotes the author uses are very explicit. That's why this book didn't get five stars.

[Doug · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well told story, focusing on diplomacy and bureaucratic politics.

[Amy Khoudari · Rating 4 out of 5]

Offers great insights into Chamberlin and the motivations behind the Munich appeasement.

[Josh McAdams · Rating 3 out of 5]

Reveals the level of self-delusion that swept over Britian in the face of Hilter's aggression. There is probably some lesson here. Became repetitive in later chapters.